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*Theatrica* and Political Action in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*

Raphaëla Dubreuil



**The University of Edinburgh**

**PhD in Classics**

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Signed:

Raphaëla Dubreuil

## Abstract

This thesis explores Plutarch's use of metaphors and similes of the theatre in order to represent, explore and criticise political action in his *Parallel Lives*. Most of the studies available on Plutarch's use of the theatre have tended to address his understanding and employment of the tragic, that is what is defined as tragedy as a genre from the conventions of language, plot and characterisation. This approach belongs to the textual, literary aspect of theatrical production, the word of the writer, and the interpretation of the reader. Although interlinked with my study, this is not what my thesis examines. I am concerned with the performative aspect of the theatre. This envelops all the components which define the activity of the theatrical spectacle: the professionals involved in the production, from the sponsors, to the musicians and dancers, the actors and their performance, from its preparation to its presentation, the costumes, the props and the sets, the intention of the performance, the impact on and the reaction of the audience. Plutarch has two means of approaching the theatrical world. He draws on the reality of theatrical productions, showing an awareness of the technical demands involved in the creation of spectacle and drama. He also draws upon the tradition of theory and definitions of the theatre which had been laid down by philosophers and playwrights. But whether his understanding stems from a familiarity with theatrical productions or a reading of theoretical discourse, Plutarch's deployments are consistent: they become a tool to assess morally the statesman or political body he is observing. While Plutarch's judgement tends to be severe, he recognises the impact and effectiveness of histrionic politics.

This thesis concentrates on three political structures: kingship, oratory and the relationship between statesman and assembly. Plutarch's moral assessment is consistent, and yet he draws on different aspects and different theories to represent not only these different structures but also individual approaches to the office of statesman. While absolute monarchs tend to resort to staging, some put the emphasis on spectacle and the experience of the observer and others concentrate on their own person by styling themselves as actors. If some orators draw on techniques used by actors, they do not equally resort to the same methods but according to their character and origin, choose different aspects of the acting profession. Although several assemblies take place in the theatre, their histrionic behaviour depends on the statesman who influences them. While other studies have noted the theatrical quality of Plutarch's *Lives*, this thesis offers the first in-depth analysis of the intricacy and richness of Plutarch's understanding of theatre as a political tool. Other works have tended to put characterisation at the centre of Plutarch's use of theatre. I propose, however, to focus on political action, revealing Plutarch's attitude not only towards the spectacular, but also, and crucially, towards some of the most important political structures of antiquity.

## Lay Summary

Plutarch, an ancient Greek biographer of the Roman Empire, wrote a series of biographies, known as the *Parallel Lives*, in which he compared the life of a famous Greek political figure with a Roman one. My thesis explores the way in which Plutarch used metaphors and similes of the theatre in order to describe and evaluate the political action of these famous men. By theatre, I mean everything that encompasses the creation of a theatrical performance minus the text: from the producer who oversees and funds the production, the musicians and dancers, the actor and his acting techniques, which includes the modulation of his voice and the use of gestures and body-language to enhance his performance, the costumes and the props, the emotions which the production is trying to elicit in the audience and the reaction of the spectators. Plutarch approaches this theatrical world through two mediums. He uses the reality of theatrical productions, drawing in the mechanisms and techniques involved in the creation of a performance. For instance, he depicts certain politicians utilising acting techniques to enhance their public performances. He also employs a tradition of theories set up by philosophers and playwrights who sought to define the theatre in a theoretical framework. For example, Plutarch explains through a number of theories the different psychological effects that a performance can have on both the actor and the audience.

Plutarch's goal in writing the *Parallel Lives* is moral. He wishes to explore the virtues and vices of these great men. It is to this end that Plutarch uses metaphors and similes of the theatrical stage both to describe and to assess morally these statesmen. This thesis explores three political structures: the king, the orator and the relationship between politician and assembly. While Plutarch's moral judgement remains consistent, he draws on different aspects and different theories to represent these different structures and the individual approach which each politician has to his or her office. King and Queen tend to resort to staging public appearances, but while some concentrate on the experience of the observer, others emphasise their own person, transforming themselves into actors. Orators who are depicted as theatrical all draw on acting techniques to enhance their performance, but the methods that they resort to depend on their character and their origins. Although several assemblies take place in the theatre, their histrionic behaviour depends on the statesman who influences them.

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## Abbreviations

### Reference Works, Corpora and note on Translation

For abbreviations of ancient texts I have used the indices of *Oxford Classical Dictionary* system, though I have not followed it to the letter. All ancient texts used are those of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* and the *Brepols Latin database online* unless stated otherwise. All translations of Plutarch are my own.

IG	Roehl et al. (1882-), eds, <i>Inscriptiones Graecae Antiquissimae Praeter Atticas in Attica Repertas</i> , Berlin.
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., Jones, H.S. and McKenzie, R. (1968), eds, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , Oxford.
Syll.	Dittenberger, W. (1883), ed., <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum. Third Edition. Vol. 1 and 2</i> , Leipzig.
TrGF	Kannicht, R. (2004), ed., <i>Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta. Vol. 5, Euripides</i> , Göttingen.

*Frontispiece*: Gold myrtle 'Meda' wreath, ca. 310 B.C., Vergina. Photograph by the Ashmolean Museum (Oxford).

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## Introduction

*Doubtless some ancient Greek has observed that behind the big mask and the speaking-trumpet, there must always be our poor little eyes peeping as usual and our timorous lips more or less under anxious control.*

George Eliot, *Middlemarch*, Chapter 29

Plutarch of Chaeronea, a Greek intellectual writing during the height of the Roman Empire at the turn of the second century A.D., is known for his moral essays and his *Parallel Lives*, a series of biographies in which he compared a famous Greek statesman with a Roman equivalent.<sup>1</sup> Plutarch sought to draw comparisons and contrasts between the character and career of his pairs with the aim of giving his reader a moral education.<sup>2</sup> The intellectual fate of Plutarch's works has been exceedingly kind. Amongst the wealth of materials, ideas and images which have directly influenced western culture stands theatrical imagery as used to describe and examine political action. From the leviathan of dramatic writing, Shakespeare, to one of Greece's most revered modern poets, Cavafy, Plutarch's histrionic politicians and narratives have shaped, influenced and even offered the possibility of contradiction to the very best. By arguing that metaphors and similes of the theatre are employed to depict and examine political action in the *Parallel Lives*, I stand in good company. This thesis, however, seeks to go beyond the mere identification of such imagery and aims to extrapolate how and why Plutarch employed it.

My title "*Theatrica* and Political Action in Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*" groups together the two central notions of my thesis. At the heart of this work is Plutarch's depiction of political action: the conduct of public figures and assemblies of different political structures, from monarchies, oligarchies and democracies. I have

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<sup>1</sup> For general studies of Plutarch, see Ziegler (1949), Russell (1973), Wardman (1974), Sirinelli (2000), Lamberton (2001) for broad treatments of Plutarch's life and works. Scardigli's (1995) edited volume explores the general themes of Plutarch's *Lives* (from biographical techniques to reader and historical context). See Barrow (1967), Boulogne (1994) and the collection of essays in Stadter and van der Stockt (2002) for scholarly works on Plutarch in his historical and intellectual contexts. See Whitmarsh (2005), with numerous references to Plutarch, for a study of the Second Sophistic, a cultural period to which Plutarch as a Greek intellectual of the Roman Empire belongs. Recently Beck (2014a)'s *Companion to Plutarch* offers an extensive number of essays on a wide range of topics.

<sup>2</sup> Duff (1999)'s excellent research remains the most comprehensive analysis of Plutarch's programme in writing the *Parallel Lives* as well as of his understanding of character and of the philosophical influences which shaped his narratives.

chosen to focus solely on the behaviour of those men and women whom Plutarch equates with the theatrical world. The term “*theatrica*”, which I have taken the liberty to adapt from the Greek *θεατρικός*, neatly envelops my understanding of the theatrical: that which pertains to the performance of a spectacle, from its preparation and its intention to its reception. In Plutarchan studies, theatrical imagery has been referred to through the term of “theatricality”. This term is not precise but covers a wider range of peoples, behaviours and concepts. Roland Barthes defined “la théâtralité” thus: “c’est le théâtre moins le texte, c’est une épaisseur de signes et de sensations qui s’édifie sur la scène à partir de l’argument écrit, c’est cette sorte de perception œcuménique des artifices sensuels, gestes, tons, distances, substances, lumières, qui submerge le texte sous la plénitude de son langage extérieur”.<sup>3</sup> Although Barthes is here creating a distinction between Baudelaire’s drama which is written purely as narrative and other great dramatists who wrote their plays with the view of having them acted out on the stage, this distinction between drama to be read and drama to be performed lies at the heart of my thesis.

I do not confine “la théâtralité” to the action on stage but I keep Barthes’ distinction between the performative aspect of the theatre, rather than its textual aspect, and expand it to any aspect of a theatrical production which aims at the creation of spectacle. These can be divided into three categories. It refers to those who influence and help create a spectacle without performing it, that is the sponsors and the stage-directors. It also encompasses a number of professionals, from the musicians, the choruses, the actors, the mimes, the jesters as well as the techniques which they use to perform, from preparation to presentation (costumes, props, sets, body-language). Finally, and integral to theatre, it includes the audience(s) who witness(es) the spectacle. Overarching these three groups are the dynamics which define their relationship, the intention of the performance, dictated by either director or performer, and the reaction, whether intended or not, of the spectators. Because Plutarch’s knowledge of the theatre is extensive and his use of this institution wide

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<sup>3</sup> Barthes (1964), 41-2 continues “Naturellement, la théâtralité doit être présente dès le premier germe écrit d’un œuvre, elle est une donnée de création, non de réalisation. Il n’y a pas de grand théâtre sans théâtralité dévorante, chez Eschyle, chez Shakespeare, chez Brecht, le texte écrit est d’avance emporté par l’extériorité des corps, des objets, des situations; la parole fuse aussitôt en substances. Une chose frappe au contraire dans les trois scénarios de Baudelaire que nous connaissons [...]: ce sont des scénarios purement narratifs, la théâtralité, même virtuelle, y est très faible.”

ranging, I have chosen not to use the term “theatricality”, as it necessarily demands a more specific explanation.

Plutarch’s approach to the theatre is two-fold. He demonstrates an understanding of theatrical productions, showing an awareness of the technical demands involved in the creation of spectacle as well as in the dramatic dynamics between performance and viewer.<sup>4</sup> He also analyses the theatre through a theoretical lens, drawing upon a tradition which had been laid down by philosophers and playwrights. Plutarch’s *Lives* offer, as historical evidence, a window into the reality of theatrical productions, if not those of the periods he is describing, at least of their reception in his own time. These works also unveil the intellectual legacy which shaped a theoretical delineation of Classical and Hellenistic theatre. Plutarch’s direct engagement with previous authors is, at times, clearly demonstrable. In certain instances, however, Plutarch makes no specific verbal allusion, which implies a more general engagement with traditions inherited from earlier sources. But whether drawing on the reality of theatrical production, or theoretical works, directly and indirectly, Plutarch’s aims remain consistent. I argue that the theatre is a tool for the moral assessment of the political action of an individual or a group.

To this end this thesis is composed of three sections. The first section explores Plutarch’s use of theatre to examine kingship. Chapter 1 explores Plutarch’s diverging treatment of Cleopatra VII of Egypt and Agesilaus II of Sparta’s political action. While the former encourages the viewing of politics as a spectacle, a practice which is reflected in her people’s attitude towards public appearance, the latter consistently rejects the theatre, in accordance with Spartan principles. Plutarch provides two models of kingship, one which favours histrionic politics and another which actively rejects it. Chapter 2 argues that Plutarch chose to depict Macedonian kings of the Hellenistic period, from Demetrius Poliorcetes and the other Diadochoi to Perseus, last king of Macedon, as actors upon the stage and examines the different influences which determined Plutarch’s image of the Hellenistic kings as actors.

The second section focuses on the relationship between oratory and performance. Chapter 3 considers the influence which acting had on Demosthenes’

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<sup>4</sup> Also noted by Jouan (2002), 189.

delivery, especially the use of his voice. Even taking into consideration this influence, however, Plutarch articulates the moral superiority of oratory over acting at the end of the *Demosthenes*. Chapter 4 explores Cicero's relationship to histrionic politics. At the heart of the *Cicero* lies the difference between oratory and acting, although both seek to persuade through emotion. While oratory is achieved through *logos*, acting, in this *Life*, does not touch on voice but on body language and use of clothes. The influence of acting on Cicero's political self finds its ultimate expression in the narrative of his death. The final section of this thesis is comprised of one chapter, Chapter 5, which explores the dynamics between statesman, *demos* and civic values in scenes set in the theatre. I argue that Plutarch uses the theatre of Athens in the *Phocion* as the *locus* for the steady degeneration of civic values at Athens.

In order to situate my study within the broader context of research, I propose here an overview of how modern scholarship has approached Plutarch's conception and use of the theatre, from a focus on tragedy and the tragic, to different attitudes towards the theatrical. Plutarch's use of theatre in the *Parallel Lives* has benefited from a substantial amount of scholarly interest. These works have tended to centre on Plutarch's use of tragedy and "the tragic" to depict character. Philip De Lacy's "Biography and Tragedy in Plutarch" unearthed the possibility of considering the literary genre of tragedy as a vital tool in the creation and the understanding of the *Lives*. De Lacy argues that Plutarch condemns tragedy because it is a falsehood which actively deceives an audience through the pretence of the actor.<sup>5</sup> On these grounds, he concludes that Plutarch's approach to tragedy is Platonic, conceiving it as a derivative and non-philosophical art form from which the reader can receive little ethical improvement.<sup>6</sup> De Lacy finishes by analysing the *Demetrius* as a Plutarchan drama, in which the author criticises his subject's character by equating his actions with language (tragic, theatrical) and situations (many reversals of

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<sup>5</sup> De Lacy (1952), 159-65 echoed by Di Gregorio (1976), 173 who concludes that while Plutarch admires Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, quoting their tragedies for moral purposes, he affirms that Plutarch's treatment of tragic spectacle is very negative. Cf. also Jouan (2002), 192-3 on Plutarch's treatment of tragic imagery to depict illusion and manipulation.

<sup>6</sup> De Lacy (1952), 167-8.

fortune, moral decline, *hybris*) associated with tragedy.<sup>7</sup> De Lacy allows a place for tragedy in Plutarch's biographical writing, albeit a negative one, but the theatrical is afforded no distinction from the tragic.

A number of scholars have sought to redress the claims that Plutarch rejected tragedy completely by arguing that he incorporated tragic elements to suit his biographical and moralistic aims. Christopher Pelling distinguishes between Plutarch's exploitation of a tragic register to depict the human condition and its superficial use for purely stylistic effect.<sup>8</sup> Plutarch may reject a tragic style of writing, but understands the value of tragedy as a means to explore human character. This dual aspect of tragedy has been noted elsewhere. Françoise Frazier, in her analysis of Plutarch's more vivid scenes, distinguishes between Plutarch's use of tragic "resonances", which invites the sublime into his narrative, and a theatrical form of writing which aims to evoke sentimental sadness: this form, Plutarch censures.<sup>9</sup> Judith Mossman also differentiates between the use of tragic imagery for solely literary ends and its positive use, here as a means to explore character.<sup>10</sup> She analyses the tensions between the epic and tragic genres in the *Alexander*, contending that the epic is used to depict Alexander's great achievements while the tragic underlines his darker character.<sup>11</sup> Tragedy is not to be detected through quotations or theatrical vocabulary but through a tragic "tone", or "colouring".<sup>12</sup> Alexander's end is ultimately more tragic than epic since it is precipitated by self-destruction and external forces, recalling the dynamics at play in the action of ancient tragedy.<sup>13</sup>

Plutarch's exploitation of tragedy as a means to depict and explore the character of his protagonist has been argued for in other *Lives*. David Braund draws out the similarities between the last moments of Crassus' life and the closing scenes

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<sup>7</sup> De Lacy (1952), 170-1.

<sup>8</sup> Pelling (1980), 132 n. 26 = Pelling (2002), 111 n. 27, a thesis re-examined at Pelling (2016). Cf. Mossman (1988), 85 on the distinction between "tragic history" and tragic elements acceptable in biography and history.

<sup>9</sup> Frazier (1992), 4525-30.

<sup>10</sup> Mossman (1988), 92. Republished in Mossman (1995). These themes are continued in Mossman (1992), where she argues that by exploiting more epic imagery in the *Pyrrhus* and more tragic colouring in the *Demetrius*, Plutarch is equating these two kings with different aspects of Alexander's character.

<sup>11</sup> Mossman (1988), 85.

<sup>12</sup> Mossman (1988), 85.

<sup>13</sup> Mossman (1988), 91-2.

of Euripides' *Bacchae*.<sup>14</sup> He reaches the same conclusions as Mossman, that theatrical imagery is not simply used to heighten the climax of Crassus's death but also to further characterise the subject. He justifies the tragic imagery by arguing that Crassus also possesses tragic flaws (avarice and lust for power) which eventually lead to his downfall.<sup>15</sup> Alexei Zadorojnyi, following Mossman's contrast of the epic and tragic in Plutarch, argues that while similar genres are at play in the *Crassus*, their uses are different. Tragedy prevails in this *Life* and epic does not necessarily denote moral superiority.<sup>16</sup> Zadorojnyi understands the presence of tragic elements in the narrative and the characterisation of the hero as Plutarch's very pessimistic understanding of the *Life*.

At the heart of Zadorojnyi's understanding of the tragic imagery of the *Crassus* lies his view that the characterisation of the protagonist bears similarities to Aristotle's tragic hero, one who is neither good nor bad but suffers a reversal of fortune due to error rather than vice.<sup>17</sup> Timothy Duff also understands Plutarch's view of tragedy as more Aristotelian than Platonic, but rather than see it as an expression of profound pessimism he understands it as part of Plutarch's wider biographical concerns.<sup>18</sup> Through an analysis of tragic imagery in the *Demetrius-Antony*, Duff explains that tragedy is not to be dismissed, but rather by depicting his subjects according to the Aristotelian definition of the tragic hero, Plutarch invites the reader to judge his hero through the study of the biography without direct authorial imposition.<sup>19</sup> Tragedy, especially the tragic as a literary genre, allows for the reader's positive engagement and understanding of Plutarch's subjects.

The tragic has not been the sole focus of modern scholarship and tragedy's more spectacular nature, the theatrical, has also been the subject of scholarly attention. Anna Maria Taglisacchi argues that Plutarch uses terms such as "tragic" and "theatrical" not simply to describe what is false and artificial but also to denote that

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<sup>14</sup> Braund (1993), 468. Braund (1997) has applied this intertextual approach by arguing for the importance of Euripides' *Phoenician Women* in Plutarch's characterisation of Pyrrhus in his *Life*.

<sup>15</sup> Braund (1993), 474.

<sup>16</sup> Zadorojnyi (1997), 175.

<sup>17</sup> Zadorojnyi (1997), 173.

<sup>18</sup> Duff (2004), 285.

<sup>19</sup> Duff (2004), 286.

which appears magnificent and splendid but without much substance.<sup>20</sup> François Fuhrman echoes this by arguing, in his analysis of Plutarch's use of imagery, that tragedy becomes a symbol of artificial pomp.<sup>21</sup> Luke Van der Stockt connects Plutarch's use of "tragic" and "theatrical" with three themes: ostentatious display, falsehood and pathetic emotion, concluding that Plutarch uses these terms to highlight negative traits such as immorality and untruthfulness.<sup>22</sup> François Jouan certainly recognises Plutarch's vivid interest in tragedies and even theatre, but argues that Plutarch employs the theatrical to emphasise the melodramatic nature of a character or a scene.<sup>23</sup> The acceptable, quasi-philosophical use of tragedy to underline both the morality of the biographical scheme and the condition of man stands in sharp contrast to the theatricality of tragedy, that is, its performative aspect which Plutarch saw as denoting a superficial, exhibitionist or false nature.<sup>24</sup> While the tragic may have merit in Plutarch, the theatrical does not.

Some scholars have advocated the inclusion of "theatricality" as an active part of Plutarch's narrative rather than a simplistic denigration of what is false and artificial. For instance, Diotima Papadi argues for the importance of both tragic and theatrical moments in the *Pompey*. She rightly points to scenes which are explicitly constructed to appear as theatrical productions, such as Pompey's troops (*Pomp.* 68.5) or the Roman plebs (*Pomp.* 48.7) which are compared to chorus-members.<sup>25</sup> Papadi suggests that such imagery may be used to depict the way in which late Roman Republican politicians conceived of "their public life as a performance on stage", but does not expand on her statement.<sup>26</sup> Papadi's central argument rests on Plutarch's construction of a progression from theatrical imagery, used to highlight Pompey's delusions of power, towards the truly tragic as his mistakes, coupled with forces beyond his control, lead him to his pitiful end.<sup>27</sup> While Papadi's article articulates two crucial points, first that although the theatrical is distinguishable from the tragic it can play an important role in the Plutarchan narrative, and second that

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<sup>20</sup> Tagliacchi (1961), 127.

<sup>21</sup> Fuhrmann (1964), 207 n. 1; 209.

<sup>22</sup> Van der Stockt (1992), 162-6.

<sup>23</sup> Jouan (2002), 194.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Zadorojnyi (1997), 170; Pelling (2016), 117.

<sup>25</sup> Papadi (2008), 112.

<sup>26</sup> Papadi (2008), 113.

<sup>27</sup> Papadi (2008), 121.

the theatrical is linked to the public life of politicians, her overall understanding of such imagery is as a means for Plutarch to characterise his subject.

Away from tragedy, Sophia Xenophontos analyses Plutarch's use of comic invective in describing the actions and character of his heroes as a means of morally instructing the reader.<sup>28</sup> Central to Xenophontos' study is her observation that certain of Plutarch's subjects behave like comic stock figures upon the theatrical stage.<sup>29</sup> Performance and spectatorship are therefore important to Plutarch's use of comedy. Yet, while Xenophontos covers a number of pairs (*Demosthenes-Cicero*, *Demetrius-Antony*, *Pericles-Fabius Maximus*) and underlines the different uses which Plutarch makes of the comic register, from the characterisation of certain men through comic *personae* to comic quotations as contrasts with the hero's character, her research is not strictly focused on the political.<sup>30</sup> In this respect, Xenophontos' argument is consistent with the researches of Mossman, Braund, Zadorojnyi, Duff and Papadi: character, not the dynamics of power, is at the forefront of her study.

Most recently, Pelling has sought to reconcile the tragic with the theatrical. Expanding on his original claims that Plutarch used tragic tones to describe the condition of man, he demonstrates that the tragic is not only employed to depict human suffering and weakness, but it is also assisted by the theatrical. Thus the dark narratives of the stage invite themselves into our reality, ceasing to stand for the bombastic and artificial, but employed to denote a magnitude of evils which should only belong to fiction.<sup>31</sup> Even when the theatrical stands for hollow pomp, it can be read within Plutarch's construction of human disaster, prefiguring decline.<sup>32</sup> More recent scholarship, then, allows for a more positive understanding of the theatrical, beyond mere superficiality, and yet its significance for the political in Plutarch has still been understudied.

The theatrical as a tool to examine political action has been raised by some scholars, but their research has tended to concentrate on only a few works. The most exhaustive list of images derived from the theatrical world which Plutarch uses to

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<sup>28</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 603.

<sup>29</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 611-5, where she argues that this is particularly true of Antony.

<sup>30</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 630.

<sup>31</sup> Pelling (2016), 123.

<sup>32</sup> Pelling (2016), 126.



describe political situations has been produced by François Fuhrman, whose remarkable research is, nonetheless, mainly descriptive.<sup>33</sup> Rosa Maria Aguilar, focusing solely on the *Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae*, lists the metaphors and similes of the theatre used by Plutarch to describe political activity.<sup>34</sup> By listing the mentions of the theatre as a point of comparison with the political world, Aguilar concludes that Plutarch saw the statesman's relationship with the people as that of the actor upon the stage, persuading an audience.<sup>35</sup> Aguilar concludes that such a view is to be imputed to Plutarch's disillusionment as a Greek operating under the Roman Empire who saw his political role as that of an actor performing a plot determined by others.<sup>36</sup> Aguilar's interpretation is problematic. Plutarch refers only once to Greek politicians acting a part dictated by the Romans (*Praecepta*, 813f). Her research also completely ignores the severe moral tone with which Plutarch parallels, not all but, certain politicians with actors. A histrionic politician, as I will demonstrate, may operate successfully but is not to be emulated. Similar to Aguilar's conclusions is George Harrison's contention that Plutarch viewed statecraft as "stagecraft", equating the political acts of certain Plutarchan heroes with "the stricture of the stage".<sup>37</sup> Harrison's study is limited in scope, with a principal focus on the *Antony*, without offering an analysis of Plutarch's equation of certain situations with specific aspects of theatrical production. As this thesis will argue, statecraft is not theatre unless it is morally reprehensible.

The *Life* which has received the most scholarly attention as to the use of theatrical imagery for political action is undoubtedly the *Demetrius*. Plutarch's direct association of the subject's conduct with that of an actor has led Jeffery Tatum to explore Plutarch's wider conception of kingship. Tatum argues that the "theatricality" of Demetrius' conduct exposes him as a *fake* monarch, as the Hellenistic leader appears as a king but one who fails to display the moral worth which should accompany the office.<sup>38</sup> Kingship is thus right action rather than

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<sup>33</sup> Fuhrman (1964), 241-4.

<sup>34</sup> Aguilar (1984), 422.

<sup>35</sup> Aguilar (1984), 423.

<sup>36</sup> Aguilar (1984), 424.

<sup>37</sup> Harrison (2005), 59.

<sup>38</sup> Tatum (1996), 142-3. Elizabeth Keitel (1995), 275-88 also explores the opposition between Plutarch's Platonic understanding of 'the Good King' and the narrative of 'the tragic tyrant' in the *Galba* and *Otho*; she does not, however, look closely at the tragic or theatrical element of those *Lives*.

looking the part. Tatum's study is not restricted to Plutarch's use of theatrical image to describe kingship but his approach demonstrates the possibility of analysing Plutarch's theatrical comparisons within a political context and not simply as means of characterisation. This approach is further developed by Mallory Monaco who contrasts the political conduct of a demagogue and a comic poet in the *Demetrius* to demonstrate how theatrical behaviour in politics is not only a central theme of the *Life* but is followed by strict moral disapproval on the author's part. Both demagogue and poet draw on comedy in circumstances which blur the lines between politics and theatre, the politician in an assembly persuading them of a fictitious victory when in fact they have lost and the poet on the theatrical stage using comic invective to undermine the demagogue.<sup>39</sup> The comedian proves to be the better man for not sacrificing, as the politician does, the needs of his city to his own pleasure and for carrying out his role as dramatic critic.<sup>40</sup> My own conclusion matches that of Monaco, but is based on a much broader reading of Plutarch's *Lives*.

Finally scholars have used the theatrical imagery of the *Demetrius* to justify a historical reality, where theatre became an important medium in understanding and carrying out politics.<sup>41</sup> This is the case of Angelos Chaniotis' analysis of Hellenistic kingship as a theatrical performance, which draws heavily on Plutarch.<sup>42</sup> Chaniotis argues that the presence of the theatre in Plutarch's corpus is inherited from Hellenistic writers who, noting an actual theatricalisation of public life, paralleled political action with theatrical performance.<sup>43</sup> While I agree with Chaniotis that Plutarch's association of politics and theatre is inherited from Hellenistic historiography, I wish to broaden Chaniotis' definition of "theatricality". Although he rightly underlines the importance which the theatrical world holds in explaining the dynamics of power at play in political action, Chaniotis' definition of political theatrics rests solely on the role of the actor and his influence on the audience.<sup>44</sup> Plutarch's exploitation of theatrical vocabulary to depict politics goes beyond the

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<sup>39</sup> Monaco (2013), 124.

<sup>40</sup> Monaco (2013), 124.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Harrison (2005), 56.

<sup>42</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 244-5. Cf. also Herberg (1999), 67; 70. Chaniotis' analysis has had an impact on modern scholarship: cf. Huskinson (2002-03), 131; Étienne (2007), 292; Cohen (2010), 38-42; Zanker (2015), 63.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. for instance Chaniotis (2013a). I will return to this in Chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 222.

image of the actor, and the moral lens through which Plutarch understands both politics and theatre necessarily distorts any historical reality.

The *Demetrius* aside, Mossman's very recent analysis of tragedy and the Plutarchan hero allows for the importance of theatrical imagery in politics. The core of Mossman's study is in line with her analysis of the tragic in the *Alexander*, the *Pyrrhus* and the *Demetrius*. Through her study of the *Lives* (the *Themistocles*, the *Alcibiades*, the *Nicias-Crassus*) in which tragic "patterning" is less straightforwardly present than in other biographies, Mossman argues that tragic imagery not only elucidates certain aspects of Plutarch's hero but also allows for a wider reflection on the motions of history.<sup>45</sup> To this use she adds that of "the theatre and its tropes" used by certain politicians to further their goals, an argument which rests on her analysis of certain passages of the *Themistocles* and the *Nicias*.<sup>46</sup> Mossman argues that Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery to explain Themistocles' political actions is less directed at underlining his deceitful nature and more at explaining his manipulation of the Athenian *demos* while Nicias' office as *choregos* demonstrates his political power.<sup>47</sup> Mossman is right in pointing out that these moments do not fit the tragic aspect of the rest of each *Life* respectively, and this is because, I argue, they need not be linked to the tragic but to a wider conception of certain statesmen and political acts as theatre-like.

This thesis does not concern itself primarily with the tragic, although it must naturally feature since it is intertwined with the theatrical. Nor does this thesis focus on the theatrical as a means to depict character, although the nature of the statesmen I examine naturally impacts on their political actions. The tragic and characterisation are important, but not central. Rather than as part of a wider conception of human nature and condition, the theatrical is considered within the political realm of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*.<sup>48</sup> This thesis seeks to go beyond the mention of certain politicians as actors, to offer a more holistic view of the relationship between theatre and politics in Plutarch's biographies. From monarchical structures to orators and

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<sup>45</sup> Mossman (2014), 447.

<sup>46</sup> Mossman (2014), 447.

<sup>47</sup> Mossman (2014), 439; 442.

<sup>48</sup> Although my starting point is the *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch's essays regrouped under the title *Moralia* feature in order to elucidate Plutarch's perspective.

assemblies Plutarch used the language of theatre to describe, observe and examine political action. The impact of theatrical imagery on Plutarch's conception of politics has been greatly underestimated. Plutarch's use of the theatre is serious and profound. It allows him to underline his conception of specific political instances which contributed to shaping the history of Greece and Rome. Plutarchan scholarship can benefit from this research, as it uncovers not only his knowledge of theatrical institutions, but also, and more importantly, his conception of a wide range of political structures. Plutarch was a biographer who, beyond an interest in character, had an acute political and historical consciousness. In turn, a study of this theatrical lens enables the modern historian to discern more clearly the intricacy of ancient historiography, upon which Plutarch has had such an impact. Both Plutarchan scholars and modern historians have much to gain from an understanding of Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery to depict political action.

## Chapter 1: Kingship and Spectatorship in Egypt and Sparta

In this chapter I contrast the relationship which two monarchies, that of Cleopatra VII of Egypt and of Agesilaus II of Sparta, entertained with histrionic politics. I here use the term “monarchies” to stress the structure of kingship rather than simply the office of king: both monarchs and people are important to my study. Comparing Cleopatra with Agesilaus may seem odd considering the structure of Plutarch’s *Parallel Lives* as they neither form an official pair nor are they mentioned in relation to one another. And yet, Plutarch set his Spartan *Lives* in such a way as to make a comparison between Cleopatra and Agesilaus, if not likely, at least rather easy. Our modern tendency is to dissociate Egyptian/Ptolemaic kingship from the Spartan model, viewing the first as an absolute monarchy inherited from Macedonian and Egyptian traditions while the other was an integral but not sole part of an oligarchic society: two kings from two separate royal houses functioned alongside a council of Elders, the *Gerousia*, and the leading magistrates, the *Ephors*. Considering Plutarch’s treatment of both royal institutions, and the traditions with which he was composing his *Antony* and *Agesilaus*, the comparison between the two becomes less problematic.

Ellen Millender’s illuminating essay on the Spartan dyarchy reveals the treatment which early Greek sources reserved for the Eurypontid and Agiad royal families: they were treated as absolute monarchs displaying aspects which recall the stereotypes of eastern kings and tyrants (cf. Hdt. 6.58 or Eur. *Andr.* 473).<sup>49</sup> This image shifted with Xenophon’s encomium of Agesilaus II as he offers a more positive, less tyrannical depiction of Spartan kingship and he takes pains to distance Agesilaus from Eastern tropes (cf. Xen. *Ages.* 10.2).<sup>50</sup> Xenophon, however, did not completely remove the Spartan kingship from its absolutist tropes. Millender has indeed stressed the notable absence, in Xenophon’s *Agesilaus*, of any Agiad king

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<sup>49</sup> Millender (2009), 4 on Herodotus’ treatment of early Spartan kingship; (2009), 6 on Euripides’ attitude. Millender (2009), 10 seeks to tease out a historically factual picture of the Spartan diarchy as a constitutional and collegial kingship.

<sup>50</sup> Millender (2009), 20. Rosie Harman (2009), 373 has also demonstrated that Xenophon’s treatment of the Spartans in his *Polity of the Lacedemonians*, as a people to be observed in order to be understood, follows similar tropes that he uses for the Persians in his *Cyropaedia*.

who could have co-ruled with Agesilaus.<sup>51</sup> Agesilaus may not be a tyrant in full Eastern fashion but he retains certain elements of that tradition. It is with these evolving traditions that Plutarch approaches his *Agesilaus*.

Xenophon does not name, in his *Agelisaus*, the other dynast who co-ruled with Agesilaus, and nor does Plutarch. Plutarch's Spartan rulers generally interact with members of the elite, with their soldiers, with the *Gerontes* and *Ephors* but no use is made of their royal counterparts. This contrasts, for instance, with the *Lysander*, where the Spartan general is locked in a power struggle with the kings (οἱ βασιλεῖς, *Lys.* 21.1), but Plutarch's Spartan monarchs in their respective *Lives* do not share their office. This idea is reinforced by the leitmotiv of Agesilaus as Agamemnon throughout his *Life*. Sonia Nevin demonstrates how Plutarch's rapprochement of the Spartan king with the mythical king, stresses Agesilaus' failings. The mythical king's difficulty in respecting the customs of other Greeks and in sharing power is reflected in Agesilaus' character.<sup>52</sup> As such, Agesilaus displays hints of the faults which Cleopatra, as an eastern monarch, fully possesses.

But Agesilaus' tendency towards absolutist control is not the only aspect that makes a comparison between him and an Egyptian ruler easier. Egypt plays an important role in the *Spartan Lives*, especially in the *Agesilaus* and *Cleomenes*. Plutarch accepts the plausibility of Lycurgus' inspiration from Egyptian society to separate the mechanical workers and artisans from the political sphere (*Lyc.* 4.5). Egypt shares ancient political connections with Sparta. Egypt is also the location of the end of both the *Agesilaus* and the *Cleomenes*, as both Spartan kings were driven to Egypt at the close of their careers. Agesilaus becomes a mercenary for king Tachos of Egypt (*Ages.* 36.1) but switches sides to support Nectanabis, Tachos' cousin (*Ages.* 37.6). Cleomenes entertains a longer relationship with Egypt as, in return for Egyptian support, Ptolemy III demands Cleomenes' mother, Cratesicleia, and children as hostages (*Cleom.* 22.4) and it is to Egypt that Cleomenes flees when he is defeated by the Achaeans (*Cleom.* 31-2). Egypt also serves as an important

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<sup>51</sup> Millender (2009), 19- 21 stresses the constitutional limitations set on Agesilaus' rule (*Xen. Lac. Pol.* 1.4-5).

<sup>52</sup> Nevin (2014), 47. Cf. for instance Agesilaus' sacrifice at Aulis and his treatment of the Boeotians (*Ages.* 6.4-5). As Nevin concludes, Agesilaus cannot hope to compare with Agamemnon's ability to unify the Greeks and fight the Barbarians, as Agesilaus eventually drove Greeks to fight Greeks and lead his men to fight as mercenaries for Egypt. Taplin (1990), 79-81 on Agamemnon's negative characterisation as a political figure in the *Iliad*.

moral device: it becomes a negative foil for Spartan practices. For instance, the meddling of Egyptian royal women in the affairs of court contrasts neatly with the involvement of Spartan women in the politics of their husbands and sons.<sup>53</sup> Plutarch intended Egypt, in the *Cleomenes*, as a foil for Sparta. In this chapter I propose to expand this comparison to the *Antony* and to Cleopatra, to demonstrate that Egyptian modes of viewing political figures contrasts rather neatly with Spartan ideas of kingship as displayed in the *Agesilaus*.<sup>54</sup>

This chapter seeks to demonstrate two points. First that theatre is important to politics, whether the monarch resorts to theatrics or not. Cleopatra encourages the viewing of politicians' public appearance as a theatrical spectacle while Agesilaus is not only never shown to resort to histrionic politics but is also shown to reject the theatrical world. In both cases the emphasis is put on the world of theatrical production: whether by inviting or rejecting theatrics, the world of the stage becomes an important tool for Plutarch to evaluate a monarch. Second, and from this analysis, I explore another theme, just as important as the first, to explain the divergence between rulers who are explicitly shown to use theatrics and those who consciously reject them as a cultural phenomenon. The potential of kings and queens for theatrical behaviour is reflected in their people's attitude towards histrionic politics. Monarchs are a reflection of the cultural make-up of their people. I start by

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<sup>53</sup> Plutarch treats the political freedom displayed by Egyptian women as part of his depiction of Ptolemy IV's corrupt court (*Cleom.* 33.1). While he spends his time performing Dionysian-like rites and playing the drums (τύμπανον ἔχων), his mistress Agathocleia rules (τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῆς ἀρχῆς πράγματα διοικεῖν) along with his mother, Oenanthe, whom Plutarch refers to as a brothel-keeper (πορνοβοσκός, *Cleom.* 33.2). In the absence of male authority and virtue, women of bad reputation take the reins of power. While Cleomenes' wife and mother exercise a certain political influence over him, the dynamic between man and woman, as well as the sphere in which these women operate, demonstrates their respectability. Agiatis may transfer onto her husband the radical ideas of his predecessor, but she does so only in private (*Cleom.* 3.2-4), while her virtues win her the ultimate compliment of being as beautiful as she is sensible (καλλίστη καὶ σωφρονεστάτη, *Cleom.* 22.2). Cratesicleia only advises her son, and her council matches her words (*Clem.* 22.6-7), as she acts to safeguard what was fitting for Sparta (τὰ τῇ Σπάρτῃ πρέποντα, *Cleom.* 22.9). Powell (1999), 396 who explores the prominent position women hold in the *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, points out that Plutarch's narrative of these *Lives* "is contrived to highlight women" and notes that the death-scene of the Spartan women in the *Cleomenes* comes close to overshadowing that of the men (*Cleom.* 39.1). While Powell (1999), 399 compares Plutarch's treatment of the Spartan women with their Roman equivalents in the *Gracchi*, he does not mention the Egyptian women.

<sup>54</sup> The historical evidence suggests otherwise. Millender (2009), 35-41 argues that Ptolemaic kingship and the Spartan royalty drew on each other in order to create their public image in the new Hellenic era; this was particularly true of queenship.

analysing Plutarch's depiction of Cleopatra and the Egyptians and I then turn my attention to his Agesilaus and the Spartans.

## **I. Egypt**

### **1. Cleopatra**

Cleopatra is a mistress of the stage and could easily contend with Demetrius Poliorcetes for the prize of most histrionic politician of the Plutarchan corpus.<sup>55</sup> Compared to Demetrius, however, whose behaviour earned him the defining rebuke "not like a king, but an actor" (*Demetr.* 44.9), Cleopatra is presented far more like a stage director than an actor. I contend that while elements of her behaviour are strongly linked to acting, her histrionic nature expresses itself in a different domain: that of transforming public scenes into spectacles.

Cleopatra's masterful seduction of Antony marks her as a fantastically convincing actor. The seductive nature of her behaviour could suggest a context of intimacy, but the premise for such an act, however, is not motivated by an erotic desire for Antony. She wishes to reduce the influence which Octavia, Antony's lawful, virtuous Roman wife may have had on her estranged husband. Her fears are founded because Octavia has already proven to be politically savvy (cf. *Ant.* 35.2; 35.7-8). Although presented as Antony's oscillation between the barbarian temptress and the civilized wife, symbolising his division between Egypt and Rome, the struggle is not simply a literary ploy to explore the protagonist's character.<sup>56</sup> It is also a political contest between two women. Cleopatra understands that Octavia can

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<sup>55</sup> I will only treat Antony's theatrical behaviour as far as it relates to either Cleopatra's or the Alexandrians'. Pelling (1988), 21-2 on Antony's own relationship to theatre and tragedy. Cf. especially his donations to the Alexandrians and the Roman reaction (Plut. *Ant.* 36.4). Swain (1990), 155 on Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery to illustrate Antony's baser nature which coincides with his return to and establishment in Alexandria. Duff (2004), 286 argues that Plutarch rejected Plato's idea of tragedy in favour of an Aristotelian understanding of the tragic hero to depict Antony (and Demetrius).

<sup>56</sup> Pelling (1988), 247 articulates Antony's struggle between Octavia and Cleopatra as a man caught between his wife and his mistress; this, Pelling demonstrates, follows an already existing literary trope of love triangles. Duff (1999a), 96-97 identifies Plutarch's treatment of Antony's erotic passion for Cleopatra within the framework of reason and passion, rather than through an erotic lens. Beneker (2012), 188 sees Antony's initial wavering between Octavia and Cleopatra as a pendulum between reason and erotic desire, where the less worthy sexual attraction wins over the higher reason.



have a profound effect on Antony's foreign policy (*Ant.* 53.5), and that behind her stands her brother, Caesar (Octavian), who is waiting to use his sister as a political pawn (*Ant.* 53.1-3).<sup>57</sup> Politics is, therefore, the catalyst for this powerful performance. I have added a passage from the *Demosthenes*, which illuminates Plutarch's dismissal of emotions displayed by actors, which, although not intended to be read side by side, illuminates Plutarch's description of Cleopatra's actions.

ἐρᾶν αὐτὴ προσεποιεῖτο τοῦ Ἀντωνίου, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λεπταῖς καθήρει διαίταις· τὸ δὲ βλέμμα προσιόντος ἐκπεπληγμένον, ἀπερχομένου δὲ τηρόμενον καὶ ταπεινούμενον ὑπεφαίνεται. πραγματευομένη δὲ πολλάκις ὀφθῆναι δακρύουσα, ταχὺ τὸ δακρῦον ἀφήρει καὶ ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὡς δὴ βουλομένη λανθάνειν ἐκείνον.

She pretended to be in love herself with Antony, and reduced her body by meagre diet. She submissively displayed a look of astonishment when he approached and one of anguish and dejection when he was leaving. Scheming to ensure that she would often be seen crying, swiftly wiping them and hiding away, as if wishing to escape Antony's notice.

(*Ant.* 53.5-6)

(...) τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν προσώπων, οὓς ὀρώμεν οὔτε κλαίοντας οὔτε γελῶντας ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ὡς αὐτοὶ θέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ἄγων ἀπαιτεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν.

[Just as] actors who perform as kings and tyrants, whom we see neither crying nor laughing in the theatre, as they are naturally disposed, but as the play demands with respect to the plot.

(*Dem.* 22.5)

I contend that the anecdote at *Ant.* 53.5-6 is designed to characterise Cleopatra as an expert actor, carrying out her role with great (and terrible) credibility. I start by comparing this passage with *Dem.* 22.5 because it expresses the theoretical template behind Plutarch's narrative of Antony's seduction by the wily Cleopatra. The passage from the *Demosthenes* is inserted within a debate on the appropriateness of emotional display in public. It marks Plutarch's response to Aeschines' criticism of Demosthenes for celebrating the death of Athens' enemy Philip II of Macedon,

<sup>57</sup> Plutarch is clear to contrast what Octavia desires with Caesar's cunning intentions: Ἐν δὲ Ῥώμῃ βουλομένης Ὀκταουίας πλεῦσαι πρὸς Ἀντώνιον, ἐπέτρεψε Καίσαρ, ὡς οἱ πλείους λέγουσιν οὐκ ἐκείνη χαριζόμενος, ἀλλ' ὅπως περιυβρισθεῖσα καὶ καταμεληθεῖσα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον αἰτίαν εὐπρεπῆ παράσχοι (*Ant.* 53.1).

when his daughter had died a few days prior (*Dem.* 22.1-3). While I will return to the importance of this passage to the *Demosthenes*, what interests me here is Plutarch's understanding of acting as driven by plot rather than personal inclination.<sup>58</sup> Cleopatra is precisely the tyrannical queen who cries, not according to her own inclination (θέλειν), but through pretence (προσποιεῖν) as her *action*, the erotic passion for Antony, demands. It is precisely this opposition, between what is faked and what is real which Plutarch constantly stresses at *Ant.* 53.6. He constructs a dichotomy between the calculating aspect of Cleopatra's behaviour and the extreme display of her emotions, as her severe bodily neglect finds its origin, not in genuine violent emotional suffering, but in pretence. The same opposition between what Cleopatra does and what her motivations truly are is expressed by the frequency of her tears (πολλάκις δακρύειν) actually stemming from a practical, businesslike attitude (πραγματεύεσθαι).<sup>59</sup> By creating this contrast between the emotional result and the contrived, calculating incentive, Plutarch casts Cleopatra as a mistress of falseness and deception through action.

The actor-like quality of Cleopatra's performance does not simply rest on her distortion of reality into a fiction, but relies also on the presence of an audience. In both the passages from the *Demosthenes* and the *Antony*, the act of seeing is crucial to actors' display of emotions. Plutarch stresses the visual aspect (ὄραον) of these dramatic displays in the theatre of the *Demosthenes*, while Cleopatra's aims are clearly to be viewed as she weeps with the intention of being looked at. The intricacy of her performance is reinforced by the use of ὑποφαίνειν, which suggests a gradual if not minimal act of showing, rather than one of complete visual display (LSJ s.v. II.2). While Pelling's laudatory analysis of Cleopatra's subtlety, as she is conscious "not to overplay her hand", certainly encapsulates her intelligent understanding of her situation, I would rather read her ingenuity within the realm of acting rather than card playing.<sup>60</sup> Pelling is right in pointing out, however, that Plutarch's employment of ὑποφαίνειν guides the reader to recognise the shrewdness of her performance which does not rely on over-emphasised gestures

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<sup>58</sup> On a discussion of *Dem.* 22.5 see Ch. 4.II, 150-1.

<sup>59</sup> Pelling (1988), 246 on the business-like quality of the term πραγματεύεσθαι.

<sup>60</sup> Pelling (1988), 246 translates ὑποφαίνειν as "just gave a hint of" or "was just visible as".

and mannerisms. This cleverness, coupled with her perpetual awareness of her audience, mark Cleopatra as an expert actor.

Cleopatra's performance consists of a sophisticated series of gestures, through which she displays a true appreciation of the physiological effect of love on the body and mind of the lover. Plutarch's narrative of Antiochus' silent suffering in the *Demetrius* parallels the *Antony*, and offers a perfect comparison between genuine and faked suffering. The Seleucid prince Antiochus finds himself in precisely the reverse situation of having to pretend he is not in love. Antiochus' anguish at desiring his mother-in-law Stratonice is so powerful that he foregoes food in an attempt at self-harm (*Demetr.* 38.2). This loss of appetite and neglect of the body constitute various formulaic stages of romantic suffering. Similarly to Antiochus, Euripides' Phaedra resolves to starve herself rather than admit her incestuous passion for her stepson Hippolytus (Eur. *Hipp.* 274-7).<sup>61</sup> By starving herself Cleopatra displays a shrewd observation of the appropriate behaviour to adopt in order to persuade her audience that she is indeed really in love: she acts out her unresolved longing by neglecting to eat. Antiochus is not the only character whose suffering Cleopatra parallels. She also displays the same symptoms which Seleucus experiences out of love for his son. Both display signs of trepidation (ἐκπλήσσεσθαι), Seleucus at the news of his son's sickness (*Demetr.* 38.8) and Cleopatra as Antony stands in her presence, while both shed copious tears (πολλοί/πολλάκις δακρύειν), Seleucus in response to the plight of his son (*Demetr.* 38.9) and Cleopatra as an external sign of distress. By demonstrating signs of emotional suffering, which Seleucus, for instance, displayed in his genuine love and concern for his son, Cleopatra demonstrates her acute understanding of the external signs which a distressed person naturally exhibits.

If Cleopatra is characterised as an expert performer, with an acute psychological understanding of the symptoms of suffering and an ability to reproduce it, contrary to her own personal inclinations, Plutarch never uses specific language of the stage to describe her actions. She is pretending (προσποιεῖν) but is

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<sup>61</sup> Both Mesk (1913), 376 and Mehl (1986), 52 have explored the potential intertextuality between various traditions of the Antigonus-Stratonice love story and Euripides' play. Pelling (1988), 246 notes the echoes between Plutarch's passage and the literary conventions of lovelorn suffering in Roman elegy.

not explicitly compared to an actor. She behaves artificially, but is not directly associated with theatrical artificiality. I argue that Plutarch does not include theatrical language here because his understanding of Cleopatra's theatrical nature is not constructed through the profession of the actor, but through the dynamics of spectacle. Cleopatra is perceived less as an actor, and more as a stage director, transforming a situation into a display where she invites the viewer to become a spectator and to react as a theatrical audience, thus transforming the moment into a performance. Where a theatrical metaphor or simile which uses acting for its imagery focuses on the performer, that which employs spectacle, as I now wish to show, centres on the audience reaction. Cleopatra manipulates public appearances as a stage director would a play. This is how she defines her relationship with Antony and how her people approach their politicians. For the remainder of this section I explore the importance of spectacle and spectatorship in the *Antony* as a defining (but not exclusive) feature of the Egyptian attitude towards political authority, first by considering Cleopatra's attitude towards Antony in public and then concentrating on the Alexandrian's reception of Antony.

In order to illustrate Antony's playful behaviour (παίζων) upon first staying with Cleopatra, Plutarch recounts his protagonist's embarrassing attempts to flirt with the queen. Antony indulges in a spot of fishing during his stay in Egypt. His moment of leisure is interrupted as Cleopatra witnesses his failure to catch anything. Vexed, Antony orders for fish that had already been caught to be hooked to his line, all done in secrecy (κρύφα, *Ant.* 29.5). But Cleopatra is not fooled. This anecdote could be read an example of the silliness displayed by a man who both embodies the lover intent on impressing his lady with his virility and the Roman abroad failing to take on local customs. But it reveals a crucial aspect of the dynamic between Cleopatra and Antony as well as betraying Plutarch's attitude towards Cleopatra's courtiers.

καὶ δις ἢ τρις ἀνασπάσας οὐκ ἔλαθε τὴν Αἰγυπτίαν. **προσποιομένη** δὲ **θαυμάζειν** τοῖς φίλοις διηγείτο, καὶ παρεκάλει τῇ ὑστεραία **γενέσθαι θεατάς**. ἐμβάντων δὲ πολλῶν εἰς τὰς ἀλιάδας καὶ τοῦ Ἄντωνίου τὴν ὄρμην καθέντος, ἐκέλευσέ τινα τῶν αὐτῆς ὑποφθάσαντα καὶ προσνηξάμενον τῷ ἀγκίστρῳ περιπεῖραι

Ποντικὸν τάριχος. ὡς δὲ ἔχειν πεισθεὶς ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἀνείλκε, γέλωτος οἶον εἰκὸς γενομένου.

And he pulled up two or three, but this did not escape the notice of the Egyptian. Pretending to be amazed, she recounted it to her friends and the next day she summoned her retinue to become spectators. Many of them embarked upon fishing boats, and when Antony let down his line, she ordered a certain servant to precede him by swimming ahead and fasten a salted fish from Pontus to a hook. Thus when Antony drew up his line, convinced he had caught something, and laughter broke out, of course.

(*Ant.* 29.5-7)

Cleopatra's identity as a trickster and Antony's as the one deceived once again determine the dynamics between them. It is her ability to feign emotion, here amazement (θαυμάζειν), which distinguishes her as an able deceiver, but note that Plutarch once again qualifies her as pretending (προσποιεῖν) rather than acting (ὑποκρίνεσθαι). Yet her treatment of Antony is described through language which belongs to the world of the stage. Rather than keep private Antony's attempts to impress her, she transforms his flirting into a spectacle with a specific audience which reacts to his performances as if they are witnessing a dramatic action. Cleopatra is explicitly shown to summon (παρακαλεῖν) her courtiers to become spectators (γίγνεσθαι θεατάς). This statement is almost an oxymoron. The act of summoning, παρακαλεῖν, belongs, in Plutarch, to the realm of male influence as it almost exclusively denotes either political or military action. For instance, it is used in an oratorical context, to denote the exhortation of a speaker to an assembly (*Tim.* 37.4), the interaction between rival speakers (*Ti. Gracch.* 14.7), or the demand for a speech (*Cat. Mi.* 66.1). In warfare it denotes the initial push to attack (*Cor.* 26.1), or an invitation to war (*Aem.* 9.6). While the term demonstrates Cleopatra's authoritative position as the head of state, what she demands of her followers is much less politically acceptable. She is not urging them into battle or pushing them to verbal exhortation but she unequivocally demands of them to become spectators.

The θεατής is not simply a viewer, but a member of an audience who watches a spectacle. The object of the viewing need not be strictly dramatic, and can extend beyond tragedy, comedy and satyr plays, to musical and dancing contests which also demand such a type of audience. For instance, a member of the audience (ἐκ τῶν θεατῶν) responds to a certain Timotheus' song in Athens, (*De Super.* 170a), while

Philip II of Macedon rebukes his son for playing a stringed instrument, arguing that kings should not be performers but spectators of such contests (θεατής, *Per.* 1). In a Roman context, the viewer of Gladiatorial shows (μονόμαχία) is also considered a θεατής (*Flam.* 18.6). Whatever the type of spectacle, this term always implies the act of viewing a staged performance. The term can, of course, be extrapolated from its original *locus* and context, but its meaning is fundamentally associated with the act of seeing staged performances.<sup>62</sup> To return to Antony's fishing, Cleopatra summons her friends with the express purpose of being spectators to a show she has prepared. This is emphasised by the inclusion of γίγνεσθαι, which suggests that Cleopatra wishes Antony's embarrassment to be viewed specifically as a spectacle, where her *philoï*'s sole function is to stand as the audience, the θεᾶται.

Although Plutarch rarely uses γίγνεσθαι with θεατής, the conjunction of these words is consistent: he employs it when a person or a group of people are solicited to observe a scene in such a way as to make it a spectacle. The best example of such use, which also provides a good point of comparison with the *Antony*, is Croesus' treatment of Solon, when he visits Sardis. In Plutarch's rendition of the famous Herodotean narrative, the Athenian lawgiver Solon leaves his city to explore the world, and upon arriving in Sardis, he is taken to the heart of King Croesus' palace, where he is led from courtier to courtier, each more magnificent than the one before, until he reaches Croesus decked in sumptuous fineries (*Sol.* 27). Plutarch offers a psychological explanation for Croesus' luxurious appearance, arguing that the king was hoping to be viewed as a spectacle (θέαμα), from which he expected (προσδοκᾶν) to stimulate, as a sight, a strong emotional reaction (πάσχειν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, *Sol.* 27.4).<sup>63</sup> Croesus' theatricalisation of his person is completely self-imposed.

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<sup>62</sup> Plutarch sometimes uses θεατής in a positive manner: one can become an observer of life and this requires a level of detachment (cf. *De Capienda*, 92c). Plutarch, for instance, urges young men to be spectators of older men's engagement in public life (*An Seni*, 790d). Monoson (2000), 212-26 demonstrates that the same idea of the philosopher as θεατής, as well as the importance of spectatorship in philosophical discourse, is found in Plato's *Republic*. See Schlapbach (2016), 138-9 for similar themes in Lucian's *Nigrinus*, where theatrical metaphors are used to depict the philosopher's act of observation. The appropriateness of a spectator, in Plutarch, is largely dependent on what he/she is observing and how he/she responds to it.

<sup>63</sup> Schmidt (1999), 118 for his extensive study on the image of the Barbarian in Plutarch, noting the recurring figure of the Eastern Barbarian as excessively rich and fond of luxury, of which Croesus (along with the Persian kings and Satraps) is a prime example. Plutarch's theatrical treatment of Croesus' relationship to his wealth is echoed in the *Table Talks* where he denigrates the wealthy who

Upon his pyre, as he is about to be burned alive and in a moment of self-awareness, Croesus recalls Solon's visit, arguing that he had invited him to be a spectator of the king himself (ὥς δὴ μοι θεατῆς γένοιτο, *Sol.* 28.4). It is he, not his guest, who invites such an objectification of his person and life, as a spectacle to be emotionally reacted to.

Both Cleopatra and Croesus are royal figures who demand of their subjects to become spectators, but where Solon refuses to engage in spectatorship by reacting with reason rather than emotion, the Egyptians gratify Cleopatra's expectations by laughing.<sup>64</sup> Plutarch's phrasing is odd. Instead of using γελᾶν to express the eruption of laughter, of which there are many examples (cf. *Flam.* 21.12; *Dem.* 19.6; *De Capienda*, 88e), he employs the combination of γίγνεσθαι with γέλως, which is very little attested in his corpus. Plutarch grammatically parallels the transformation of the courtiers into spectators, and their reaction to Antony's humiliation, to emphasise the theatrical connection between the two instances, as laughter is the ultimate reaction to a comic drama (cf. *De Laude*, 545e; *Alex.* 29.6, *Adulator* 68b). Cleopatra thus transforms Antony's actions into a performance to be experienced as a theatrical spectacle. This instance is not unique. Spectatorship determines the way in which Cleopatra, especially at *Ant.* 29, responds to Antony.<sup>65</sup> At the start of their courtship, Cleopatra fully participates in Antony's revelries, which Plutarch emphasises by a series of verbs prefixed by συν-, denoting all kinds of entertaining activities from dice playing (συγκυβεύειν), drink sharing (συμπίνειν) and hunting (συνθηρεύειν). Cleopatra cannot, however, participate in all of Antony's pastimes since she is excluded from his military exercises (γυμνάζεσθαι ἐν ὄπλοις), and yet she still finds a way of including herself in these activities by participating as part of an audience (θεᾶσθαι). But Cleopatra's transformation of Antony's fishing into a spectacle is not simply symptomatic of her attitude towards her lover. It is precisely these dynamics, of spectators viewing Antony's actions as a comedy to be laughed at, which defines the understanding which Cleopatra's people hold of the protagonist.

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display their possessions, needing spectators, like a tragedy (καθάπερ τραγωδία, *Quaes. Conv.* 679b).

<sup>64</sup> Pelling (2001), 298 argues that Cleopatra transforms the mockery into a compliment by undermining the Egyptian kings as fishermen in contrast with Antony's status and military potential as a Roman general.

<sup>65</sup> These are not the only instances in which Cleopatra is designated a spectator of a non-theatrical moment: cf. her observation of the slaves that try out her deadly poisons (*Ant.* 71.7).

## 2. The Alexandrians

Cleopatra and her friends are not unique in treating Antony as a spectacle. In fact, the Alexandrians display the same attitude towards his indecent public behaviour. I argue that this attitude is inherited from their cultural context. This is clear when comparing their reading of power with the Romans' reception of Antony.

**τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ἐκ τούτων ἀπηχθάνετο, τοῖς δὲ χρηστοῖς καὶ σόφροσι** διὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον οὐκ ἦν ἀρεστός, ὡς Κικέρων φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἐμσεῖτο, βδελυττομένων αὐτοῦ μέθας ἄωρους καὶ δαπάνας ἐπαχθεῖς καὶ κυλινδήσεις ἐν γυναῖοις, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ὕπνου καὶ περιπάτους ἀλύοντος καὶ κραιπαλῶντος, νύκτωρ δὲ κώμους καὶ θεάτρα καὶ διατριβὰς ἐν γάμοις **μίμων καὶ γελοιοποιῶν.**

He was hated by the many for this, and through the rest of his lifestyle he dissatisfied useful and temperate men, as Cicero said, and they detested him, loathing his unreasonable drunkenness, his heavy spending, his wallowing in female company, as he spent the day sleeping or wandering aimlessly and in a debauched state, and the night in revelry and theatres and amusements at the weddings of mime artists and jesters.

(Ant. 9.5)

καὶ νύκτωρ προσισταμένῳ θύραις καὶ θυρίσι δημοτῶν καὶ **σκώπτοντι** τοὺς ἔνδον συνεπλανᾶτο καὶ συνήλυε θεραπεινιδίου **στολήν** λαμβάνουσα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὕτως ἐπειράτο **σκευάζειν** ἑαυτόν. ὅθεν ἀεὶ **σκωμμάτων**, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ **πληγῶν ἀπολαύσας** ἐπανήρχετο: τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις ἦν δι' ὑπονοίας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ **προσέχαιρον** αὐτοῦ τῇ **βωμολογίᾳ** καὶ συνέπαιζον **οὐκ ἀρρῦθμος οὐδ' ἀμούσως** οἱ Ἀλεξανδρεῖς, ἀγαπῶντες καὶ λέγοντες ὡς τῷ τραγικῷ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους χρῆται προσώπῳ, τῷ δὲ **κωμικῷ** πρὸς αὐτούς.

And during the night, he stopped at the windows and doors of commoners and joked with those inside, and she followed him and wandered about, taking the garb of a slave girl, for he endeavoured to dress himself up in this way. From this, he provoked always jibes and often beatings before returning home and yet the majority guessed who he was. The Alexandrians, however, rejoiced at his buffoonery and played along neither ungracefully nor without music, regarding him with affection and saying that he played a tragic role with the Romans and a comic one with them.

(Ant. 29.3-4)



The Alexandrian reception of Antony's misdeeds is constructed almost as a parallel to the Roman perception of his public behaviour. Both passages describe, not a response to precise political measures, but to his general conduct, as he has sought amusement in the public eye. Yet their respective responses are in complete contrast with one another: where the Romans process the situation from a moral perspective, the Alexandrians only understand Antony's behaviour as a theatrical performance. I will first consider the Roman interpretation of Antony's antics, and then the Alexandrian approach, taking Antony's behaviour into consideration in both cases.

Despite Plutarch's polarisation of Rome's population between the "many" (πολλοί) and the "useful and temperate" (χρηστοί καὶ σώφρονες), these two groups assess Antony with the same ferocious hatred. Plutarch creates a picture of disgust with a generous use of synonym: the many hate (ἀπεχθάνεσθαι) him while the worthy and temperate men detest (μισεῖσθαι) and loathe (βδελύσσεσθαι) his conduct. Plutarch then focuses on the psychological reasoning behind these worthy (χρηστοί) and temperate (σώφρονες) men's rejection of Antony. The association of χρηστός with σώφρων designates, in Plutarch, two ideal political virtues.<sup>66</sup> His *Precepts of Statecraft*, an essay designed as a guide for the ideal politician, directly states that the government of the city needs such types of men (χρηστῶν καὶ σωφρόνων δεῖσθαι, *Precept.* 807a). Plutarch later defines them in opposition to the type of vices that should be banned from political life. He urges the prospective politician to create his policies with χρηστός and σώφρων, while expelling from the city (ἐξελαύνειν) such spectacles (τὰ τοιαῦτα θεάματα), which excite and encourage the buffoonish and the licentious (τὸ βωμολόχον καὶ ἀκόλαστον, *Precept.* 822c). Plutarch thus uses the salacious side of the theatrical world, with its potential for scurrilous performances, to oppose the virtues of serviceability and moderation. It is exactly this opposition which Plutarch re-creates in the *Antony*. He is shown to be absolutely useless and intemperate. Antony's conduct is one of pure excess, where he abandons himself to all bodily pleasures: from too much wine to

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<sup>66</sup> See Frazier (1996), 192 for her study of σωφροσύνη in Plutarch's work which demonstrates how important σώφρων was in Plutarch's conception of the ideal statesman, a concept which he had inherited from Platonic ideals.

over-spending and sexual immoderation (cf. *Demetr.* 1.8).<sup>67</sup> The portrait which Plutarch gives of Antony here, of a man who cannot perform σωφροσύνη, is reinforced by the type of company he keeps. He associates with mimes (μίμοι) and jesters (γελωτοποιοί), the stereotypical duo of licentious performance artists, who encourage excess.

Both mime artists and jesters are part of Plutarch's literary arsenal for creating images of debauchery. In the *Antony* the protagonist's inability to restrain himself is repeatedly shown by his socialising with mimes. These artists are explicitly linked to lifestyles of luxury (ήδυπαθής) and licentiousness (ἀκόλαστος, *Ant.* 21.1-3), where they are his companions in his night-time frolics, where he enjoys physical pleasure in surfeit (cf. also *Ant.* 21.3). They are not simply Antony's companions but they also encourage the worst in him. He is so indulged at the wedding of Hippias, who Plutarch is clear to name as a mime artist, that upon arriving early the next morning at the Forum, he ends up vomiting on his toga (*Ant.* 9.7). The same imagery is used in the *Sulla*, where the protagonist shares in the dissolute life (συνακολασταίνειν) of mime artists from a young age (*Sull.* 2.2), to which he will return later in life in his less savoury moments (*Sull.* 33.2; 36.1). The jester (γελωτοποιός) is an attested comic performer who, like the mime artist, Plutarch sometimes names historical artists, such as a certain Saculio (*Brut.* 45.8) and Philip or Gabba, Augustus' jesters (*Quaes. Conv.* 701c and 726a).<sup>68</sup> They are often associated with mime artists and scenes of debauchery (*Sull.* 2.2; *Ant.* 9.5), and Plutarch's social scorn for them is consistent.<sup>69</sup> Students are advised to disapprove morally of these artists' work (προβάλλεσθαι καὶ κακίζειν, *Quomodo adul.* 18c), while jesters are dismissed as second rate types of entertainers at dinner parties, since they only bring pleasure (ήδονήs ἔνεκεν) and nothing useful (χρεία μὴ συνάγεσθαι, *Quaes. Conv.* 629c).

Plutarch represents the Romans' evaluation of Antony through a moral lens. It is his excessive behaviour and his bad company which inspires disgust because

<sup>67</sup> Pelling (1988), 14, Duff (1999a), 116 on immoderation constituting an important aspect of Antony's character. Frazier (1996), 239 on the importance of moderation in the Plutarchan hero.

<sup>68</sup> See Milanezi (2000), 402-3 for an insightful discussion of γελωτοποιός in literature, especially in the symposiastic context with some valuable remarks on the development of the word. Milanezi notes that the nominal form of this term only appears in the fourth century, attested in Xenophon (*Symp.* 1.11; *An.* 7.3.33) and Plato (*Rep.* 620c). It is clear that they were performers and entertainers.

<sup>69</sup> Milanezi (2000), 411 argues that Plutarch's judgement is more severe than that of Athenaeus.

they reveal his unsavoury character. Plutarch creates a moral dichotomy between those judging Antony, who possess all the virtues of the ideal politician, and Antony himself who indulges in the seedy world of theatrical low-life. Antony, however, is not performing here; he is simply keeping company with dramatic artists. This last point is crucial, especially in comparison with his behaviour and its reception in Alexandria. If the Roman evaluation of Antony's behaviour stems from their understanding of political vices and virtues, the Alexandrians rely on a completely different set of values, that of theatrical spectacles.

The Alexandrians' reaction to Antony's behaviour stands in polar opposition to the Romans' response. They identify Antony's conduct with a "comic role" (κωμικόν [πρόσωπον]), thereby transforming Antony's night wanderings into a performance taken from a comedy. The performative aspect of Antony's conduct is further suggested by the type of feeling experienced by the Alexandrians. Where the Romans feel a surge of hate, the Alexandrians feel pleasure (προσχαίρειν). The experience of pleasure as an audience response to a theatrical performance recalls the conventional emotional reaction theorised by earlier philosophers. While Plato warns against the pleasurable outcome of both tragedy (Pl. *Rep.* 606b) and comedy (*Rep.* 606c) and Aristotle considers it an acceptable reaction to both genres (Arist. *Poet.* 1453b13; *Poet.* 1453a35), both agree that it is at the heart of the audience's response to poetry and in particular theatrical drama.<sup>70</sup> This Plutarch also accepts as an integral response to drama, even if the action depicts suffering (cf. *Quomodo adul.* 18c).<sup>71</sup> Not only do the Alexandrians identify Antony's behaviour as a comic act, responding to it with feeling appropriate to that felt by spectators, but they also

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<sup>70</sup> Plato, in the *Republic*, argues that poetry is dangerous because it solicits pleasure (and pain) rather than lawfulness and reason (*Rep.* 10.607a). In the *Republic* poetry and reason exercise two opposing forces on the emotions: poetry induces an overpowering of emotion, including laughter (*Rep.* 3.388e), while reason checks emotion by overpowering it (*Rep.* 10.604c). Mimetic art (ἡ μίμησις) only offers what is pleasant (ἡδεῖα) rather than what can be beneficial (ὠφελίμη, *Rep.* 10.607c-e). See Russell (2005), 222-3 for a discussion of reason as regulating pleasure in Plato. Janko (1984) and Golden (1987) attempt to tease out Aristotle's non-extant treatises on comedy through the "Tractatus Coislinianus", a work that cites "pleasure and laughter" as the comic equivalent of tragedy's "pity and fear". In the *Poetics*, Aristotle postulates that the pleasure which the audience derives from a "happy" denouement, where strife is resolved, is more suitable to comedy than tragedy (Arist. *Poet.* 1453a35-6), implying that pleasure is an expected reaction to comic drama. Aristotle argues that pity induced by poetry and drama in general is pleasurable because *mimesis* leads to learning and reason (*Poet.* 1448b15-7). See Russell (2005), 72-3 for a discussion of learning and pleasure in Aristotle and Warren (2014), 95-102 on the importance of reason in relationship to and as a regulator of pleasure in Plutarch.

<sup>71</sup> I will return to this in more detail see Ch.2, I.2, 97-8.

participate in the drama. Pelling rightly argues that by depicting them as playing along (συμπαίζειν) with rhythm (οὐκ ἄρρῦθμωζ) and musicality (οὐδὲ ἀμούσως), Plutarch suggests that they accompany him, keeping time with his acting.<sup>72</sup>

This vision of the Alexandrians, who both delight in theatrical entertainment and misbehave publically in a theatrical way is paralleled by Dio Chrysostom's portrait of the city in his *Alexandrian Oration*. Dio manages a *mise en abyme* by using the location of his speech, delivered at Alexandria, to chide the people for their obsessive love of dramatic and spectacular amusements. Dio depicts them as sober enough in their daily routines, but as possessed by drugs as soon as they enter the theatre (Dio, 32.41).<sup>73</sup> Using almost the same language as Plutarch, Dio describes the effect which a moment of instability (τὸ τῆς ἀταξίας πνεῦμα) causes the Alexandrians, as they misbehave with jests, blows and laughter (σκώμματα, πληγαί, γέλωζ, Dio, 32.30). If the Alexandrians are not responding to public upheavals with comic overtones, they are indulging in audience-participation by dancing along to the musical performance (cf. Dio, 32.55). The vision which Dio presents of the city closely parallels Plutarch's rendition and strongly suggests a surprising stereotype of Alexandria as a spectacle-loving city.<sup>74</sup> For instance, Michael Trapp's overview of later Greek sources under the empire underlines the accepted notion of Alexandrian wit as a local response to political figures.<sup>75</sup> Yet if Dio and Plutarch share a similar attitude towards the Alexandrians, their inclusion of this imagery is determined by their programme.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Pelling (1988), 197.

<sup>73</sup> ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἰσέλθωσιν ἢ τὸ στάδιον, ὥσπερ φαρμάκων αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖ κατορωυγμένον.

<sup>74</sup> This transcends the ancient sources. Jones (1978), 37 on Alexandria as "sophisticated" and "pleasure loving". Trapp (2004), 118 nuances this view as a moralistic, outsider perspective. Haas (1997), 11 for a revision of Alexandria's portrayal as unrestrained and unruly.

<sup>75</sup> Trapp (2004), 120. Trapp (2004) presents an overview of Alexandria in Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Dio Chrysostom's *Alexandrian Oration*, Plutarch's *Antony*, Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* and Athenaeus' *Deipnosophists*; Trapp (2004), 124 stresses the variety of approaches despite the recurring thematic motifs.

<sup>76</sup> For instance, Dio's Alexandrians indulge more in music and chariot-racing (cf. Dio. 32. 41), see Kasprzyk and Vendries (2012), 86-103. Horse or chariot racing are not mentioned in the *Antony* as an Alexandrian entertainment. While Plutarch's Alexandrians are considered musical (*Ant.* 29.4), the association of instruments and Alexandria is indirect: cf. the instruments accompanying Cleopatra as she sails on her barge (*Ant.* 26.1); the procession which Antony hears on the eve of his defeat, is more of a tumult (*Ant.* 75.4). Other cities are associated more directly with music: cf. Ephesus (*Ant.* 24.4) and Samos (*Ant.* 56.8), both as part of celebrations organised by Antony, who has already been shown to indulge in the company of musicians as he arrives in Asia (*Ant.* 24.2). Horse-racing is related to

The behaviour of Plutarch's Alexandrians recalls Cleopatra's own theatricalisation of Antony's public appearance.<sup>77</sup> Their treatment of Antony, which echoes comic action, might not have been in essence a Plutarchan creation but the integration of such imagery betrays Plutarch's moral programme. Scholars have tended to analyse Antony and Cleopatra's night escapades as an allusion to Nero's mischief.<sup>78</sup> Without disputing this reading I would like to add another interpretative layer to this passage. The Alexandrians, I argue, are partly justified in associating Antony's conduct with a dramatic role. I contend that Plutarch presents Antony as a comic actor performing according to the norms that define a certain *persona* from this dramatic register. Although the anecdote seems fleeting, the language which Plutarch uses is loaded with theatrical meaning and moralistic evaluation. A similar reading has been proposed by Sophia Xenophontos, whose argument rests on Plutarch's exploitation of comedy in the *Lives* to assess morally his subjects.<sup>79</sup> She further argues that Plutarch uses the stock figure of the *miles gloriosus* (braggart soldier) of ancient comedy to depict Antony.<sup>80</sup> Xenophontos' treatment of *Ant.* 29.3-4, which concludes her study of Antony, does not deal with his behaviour in detail but rather on the reaction of the Alexandrians. She argues that while they acted as his flatterers, their appreciation of Antony allows Plutarch to demonstrate how one can approach Antony with compassion.<sup>81</sup> Xenophontos reads the Alexandrians as the same flatterers who indulge him at Cleopatra's court. I disagree. These Alexandrians are the people of Alexandria whose delight in drama is symptomatic of their city's

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Roman military encounters (cf. *Plut. Ant.* 41.6; 62.3); the hippodrome is mentioned once but as part of the area which Caesar (Octavian) occupies as he invades Alexandria (*Ant.* 74.4).

<sup>77</sup> Dio's Alexandrians also reflect their leader's behaviour, where the emphasis is put on music. For instance, the Alexandrians' obsession with flute-playing (*Dio.* 32.51) is echoed by their previous monarch, Ptolemy XI, as he solely concentrated on piping rather than on the affairs of state (*Dio.* 32.70). Kasprzyk and Vendries (2012) for a good edited volume on the *Speech to the Alexandrians*, with an analysis of Dio's *topos* of the Alexandrians as theatre-loving and a section on Dio's philosophical understanding of politics (cf. Kasprzyk and Vendries (2012), 115-41) but more research needs to be done on the relationship between theatre and politics in this speech.

<sup>78</sup> Pelling (1988), 197 on the potential of Nero as a model for Plutarch's Antony; he notes the parallel between Antony's disguise as a slave and Tacitus' description of Nero's own use of a slave-costume to wander the city (*Tac. Ann.* 13.25). Brenk (1992), 4375 explores further the similarities between Plutarch's Antony and the image of Nero handed down by Roman historiography. If Antony's night escapades are modelled on Nero's behaviour, this would imply that this anecdote appeared at the end of or after the Julio-Claudian period.

<sup>79</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 603.

<sup>80</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 611-6.

<sup>81</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 615.

identity rather than that of the vile flatterers whom Plutarch could not abide.<sup>82</sup> Rather than flattering Antony, they humour him and do so on account of their keen appreciation of spectacle. While I agree with her overall conclusion, that comedy in the *Antony* allows Plutarch to criticise both Antony and his entourage, I understand Plutarch's criticism of both Antony and the Alexandrians at *Ant.* 29.3-4, through the use of comedy, to be much more severe.<sup>83</sup>

Plutarch describes these nocturnal adventures using a theatrical register, and casts Antony (and Cleopatra) as actors rather than figures of state. By employing *στολή*, for instance, when they dress up as servants, he portrays their act more as one of actors putting on a costume than simply aristocrats indulging in fancy dress. This term does not simply refer to clothing, but is often used in the Plutarchan corpus to designate outfits that possess a costume-like quality. This term tends to describe an ensemble of clothing that the wearer dons in order to alter his or her identity.<sup>84</sup> In the *Antony* the *στολή* is repeatedly used in contexts of dressing up to alter a certain reality. For example, Antony's emulation of Heracles and Cleopatra's embodiment of Isis are both expressed through a personal re-appropriation of these divinities' attire. Antony endorses, through his clothes (*τῇ στολή βεβαιούν*), the rumours of his descent from Heracles (*Ant.* 4.2), while Cleopatra presents herself in public with Isis' outfit to be hailed as New Isis (*στολή Ἴσιδος ἐξιέναι*, *Ant.* 54.9). Neither can claim to be living gods without raising, at least in Plutarch's perspective, great scepticism, but both attempt to transform their identity through an ensemble of clothes which can only be described as a costume.<sup>85</sup> It is this very same image which Plutarch, in his famous tableau of Cleopatra sailing to Cydnus, employs to describe maidservants attired as Nereids and Graces (*Νηρηίδων ἔχεσθαι καὶ Χαρίτων*

<sup>82</sup> Pelling (1988), 182 on Plutarch's attitude towards flatterers.

<sup>83</sup> Xenophontos (2012), 616.

<sup>84</sup> For instance, Plutarch explicitly associates the *στολή* with the scenic aspect of tragedy in his narrative of Dion's terrifying vision as a scheme is formed against him (*Dio.* 55). He sees a woman whose garb (*στολή*) corresponding to that of a Fury from tragedy (*μηδὲν Ἑρινύος τραγικῆς παραλλάττειν*, *Dio.* 55.2). Without having to resort to a description of this female apparition, Plutarch needs only to mention the ensemble of an iconic *persona* from tragedy to create a visual impact. As a point of comparison, Alexander dresses himself to rejoin his soldiers after a period of recovery, Plutarch mentions his *ιμάτιον*, but when Alexander wears outfits that do not strictly correspond to his identity such as Persian (*Alex.* 31.5) or Parthian (*Alex.* 45.1) clothing, Plutarch uses *στολή*. Without direct association to the theatre, the term still conjures an idea of costume ensemble rather than ordinary clothing.

<sup>85</sup> On clothes and politics in Plutarch see Ch. 2, I.1, 84 n. 213.

στολάς, *Ant.* 26.3).<sup>86</sup> Although this vision is delightful, the contrast is fully felt between the status of these women as slaves and their presentation as divine entities.

If the mention of στολή in the *Antony* already invokes an idea of theatrical disguise, its costume-like quality is sealed by Plutarch's use of σκευάζειν to denote Antony's emulation of Cleopatra's dressing up. This verb can simply refer to the act of preparation (cf. *Mar.* 35.10, *Cat. Ma.* 21.4; *Art.* 30.5), although Plutarch usually favours παρασκευάζειν.<sup>87</sup> Plutarch, however, frequently employs σκευάζειν as the act of wearing a σκευή, a costume for a dramatic performance. For instance, in order to capture Salamis, Solon devises a plan to lure the Megarians out of the island by sending a trusted Athenian who, pretending to be a deserter (προσποιεῖν αὐτόμολος εἶναι), persuades them to capture the Athenian women sacrificing on the coast of Colias (*Sol.* 8). He then orders a group of young men to disguise themselves in women's clothing (ἐνδύμασι καὶ μίτρας καὶ ὑποδήμασι σκευάζειν) and to dance on the shores (χορεύειν) with concealed weapons (*Sol.* 8.5). Although the context is not that of a dramatic performance to be presented in an actual theatre, Plutarch uses theatrical imagery to explain Solon's ploy. Solon is a chorus leader, who elaborately directs his actor, in the role of the deserter, and his chorus, a homogenous group of young men identically disguised and dancing in unison, in a successful performance which fools the enemy. It is he who orders (κελεύειν) the entire action and places (προσάπτειν) his "chorus" towards the sea. Within this scenic elaboration of a physical performance, σκευάζειν takes on a theatrical meaning to designate costume wearing: the young men are dressing to falsify their identity. Solon's young men are not unique. Plutarch often mentions σκευάζειν in conjunction with clothing to express the act of deceiving through visual rather than linguistic means. Thus Sestrius dresses up in Celtic clothing (ἔσθῆτι Κελτικῇ) to spy on the enemy (*Sert.* 3.3), and the Romans escape the city

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<sup>86</sup> I have chosen not to include Plutarch's description of Cleopatra's barge scene although Plutarch refers to it as a θέα since I agree with Pelling (1988), 187: Plutarch meant the scene to appear as a painting, rather than a dramatic spectacle. There are, of course, strong performative elements, which are explored by Chaniotis (1997) 241-2, who includes this description as part of the evidence supporting the existence of a Hellenistic tendency to stage royal appearances where monarchs impersonate certain Gods through costume, just as actors appear on stage; here Cleopatra is Aphrodite. In Plutarch, however, Cleopatra's identity as the goddess of love seems to depend more on the attributes that surround her rather than on a specific costume. This will come later when she appears as Isis (cf. *Ant.* 54.9).

<sup>87</sup> For the theatrical ambiguity of παρασκευάζειν see Ch. 2, II, 142-3.

during the civil war garbed as slaves (ἐν ἐσθήσιν οικειτικαίς, *Caes.* 31.1).<sup>88</sup> By combining σκευή with σκευάζειν Plutarch unequivocally casts Antony and Cleopatra within the realms of actors putting on costumes. Yet the theatrical element of his behaviour extends well beyond a simple matter of outfit: the nature of Antony's conduct once he is in character echoes the narrative of a certain type of ancient comedy.

Plutarch's description of Antony's nocturnal misdemeanours displays the author's acute understanding of the dynamic which constitutes comic action on the theatrical stage. Antony's antics follow the tropes which defined the plot of New Comedy.<sup>89</sup> The backdrop of the action sets the stage for the comic action as Antony's performance does not take place in palaces or battlefields, as would suit a queen or a general, but at the door of ordinary people's homes.<sup>90</sup> The mention of the doors and windows are tantalisingly suggestive of the scenic structure of later comic performances.<sup>91</sup> Menander often exploits, for instance, the tensions between

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<sup>88</sup> For other mentions of σκευάζειν as disguise through an ensemble of clothing: *Crass.* 24.1; *Septem.* 161c; with an ambiguous meaning at *Ant.* 50.4, where it could be understood as both *prepared* and *disguised*.

<sup>89</sup> Marshall (2016), 133 on Plutarch's good knowledge of Old and New Comedy, with numerous references to Aristophanes, Eupolis, Cratinus, Plato Comicus and Menander. While Bréchet (2005), 19 sums up the different criticisms levelled at Aristophanes' style of comedy, he also points to Plutarch's literary appreciation, pastiche (*De glor. Ath.* 348d-e), and even moral use of the comic poet (*Praecepta*, 804b-c). Di Florio (2005), 140 for a study of Plutarch's use of Menander, with a concise list of quotations. Plutarch's most obvious work on ancient comedy is his *Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander*, where Plutarch opposes Old Comedy to New comedy, but which, as Marshall (2016), 132 points out, does not reflect Plutarch's usual careful writing; this he argues suggests some heavy tampering on the part of the epitomator. Hunter (2000), 272 addresses Plutarch's vehement dislike of Aristophanes in the *Compar.* in favour of Menander as an inherently elitist picture of the poets: he divides them on political grounds, with Aristophanes' demagogic appeal to the crowd on the one hand, and Menander's more elitist upholding of order on the other. Aguilar (1997) for a wider study on Athenian Comedy in Plutarch's *Lives* with a particular focus on the *Pericles*; Aguilar (1997), 23 concludes that as a moralist Plutarch can only disapprove of comic poetry; she, however, conflates Plutarch's distaste of buffoons and jesters with a rejection of comedy as a genre.

<sup>90</sup> Swain (1992), 79-81 argues that the romantic intrigue of the *Antony* is influenced by tropes present in the ancient novel and in pantomime but he does not address this passage.

<sup>91</sup> Although written with very different aims, my research owes much to Timothy Wiseman's 1998 chapter 'The tragedy of Gaius Gracchus'. Wiseman (1998), 53, picking up on Karl Meiser's research, argues that the scene leading up to and including Licinia's supplication to her husband Caius (*C. Gracch.* 14-15) was inspired by a historical Roman tragedy. Meiser (1887) had argued for the existence of Roman tragedies inspired by historical action rather than myth. Although most of Wiseman's article rests on the historiographical possibility of using a tragedy as a historical source, he sites as evidence for staged tragedy Plutarch's mention of the two doors that frame the scene (*C. Gracch.* 14.5 and 15.2). Wiseman (1998), 56 allows for different degrees of sources, arguing that Plutarch could either have been directly inspired by the play or recounted a source which had taken the play as historically accurate and kept some of its dramatic features in the narrative. Wiseman does not exploit this point any further but he raises the importance of scenic backdrop in the ancient



characters indoors and those outdoors, as, for example, Cnemon's interaction with the crowd swarming at his door (*Men. Dys.* 165-69), or Getas' loud banging on Cnemon's door, asking for the servant (*Dys.* 459-65).<sup>92</sup> Plutarch himself recognised the link between banging at doors and the comic plot as he muses on the Greek custom of inhabitants banging on their outward opening doors to warn passers-by, the proof of which, he reports, is said to be drawn from comedies (ἀπὸ τῶν κωμωδιῶν λαμβάνοντες, *Pub.* 20.3-4). By mentioning Antony's action at the doors and windows of the ordinary people, Plutarch is recalling the popular nature of the comic cast, as opposed to the royal or self-consciously heroic status of tragic *personae*. But Plutarch also recalls the staging of ancient comedies, which relied on such domestic landscape to develop comic effects.<sup>93</sup>

The true comic element comes from Antony's behaviour. He embodies one of the iconic *personae* of the comedy repertoire, the slave.<sup>94</sup> Although Plutarch does not directly name Antony's costume, his disguise as a slave is heavily implied. Plutarch introduces the scene by describing Cleopatra donning the outfit of a slave girl (θεραπαινίδιον). She is not dressed up as a queen from tragedy enslaved through an epic war, but as a type of slave who unequivocally belongs to the domestic sphere. The θεραπαινίδιον seems also to have been a stock figure of ancient comedy.<sup>95</sup> Plutarch adds that Antony endeavoured to prepare himself in the

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visualisation of dramatic representations. I am not suggesting that this passage from the *Antony* was inspired by a satirical representation of Antony and Cleopatra's night time follies but rather that Plutarch was aware of the dynamics of playing with doors and windows which were incorporated and used in performances.

<sup>92</sup> Steidle (1968), 41 for a discussion of the comic use of doors and windows in Menander's *Dyskolos*.

<sup>93</sup> Csapo (2014), 67 argues that door-knocking scenes are a comic ploy already used by Aristophanes.

<sup>94</sup> Xenophonos (2012), 615 identifies Antony's embodiment of the slave as a stock comic character but does not go any further in her analysis. Slaves were a defining feature of comedy. For a selected bibliography of slaves in Aristophanes: Stephanis (1980) on an extensive catalogue of slaves in Aristophanes' comedies; Sommerstein (2009), 136-54 for Aristophanes' subversion of the status difference between slaves and citizens; Walin (2009) offers a specific look at a slave and his relationship with his master in *Peace*. Slaves in Menander: MacCary (1969) explores the correlation between Menander's slave names and their characterisation; Krieter-Spiro (1997) highlights the variety and differences in Menander's slave, with a particular emphasis on their profession. Akrigg and Tordoff (2013) offer a wide collection of studies on slavery from Aristophanes and Menander, to fragments of Old Comedy and different types of Greek art.

<sup>95</sup> Pollux, who detailed different types of mask-designs for various slave characters in the comic register, included at least two different types for the θεραπαινίδιον (one with short hair περικεκαρμένον, *Pol. On.* 4.154, and one with smooth locks παράψηστον, *On.* 4.151 and 4.154). This suggests that it was a common enough role in comedy by the first century to warrant its own diversity. David (2013) 94 points to the problematic use of Pollux as a historical source for masks. See MacCart (2007), 257-262 on the typology of masks in Old and New comedy that can be gleaned from

same fashion (οὔτως), that is as a servant, although he foregoes the exact mention of Antony's disguise, as the οὔτως recalls the θεραπαινίδιον, possibly implying that Antony may have dressed like a maidservant. This naturally contributes to ridicule Antony by distorting at least his status (and perhaps even his gender) through clothing. Antony does not, however, content himself with simply dressing the part: he acts it out.

Antony's endorsement of the slave *persona* is enhanced by the verbal and physical abuse he receives on his nights out. This echoes the narrative of the slave in ancient comedy, where the humour often revolved around the threat or the actual beating of a slave character.<sup>96</sup> Menander resorts to this in the *Samia*, for instance, when the young lad Moschio punches his slave Parmeno as the latter attempts to understand his master's actions and reason with him (Men. *Sam.* 679). Previously Parmeno had already been threatened with beating (*Sam.* 321; 662), while another master, Demeas, also threatens to beat his slave with a stick (*Sam.* 440). The *Dyscolus* sees Sostratus throw jibes and heap insults upon his slave Pyrrhias (*Dys.* 82; 123; 139-40), as the latter rushes on stage panic-stricken, for the purpose of entertaining the audience.<sup>97</sup> The violence which slaves are subjected to, whether physical or verbal, was a consistent feature of New Comedy.<sup>98</sup> In this light, it is hardly surprising that Antony's abuse, whilst a slave, should be read by the Alexandrians as a comedy.

Yet this scene is not simply a comic description of Antony's silliness. This comedy and the words used to describe it betray Plutarch's moralistic evaluation of his character's behaviour. Antony does not content himself with playing a comic part, but the type of comedy which is acted out belongs to a register which Plutarch

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vase paintings although Piqueux (2013), 70 highlight the difficulties in creating a typology of masks from archaeological evidence, and expresses doubt as to the creation of a standardised list which would unify all types of sources.

<sup>96</sup> Tordoff (2013), 41 argues that part of the comic value of slavery was based on the amusing potential of the slave's humiliation. See Konstan (2013), 154 on the easy comic potential of abusing slaves on stage. Halliwell (2009), 399 remarks that crude and insulting language in Menander is either uttered or suffered by slaves rather than citizens; this associates the aggressive style of humour based on humiliation with slaves rather than other *personae*.

<sup>97</sup> Aristophanes also stages a beaten slave for comic effect (Aristoph. *Wasps*, 1292-5). The comedy occurs, however, through the language and imagery which the slave, Xanthias, employs after the beating which has taken place off stage. Biles and Olson (2015), 459 underline the centrality of Xanthias' speech in creating a comic effect.

<sup>98</sup> Cox (2013), 165-6.

considered vulgar, as opposed to high comic action. The description of Antony's adventures in Alexandria, and the citizens' response to it, is tantalisingly similar to the chorus' celebration of Aristophanes' claims to innovation in the *Peace*. The chorus argues that the playwright offers his audience a new form of drama, departing from the traditional models of comedy by inventing a new type of humoristic play. The language used by Aristophanes to qualify this lowly form of comedy beautifully echoes Plutarch's description of Antony's calamities on the streets of Alexandria. Where Aristophanes' chorus celebrates the poet for departing from the vulgarity of buffoonish jests (βωμολόγευμα ἀγεννή, *Peace*, 748), the Alexandrians associate Antony's behaviour with buffoonery (βωμολοχία).<sup>99</sup> Where the chorus defines this lowly form of comedy by its reliance on the humiliation of slaves, as they are mocked (σκόπτειν) and beaten (πληγαί, *Peace*, 745), Antony, disguised as a slave, endures both jibes (σκόμματα) and blows (πληγαί).<sup>100</sup> If indeed Plutarch is alluding to Aristophanes, the message is a grim one. Not only is Antony behaving like an actor performing the role of a slave, but also the type of comic acting he is acting out is a lowly, vulgar form of comic entertainment.

Even without considering this passage as an allusion to the Aristophanic exploration of the comic genre in the *Peace*, Plutarch's own theory of comedy elsewhere echoes Aristophanes' chorus and casts Antony's behaviour within the realm of unacceptable comic action. In his *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, Plutarch distinguished between good and bad comedy. The first presents harsh political matters (πολλὰ (...) ἀύστηρὰ καὶ πολιτικά) before its audience (πρὸς τὸ θέατρον, *Adulator*, 68b), while the second, by tainting the humour and frank speech (παρρησία) with buffoonery (βωμολοχος), undermines the benefits of both

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<sup>99</sup> Sommerstein (1985), 168 argues that the complexity of this passage stems from a revision by the author, although the difficult lines do not concern those I have quoted. See Olson (1998), 219 on the textual transmission and interpretation of the Greek. The term βωμολοχία is strongly associated with comic performers and spectacles throughout the Plutarchan corpus, and acts of buffoonery are included as part of visuceal entertainment (cf. Sulla distracting himself from his sorrows with such performances at *Sull.* 35.3, and the chilling use of Crassus' head by Armenian entertainers at *Crass.* 32.3).

<sup>100</sup> Dover (1972), 206 suggests that Aristophanes did not keep to this programme in later plays but continued to entertain by having his slaves abused (cf. *Lys.* 1216-24; *Birds*, 1313-36). Plutarch's use of Aristophanes' theory of comedy in the *Peace* could be pushed even further. The chorus also mentions the depiction of Heracles made servile (*Peace*, 741) as an easy comic trope, just as Antony, who has repeatedly been shown to emulate Heracles (cf. *Ant.* 4.2; 36.7; 60.4) is here made servile. Xenophontos (2012), 612 picks up on Antony's comic depiction and his avatar as Heracles. See Sommerstein (1985), 167 on Hercules as a comic figure.

(*Adulator*, 68c). Plutarch concludes that the audience can tease nothing useful (οὐδὲν χρήσιμον) from such base performances (*Adulator*, 68c).<sup>101</sup> Although expressed here in a different language, Plutarch's evaluation of worthy comedy could be linked back to Aristophanes in the *Peace*: the chorus announces that the poet's new line of comedy takes on a political dimension, as he proposes a severe criticism of Cleon, a leading figure in contemporary Athenian politics (*Aristoph. Peace*, 752-3).<sup>102</sup>

Antony's behaviour, the location, the participants, the action, all belong to the type of comedy which Plutarch did not value but considered beneath the dignity of the proper citizen and politician. The drama relies on the physical performance of domestic violence, designed for pleasure, rather than on the careful deconstruction of contemporary political themes to educate the audience. Antony is morally condemned for allowing his body to be treated in such a demeaning manner. If Antony has the opportunity to behave like an actor, rather than a politician, it is because Cleopatra and her people allow it to happen. Here the shadow of Alexandria looms large. Whereas in Rome he merely kept company with jesters, in this Hellenistic hub he becomes the creator of laughter. The Alexandrians, by recognising the performance as a comic one, and by enjoying it rather than condemning it, not only display their vulgar taste for unsophisticated entertainment but also allow dramatic performances to blend into politics. This is further emphasised by their association of Antony's Roman affairs with a tragic performance, where the Alexandrians extend the theatrical world into a sphere where it does not belong.

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<sup>101</sup> ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον αὐστηρὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ πεποίητο: συμμεμγμένον δὲ τὸ γελοῖον αὐτοῖς καὶ βωμολόχον, ὥσπερ σιτίοις ὑπότροιμα μοχθηρόν, ἐξίτηλον ἐποίηε τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ ἄχρηστον, ὥστε περιῆν κακοηθείας δόξα καὶ βδελυρίας τοῖς λέγουσι, χρήσιμον δὲ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων. Aristophanes in the *Frogs* does not see a contradiction between laughter and seriousness (*Frogs*, 389-90).

<sup>102</sup> Cleon, Athens' leading politician after 430 BC, is the object of much satire (*Peace*, 754; cf. 755-60). See Sommerstein (1985), 169 and Olson (1998), 222-3 for a detailed analysis of Cleon's caricature. The language used to describe Cleon, however, is beyond frank speech and belongs to a very graphic register. The idea that Aristophanes is claiming greatness by turning his attention to politics has been challenged by Silk (2000), 349 who argues that Aristophanes' claim for his art at *Peace* 748-52 is based more on literary merits; the distinction lies in arousing laughter through slapstick humour (beating a slave) and through carefully crafted language (Aristophanes' masterful depiction of Cleon).

The distinction between Antony's behaviour in Alexandria and in Rome, according to the Alexandrians, is not articulated as an opposition between acting and non-acting, but as one of different dramatic registers. Antony's dealing in Rome could be viewed through the modern idea of *tragic* perhaps, that is, as a serious action with a terrifying end, but the mounting conflict he enters into against Octavian is not described through stage or acting metaphors. Antony himself is not systematically or successfully histrionic. Nowhere does Plutarch use theatrical language to describe his interaction with his fellow Romans, and the rare times where Antony attempts to treat Roman public affairs as a spectacle, he is thwarted or criticised (cf. Antony's endeavours to crown Caesar before the *demos* on the *bēma*, *Ant.* 12). Yet the Alexandrians remove some of the reality and seriousness of Antony's political action with Rome by equating it with a dramatic role. By viewing Antony's behaviour as a performance, the Alexandrians echo Cleopatra and her followers' evaluation of his conduct according to the norms of theatrical spectacle. This understanding stands in opposition to the Roman process of evaluation which relies on a set of virtues which belong to the political arena, and vices which are associated with spectacle. Far from the dismissive distinction the Romans make between political action and theatrical display, the Alexandrians actually invite the dramatic world into the political arena.

If Cleopatra, her Egyptian followers and the Alexandrians allow public appearances of politicians to be transformed into spectacles it is because they are of the same mould. I contend that the penchant towards theatrical politics, and the manner in which a leader is theatrical, is echoed by the way their people interact and view their statesmen. If Cleopatra shares the same type of histrionic politics as her people it is because she is the ruler of Egypt. Cleopatra is thought of, in modern historiography, as the last Macedonian monarch to sit upon a throne of note. For Plutarch, however, she was "the Egyptian" (ἡ Αἰγυπτία), a term so potent to describe her that he uses it without reference to her name.<sup>103</sup> While Plutarch was aware of her Macedonian heritage, denigrating her royal ancestors for their ineptitude at learning Egyptian, or

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<sup>103</sup> Cf. *Ant.* 25.3; 27.5; 29.6; 31.4.

even forgetting their Macedonian dialect (*Ant.* 27.5), Cleopatra's culture is made to be Egyptian, not Macedonian.<sup>104</sup>

Egypt is certainly instrumental to the *Antony*. Simon Swain rightly points out that Antony's fluctuation between Rome and Egypt allows Plutarch to illustrate his subject's wavering moral character.<sup>105</sup> Antony's increasing absorption of Egyptian lifestyle, from his interaction with its people to his love affair with Cleopatra, parallels his steady alienation from Roman values, a development which ultimately contributes to his downfall.<sup>106</sup> From Swain's article, two key points can be demonstrated. First, his conclusion suggests the importance which culture and geography hold in Plutarch's understanding of the shaping of history as he credits culture and geography with a certain influence on the decisions and actions of men.<sup>107</sup> Second, Plutarch's Cleopatra was not conceived of as Hellenic or even Macedonian but as Egyptian. Swain argues that Cleopatra's Egyptian identity opposed Roman and Hellenic values, a conclusion I would like to nuance.<sup>108</sup> Cleopatra's Egyptian identity need not be seen only as an opposing force to Roman or even Hellenic values, and therefore as a narratological tool to showcase Antony's ethical mutation.<sup>109</sup> I argue that Cleopatra was Egyptian because she ruled over Egyptians.

The resemblance between a ruler and his or her people, especially between the Ptolemies and the Egyptians is best illustrated by the Spartan Therycion's outburst in the *Cleomenes*. The speech of Therycion, Cleomenes' Spartan friend who follows him to Egypt and exile after Antigonus III Doson's capture of Sparta, reveals the perceived parallel between leader and people, regardless of their separate cultural and ethnic origins. In an attempt to dissuade his king from reaching Egypt, Therycion argues that since the Spartans have been defeated but had not died in battle, suicide was now the noblest course (*Cleom.* 31.5). Part of his argument rests on Sparta's cultural superiority.

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<sup>104</sup> See Pelling (1988), 191 on the implication that they would have spoken *koinē* Greek.

<sup>105</sup> Swain (1990c), 153.

<sup>106</sup> Swain (1990c), 155.

<sup>107</sup> Duff (1999a), 61 echoes this with a slightly different angle, by highlighting the influence of education and environment on a person's virtuous and vicious disposition.

<sup>108</sup> Swain (1990c), 152.

<sup>109</sup> Swain (1990c), 153.

εἰ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶ δουλεύειν τοῖς ἀπὸ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοὺς ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους, πλοῦν πολὺν κερδανοῦμεν Ἀντιγόνῳ παραδόντες ἑαυτοὺς, ὃν εἰκός ἐστι Πτολεμαίου διαφέρειν ὅσον Αἰγυπτίων Μακεδόνας.

For if it is not shameful for those begotten from Heracles to be slaves to those of Philip and Alexander, then we will spare ourselves much sailing by giving ourselves to Antigonus, who is as superior to Ptolemy as the Macedonians are to the Egyptians.

(*Cleom.* 31.5)

This section of Therycion's speech is of course imbued with Spartan self-importance, but it still betrays the relationship which the Greeks perceived between the head of state and the people which he governs. Claude Mossé's commentary on the *Cleomenes* demonstrates the clash between our modern concepts of cultural difference and appropriation with that of the ancients. She sees Therycion's approach as "étonnante", arguing that while Antigonus was the successor of Philip and Alexander, as a Macedonian who had inherited the throne from his successful Macedonian ancestors, Ptolemy was "tout aussi macédonien que lui".<sup>110</sup> In our modern perspective the ethnic origins of Ptolemy (and Cleopatra) determine their heritage, while for Therycion, Ptolemy's people are the Egyptians and should be judged according to their values.<sup>111</sup>

Just as Therycion's Ptolemy, Plutarch's Cleopatra is associated with her people rather than her family heritage. Cleopatra both associates herself and is associated with Egyptian people and customs. For instance, when she rebukes Antony for attempting to impress her with his fishing skills (*Ant.* 29.5), she gently chides him by balancing the duties of a Roman general with those of an Egyptian monarch. She commands him to give his fishing rod to the kings of Pharos and Canopus (Φαρίται καὶ Κανωβίται βασιλεῖς) arguing that his hunt is for cities, kingdoms and continents (πόλεις καὶ βασιλείαι καὶ ἤπειροι, *Ant.* 29.7).<sup>112</sup> This, of course, demonstrates Cleopatra's ability to humour Antony, but also betrays her sense of identity. Both the Island of Pharos and the city of Canopus were water-

<sup>110</sup> Mossé (2001), 1490.

<sup>111</sup> Mossé (2001), 1490 is right, however, in arguing that Therycion's speech reveals the Hellenic distaste for what is perceived as oriental, since Plutarch will go on to depict Sparta's superiority to the Egyptian court, which is portrayed as pleasure-loving and degenerate (*Cleom.* 33).

<sup>112</sup> I here follow Ziegler (1971), 89 who reads βασιλεῦσιν. Bekker (1855), 383 reads ἀλιεῦσιν.

related locations that framed the city of Alexandria, as the island was just off the city, to the North West, and Canopus, which sat on the mouth of the Nile, transferred its name to the city's Eastern Gate.<sup>113</sup> Cleopatra, therefore, by designating the local kings as fisherman is denigrating her political class and contrasting it with the ambitions and scope of the Roman *imperator*.

The argument could be put forth that Alexandria, as a product of Macedonian colonisation, should be viewed as a synonym with its founding culture. But Alexandrians, especially in the *Antony*, are not represented as Macedonians, and the importance of fishing, in Cleopatra's depiction of the local kings, likens them much more to Egyptians, who were strongly associated with water-based life, than Macedonians.<sup>114</sup> Alexandria's status as an Egyptian city is later established as Antony celebrates his triumph over the Armenians in Alexandria (εἰς Ἀλεξάνδρειαν), and confers upon the Egyptians (Αἰγύπτιοι) certain Roman privileges to indulge (χαρίζεσθαι) their queen (*Ant.* 50). This passage illustrates the permeability of Alexandria, both as a unique city and as part of Egypt, but also demonstrates the importance of Egyptians for Cleopatra, or at least as perceived by Antony, who uses them to gratify her. Plutarch made Cleopatra an Egyptian, who shared her histrionic behaviour with that of her people. This stands in direct contrast with the Spartan approach to public appearance and spectacle.

## **II. Sparta**

### **1. Modes of Viewing**

If Plutarch describes Cleopatra's deception of Antony as a performance and the Alexandrians' experience of power as that of spectators in a theatre, he does not apply the same language to analogous situations within a Spartan context. Plutarch's

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<sup>113</sup> El-Abbadi (2004), 266 on the Island of Pharos and Canopus as harbours during Ptolemaic Egypt and earlier. Pelling (1988), 301 understands the Pharos as referring to Alexandria's mythical lighthouse and Canopus as a reference to the city gate.

<sup>114</sup> The Nile and the activities which it offered, such as fishing and sailing, had been considered a hallmark of Egyptian identity by the Greeks, from Herodotus (2.17-19). Cf. Aristotle (*Meteo.* 351b29-35). Vasunia (2001), 91 for a discussion of Egypt in Greek thought as "the gift of the river". The place of river activities in re-imagining Egypt transcended the Greek world: Swetnam-Burland (2015), 145 on Nilotic scenes that came to grace the walls of imperial villas.



Spartan leaders are wily, and often resort to deception, and yet are not taxed with artificiality or distortion of reality, concepts which are so often associated with theatre in the *Lives*.<sup>115</sup> For instance, while Agesilaus resorts to a deceitful *mise-en-scène*, faking victory after a Spartan defeat (*Ages.* 17), Plutarch foregoes any theatrical language or image of artificiality. As the king learns of the Spartan annihilation by Persian forces off the shore of Cydnus and of the death of Peisander, his chosen naval commander and brother-in-law (*Ages.* 10.6), he tricks his army by performing a lie.

ἡχθέσθη μὲν οὖν, ὡς εἰκός, ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ διὰ τὴν πόλιν, ὅπως δὲ μὴ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ μάχην βαδίζουσιν ἀθυμία καὶ φόβος ἐμπέση, τάναντία λέγειν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἤκοντας, ὅτι νικῶσι τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ· καὶ προελθὼν αὐτὸς ἔστεφανωμένος ἔθυσεν εὐαγγέλια καὶ διέπεμπε μερίδας τοῖς φίλοις ἀπὸ τῶν τεθυμένων.

He was pained by these tidings, as was natural, on account of his friend and his city, and yet, so that his soldiers might not be taken by despondency and panic as they walked into battle, he ordered those coming from the sea to speak the opposite, that they had won a naval battle. And coming forward crowned, he made sacrifices for the good news and sent a portion of the offerings to his friends.

(*Ages.* 17.3)

This passage is full of elements that could easily be spun using theatrical language and yet Plutarch does not indulge in such imagery. Just like Cleopatra's love-act, Agesilaus' pretence is a blatant distortion of reality. He is not simply lying by omission, but he involves others in his deception. Not only is this alteration of the truth not described through the terminology of artificiality, but also no negative moral judgement is explicitly attached to this act. Plutarch does not use any vocabulary of creation or trickery, such as he uses to describe Cleopatra's actions. As Agesilaus encourages the messengers in his deception, Plutarch plainly states that they spoke the reverse (τάναντία λέγειν) of what happened. While the messengers' alteration of the news may not require theatrical imagery, Agesilaus' conduct has more in common with Cleopatra's performance than one might expect

<sup>115</sup> Lloyd (2005), 134 notes treachery as a stereotypical Spartan feature in non-Spartan sources cf. Euripides' *Andromache*, whose eponymous character refers to the Spartans as "lords of lies" (ψευδῶν ἄνακτες, *Andr.* 447). See also Hdt. 9.54.1; Aristoph. *Peace*, 623. Plutarch's Agesilaus on more than one occasion turns to deceit (cf. *Ages.* 9.3).

from a Spartan king. He reinforces his lie through a public performance designed to manipulate the opinion of his audience. Despite this *mise-en-scène*, as Agesilaus acts out his part before an audience, Plutarch's description lacks any suggestion of theatrical staging.

Plutarch's version of this simulated victory celebration is inspired by Xenophon's account of Sparta's altercation with Persia (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.13-14).<sup>116</sup> Plutarch's version puts more emphasis on the importance of public appearance and performance. While Xenophon's Agesilaus simply sacrifices (βουθυτείν) with no suggestion of stagecraft (*Hell.* 4.3.14), Plutarch plays with the performative aspect of Agesilaus' public appearance, as he comes forward (προέρχασθαι) wearing the accessory to match the occasion (ἔστεφανωμένος). Yet, while Plutarch is conscious of Agesilaus' public appearance, as he steps out to manipulate his soldiers, there is no sense of the viewer's experience or reaction at the sight of the king's presence. Plutarch does not reproach him for the garland, which could easily be described as a costume since it is used to persuade the audience of the validity of these celebrations, which in reality hide the death of Spartan warriors.<sup>117</sup> Where Cleopatra's love game is immediately cast into the realm of artificial self-presentation, as Plutarch constantly reminds the reader of the tensions between Cleopatra's actual intentions and the falseness of her actions, there is comparatively no tension between the real and the fake in Agesilaus' deception of his soldiers.

If Agesilaus' performance, as he dresses up to persuade his audience of a lie, hoping to manipulate their emotions, is not described through the lens of a theatrical production, this could partly be explained by the source from which Plutarch is drawing his account. Xenophon's version is devoid of any sense of theatrical presentation. Even the lie is justified as a form of respect towards his soldiers' temperament, who are willing to share news when it is good but choose to conceal it

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<sup>116</sup> Shipley (1997), 48-51 on Plutarch's use of Xenophon as a source for the *Agesilaus*. While Plutarch certainly follows Xenophon's *Agesilaus* and *Hellenica* in certain aspects, Shipley (1997), 49 stresses Plutarch's thematic independence from his original source. Hamilton (1992), 4208 collates the sources named by Plutarch in the *Agesilaus*. Hamilton (1994) proposes a third source, from Boeotia and hostile to Agesilaus, which Plutarch and Xenophon would have used differently.

<sup>117</sup> By contrast, Demosthenes' own festive appearance at Philip II of Macedon's death is the object of much more elaborate description, increasing the visual impact of his actions (ὁ Δημοσθένης ἔχων λαμπρὸν ἰμάτιον ἔστεφανωμένος *Dem.* 22.3) and is followed by heavy criticism (*Dem.* 22.5).

when it is bad (*Hell.* 4.3.13).<sup>118</sup> Yet I contend that Plutarch is not simply responding to Xenophon's version but is reading the incident in a wider political framework. Plutarch is not borrowing language from the lexical field of theatrical staging because the king's motivations are *good*. He is not attempting to further his own ambitions or to serve his own interests but is acting with political consciousness.<sup>119</sup> The distress felt by Agesilaus at the news of Peisander's death is not simply due to his personal appreciation of the man but also on account of his city (διὰ τὴν πόλιν). He is conscious of Sparta's welfare and the consequences which military failure might have on his army's morale. Not only are Agesilaus' intentions honourable, but what his performance is aimed at specifically is the antithesis of what theatrical productions are supposed to achieve: Agesilaus aims to stifle a surge of emotions. In fact, the king will attempt to ward off despondency (ἀθυμία) from the hearts of his soldiers throughout his life (*Ages.* 30.5; 32.7) and is the only Spartan king or general to do so.

Cleopatra, by comparison, not only encourages extreme emotionality in both herself and Antony, but she is also not acting out for any particular good. Unlike Agesilaus, who does not display any emotion in public, Cleopatra makes a show of her supposed grief. Where Agesilaus seeks military success through the avoidance of negative feelings, Cleopatra increases her's and Antony's emotionality to the detriment of his immediate (and future) military triumph. Her seduction directly affects his war plans, as he postpones his expedition against the Parthians, despite the prime conditions, in order to appease what he believed to be her pain at abandonment (*Ant.* 53.11). This distinction between Agesilaus' avoidance of over-emotionality and Cleopatra's encouragement of excessive feeling recalls Plutarch's own distinction between drama and philosophy. Where Theodorus, a tragic actor, valued tragedy over comedy because it made the audience weep and lament (δακρύειν καὶ κλαίειν) rather than laugh (τὸ γελᾶν ποιεῖν), Plutarch agrees with philosophers who argue that philosophy is superior to both for ending sorrow and

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<sup>118</sup> Shipley (1997), 225 points out the lack of moral judgement on both Plutarch and Xenophon's part, but he focuses on the religious aspect of Agesilaus' act, which could easily be construed as blasphemous. Shipley does not point out the potential goodness of the king's actions in wishing to preserve the morale of his soldiers.

<sup>119</sup> Plutarch uses προσποιεῖν twice to describe Agesilaus' self-centred pretences, as for example when Agesilaus (not unlike Cleopatra) toys with the emotions of Megabates, a young man he is in love with (*Ages.* 11.6); cf. also *Ages.* 22.1.

correcting judgement (*De Laude*, 545f).<sup>120</sup> The opposition between what is positively profitable to an individual, and what cannot help him, is construed as the experience of negative emotion – grief in the *On Praising Oneself Inoffensively*, and erotic passion in the *Antony* – which must be avoided in order to allow sound judgement and a calm mind to dictate a man’s actions. To describe Agesilaus’ deception through a theatrical lens would imply a moral condemnation, which Plutarch withholds here: Agesilaus, however deceitful, cannot be theatrical because he avoids emotion and acts for the common good.

If Agesilaus is not described as theatrical in his enactment of pretence, neither are the Spartans in their understanding of political power. When viewing their leader’s public behaviour, they do not treat the experience as a performance inviting spectatorship but as one which requires a political and moral evaluation of the men before them. This is best shown by comparing the Spartans’ reaction to Agesilaus’ and Lysander’s rivalry in Ephesus (*Ages.* 7.1-3) with the Egyptians’ later response to their first meeting with Agesilaus (*Ages.* 36.4-5). Similarly to Cleopatra’s and Antony’s antics before the Alexandrians, Plutarch is not describing the Spartan leaders’ behaviour within a political decision making process, such as at an assembly, but in a public context, as leaders interact with the people. In the first example, the tension between Agesilaus and Lysander stems from the former’s enjoyment of tremendous popularity, with crowds at his door, while the latter does not receive the same attention (*Ages.* 7.1-2). The second example occurs when Agesilaus has left Sparta to aid the Egyptian King Tachos at the end of his life (*Ages.* 36.1) and is met by the Egyptian crowd.

οὐδείς γὰρ δεινότερος οὐδὲ φοβερώτερος ἐκείνου τῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀποσταλέντων ἐγένετο στρατηγῶν, οὐδὲ μείζονα τοὺς φίλους ἀνὴρ ἄλλος εὐεργέτησεν οὐδὲ κακὰ τηλικαῦτα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐποίησεν. ὧν ἔτι προσφάτων ὄντων. οἱ ἄνθρωποι μνημονεύοντες, ἄλλως δὲ τὸν μὲν Ἀγησίλαον ἀφελῆ καὶ λιτὸν ἐν ταῖς ὁμίλαις καὶ δημοτικὸν ὀρώντες, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοίως σφοδρότητα καὶ τραχύτητα καὶ βραχυλογίαν παρούσαν, ὑπέπιπτον αὐτῷ παντάπασι καὶ μόνῳ

<sup>120</sup> ἂν δὲ γ' οἶμαι πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶπη φιλόσοφος ἀνὴρ 'ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ποιεῖν, ὧ βέλτιστε, κλαῖειν καὶ δακρύειν, τὸ δὲ παύειν λυπούμενους καὶ κλαίοντας σεμνὸν ἔστιν,' ἐπαινῶν ἑαυτὸν ὡφελεῖ τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ μετατίθησι τὴν κρίσιν.

προσείχον. ἐκ δὲ τούτου πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λοιποὶ Σπαρτιᾶται χαλεπῶς ἔφερον ὑπηρέται Λυσάνδρου μᾶλλον ἢ σύμβουλοι βασιλέως ὄντες.

Of all the generals sent to Asia, none held more power nor were more terrifying than [Lysander] and no other man had so greatly benefited his friends nor caused such great harm to his enemies. The men remembered these recent events, besides seeing that Agesilaus was artless, plain in his intercourse and common of manner, and while [Lysander] equally possessed the same vehemence, harshness and brevity of speech as before, they surrendered to the latter completely and turned towards him alone. In consequence of this, the rest of the Spartans first endured, with difficulty, being the servants to Lysander rather than the advisors of the king.

(Ages. 7.2)

ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Αἰγυπτίων σπουδὴ τε μεγάλη καὶ προσδοκία διὰ τοῦνομα καὶ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ συνετρόχαζον ἅπαντες ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν. ὡς δὲ ἐώρων λαμπρότητα μὲν καὶ κατασκευὴν οὐδεμίαν, ἄνθρωπον δὲ πρεσβύτην κατακείμενον ἔν τιτι πόα παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, εὐτελή καὶ μικρὸν τὸ σῶμα, τραχὺ καὶ φαῦλον ἱμάτιον ἀμπεχόμενον, σκώπτειν αὐτοῖς καὶ γελοιοποιεῖν ἐπήει.

And the other Egyptians were very eager and expectant, through the name and reputation of Agesilaus, and ran together to the sight. And upon seeing neither splendour nor furnishings, but an old man lying down in some grass by the sea, with a mean and small body, covered by a rough and ordinary cloak, they fell to mocking him and making fun of him.

(Ages. 36.4-5)

In both instances Agesilaus' simplicity is at the heart of how his political status is understood by others. While the men at Ephesus and the Egyptians reject him, the former for not being more like Lysander and the latter for not living up to their expectations, the Spartans support Agesilaus. In both passages, the reaction of the people stems from viewing (ὄρᾶν) the king: it is Agesilaus' simplicity, especially in comparison to the ideal of a statesman, which causes the dissatisfaction in non-Spartans. Despite these very similar premises – an evaluation born from the viewing of Agesilaus' simplicity – these reactions and their consequences betray different ways of understanding and processing political authority. I will first examine the Ephesian and Spartan treatment of Agesilaus and then address the Egyptian judgement of the king. I argue that while the former is based on the identification of certain character traits, which the viewers prefer to see displayed in their leader's

actions, the latter is purely based on qualities which Plutarch judges as superficial because they do not rely on the evaluation of moral worth.

The scene at *Ages.* 7.2 offers two different perspectives on two different men: Lysander and Agesilaus are first judged by the men present at Ephesus and then by the Spartans.<sup>121</sup> Through these two leaders, Plutarch contrasts two different aspects of the Spartan character. Lysander's association with "vehemence, harshness and brevity of speech" is in keeping with his depiction in the Plutarchan corpus (*Lys.* 13.5; 22.1; 28.1; *Ages.* 8.4). But this vehemence, harshness and brevity of speech is not simply a reflection of his character. These traits are part of a set of traditional virtues associated, in the Plutarchan corpus, with the Lacedaemonian aristocracy. Only the elite, in the Spartan Lives, ever display either vehemence (σφοδρότης) or brevity of speech (βραχυλογία). Plutarch uses σφοδρότης to justify the institutionalisation of the Ephors, arguing that it did not alter the spirit of Lycurgus' oligarchic constitution as it only made the aristocracy more violent (σφοδροτέρα ἢ ἀριστοκρατία, *Lyc.* 29.6). It is also one of King Cleomenes' characteristics, as he is often spurred on by a vehement spirit (μετὰ σφοδρότητος ὄρμειν) into doing what he believes to be good (*Cleom.* 1.4). The same is true of βραχυλογία, which is very seldom used in Plutarch's Spartan corpus but is strongly associated with Lycurgus, a figure of the Spartan elite par excellence, who imposed his vision on his people through law (*Lyc.* 19.3). The term τραχύτης is used only once more in the Spartan corpus, in the Agesilaus, to describe the river Eurotas, the frontier of the Spartan territory (cf. *Ages.* 19.4; 31.6; 34.4) when it is at its most ferocious, after the melting of the snow (*Ages.* 32.2). In this context τραχύτης is not associated with a Spartan aristocrat but is used to describe an exceptional state of a Spartan landmark as it repels the enemy's advance. These qualities are not the standard Hellenic virtues associated with leadership, but are specifically Spartan, and belong exclusively to their idea of aristocratic excellence.

Just like Lysander, Agesilaus is not measured according to his appearance, but according to his character. Shipley rightly argues that these characteristics are in keeping with Plutarch's initial portrait of the king.<sup>122</sup> I wish to argue, however, that

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<sup>121</sup> Xenophon names them as locals (*Hell.* 3.4.7). Shipley (1997), 133 identifies these men as oligarchs and seems to imply that they are locals.

<sup>122</sup> Shipley (1997), 132.

these traits are more than a reiteration of Agesilaus' personality but carry a political dimension. Agesilaus' traits, artlessness (ἀφελής), plainness (λιτός) and, to some extent, commonness (δημοτικός) are in fact among the traits which Plutarch, and his Spartan elite, identify with the Spartan people. The idea of simplicity in opposition to intricacy (ἀφελής) is a typical Spartan characteristic which Lycurgus wished to encourage as a mode of life through his reforms. For instance, the scant dress imposed on Spartan girls encouraged a simple way of life (ἔθισμός ἀφελής), which makes them modest (*Lyc.* 14.4).<sup>123</sup> This is not reserved for Gorgo, King Leonidas' wife (*Lyc.* 14.4), or Cleombrotus' queen Chilonis (*Agis*, 17.2), or Agiatis, Cleomenes' bride (*Cleom.* 1.2) but for the wider female population. The only other Spartan king associated with ἀφελής is Cleomenes, and it is used in conjunction with him only once, as Plutarch describes the man's closeness to the common man (οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς, *Cleom.* 13.1). Plainness (λιτός), in the Spartan corpus, is associated with modest objects such as an unadorned cloak (*Ages.* 14.2) or a simply made papyrus (*Ages.* 36.6). At Ephesus, Agesilaus' plainness is specifically connected with his intercourse (ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις), which contrasts to some extent with Lysander's more Lycurgan style of speech (βραχυλογία). The only other association of λιτός with an elite Spartan reveals the subject's egalitarian views, rather than oligarchic leanings (ισότης καὶ κοινωνία, *Agis*, 7.3). The terms ἀφελής and λιτός are always purposefully connected to commonality rather than elitism. The idea of commonness (δημοτικός) in the Agesilaus plays an important role in the king's relationship with his people. Rather than referring to the political inclination towards the demos (in opposition to the aristocracy) as is the case in the other Spartan Lives (cf. *Lyc.* 7.2 *Lys.* 8.3; 19.3), δημοτικός is associated with Agesilaus' closeness to his people. The term is used to explain the effects which the agogē, the Spartan education for boys, had on Agesilaus. By following this training, which ordinary boys in Sparta received, but from which heirs to the throne were exempt (*Ages.* 1), Agesilaus became δημοτικός, demarcating him as the Spartan king who was most in harmony with his people (*Ages.* 1.3).<sup>124</sup>

<sup>123</sup> The term ἀφελής also defines the type of music and poetry which the Spartans produce after Lycurgus' reforms (*Lyc.* 21.1).

<sup>124</sup> διὸ καὶ πολὺ τῶν βασιλέων εὐαρμοστότατον αὐτὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις παρέσχε, τῷ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ προσκτησάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλόνοτον.

By contrasting vehemence and harshness with artlessness and simplicity of manner, Plutarch is not only setting up two men against each other, but also opposing two different aspects of Spartan character.<sup>125</sup> Faced with this dichotomy, the Spartans do not side with Lysander but with Agesilaus. Note here that the Spartans identify this adoration of Lysander's vehemence with being servants (ὕπηρέται), while serving Agesilaus, as the rightful superior, would confer onto them a status of advisors (σύμβουλοι). Their concerns are political, as they seek to see the Spartan order of royal supremacy over generalship preserved. They also wish to guarantee their own status amongst the power struggle of their political superiors. Agesilaus' simplicity is not, in the eyes of the Spartans, problematic in a leader and does not detract from his authority as king. The emphasis is put on political status, not appearance.

Whether the crowd at Ephesus or the Spartans, they do not behave like spectators. No importance is awarded to physical performance on the part of the leader or theatrical spectatorship on the part of the people to explain the dynamics between these two entities. Although this passage displays Plutarch's polarisation of Spartan culture, defining people against aristocrats, I am less concerned with the intricacy of Spartan society and wish to focus more on the model of political viewership this passage offers, especially in contrast with other political cultures where power is processed very differently. The absence of imagery relating to theatrical performance is even stronger when contrasting this Spartan attitude with that of the Egyptians as they evaluate Agesilaus. While I argue that the Egyptians' reaction is described using theatrical language, and casts them both as spectators and performers, Plutarch does not oppose the Egyptians' falsehood to Agesilaus' honesty. Both are acting according to their genuine understanding of royal display. This point is crucial to understand Plutarch's devaluation of Egyptian political culture, especially in comparison with the Spartan model. The distinction between the Egyptians on the one hand, and Agesilaus (or the Spartans more generally) on the other, lies in the values that they seek in leadership.

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<sup>125</sup> For a similar tension between Lysander's vehemence and harshness contrasted with his Spartan colleague Callicratidas' simplicity cf. *Lys.* 5-6; 7.3.



If the Spartans identified certain character traits in their leaders, the Egyptians expect more external signs of power. They do not value a set of virtues but expect “splendour” (λαμπρότης) and “furnishing” (κατασκευή). The noun λαμπρότης, and its adjective λαμπρός, do not necessarily refer to the quality of physical radiance. In the *Agesilaus*, when λαμπρότης is associated with Spartans, it is always used metaphorically in conjunction with their military achievements (*Ages.* 7.3; 24.3), the loss of which is mourned at the end of the *Life* just before Agesilaus sails to Egypt (*Ages.* 33.5). The term κατασκευή invokes lasting preparation, and is often used in an architectural context (cf. for instance *Lyc.* 6.3; *Tim.* 22.1; *Dio.* 10.5). Yet I am less interested in these two words’ individual meaning and more concerned with their connection to radiance in a royal context. The association of λαμπρότης which κατασκευή suggests a superficial dimension and reveals the type of royal luxury Egyptians correlate with genuine kingship. Plutarch, however, associates these two terms to describe the type of royal power he disapproves of. His *Dion* offers a good example of this, as he describes his ideal king. He considers a true king to be a man who seeks to furnish his soul with qualities inspired by virtue and justice (ὕπ’ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης), to which he opposes the man who values luxury through sumptuous clothing and possessions qualified as “brilliant with furnishing” (κατασκευῆ λαμπρύνειν, *Dio.* 10.4-5).<sup>126</sup> Here radiance and furnishing are associated with the materialistic aspect of kingship, which Plutarch considers superficial in comparison with the king’s ethical duties. Not fineries, Plutarch warns, but virtues make a king.

Yet these Egyptians’ superficiality, as they value luxury above virtue, is only part of Plutarch’s derogatory picture. They behave in exactly the same way as Cleopatra’s followers and Alexandrian folk do when they witness Antony’s

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<sup>126</sup> There are many examples in which Plutarch plays with the tensions between the moral definition of a king, as a man whose title demands that he conduct himself with virtue and justice, and the conflicting appearance of kingship, which involves expensive clothes and furnishings: cf. *Cleom.* 13.3, for instance, where his virtue is also contrasted with his lack of κατασκευῆ. This tension between the Egyptians’ inability to appreciate Agesilaus for his true worth is part of a wider theme of the *Life* as Plutarch repeatedly contrasts Eastern people and commanders’ expectations of visual sophistication in their kings with Agesilaus’ modest looks. See, for instance, Agesilaus’ meeting with Pharnabazus where the Spartan king is presented in all his simplicity, sitting humbly on the grass in the shade of a tree, while Pharnabazus’ attendants set out lavish cushions and carpets for the Persian Satrap (*Ages.* 12.1-2). Shipley (1997), 183 on Pharnabazus’ attire and paraphernalia as decadent. Humble (2002), 93 on Agesilaus’ moderation and its effect once he arrives in Asia (*Ages.* 14.1).

degrading performances (cf. *Ant.* 29. 3): they treat this meeting as a spectacle (θέα), which they respond to with jesting (σκόπτειν) and clowning (γελωτοποιεῖν).<sup>127</sup> This confirms Plutarch's prejudice of the Egyptians as a people who can only treat the public appearance of leaders as a comic performance to react to, as the combination of θέα with reactions such as σκόπτειν and γελωτοποιεῖν recalls the normative behaviour of comic drama offered in the theatre. These reactions, especially γελωτοποιεῖν, do not simply betray the Egyptians' treatment of power as a spectacle, but they also cast them, the spectators, in the role of comic performer. The choice of γελωτοποιεῖν to refer to the witnesses' act of laughing is loaded with performative meaning. The Egyptians here are not simply laughing (γελάω), but they *make laughter* (γελωτοποιεῖν). I have already discussed the negative portrayal Plutarch gives of the jester (γελωτοποιός), and his association with mime artists, and low life performers, who over-indulge and encourage the worst in weak men (cf. my discussion of *Ant.* 9.5-6). By reacting to Agesilaus' simplicity through γελωτοποιεῖν, Plutarch casts the Egyptians as performers of this lowest social order, with only superficial pleasure to offer.

While Plutarch does not necessarily condone a preference for vehemence and harshness over simplicity and artlessness, his treatment of the Spartans' perception of Agesilaus and Lysander at *Ages.* 7.2 is not tainted with the same scorn he reserves for the Egyptians at *Ages.* 36.5. Despite their differences, all Spartans fundamentally process political power using the same framework: they look for certain character traits which they identify as virtues. This is opposed to the Egyptian model, where the people treat power as a theatrical performance, to be analysed and reacted to within the framework of bad comedy. Plutarch associated the superficial engagement and evaluation of authority figures with theatrical imagery. But theatre

<sup>127</sup> The importance of the Egyptians as performers is obvious when comparing Plutarch's narrative with other versions of the event. Nepos' version concentrates much more on the visual aspect of Agesilaus' plainness, as he shares a simple meal with his men, reclining on a straw pallet and wearing but a skin. The tension between him and the Egyptian officers (not people) rests on their attempts to embellish his meal with more sophisticated dishes and fineries (Nepos, *Agesilaus*, 8.2-3). Nowhere does Nepos use theatrical language to describe the reaction of the Egyptians. Athenaeus includes Agesilaus' humiliation as he lands in Egypt in his list of examples of men who enjoy making fun of others (οἱ φιλοσκόπτων, *Ath.* 14.616d). The scene focuses entirely on King Tachos of Egypt's mockery (σκόπτειν) of the Spartan king, on the grounds that he was small of stature (εἶναι γὰρ βραχὺς τὸ σῶμα). Just as in Nepos, there is no sense of theatrical viewership or performance on the part of the Egyptians, and the focus is kept on Tachos and Agesilaus' one-liners as they try to out-scorn the other.

plays an even bigger role in the *Agesilaus* (and *Spartan Lives*) than simply a means to undermine the Egyptians and to atone for the hero's inability to seduce foreigners in their land. The explicit rejection of theatre's core mechanism, *mimesis*, and its penchant for artificiality, defines Agesilaus' understanding of art, as it defined the Spartan's attitude towards it.

## 2. Rejection of Theatre

In this section I contend that Plutarch represented Agesilaus as explicitly rejecting the theatrical arts and that this dismissal of theatre corroborates Plutarch's wider depiction of Spartan cultural preferences displayed both by other kings and by the Lacedaemonians themselves. I first touch upon Agesilaus' rejection of acting and *mimesis*. I argue that this reflects a deeper perception of the world, which explains this king's non-histrionic attitude towards authority and ruling. It is inserted in Plutarch's military narrative of the Spartan acquisition of Corinth. The Spartans take possession of the city as it is celebrating the Isthmian games, and rather than abandon the festivities, Agesilaus orders their completion (*Ages.* 21.1-3). Plutarch follows his narrative with a discussion of the king's attitude towards public performances. Plutarch distinguishes between what Agesilaus values and supports, the chorus and contests (χοροί καὶ ἀγῶνες), especially those of girls and boys (παίδων [καί] παρθένων ἄμιλλα), and what he rejects, which is what others tend to admire (*Ages.* 21.3).<sup>128</sup>

καὶ ποτε Καλλιπίδης ὁ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ὑποκριτῆς, ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ σπουδαζόμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπήνησεν αὐτῷ καὶ προσεῖπεν, ἔπειτα σοβαρῶς εἰς τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας ἐμβαλὼν ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυτο νομίζων ἐκείνον ἄρξειν τινὸς φιλοφροσύνης, τέλος δὲ εἶπεν· “Οὐκ ἐπιγινώσκεις με, ὦ βασιλεῦ;” κάκεινος ἀποβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶπεν· “Ἄλλὰ οὐ σύγε ἐσσι Καλλιπίδας ὁ **δεικηλίχτας;**” οὕτω δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι **τοὺς μίμους** καλοῦσι. παρακαλούμενος δὲ πάλιν ἀκοῦσαι **τοῦ** τὴν ἀηδόνα **μιμουμένου**, παρητήσατο φήσας, “Αὐτὰς ἄκουκα.”

<sup>128</sup> συμπαρῆν ἀεὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ σπουδῆς μεστὸς ὢν καὶ οὔτε παίδων οὔτε παρθένων ἀμίλλης ἀπολειπόμενος, ἃ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἑώρα θαυμάζοντα εἰδοὶ μὴδὲ γινώσκειν.

And when the actor of tragedies Callipides, who had a name and fame amongst the Greeks, and was eagerly respected by all, first encountered him and accosted him, thereupon interposing himself haughtily amongst his attendants, and he showed himself off, believing that Agesilaus would address him with a friendly greeting, finally said: “Do you not recognise me, oh King?” and he looking upon him said “But are you not Callispides the *dicelict*?” For that is how the Spartans call mime artists. And once when he was called upon to listen to the imitator of a nightingale, he declined saying “I have heard the nightingale itself”.

(Ages. 21.4-5)

These anecdotes are not simply trivial, included to illustrate Agesilaus’ ready wit, but reveal a much deeper set of values, which I will go on to argue are reflective of Spartan attitudes. The king’s rudeness to Callipides rests on his denigration of the actor’s status. Agesilaus denies the validity of the acting profession, as he recognises Callipides, not as a ὑποκριτής, but as a δεικηλίκτας. The term δεικηλίκτας is very seldom attested, and is considered to be both the actual Spartan word for the attic ὑποκριτής and a type of jester (LSJ s.v. δεικηλίκτας). Since this term appears to be so rare, it is not surprising that Plutarch felt the need to explain it to the reader: he explains it as the Spartan term for mime artists (μίμοι). Athenaeus, who is the only extant author also to mention the δεικηλίκτας and offer his translation of the term, gives a slightly different picture.<sup>129</sup> He includes the δεικηλισταί as the performers of a Spartan comic entertainment, which relies on simple wordplay (Ath. 14.621e). Athenaeus translates δεικηλισταί as “stage craftsmen” (σκευοποιοί) or “imitators” (μμηταί).<sup>130</sup> This term accordingly targets all workers of the theatrical world, from those who help design the production (σκευοποιοί) to those that imitate action on the stage (μμηταί). But a μμητής is not a μίμος and Plutarch knew the difference. The μμητής in Plutarch is only the man who imitates (cf. *Adulator*, 53c-e; *Comp. Sol. Publ.* 1.1; *Lyc.* 27.3; *Demetr.* 1.6). Whatever the original Spartan meaning, Plutarch has chosen to equate the term with, what he considers to be, the lowest

<sup>129</sup> Shipley (1997), 264 also notes the existence of the δεικηλίκτας in Athenaeus’ version but does not discuss the nuances between Athenaeus and Plutarch’s respective definitions of the term.

<sup>130</sup> Atheneaus’ subsequent discussion confirms that this Spartan term is very specific to a type of artist, rather than an umbrella term for all actor-type performers in the Doric lexicon. The translation of δεικηλισταί is followed by the appellations of these terms in other communities: the Sicyonians call them “phallus-bearers” (φάλλοφόροι) while others prefer “improvisers” (αὐτοκάβδαλοι, *Deip.* 14.621f). Rather than an umbrella term for all actors in the Doric lexicon, the δεικηλισταί were a type of comic performers and were associated with notions of mimetic artificiality and craftsmanship in Spartan culture.

group of professionals. In the light of my discussion of mime artists in Plutarch at *Ant.* 9.5, Agesilaus' consideration of Callipides' profession as a mime is, therefore, very damning because it sets his profession within the realm of morally disreputable entertainers.

Callipides, on the other hand, takes pride in his profession as an “actor of tragedies” (ὁ τῶν τραγωδιῶν ὑποκριτής) and expects recognition and respect.<sup>131</sup> This profession should distinguish him from the seedy class of buffoon-type artists abundant in Plutarch's description of Roman orgies and Egyptian performances.<sup>132</sup> While Plutarch's attitude towards acting, and in particular tragic acting, is very sceptical, he allows the performance of tragedy to be a higher art form than mime. For instance, a man who finds delectation in mime shows (ἡδεσθαι μίμοις), qualified as bad art and bad taste (κακοτέχνους καὶ κακοζήλους), should be tempted back towards good tragedies and comedies (*Ques. Conv.* 706d). Although rarely, Plutarch sometimes uses the acting profession as a positive comparison with politics. In the *Precepts of Statecraft*, Plutarch employs an acting metaphor to describe the perfect balance between contemporary Greek political action and Roman hegemony. He declares that Greek politicians should emulate the actors who pour their own talent into their performance but respect the prompter and the rhythm dictated by the play, thus viewing Roman power as the check over their political incentives (*Praec.* 813f).<sup>133</sup> Such a comparison with mime artists would be unthinkable for Plutarch.

If Agesilaus reveals his disregard for the acting profession, relegating it to a lower class of entertainer, his moral rejection of the theatrical art is exposed in the subsequent anecdote, as he refuses to hear a man imitate the song of a nightingale. I contend that Agesilaus' understanding of theatre adheres to the Platonic rejection of *mimesis*, and that the king's refusal to hear the “imitator” of a nightingale is a wider

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<sup>131</sup> Mentioned at *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2319 for winning the acting competition at the Lenaia in 419/18. Ghiron-Bistagne (1976), 143 on Callipides' fame.

<sup>132</sup> Muñoz Gallarte (2013) for a list of the tragic actors mentioned in Plutarch, whose (2013), 75 n. 40 remarks on Callipides' meeting with Agesilaus are too superficial, I believe, boiling it down to Plutarch's use of the actor as a figure of excess.

<sup>133</sup> ἀλλὰ μμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, πάθος μὲν ἴδιον καὶ ἦθος καὶ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἀγῶνι προστιθέντας, τοῦ δ' ὑποβολέως ἀκούοντας καὶ μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων.

symbolic rejection of artistic creation. Agesilaus justifies his refusal to hear the artist on the grounds that he has heard the bird itself. Note here that Agesilaus is not rejecting musical productions in general, but specifically the type that relies on a human's imitation of a sound that exists naturally without reproduction. This echoes Plato's famous regard of truth above mimetic creation, which occupies much of his repudiation of the theatrical arts from the Ideal City designed in the *Republic* (Pl. *Rep.* 597e).<sup>134</sup> Agesilaus cannot see the merit of the artist when he has knowledge of the real sound. This anecdote, however is not a simple echo of the Platonic understanding of mimetic art, but recalls Plato's specific denunciation of a certain type of musical creation, which relies on the imitation of natural sounds. Also in the *Republic*, music which reproduces the cries of animals, such as the neighing of horses (ἵπποι χρομετίζοντες) and the bellowing of the bull (ταύροι μυκωμένοι), is considered unfit for the Guardians of the City to imitate (μμεῖσθαι, *Rep.* 396b).<sup>135</sup> Although no specific reason is given, in this passage, as to *why* such sounds must be avoided, this type of musical emulation is given the most derogatory association to being mad (μαίνεσθαι). This he repeats in the *Laws* by qualifying as crude (ἀγροικία) such music that solely imitates animal sounds (φωναί θηριώδεις), without any other form of accompaniment (*Leg.* 669d-e; 700d7-8).

Scholars have associated this specific criticism of onomatopoeic reproduction of animal sounds with a rejection of contemporary theatrical musical practices. Plato's general criticism of certain types of music (cf. *Gorg.* 501a), and

<sup>134</sup> Agesilaus' rejection of mimetic art has a precedent. Plutarch has already established Agesilaus' distaste for *mimesis* and artificial transplantation of reality into an art form. Plutarch's introduction of the king's physicality is accompanied by an anecdote explaining Agesilaus' incentives to refuse: αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποθνήσκων ἀπέειπε "μήτε πλαστὰν μήτε μιμηλάν" τινα ποιήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος εἰκόνα, λέγεται δὲ μικρὸς τε γενέσθαι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εὐκαταφρόνητος (*Ages.* 2.2). The influence of Plato on Plutarch's depiction of Spartans has been noted by modern scholarship. Beck (1999), 173 remarks on the Platonic influence on Plutarch's Spartan *Lives* and (1999), 183-6 argues that his depiction of Agesilaus through anecdotes is inherited from Xenophon's own Socratic depiction of the Spartan king. Duff (1999b), 320-1 argues that Plutarch drew on Plato's definition of "great natures" to characterise Agesilaus. Stadter (1999), 482-3 argues for the importance Plato's depiction, in the *Republic*, of the ideal city's destruction through the obsessive pursuit of honour: Plutarch drew on this idea to depict Agesilaus and his politics. Futter (2012) has pointed out Plutarch's rapprochement between Plato's political philosophy and the constitution set up by Lycurgus. A Platonic reading of Agesilaus is, therefore, worth considering but this exceeds the scope of my thesis.

<sup>135</sup> Pelosi (2010), 62 on Plato's repudiation of "New Music" as stemming from this genre's desire to supplant reality through imitation. This is a perversion of Plato's belief in music's ability to improve the listener's moral character: music does for the soul what gymnastic does for the body (*Rep.* 376e). See Pelosi (2010) for a detailed analysis of Plato's philosophical approach to music.

this passage in particular, has been associated with his mistrust of a new genre developing at the end of the fifth century in Athens.<sup>136</sup> Although modern scholars have coined this development as “New Music”, it was specifically designed for theatrical productions and dithyrambic poetry.<sup>137</sup> Plato’s Athenian Stranger goes as far as to hold this style responsible for the degeneration of the Athenian population, through theatrical productions (*Leg.* 700d-701a), but its negative portrayal is also found in Aristophanes’ comedies, such as Aeschylus’ criticism of Euripides’ style in the *Frogs* (Aristoph. *Frogs*, 1301-25). In this light, the imitation of a bird is not simply an acquired skill, but belongs to a wider musical genre practiced in the theatre. To reject it is not simply a matter of taste but can be read in the wider context of criticism aimed at theatrical music. The connection of the nightingale (ἀηδών) with mimetic singing, however, does not necessarily need a Platonic reading to connect it to dramatic representations. It is itself a very strong theatrical symbol, to which Plutarch was sensitive, as I will now prove.

The imitation of the ἀηδών, especially if mentioned after that of a tragic actor, harks to the bird’s cultural relationship to performative art. Plutarch’s nightingales are repeatedly associated with poetical performances. In his *Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer*, Plutarch links the nightingale’s sweetness of song with the poets’ desire to imitate such a beautiful sound. As proof of beauty’s existence in nature, he invokes the comparison, made by the most skilled and fine of voice (οἱ λογιώτατοι καὶ καλλιφωνότατοι), between their endeavours (τὰ ἥδιστα ποιήματα) and the songs of nightingales (ἀηδόνων ᾠδή, *De Soll.* 973a).<sup>138</sup> A few lines later, Plutarch classes the nightingale’s cry as one of the fundamental didactic influences of the fauna on man (*De Soll.* 974a). It is precisely this melodiousness (λιγυρός ἀηδόνος) that has been the object of imitation in song (ἐν ᾠδῇ κατὰ μίμησιν) to improve human art (*De Soll.* 974b). Here the emulation of the nightingale is considered to be the epitome of sophisticated and agreeable song,

<sup>136</sup> Richter (1968), 9; Pelosi (2010), 32.

<sup>137</sup> Commentators as early as Adam (1902), 151 saw this denigration of animal cries, to which Plato also added the crash of sea and thunder, as the philosopher’s criticism of the musical customs employed by dramatists in theatrical productions. Barker (1984), 95-7 for a good sourced-based discussion of the musical changes of the end of the fifth century. See Csapo (2004) for an excellent discussion of “New Music” as a musical innovation designed for the theatre, who offers a positive depiction of the genre, away from the criticisms of Plato and Aristophanes.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. *Se Soll.* 982f, for the reiteration of the nightingale’s sweet song.

improving, rather than hindering, the human experience of music.<sup>139</sup> But the nightingale is not just a natural musician to be imitated, it is also associated with tragedy and tragic performances.

In his *Table Talks*, Plutarch recounts a dinner he attended in Rome, where the discussion turned to the Pythagorean rule of forbidding the presence of swallows in houses (*Quaes. Conv. 727c-e*). Sulla, a Carthaginian friend of Plutarch's, suggests that this rule cannot be born out of superstition since the Pythagoreans do not reject nightingales, which, like swallows, are associated with tragedies (τραγωδίαι, *Quaes. Conv. 727e*).<sup>140</sup> Note here that Plutarch is not using the term *tragic* but is actually referring to the genre of tragedy. The nightingale often appears in tragedies; its mournful song acts as a comparison for the lamentation of various characters (cf. *Aesch. Supp. 62*; *Soph. Aj. 629*).<sup>141</sup> Sophocles' *Tereus* even dramatised the myth in which Procne kills her son and feeds him to her husband, Tereus, in retribution for the latter's rape and mutilation of her sister Philomela. In a desperate attempt to escape from Tereus, the sisters pray to the gods for deliverance, and they subsequently change Tereus into a Hoopoe, Philomela into a swallow and Procne into a nightingale. Sophocles' tragedy is not extant but Aristophanes' *Birds* dramatises, in a very different context, Tereus as the Hoopoe, leader of the birds, who is persuaded by two Athenians to build, along with the other birds, a city in the heavens. The Hoopoe is accompanied by his wife, Procne the Nightingale, whose presence as a non-speaking part would have been created by a flute-player imitating her song through a musical instrument (v.204).<sup>142</sup> I am not suggesting that Plutarch's nightingale alludes to either Sophocles or Aristophanes' *persona* but rather that Plutarch was aware of this bird's strong associations with drama.

To return to Agesilaus, his rejection of the imitator, coupled with the king's denigration of a famous actor's professional merits, should be understood as his disapproval of the theatrical genre in general. Plutarch was aware of the difference between an actor and a mime, and of the valid importance of the value which poetical creation placed on the imitation of a sweet-sounding bird. Here Agesilaus is

<sup>139</sup> Also stated by Aristotle (*De audibilibus*, 800a.26).

<sup>140</sup> τὴν γὰρ ἀηδόνα, ταῖς αὐταῖς τραγωδίαῖς ἔνοχον οὔσαν

<sup>141</sup> Barker (2004), 189 for an in-depth discussion of the nightingale's use in ancient poetry and tragedy.

<sup>142</sup> Barker (2004), 195 presents a reading of the *Birds* which revolves around the Nightingale as a parody of "New Music".



not Plutarch's mouthpiece, but is depicted according to the biographer's understanding of his subject's character, that is as sharing the values of the classical thinkers who disapproved of dramatic productions. This rejection of *mimesis*, whether plastic or dramatic, is not simply linked to Agesilaus' personal preferences. Plutarch connects this (Platonic) denigration of imitation with the character of Lacedaemonians more generally, of which the *Cleomenes* offers a clear example.

Plutarch's most explicit psychological description of the Spartan anti-theatrical attitude, both as an entertainment and as a ploy used outside its original *locus* in a non-dramatic context, is presented in the *Cleomenes*. This king has just raided the countryside around Megalopolis, and upon intercepting "Technicians of Dionysus" (τεχνίται περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον), he sets up a theatre on enemy soil (πηγνύειν θέατρον ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ) where he organises a contest for forty *minae* (προτιθέναι ἀπὸ τετραράκοντα μνῶν ἀγῶνα) and sits for an entire day watching these spectacles (μίαν ἡμέραν θεᾶσθαι, *Cleom.* 12.3).<sup>143</sup> Plutarch immediately adds that the king did not act out of a *need* for spectacles (οὐ δεόμενος θεᾶς) but to show his contempt for his enemies and his absolute control of events and resources at this time of war (*Cleom.* 12.3).<sup>144</sup> This concluding comment is important. Plutarch feels the necessity to stipulate that enjoyment was not Cleomenes' motive. As a point of comparison, Plutarch treats Lucullus differently as he concludes the narrative of the Roman's invasion of the city of Tigranocerta. Lucullus chances upon Dionysian artists (τεχνίται περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον) held captive in the city and with these artists he organises contests and spectacles to mark his victories in the captured city (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰς θεᾶς τῶν ἐπινικίων, *Luc.* 29.4). Plutarch, however, does not follow this narrative with a moralising comment on Lucullus' motivations. The account continues chronologically, with Lucullus' actions once the city has been taken. Cleomenes' behaviour, however, demands an explanation because his encouragement of the theatrical arts is at odds with Plutarch's overall depiction of Spartan preferences. This theatrical production contradicts Spartan ethics in at least

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<sup>143</sup> Le Guen (2001a), 339 identifies these Technicians of Dionysus as belonging to the Isthmian and Nemea guild, an established company that thrived during the Hellenistic period.

<sup>144</sup> ἀλλ' οἷον ἐντροφῶν τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ περιουσίαν τινὰ τοῦ κρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιδεικνύμενος.

two ways: first, its understanding of agonistic spectacles, and second its attitude towards money and dramatic productions.

The Spartans put much emphasis on choral competition and their maintenance. For instance, Agesilaus only enjoys displays performed in the theatre if they concern the choral and agonistic performance of children (*Ages.* 21.3) and the Ephors preserve the competition of choruses in order to preserve order as the Spartan defeat is announced (*Ages.* 29.1-3).<sup>145</sup> This has a precedent in the Spartan *politeia*. Lycurgus allowed girls to run and sing before young men at contests (*ἀγῶνες*), with the specific design to encourage the young Spartans into marriage (*Lyc.* 15.1). The importance which the Spartans place on the social benefits of contest, as opposed to any other advantage, is illustrated by the incorruptibility of a Spartan athlete at the Olympic Games. He refuses to be bribed, and endures a gruelling struggle, with the knowledge that athletic victors will be permitted to fight next to their kings in battle (*Lyc.* 22.4). More generally the opposition between theatre and Spartan collective struggle is explicitly stated of Lysander, the Spartan general, whose reputation for conducting his military affairs in the best interests of Sparta is explicitly qualified as un-theatrical (*οὐδὲ θεατρικῶς*, *Lys.* 21.4). Although Plutarch's Spartans encourage and participate in agonistic performances, these "Technicians of Dionysus" are at the antipodes of their customs.

Brigitte Le Guen has carried out the most extensive study of these artists' associations and offers a very thorough survey of the available sources, with a matching analysis of the data.<sup>146</sup> Her research demonstrates that the Technicians of Dionysus, as they were historically named, were guilds which developed in the Hellenistic period, and regrouped a number of highly trained professionals who specialised in tragic and comic performances.<sup>147</sup> The professionals ranged from actors, musicians (flute or zither players), chorus leaders, chorus dancers and singers, and costume designers (cf. for example Heraclitus, son of Heraclitus, a tragedian at *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 728 K 31-2 or Menophilus, son of Hipponicus, a comedian at *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 698 A 24-

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<sup>145</sup> The Spartan and Agesilaus' emphasis on the educational purposes of choruses is reminiscent of Plato's attitude towards choruses in the *Laws* (*Pl. Leg.* 2.664b-7a). See this chapter, 53 n. 131.

<sup>146</sup> Le Guen (2001a), (2001b).

<sup>147</sup> Le Guen (2001a), 34-6.

5).<sup>148</sup> These men trained to specialise in one aspect of a dramatic performance, and stood as professionals of the theatre. While the epigraphic evidence suggests a proud group of thriving enterprising workers, Plutarch's stance is more elitist. Although Plutarch rarely mentions these artists, the portrait he offers overall is not flattering. He associates them with the pleasure-loving world of tyrannical figures such as Sulla, who keeps company with them as he rests from his gout (*Sull.* 26.3) or Antony as they follow his orders to participate in great festivities at Samos, despite the whole world being at war (*Ant.* 56.7). Not only does Plutarch associate these artists with inappropriate, luxuriating behaviour, but he also condemns them as artists. He shows them to be motivated to perform well, not by a desire to produce harmony, but by a competitive spirit of gain (*De Capienda*, 87f).<sup>149</sup> These dramatic artists are completely in opposition to the value of Plutarch's Spartans, who only appreciate spectacular competition if it can be useful to their society. The artists whom Cleomenes intercepts are professionals and not members of society attempting to improve their bodies and mind to benefit or participate more fully in their society. They, like Callipides, perform for the sake of money, glory and theatre, where social and military benefits should be valued above all else.

The second point of contention, which justifies Plutarch's explanatory proviso, is Cleomenes' award of forty minae (ἀπὸ τετταράκοντα μνῶν), an exorbitant prize, for the winner of the contest. Opulence, especially monetary excess is decidedly un-Spartan in Plutarch's corpus. Expenditure on halls for assemblies is considered too frivolous (*Lyc.* 6.3), tableware must be plain and unsophisticated to match the simplicity of the houses (*Lyc.* 13.4) and luxury can be stamped out of the Spartan mind through discipline (*Lyc.* 14.4). This Spartan austerity naturally extends to the theatrical world, where overspending on productions is considered to be ridiculous. After an exhaustive list of the professionals drafted by Athens for the performances of tragedies (*De Gloria.* 348e), Plutarch concludes by reporting the impressions of an anonymous Spartan, as he denounces the Athenians' extravagant spending on drama. The investment, which the Athenians pour into their

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<sup>148</sup> Le Guen (2001b), 46-63 provides an exhaustive series of tables, through which she sets up a clear census of these men's specialities by providing, in chronological and geographical order, their name, specialisation, date and source in which they appear. See Le Guen (2001b), 105-13 for her analysis of their professional activities in theatres specifically.

<sup>149</sup> See *Quaes. Rom.* 289c for a more positive, if unique, description of these artists.

performances, could only benefit them more if they directed it into war efforts (*De Gloria*. 348f).<sup>150</sup> The comment allows Plutarch to balance what he has represented as specifically Athenian – the zealous preparation and expense of dramatic production – with the Spartan culture of devaluing theatre at the expense of war. So Spartans do not spend money on theatrical productions, do not encourage art for art’s sake, but only value performances if they have an educational or practical outcome. Plutarch insists so heavily on Cleomenes’ disinterest that he follows his theatrical shows with a generalised comment on army processions.

ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν **στρατευμάτων** ἐκείνο μόνον οὐ μίμους παρακολουθοῦντας εἶχεν, οὐ θαυματοποιούς, οὐκ ὀρχηστρίδας, οὐ ψαλτρίδας, ἀλλὰ πάσης **ἀκολασίας** καὶ **βωμολοχίας** καὶ **πανηγυρισμοῦ** καθαρὸν ἦν.

At other times, of all the Hellenic and Royal hosts, [the Spartans] displayed neither attending mimes, nor spectacle-makers, nor dancing girls, nor female harpists, but were pure of possessing licentiousness, buffoonery and celebratory display.

(*Cleom.* 12.4)

Plutarch does not simply oppose two different types of military customs but polarises these practices according to a moralistic framework. The author’s moralism takes on a literary turn, as he describes the first group according to the professionals they include in their processions, and the latter through the vices it rejects. Not only do these men and women belong to the standard list of entertainers with bad reputations, but they are stereotypically characterised by the vices which the Spartans seek to avoid. I have already addressed Plutarch’s association of mimes with debauchery, to which he also includes the “spectacle-makers” (θαυματοποιοί, cf. *Ant.* 21.3).<sup>151</sup> Mimes and spectacle-makers offer the sort of entertainment, which Plutarch considered buffoonish (βωμολοχία), such as swallowing swords (*Lyc.* 19.2) and which, like the beating of slaves, relies on spectacle rather than on political consciousness. The combination of dancing girls (ὀρχηστρίδες) and female harpists

<sup>150</sup> πρὸς ἃ Λάκων ἀνήρ ἀποβλέψας οὐ κακῶς εἶπεν, ὡς ἀμαρτάνουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι μεγάλα τὴν σπουδὴν εἰς τὴν παιδίαν καταναλίσκοντες, τουτέστι μεγάλων ἀποστόλων δαπάνας καὶ στρατευμάτων ἐφόδια καταχορηγούντες εἰς τὸ θέατρον. This is exactly the same reproach, although phrased differently, that Demosthenes addressed to his citizens in the *Against Leptines* (Dem. 20.26).

<sup>151</sup> The anecdote is repeated by Pseudo-Plutarch (*Apoph.* 216c).

(ψάλτριοι) seems to be also part of the arsenal of evocations of easily recognisable figures of licentiousness (ἀκολασία), which the Spartans are so keen to avoid. These two groups of women also evoke sexual commodity in Plutarch. The *Dialogues on Love* offer examples of these women's sexual potency. For instance, as proof that even absolute rulers can be unsuccessful suitors, Plutarch recounts Alexander's lust for the courtier Antipatrides' flute girl, brought by her owner to a party, but denied to the king (*Amat.* 760c) while dancing girls are included in Plutarch's list of women who, often foreign and purchased, enslave men through their indecency (*Amat.* 753d).<sup>152</sup>

Plutarch is expecting his reader to recognise immediately as corrupt the type of entertainers that graced Hellenic and Royal processions. The invocation of spectacle-makers and mimes as stereotypical figures of crassness seems to exist already in Demosthenes, who uses them to emphasize Philip of Macedon's vices. To support his vision of the debauchery encouraged by its king which takes place at the Macedonian court, he invokes the kind of men who are welcome there: the exiled Athenians whose licentiousness is considered even greater than such entertainers (*Dem.* 2.19).<sup>153</sup> Contemporary with Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom also used mimes and spectacle-makers as figures to invoke quickly images of "cheap" (φάυλος) entertainment (*D. Chr.* 66.8). Both are generally associated with the erotic side of parties, and therefore with an excess of pleasure. Plato, for instance, contrasts aristocrats' ability to rely solely on conversation at symposia, rather than depend on dancing girls and harpists for entertainment (οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδες οὔτε ψάλτριοι, *Pl. Prot.* 347d).<sup>154</sup> Plutarch is, therefore, not unique in his denigration of these men and women but plays with a tradition that existed before him and endured after his period.

The association of this type of company with festal celebrations (πανηγυρισμός) serves to link these professionals not only to the theatre, but also to the ambiguities of army life. In Plutarch the act of celebrating a festival

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<sup>152</sup> Harp players can be acceptable if their music is good: cf. *Quaes. Conv.* 616a, 643b, 644c, 710e.

<sup>153</sup> Similar imagery is used much later by the author of the *Suda* to define a certain Ardabourios' over-indulgence in luxury (*Suda* s.v. Ἀρδαβούριος).

<sup>154</sup> Athenaeus employs similar imagery when conjuring the debauched symposia of Straton, king of Sidon, who exceeded all men in his love of luxury (ὑπερβάλλειν ἡδυπαθεία (...) πάντας ἀνθρώπους, *Deip.* 12.531b). In his pursuit of pleasure, Straton organises for harpists to attend his dinners and imports dancers from all over Greece (*Deip.* 12.531b-c).

(πανηγυρίζειν) and its derivatives is, despite their religious aspect, strongly associated with theatrical performances. Plutarch links πανηγυρίζειν to political inappropriateness: Antiochus I Soter's and Ptolemy II Philadelphus' ability as able generals was tainted by the time they spent celebrating in theatres (πανηγυρίζοντες ἐν πομπαῖς καὶ θεάτροις διατελεῖν, *De Alex.* 341a). A similar image is used in the *Cato the Elder* to describe Scipio's immature conduct, as he spends his time in the theatres (διατριβή ἐν θεάτροις) and this is likened not to his actual status as a military commander but to that of a festival participant (ὥσπερ οὐ στρατηγῶν, ἀλλὰ πανηγυρίζων, *Cat. Ma.* 3.6). There is, therefore, a strong link in Plutarch's writings between the theatre as the *locus* for spectacles and festival celebration. This association could easily justify its inclusion in the list of vices avoided by the Spartans, but I argue that festivals are also specifically linked with military endeavours in Plutarch.

The mention of πανηγυρισμός in a military context at *Cleom.* 12.4 is not innocent considering Plutarch's use of festive celebration in his depiction of the dark side of army life. He uses this theatrical type of public celebration to illustrate the behaviour of commanders and soldiers who have forgotten themselves. Plutarch offers the reader in his *Eumenes* a very negative assessment of the Diadochoi's influence, devaluing their worth by describing them as dissolute (ἀνάγωγοι) and effeminate (μαλακοί), displaying a tyrannical (τυραννικός) and barbarian (βαρβαρικός) penchant (*Eum.* 13.10), in short all the stereotypical vices associated with terrible leadership. But this damning portrait does not end here, as Plutarch adds that their inept commandership transformed – Plutarch uses created (ποιεῖν) – their soldiers' camp (τὸ στρατόπεδον) into a residence of wasteful festive celebrations (ἀσωτίας πανηγυριζούσης καταγώγιον, *Eum.* 13.11). The description of soldiers' dissolute lifestyle through festive imagery is also used in the *Pompey*, as Caesar's army discovers the enemy camp after their victory at Pharsalus (*Pomp.* 72). To justify Caesar's victory, Plutarch depicts Pompey's encampment, decked with flowers and strewn with wine cups, as that of men ready to celebrate at festivals rather than prepare for battle (εἶναι (...) πανηγυριζόντων μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς μάχην ἐξοπλιζομένων, *Pomp.* 72.4). The association of πανηγυρισμός with the Greek and Royal forces, but not with the Spartan army, not only recalls the theatrical

nature of these men and women Plutarch has associated with the former, but also devalues their moral and military worth.<sup>155</sup>

Plutarch never states that the Spartans did not allow performers to grace the company of their soldiers, but place the emphasis on the vices which they reject. This literary ploy allows him to *de-theatricalise*, as it were, the Spartan military by not having to describe any type of performer entertaining the Spartan soldiers with their talents. In the *Lycurgus*, however, Plutarch explicitly discusses marching rhythms (ἐμβατήριοι ῥυθμοί) accompanied by a flute (πρὸς τὸν αὐλὸν), which were used when the Spartans were marching against their enemies (ἐπάγειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, *Lyc.* 21.3).<sup>156</sup> Here Plutarch, however, also feels the need to justify such a practice, arguing that the music countered any possible feeling of cowardice (ἡγείσθαι οὐ κακῶς), and therefore served a useful function for Spartan society. Once again, artistic performance can only be endorsed if it benefits Sparta's wellbeing and *ethos*. This sentiment is implied at *Cleom.* 12.4, as the Spartans were clear of the vices, which are all linked to the worthless side of dramatic performances, fit only for less sophisticated forms of entertainment. Plutarch distinguishes between what is acceptable within a military context and what is simply too theatrical to be extrapolated outside its original *locus*.

Agesilaus' attitude at the Isthmian Games and Cleomenes' impromptu theatrical contest bear remarkable similarities. In both cases the kings have successfully invaded an enemy territory, and are not operating on their own soil. In both cases they use local resources to fund the games, implied in the first instance by Plutarch's assurance that the Argives abandoned their equipment for the festival in Corinth (τὴν παρασκευὴν ἅπασαν ἀπολιμπάνειν, *Ages.* 21.2), and in the second

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<sup>155</sup> Direct references to these professionals as part of military expeditions or hosts (στρατεύματα) are hard to find. When musicians and performers are mentioned it tends to be as part of festivals and celebrations. Erskine (2013), 51 notes the use of the army in celebratory processions, which sometimes included musical competitions, such as Alexander's sacrificial parade for Asclepius at Soli (Arrian, *An.* 2.5.8), Ptolemy II's procession in Alexandria (Athen. *Deip.* 5.202f) and Antiochus IV at Daphne (Athen. *Deip.* 5.194c-d). Le Guen (2014) details the competitions held by Alexander on his campaign to the East but does not identify a band of musicians and spectacle professionals that operated within the army. Cooks and the organisation of feasts for festivals seem to have been important amongst camp followers (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13.11). Plutarch, however, does not directly place the professionals at *Clem.* 12.4 in a festal context. The celebratory nature of their behaviour seems to be more of an adjective to qualify their conduct than it is reflective of the occasion.

<sup>156</sup> This is corroborated by Thucydides (Thuc. 5.70; 7.44.6). See Pritchett (1971), 107 for an analysis of literary evidence for the marching *paian*, sung by soldiers on the march to battle, with a particular emphasis on Sparta.

by Cleomenes' incentive to mock his enemies through conspicuously displaying the wealth he has amassed by raiding their territory (περιουσία, *Cleom.* 12.4). In both instances, Plutarch explicitly explains why his protagonists could not possibly have acted out of enjoyment but used these games for political reasons, in the first instance to establish stability in a conquered land (*Ages.* 21.2) and in the second to display Spartan hegemony (*Cleom.* 12.4). The military context is crucial because the Spartans are never shown to organise theatrical games on their own territory with their own resources, but only when they have conquered other Greek cities, using the spoils to fund these events. This reinforces the decidedly non-Spartan nature of theatre, which, because it is not valued as a form of entertainment, cannot be used under any circumstances.

Cleopatra and Agesilaus form an unlikely pair. And yet, a comparison between the two and their relationship to theatre in public life brings out two important aspects of Plutarch's conception of histrionic politics. Although statesmen may act in the same way, deceiving those around them through their manner and their actions, not all incur the same level of criticism. Pretence can be forgiven if it discourages the surge of emotion that could endanger the good of the realm. But the differences between Cleopatra and Agesilaus do not simply rest on their exploitation of deception. While Cleopatra repeatedly encourages the theatricalisation of the public appearance of political figures, by transforming the observer into a spectator, Agesilaus recoils from performance in the theatre let alone histrionic politics. These traits the monarchs share with their people. The Egyptians can only reach a superficial appreciation of public figures, judging statesmen as staged display to be criticised if found un-dramatic and too simple. The Spartans on the other hand despise the theatrical world, considering it a perverse imitation of reality, not worth engaging with. If the theatre is to be approached it is to demonstrate Spartan military superiority in non-Spartan territory. And yet, in doing so the Spartans concede to the importance of theatrical productions at least in the wider Hellenic world, and still use them to display their authority. But unlike Cleopatra, they neither take the theatrical world out of its realm, as the productions always stay in the theatre, nor do



they involve their body or those of other politicians in the representations. In Plutarch's *Lives*, not being theatrical appears just as important as being so.

## Chapter 2: Monarchs as Actors in the Hellenistic period

In this chapter I analyse Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery to depict the conduct of Macedonian kings. Plutarch's attention to Macedonian kings is by no means consistent or exhaustive, although two of his longest *Lives* are dedicated to Alexander the Great, the most famous of the Macedonian kings, and to Demetrius Poliorcetes, the co-founder of the Antigonid dynasty.<sup>157</sup> The time of the Diadochoi, Alexander's successors who carved out his empire into a set of kingdoms, is the period of Macedonian history which Plutarch delves into with more detail as he composed, along with the *Demetrius*, the *Eumenes* and the *Pyrrhus*.<sup>158</sup> Although neither Eumenes of Cardia nor Pyrrhus of Epirus were Macedonians, their *Lives* reflect the importance which their interaction with and against Macedonia held for their careers.<sup>159</sup> Besides this cluster of biographies, the inclusion of Macedonian Kings in the *Lives* depends on their relationship to the principal subject rather than as individuals worth treating independently. For example, Philip II appears either as Demosthenes' nemesis (cf. *Dem.* 12) or as the father of a more famous son (see his mention in the first quarter of the *Life*, but subsequent disappearance after his death, *Alex.* 2-7; 9-12; 19).<sup>160</sup> While Macedonian monarchs are referred to in other *Lives*, both Greek and Roman, they appear as enemies to be fought and their treatment tends to be minimal or scathing.<sup>161</sup>

Despite the scattered references to Macedonian kings throughout Plutarch's corpus, the frequency and intensity of these kings' reliance on theatre does not emerge until the *Demetrius* and the rise of the Diadochoi. Crucially, Alexander is treated differently from his successors. He is not taxed with the same theatrical imagery and language with which Plutarch so iconically associated the Diadochoi.

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<sup>157</sup> Geiger (1981), 90 for a discussion on Plutarch's choice of Hellenistic heroes.

<sup>158</sup> The *Aratus* covers the two following generations of Hellenistic Kings: Demetrius II's succession after Antigonus II (Demetrius Poliorcetes' son, *Arat.* 34.2).

<sup>159</sup> Cf. *Eum. Pyrrh.* 6-8; 10-14 for the important passages.

<sup>160</sup> Asirvatham (2010) for a general overview of the relationship between Philip II and Alexander, as father and son, in Greek imperial literature. Asirvatham (2010), 201-2 on specifically Plutarch's treatment of Philip in the *Alexander* as obscured by his son's vision and enterprise.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Perseus as the enemy of Rome and vicious foil to Aemilius' virtue in the *Aemilius Paullus*, whose treatment I discuss in section 2 of this chapter. Cf. also Philip V of Macedon as the enslaver of Greece at *Flam.* 9.8, 10.5. Even Alexander is used as a contrast for Phocion's simplicity: *Phoc.* 18.

This is all the more surprising considering the wealth of scenes which reference and depict theatrical productions. Alexander loves the theatre. From the onset of the *Life*, Plutarch informs us that Alexander favours tragic and musical competitions (ἀγῶνες τραγωδῶν καὶ ἀλύπτων καὶ κιθαρωδῶν) over athletics (*Alex.* 4.11).<sup>162</sup> As he moves eastwards, he not only receives the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides when he orders books (*Alex.* 8.3), but he also regularly attends and organises celebrations where dramatic competitions are given pride of place. For instance, upon his return from Egypt into Phoenicia he attends dramatic productions of choruses and tragedies (χορῶν καὶ τραγικῶν ἀγῶνες, *Alex.* 29.2) where the best actors compete (οἱ ἐνδοξότατοι ὑποκριταί, *Alex.* 29.3), and he marks his arrival at Ectabana, in Media, with theatrical productions and festivities (ἐν θεάτροις καὶ πανηγύρεσιν, *Alex.* 72.1). This appreciation for the theatre extends to individual artists. He trusts Thessalus, a tragic actor, with an embassy to secure an alliance with the Carian satrap Pixodarus by asking that the latter marry his daughter to Alexander and not his half-brother (*Alex.* 10.2). He also pays for the fine which Athenodorus, a tragic actor, incurred for not keeping his contract with the Athenians (*Alex.* 29.5), complies with Lycon of Scarpheia's comic demand for money while performing well (εὐήμερεῖν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, *Alex.* 29.6), and, on being prompted by his revelling Macedonians, tenderly kisses Bagoas for his prize in dance (χορεύων νικῆσαι, *Alex.* 67.8).<sup>163</sup>

Although Plutarch highlights theatre and performance, and Alexander shows great sensitivity towards the acting world, the limits between politics and acting are preserved. Despite this enjoyment of dramatic productions, Plutarch is clear to inform us that Alexander never mixed his pleasure in spectacles with his affairs of state (*Alex.* 23.2).<sup>164</sup> This is made clear in the timing of his celebration at Ectabana,

<sup>162</sup> In this light, Alexander's love for Roxanna, whom he first saw chorus-dancing at a festivity (*Alex.* 47.7), is not anodyne. Cf. *Alex.* 67.8 for Alexander's drunken viewing of song and dance competitions, which concludes Plutarch's description of the Bacchic-like behaviour of Alexander and his Macedonians on the march. Pelling (1999), 365 = (2002), 202 reads the recurring mentions of theatrical and tragic scenes towards the end of the *Alexander* as a Dionysian reference, especially in the light of Alexander's steady increasing consumption of wine. Adams (2007b), 126 refutes Plutarch's claim that Alexander disliked athletic games.

<sup>163</sup> See Le Guen (2014), 251-5 for a comparative table of all the mentions in literary sources of the competitions held by Alexander, organised by place and date in relation to author.

<sup>164</sup> ἐπεὶ πρὸς γε τὰς πράξεις οὐκ οἶνος ἐκείνον, οὐχ ὕπνος, οὐ παιδιά τις, οὐ γάμος, οὐ θέα, καθάπερ ἄλλους στρατηγούς, ἐπέσχε.

which occurs once his affairs are in order (*Alex.* 72.1). This is particularly poignant at *Alex.* 29, as the kings of Cyprus are named as the *choregoi* (χορηγεῖν γὰρ οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν Κυπρίων) but Alexander only participates as a spectator (*Alex.* 29.2). The distance he holds with these games is such that even when his favourite actor loses he does not intervene and, while recognising the judges' choice, only expresses his disappointment upon leaving the theatre (*Alex.* 29.4). Despite his appreciation of drama, Alexander knows how to draw the line between his role as statesman and his enjoyment of theatre as a spectator. Alexander's own relationship with the stage preserves him from too histrionic a style of politics.

While Alexander shows a certain affinity for dramatic productions, Plutarch employs very little theatrical language to describe Alexander's behaviour. If there are some instances in which the theatrical spills over into the political, Alexander's involvement is rather restrained. When Alexander discovers that some of his followers had been staging mock single combats pretending to be Alexander and Darius (*Alex.* 31.1-2), he encourages the performance by lending his armour to his imitator and having Philotas hand his to the pretend Darius (*Alex.* 31.4). The theatrical quality of this scene occurs as the Macedonians look on (θεᾶσθαι), witnessing the combat as if it were a spectacle (*Alex.* 31.4). The spectacular nature of the event can partly be explained by the evolution of the performance, which starts as a game (παίζειν) of rather informal fist fighting (*Alex.* 31.3), to become a sophisticated epic-like single combat through the simple addition of Alexander's armour.<sup>165</sup> This armour acts exactly as a theatrical costume, allowing the two combatants to blend more convincingly with their pretend identities, as the Macedonian soldiers invest in this scene a prophetic ability to determine the fate of the campaign (*Alex.* 31.4). Yet, despite the movement from a game to a spectacle, which relies on costume to convincingly falsify the truth, Alexander is only indirectly implicated in the theatricalisation of the single combat. By lending his armour he allows the pretence to be carried out, but, unlike Cleopatra, he never encourages his soldiers to view the scene as a dramatic performance. The θεᾶσθαι belongs to the Macedonian soldiers alone.

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<sup>165</sup> See Mossman (1988), 87 on Achilles' armour and epic imagery in the *Alexander*.

The theatrical world and its imagery are present in the *Alexander*, both in its initial dramatic form as a celebration and entertainment, and its metaphorical form as an illustration of the dynamics between observer and observed. Yet its use as the latter is positively discreet compared to its use in the *Demetrius*. The extended metaphors and similes of the stage do not appear until the death of Alexander the Great. The level of histrionic action in Macedonian manifestation of royal power is not inherited from but progresses and develops after Alexander's death. It is this moment, the transformation of Alexander's entourage into kings, that I now explore in the following section.

### **I. The Diadochoi: the Advent of Histrionic Politics**

Plutarch's narrative of Demetrius' life is so rich in theatrical imagery that it has inspired a proportionate wealth of analysis.<sup>166</sup> I have already mentioned the landmark in the study of tragedy in Plutarch, Philip De Lacy's *Biography and Tragedy*, in which Demetrius naturally features heavily.<sup>167</sup> De Lacy argues that the *Demetrius* demonstrates Plutarch's use of tragedy as a means to write biography. This use is two-fold. First, Plutarch uses Platonic denunciations of tragic theatre to comment on Demetrius' actions and thereby illustrate the moral degradation of his subject. Second, he concludes that the author's disapproval of his protagonist is further emphasised by the structure of the narrative which follows the template of the tragic plot (moment of *hybris*, reversal of fortune), thereby reaffirming Demetrius' identity as a tragic hero, which Plutarch, as a Platonist, could not approve.<sup>168</sup> Tragedy, in a Platonic sense, therefore becomes a template in the *Demetrius* to pass moral judgement on the protagonist.<sup>169</sup> Timothy Duff's analysis of theatrical imagery in the *Demetrius-Antony* prologue also addresses the nature of Plutarch's interpretation of tragedy, which he argues does not stem from Platonic

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<sup>166</sup> The theatrical imagery is so consistent that any study of the *Demetrius* can hardly escape a mention of the dramatic elements, even if it is not the focus: cf. Candau Morón (1999), 142 for a list of the different theatrical elements of the narrative.

<sup>167</sup> De Lacy (1952).

<sup>168</sup> De Lacy (1952), 170.

<sup>169</sup> De Lacy (1952), 171. This is strongly corroborated by Andrei, who picks up on De Lacy's interpretation: Andrei (1989), 80. Although Andrei (1989), 81 touches upon the political nature of Plutarch's use of tragic imagery, his interpretation remains based on the author's denigration of Demetrius' vicious character.

but Aristotelian ideas.<sup>170</sup> Duff's study focuses on explaining Plutarch's reasoning for integrating examples of vice in a work which is dedicated to the illustration of virtue.<sup>171</sup> He reads Plutarch's understanding of drama as being more Aristotelian, where tragedies depict the lives of men, neither good nor bad, who suffer a reversal of fortune from success to disaster.<sup>172</sup> This allows Plutarch to present a morally complicated picture, and to invite the reader to respond critically to vice and virtue through an "active involvement" in the tragic lives of these two men.<sup>173</sup> In this way theatrical imagery becomes, for the biographer, a means to establish a complex moral picture for his reader to react to.

Although Judith Mossman does not take the *Demetrius* as her starting point, her analysis of tragic imagery to depict Pyrrhus, especially in relation to Alexander has prompted her to argue that tragedy, once again, allows Plutarch to express his disapproval of Demetrius. Mossman had previously argued that Plutarch played with the differences between epic and tragic tones to highlight different aspects of Alexander's character, that the former showcases his qualities while the latter tends to emphasise his "darker" side.<sup>174</sup> This "tragic patterning" is identified as the disaster which results from the influence which an external (divine) force occasions on Alexander, who, because of his character, is pushed to self-destruction.<sup>175</sup> Applying this dichotomy between epic and tragic tone to the *Pyrrhus* and the *Demetrius*, Mossman concludes that the prevalence of epic imagery to describe Pyrrhus' actions, as opposed to the omnipresence of tragic themes which define Demetrius' character, demarcate Pyrrhus as more similar to Alexander than Demetrius.<sup>176</sup> Although their understanding of the tragic is different, De Lacy, Duff and Mossman are, however, unified in their reading of such imagery: tragedy and tragic elements are used by Plutarch to explore Demetrius' moral character and its evolution.

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<sup>170</sup> Although Duff (2004), 275 never openly states that his article is in opposition to De Lacy, he argues that Plutarch is subtly echoing different passages in Plato in order to disagree with them and offer a different way of interpreting human frailty.

<sup>171</sup> Duff (2004), 271.

<sup>172</sup> Duff (2004), 285.

<sup>173</sup> Duff (2004), 286.

<sup>174</sup> Mossman (1988), 90.

<sup>175</sup> Mossman (1988), 88.

<sup>176</sup> Mossman (1992), 104.

Demetrius' dramatic behaviour has been the object of a more political study, where scholars have tried to reconcile this *Life* with Plutarch's depiction of kingship. This view is echoed by Philip Stadter, who reads Demetrius' actor-like behaviour as Plutarch's condemnation of a false monarch, infused by an exaggerated sense of self-worth.<sup>177</sup> Jeffery Tatum's argument is similar but more extensive. Although Tatum's focus is literary, he reads the *Demetrius* as Plutarch's sharp evaluation of Hellenistic royalty, with Demetrius as his main (and extreme) example.<sup>178</sup> The other Diadochoi, who express their power through appearance and affected behaviour, emulate Demetrius' "theatricality".<sup>179</sup> Poliorcetes is thus only one example of these kings who express their political position in theatrical terms. Tatum's research, however, stops with an evaluation of the Diadochoi's character, rather than an exploration of Plutarch's political study of the mechanisms of this new monarchy. Similar to Tatum, Duff interprets Plutarch's attitude towards these men as rulers through an evaluation of their character. For Duff, the biographer sees these people as a group of men more sensitive to greed and more desiring of glory than others.<sup>180</sup> Pyrrhus is Duff's starting point, but he uses Demetrius as an example of a man whose successes have corrupted him and made him hubristic.<sup>181</sup>

The theatrical aspect of this *Life* has not always been interpreted from a moralistic point of view, but has been read as confirmation of the era's actual dramatic nature: Plutarch's depiction of the Hellenistic period is taken to be historically accurate. Jerome Pollitt considers drama to be at the heart of Hellenistic art and architecture and explains that this artistic mentality emanated from the nature

<sup>177</sup> Stadter (2010), 205 = (2014), 295. Stadter (2010), 197-216 = (2014), 286-302 does not focus on the *Demetrius* but reads it as part of six pairs (Agesilaus-Pompey, Alexander-Caesar, Nicias-Crassus, Phocion-Cato Minor, Brutus-Dion, Demetrius-Antony), which, he argues, were designed by Plutarch as a set, to be read together or independently. See Stadter (2010), 208-10 = (2014), 299-1 on the tragic themes, such as clothing, stage appearances, fortune changes as present in the *Demetrius*, *Antony*, *Nicias*, *Crassus* and *Caesar*.

<sup>178</sup> Tatum (1996), 142. The most extensive research on Plutarch's Hellenistic kings as a political group, to my knowledge, is Aalders' discourse on Hellenism and Patriotism. Aalders sees Plutarch's dislike of Hellenistic kings as stemming from firstly his disapproval of their extravagant life-style – using the *Demetrius* to support his argument – and secondly (and most importantly) Plutarch's sorrow at Macedonian suppression of Greek freedom: Aalders (1982), 17. The theatrical aspect of Plutarch's Macedonians, however, does not enter into Aalders' discussion.

<sup>179</sup> Tatum (1996), 142.

<sup>180</sup> Duff (1999a), 115-6.

<sup>181</sup> Duff (1999a), 116.

of Hellenistic politics, where the politician was a public performer.<sup>182</sup> Pollitt draws this conclusion by using Plutarch's description of Demetrius' actor-like behaviour in political situations.<sup>183</sup> He concludes that this theatrical mentality partly developed as a need for artists to create a visual language to suit the mood of contemporary politics.<sup>184</sup> This use of Plutarch, as proof that Demetrius was truly theatrical, is taken up by Angelos Chaniotis. Chaniotis situates the Macedonian's dramatic nature within the context of a developing relationship between politics and the world of the stage during the Hellenistic period.<sup>185</sup> Just like Pollitt, Chaniotis considers that Plutarch has identified the true nature of Hellenistic politics as exemplified by Demetrius and can, therefore, be used as a reliable source. Harrison echoes this idea by arguing that Frederick Brenk's qualification of Antony as "baroque" is Brenk's way of relating Antony to the other Hellenistic leaders in Plutarch who display an "exuberant" and "theatrical" nature of their time – with, once again, Demetrius at the forefront.<sup>186</sup> I hope to show that, because Plutarch's biographies are moralistic by nature, this historical reading can be dangerously misleading.

In this chapter I explore Plutarch's use of such imagery to describe a certain attitude towards kingship. I contend that Plutarch used metaphors and similes of the theatrical stage to describe the Diadochoi and Demetrius' conduct as kings in order to criticise their political attitude. While Plutarch was certainly not the first to describe the Diadochoi or Demetrius Poliorcetes through such theatrical language, he used this lexical field to assess ethically his subject within a political framework. The theatre is not simply a literary ploy, but is an integral part of Plutarch's discourse on the nature of kingship and public action.

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<sup>182</sup> Pollitt (1986), 230.

<sup>183</sup> Pollitt (1986), 7.

<sup>184</sup> Pollitt (1986), 7 argues that this theatrical mentality was not restricted to state art but extended to other types such as domestic or popular art. This was partly caused by the increasing power artistic guilds held in cities.

<sup>185</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 244.

<sup>186</sup> Harrison (1995), 92 makes the rapprochement between Plutarch's Hellenistic life and the "baroque" quality of Hellenistic art. See Pollitt (1986), 111 on baroque as a style of the Hellenistic period.



## 1. The Diadochoi as Actors

Before entering into the matter of this chapter it is important to understand the themes which Plutarch explored in the *Demetrius*. Jeffery Tatum has clearly shown how this *Life* demonstrates Plutarch's analysis of the values put forth by what modern historians think of as the creation of early Hellenistic kingship.<sup>187</sup> He rightly argues that while the protagonist embodies the promise of an ideal monarch, he ultimately fails to enact the virtues which a king ought to uphold.<sup>188</sup> On the one hand Demetrius possesses the physical attributes of the ruler, with his "beauty" (κάλλος), his "heroic appearance" and his "royal majesty" (ἡρωική τις ἐπιφάνεια καὶ βασιλικὴ σεμνότης, *Demetr.* 2.2). He also displays a capacity for both equity and justice (πρὸς ἐπιείκειαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην, *Demetr.* 4.5), two of the fundamental virtues a king must possess (cf. *Demetr.* 42.8). Much of the *Life* stresses the importance of a ruler's inherent need to uphold both justice and virtue through law (cf. *Demetr.* 42.7; 42.8). In Plutarch's eyes, if Demetrius ultimately fails as a king it is because of his inability to be just and act virtuously. While Tatum rightly identifies Plutarch's equation of the Diadochoi with actors upon the stage (*Demetr.* 18.5) as part of the author's wider discussion on morality and kingship, his argument could be developed much further.<sup>189</sup> My conclusion is similar to Tatum's, namely that this simile betrays Plutarch's desire to point out the Diadochoi's lack of proper royal virtue, but I deepen the study to uncover Plutarch's moral framework.

The comparison between the Diadochoi and actors concludes Plutarch's narrative of their accession from generals to kings. As a result of Demetrius' defeat of Ptolemy at sea, the flatterer Aristodemus of Miletus publically hails Antigonus as king (*Demetr.* 17.6). The people, following his example, proceed to confer the title (βασιλεύς) on father and son along with the diadem (διάδημα), the symbol of Macedonian kingship (*Demetr.* 18.1). Soon the Egyptians award the title to Ptolemy, while Lysimachus and Seleucus also start wearing diadems (*Demetr.* 18). Plutarch

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<sup>187</sup> Tatum (1996) explores regal imagery in Plutarch's wider works but with a focus on Demetrius and Romulus. Andrei (1989), 80-81 also noted the use of theatrical imagery to undermine Demetrius' understanding of the royal office.

<sup>188</sup> Tatum (1996), 141.

<sup>189</sup> Tatum (1996), 142.

proceeds to explain the impact of these attributes, the title and the diadem, on men who had not previously been kings.

τοῦτο δὲ οὐ προσθήκην ὀνόματος καὶ σχήματος ἔξαλλαγὴν εἶχε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκίνησε καὶ τὰς γνώμας ἐπήρε καὶ τοῖς βίοις καὶ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις αὐτῶν ὄγκον ἐνεποίησε καὶ βαρύτητα, καθάπερ τραγικῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἅμα τῇ σκευῇ συμεταβαλλόντων καὶ βάδισμα καὶ φωνὴν καὶ κατάκλισιν καὶ προσαγόρευσιν.

This in addition did not only carry an appendage of a name and change of appearance, but also stirred the mind of these men and made them haughty and created self-importance and arrogance in their lives and intercourse, just as tragic actors, who, in connection with their costumes, change simultaneously their walk, their voice, their dining and their greeting.

(Demetr. 18.5)

In order to illustrate the effects which newly found kingship produces on the Diadochoi, Plutarch uses a theatrical simile. By contrast Diodorus, in his account of the same events, does not include any imagery pertaining to the world of dramatic performances (Diod. 20.53.2). For Plutarch, the acquisition of a new name, the title of king (βασιλεύς), and an altered appearance, the wearing of the diadem (διάδημα), induce on the men a change similar to that which affects actors as they perform upon the stage. This is how most scholars have read this simile: as a denigration of Alexander's successors, who are kings by superficial means only, by acquiring a name and a piece of cloth, rather than through any natural disposition towards kingship.<sup>190</sup> I do not disagree with such a reading, but propose a more detailed analysis of Plutarch's multi-layered use of theatrical imagery. I contend that he draws on both philosophical understanding of theatrical productions and theatrical performances, which complement each other in creating an image of the Diadochoi as actors.

I contend that Plutarch's damning commentary on the effects of this newly found kingship is imbued with Platonic theory of *mimesis*.<sup>191</sup> In Book 3 of the

<sup>190</sup> Cf. De Lacy (1952); Tatum (1996), 142. Tagliacchi (1960), 131 argues that Plutarch's criticism rests less on his denigration of the acting profession and more those whose behaviour is histrionic out of the theatrical context.

<sup>191</sup> On Plutarch's awareness of Plato's discourse of *mimesis*, cf. Plut. *Plat.* 1001e. Zadorojnyi (2012), 178-9 on Plutarch's Platonic understanding of *mimesis*. Plutarch's conception and use of *mimesis* changes according to the context. See Duff (1999a), 37-40 on imitation at the heart of the mechanism

*Republic*, Plato argues that a man should be allowed to imitate only what is appropriate, that is what promotes virtues such as bravery, temperance, piety and freedom, but should refrain from copying what is inherently vicious, that is what negates liberty (τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα ποιεῖν) or what is considered dishonourable (αἰσχρός, *Rep.* 395c). The consequence of imitating is double. First, it leads to an appreciation of what one imitates, so that if one copies vicious acts and thoughts, one builds a regard for these base qualities. Second, the reality of what one imitates establishes itself in the body (σῶμα), the voice (φωνή) and the understanding (διάνοια, *Rep.* 395d) of the imitator. The aspects of what one imitates thus become a part of one's nature (*Rep.* 395d). In other words, imitation has an active influence on the imitator, who takes on the characteristics of what or whom he is imitating. Like Plato's imitator, the Diadochoi, who are not originally kings but who start emulating monarchs in their public behaviour, find themselves mutating. It is exactly a behavioural change which Plutarch stresses as the consequence of this acquisition of royal title and dress. The affected areas are their mind (φρόνημα) and their judgement (γνώμη), echoing the influence upon διάνοια identified as one of the areas modified by *mimesis* in Plato. But the Diadochoi's understanding is not the only part of their person which is affected by this emulation. Their morality finds itself transformed for the worse as this title and this diadem creates (ἐμποιεῖν) self-importance (ὄγκος) and arrogance (βαρύτης). This, I argue, betrays the Diadochoi's imitation of the negative aspects of kingship.

The verb ἐμποιεῖν, used to equate the influence of title and diadem with the kingly traits of self-importance and arrogance, strongly recalls Platonic ideology. In the *Republic*, Plato uses ἐμποιεῖν to designate the effect which an (external) corrupting force has on the mind or the body of man. Thus luxuriousness (τρουφή)

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through which the reader can gain virtue by reading the *Parallel Lives*, that is by imitating the qualities of the great men Plutarch has laid before them to observe (*Per.* 1.4; 2.4). Duff (1999a), 43 also points out that Plutarch own work is a form of imitation. Cf. also Gray (1987), 469 on *mimesis* as recreation of reality in Greek Historiography. Zadorojnyi (2012), 177 echoes Duff's analysis but (2012), 180 argues for a multifaceted use of *mimesis* in Plutarch as both a positive and negative force; *mimesis* is not simply used to explain the educational process of his work but also of persons who deceive out of vice. Van der Stockt (1990) explores Plutarch's ambiguous evaluation of the aesthetic quality of art as inherently mimetic. He (1990), 26 distinguishes between two approaches to art and *mimesis* in Plutarch: the morally problematic nature of poetry and *mimesis*, with its parallel to the Platonic doctrine, and (1990), 30-1 the spectator's/reader's ability to intellectualise mimetic forms of art. See Duff (1999a), 72-98 on Plutarch's Platonism in the *Lives* and Dillon (2014) on the *Moralia*.

produces cowardice (δειλίαν ἐμποιεῖν *Rep.* 590b), while rottenness of a food (ἢ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων) provokes defects in the body (ἐμποιεῖν τῷ σώματι σώματος μοχθηρίαν, *Rep.* 609e). It is with this idea of moral corruption that Plato describes the effect of the mimetic artist on the human mind. As an argument to expel the poet as a mimetic artist from the Ideal City, Plato argues that this artist, through his *mimesis*, (ὁ μιμητικός ποιητής) produces in the soul of each individual man (ιδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῆ ψυχῆ ἐμποιεῖν) a vicious constitution (κάκη πολιτεία, *Rep.* 605b). This Platonic passage complements the previously cited section of the *Republic*, putting the accent on the mimetic artist's influence on his audience, rather than on himself, but the idea remains the same. Bad imitation corrupts the soul. By qualifying the effect of the title and the diadem through ἐμποιεῖν, Plutarch is casting the Diadochoi as bad imitators of royalty.<sup>192</sup>

If *mimesis* provokes vice in men, so does the title of king and the wearing of the diadem in the behaviour of the Diadochoi, as is shown by their display of ὄγκος and βαρύτης, two terms associated with the vicious aspects of absolute monarchy. These traits, for instance, are used of the Numidian King Juba, whose arrogant temper (βαρύτης φρονήματος) and self-importance (ὄγκος) acquired through wealth and power (διὰ πλοῦτον καί δύναμιν) render him intolerable (οὐκ ἀνεκτός, *Cat. Mi.* 57.1).<sup>193</sup> This combination is also characteristic of Alexander's less attractive spirit, as his enemies were oppressed (βαρύνεσθαι) by his display of self-importance (ὄγκος, *Alex.* 33.10). More importantly, at *Demetr.* 41.5, in language very similar to that of *Demetr.* 18.5, the Macedonians read the Diadochoi's public conduct as if they were acting out on a stage the ὄγκος and βαρύτης of Alexander (*Demetr.* 41.5). What this passage achieves is an elaboration on the idea presented at *Demetr.* 18.5 through an explicit naming of the original model which the Diadochoi are emulating, that is the pompousness, rather than the virtues, of

<sup>192</sup> Plutarch's use of ἐμποιεῖν is less negative as it can denote either good or bad influences. The difference lies in the person or force from which the power of influence emanates. Thus Tullus Hostilius, Numa's unworthy successor, who does not understand religion but gives in to superstition, is emulated by his followers: as he dies they too are influenced by superstition, rather than an adequate understanding of the divine (*Num.* 22.7). The verb is also used of the influence which Cleon's disrespect for decency occasions on the political class (*Nic.* 8.6). For positive connotation of ἐμποιεῖν, cf. Pelopidas' demonstration of bravery which inspires vigour and zeal in his soldiers (*Pel.* 32.6).

<sup>193</sup> These terms are also used of the effects which the Persian booty holds on the Macedonians; the abandonment of this wealth, as Alexander crosses into India, is eventually paralleled with a deliverance (ὥσπερ λύεσθαι, *Aem.* 12.11).

Alexander's character as monarch. By using both ὄγκος and βαρύτης, Plutarch is highlighting the Diadochoi's appropriation of the more superficial and immoral aspect of (Alexander's) kingship: they are interested in power and display, rather than the true royal qualities of justice and lawfulness (cf. *Demetr.* 42). Plutarch's use of Platonic theoretical language of *mimesis* allows him to put forth two criticisms. First, they are not true kings, but imitators of a model set forth by Alexander, a real monarch. Second, it allows Plutarch to condemn them for imitating what is not worthy of the office of kingship.

Plutarch's analysis is not a *verbatim* allusion to Plato's theory, as he foregoes any mention of the key Platonic word of *mimesis* (μίμησις), which is so conspicuous in the *Republic*. I contend that it is present in this passage through the equation of Demetrius and his colleagues with tragic actors, the mimetic artists *par excellence*. Plutarch, I argue, suggests *mimesis* through acting, rather than using the term directly, because of the importance which tragic performance has in connection with kingship. The linguistic ties between the Platonic theories of *mimesis* and Plutarch's description of the Diadochoi at *Demetr.* 18.5 are also found in the behaviour of the actors upon the stage. As I have stated Plutarch picks up on Plato's assertion that *mimesis* affects the mind of the imitator. The change of body (σῶμα) and voice (φωνή, *Rep.* 395d), however, is not attributed directly to the Diadochoi but to tragic actors. It is they who change their body language (βάδισμα), and their voice (φωνή), almost echoing perfectly Plato's language. The comparison is apt since actors underwent significant physical and tonal changes to enhance their performances.<sup>194</sup> Of this Plutarch was well aware. He notes, in his *Table Talks*, how actors' voices change pitch to resemble sorrowful music in their laments. This, he explains, is achieved to inspire sadness in the audience (*Quaes. Conv.* 623b).<sup>195</sup> The change of voice to invoke sorrow or pain is also equated with the mimetic part of the actors' performances, who, in order to convey emotion, artificially modulate their voices to match the sounds of real suffering (*Quaes. Conv.* 673d). Appropriate

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<sup>194</sup> On the importance of the actor's voice and its quality cf. Pl. *Rep.* 568a-b. See Pavlovskis (1977) on the playwright's use of the actor's voice in tragedy, especially for the singing parts and Csapo (2010), 66 on the physicality of performing on stage.

<sup>195</sup> Yet this modulation of voice to convey emotion is not exclusive to the actor and Plutarch even couples the theatrical performer with the orator in the group of professionals whose pitch changes in their speech to convey sorrow (*Quaes. Conv.* 623b). See Ch. 3, I, 127.

gesture to convey character was also an important part of the actor's technique and one which Plutarch recognised, as it is listed, along with the voice, as one of the areas which undergo change during performance (*Quaes. Conv.* 711c). A philosophical reading is both dependent on and complemented by Plutarch's inclusion of tragic performance.

Platonic philosophy is not, however, the only influence which explains Plutarch's use of a theatrical simile. Scholars have tended to explain Plutarch's depiction of the Diadochoi as actors through the type of sources available to him. The theatrical quality of the *Demetrius* has been put down to Plutarch's reliance on Duris of Samos, a Hellenistic historian who compiled a *Macedonian History* (cf. *Ath.* 6.249c).<sup>196</sup> Duris has been considered a likely source due to the scope of his work, since his *History* covered the reign of the Diadochoi, and also the nature of this work which has been considered an example of "tragic history". This style of historiography has been defined as one that prizes a sensational provocation of the reader's emotion at the expense of historical truth.<sup>197</sup> Plutarch's use of Duris is ambiguous.<sup>198</sup> While he dismisses Duris' depiction of Pericles and the Athenians' great brutality as ἐπιτραγωδεῖν, that is as too excessive to be the truth (*Per.* 28.2-3), he favours Duris as a reliable source on more than one occasion (*Lys.*18.3; *Ages.* 3.1; *Phoc.* 4.3).<sup>199</sup> The aim of this study is not to determine whether Duris was, or was

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<sup>196</sup> This is how Sweet (1951), 180, in his analysis of the sources which Plutarch used in the *Demetrius*, explains the tragic imagery. De Lacy (1952), 168 n. 73 rejects the possibility of the tragic imagery as a Plutarchan invention and favours Duris as the sources (suggested by Sweet). Cf. also Andrei (1989), 43; Duff (2004), 284 n. 46.

<sup>197</sup> On 'tragic history' as a trend in Hellenistic history cf. Meister (1990), 80-1, who defined Hellenistic historiography as 'rhetorische, tragische und tatsachenbezogene Geschichtsschreibung', defining it as a genre only interested in the style with little histrionical analysis. Historians have sought, however, to go beyond this sensationalist depiction of certain types of historical writing. Walbank (1960) has demonstrated that, from the fragments which survive of Duris' writing, the elements which previous scholars have deemed 'tragic' are in fact present in earlier forms of historical writing, and do not define Duris' style but rather historiography as a genre. Marincola (2003), 286 has also sought to de-mystify the existence of such a type as 'tragic history' arguing that emotional appeal is a crucial part of ancient historiographical writing.

<sup>198</sup> Candau Morón (2009), 154 treats Plutarch's attitude towards 'tragic history' by studying his use of 'tragic historians' such as Duris and Phylarchus. Rather than refute the existence of 'tragic history', Candau Morón seeks to define it. He does not discuss the *Demetrius*, however, since Plutarch never acknowledged Duris directly as his source.

<sup>199</sup> Tritle (1988), 21 = (1992), 4281, for instance attributes Plutarch's anecdotal depiction of Phocion as a restrained philosopher-like figure to Duris. See Pownall (2016), 51-52 on Plutarch's general treatment of Duris.

not, a “tragic historian”, but to focus on Duris as a likely source for Plutarch’s *Demetrius*. Frances Pownall demonstrates that Duris’ approach to the Macedonians was moral, condemning them (cf. Polyperchon at Ath. 4.155c; Philip II at Ath. 6.231b-c) and those who flattered them (cf. the Athenians at Ath. 12.542b-e) for their excessive behaviour.<sup>200</sup> Part of Pownall’s argument rests on Duris’ denigration of Demetrius’ excessive dress (Ath. 12.535e-536a), which I now propose to compare to Plutarch’s version (Plut. *Demetr.* 41.6-8), to establish if Duris can indeed be considered a source for the *Demetrius*, despite Plutarch’s want of citation.<sup>201</sup> The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the theatrical imagery of the *Demetrius* can be explained as originating from the sources which Plutarch was using. The following section is dedicated, however, to demonstrating that Plutarch had a clear thought process in using certain theatrical terminology and that this imagery goes beyond a simple copying of what was available to him.

Both Athenaeus and Plutarch describe Demetrius’ footwear (ὑπόδεσις/περὶ τοῖς ποσί) which is further qualified as a form of smaller shoe, a half-boot in Athenaeus (ἐμβάτης) and a slipper in Plutarch (ἐμβάς), two very similar terms.<sup>202</sup> Both types of shoe are described as being made of purple dye (πορφύρα/ἐκ πορφύρας), which is qualified as “most expensive” (πολυτελεστάτη) by Athenaeus, and “pure” (ἄκρατος) by Plutarch. The purple is complemented by a gold design (χρυσοῦ ποιικιλία/χρυσοβαφής), which craftsman (οἱ τεχνῖται) weaved back and forth (ἐνυφαίνειν ὀπίσω καὶ ἔμπροσθεν) on to the shoe in Athenaeus, while, in Plutarch, this gold design is more laconically named as the material of which the shoe is made (ποιεῖσθαι). Demetrius is also shown to own (a) cloak(s) (χλαμύδες/χλαμύς), covered by the whole celestial sphere (τὸ δὲ πᾶν ὁ πῶλος) in Athenaeus or universe (κόσμος) in Plutarch, accompanied by stars and the zodiac (χρυσοῖ ἀστέρες καὶ τὰ δώδεκα ζῳδία) in the former and the firmament (οὐρανός) in the latter.<sup>203</sup> The final item in Demetrius’ wardrobe is his headpiece. Both describe a double construction, a headdress (μίτρα) and a felt hat (καυσία) in Athenaeus, and felt hats (καυσία) with a double mitre (διμίτροι).

<sup>200</sup> Pownall (2016) attempts to recreate Duris’ political leanings through the fragments available; she concentrates on Athenaeus rather than Plutarch.

<sup>201</sup> Pownall (2016), 49 reads Duris’ criticism of Demetrius as a denunciation of his ‘theatricality’.

<sup>202</sup> Unless stated otherwise, Athenaeus is always quoted first.

<sup>203</sup> The cloak is shiny and brownish grey in Athenaeus; no other colour is mentioned in Plutarch.

Athenaeus' description of the hat with its fringes running down Demetrius' back is more elaborate. The only transposition consists in the colour of Athenaeus' hat, which he describes as shot with gold as well as purple (χρυσόπαστος, ἀλουργής), while it is Demetrius' robes in Plutarch (not mentioned by Athenaeus) which are described in almost exactly the same manner, as embroidered with gold and purple (χρυσοπάρυφος ἀλουργίς).

The similarities are striking, with words and imagery which echo each other almost consistently. Athenaeus' version is more verbose than Plutarch's account, although this can be put down to Plutarch's generally more laconic style, as he usually evokes visual scenes in well-chosen but succinct language.<sup>204</sup> In this light, the "pure" purple of Demetrius' slippers can easily be an echo of Athenaeus' "most expensive", since, as Mossman demonstrates, Plutarch, by highlighting its purity, is stressing the quality and the expense of Demetrius' purple dye.<sup>205</sup> Even Athenaeus' description of the craftsmen weaving the golden thread in Demetrius' half-boots is suggested in Plutarch's ποιείσθαι. Plutarch clearly uses his own terms to describe an already existing image of Demetrius' clothing.<sup>206</sup> Of course, the meaning of this ekphrasis shifts according to the context in which the author has included it in his narrative. Recent studies have demonstrated that both Plutarch and Athenaeus adapted and changed their textual sources.<sup>207</sup> Athenaeus includes it last of a long list of other rulers who have overindulged in lavish clothing, while Plutarch incorporates it as an illustration of Demetrius' imitation of the less virtuous aspects of regal power (*Demetr.* 41.3-4). But since my concern here is origin, and since the texts bear great similarities, they must share a common source. It is not possible for me to argue with absolute certainty that Athenaeus is quoting Duris faithfully, without any

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<sup>204</sup> See Pelling (1980), 127 = (2002), 91 on Plutarch simplifying the language of his sources. Mossman (2015), 155 n. 18 notes that Plutarch's description of Demetrius' slippers is poetical, rather than prosaic, which she argues is a deliberate choice to suggest the wearer's "theatricality", especially when compared with the original source, Duris of Samos.

<sup>205</sup> Mossman (2015), 153.

<sup>206</sup> Mossman (2015), 158 closely reads this passage to argue that Plutarch's terminology is carefully chosen to recall certain aspects of Demetrius' character.

<sup>207</sup> See Pelling (1980) = (2002), 91-115 for a study of Plutarch's adaptation of his source material and Billows (1990), 333-5 on Athenaeus and Plutarch's manipulation of Duris' language. Several recent studies have demonstrated how Athenaeus manipulated his sources: cf. Pelling (2000a), 187 on Athenaeus' misquotation of ancient historians as intentional to suit his purpose. Gorman and Gorman (2007), 51 demonstrate how Athenaeus' assertion that the fall of Sybaris was due to their moral degradation through luxury is not, as Athenaeus claims, inherited from the sources he cites.



form of tampering, but the similarity of the imagery suggests that both Athenaeus and Plutarch did indeed read Duris for the *Demetrius*.

This last point is crucial since Athenaeus adds one line to Duris' citation, which Plutarch does not. He states that on the occasion when the Athenians celebrated Demetrius' festival, they carried a representation of him onto the stage (ἐπὶ τοῦ προσκηνίου, Ath. 12.536a). This implies that Duris' *Macedonian History* associated Demetrius, or at least his representation, with the stage of the theatre. This can partly be explained because Demetrius' own festival was celebrated in Athens at the same time as the Great Dionysia, the theatrical festival *par excellence*.<sup>208</sup> Yet, although Demetrius' association with the stage may have emanated from a historical reality, it was preserved in the sources which Plutarch consulted. Nor is Duris the only source to connect Demetrius with the stage. Another incident, reported by both Athenaeus and Plutarch, suggests that other earlier sources drew on theatrical metaphors to describe aspects of Demetrius' life. Both include a retort which Lysimachus made, wishing to insult Demetrius' paramour Lamia, as he argued that (in Athenaeus) he had never seen/ (in Plutarch) it was the first time he saw (ὄρᾶν) a prostitute (πόρνη) go out from the tragic stage (ἐκ τραγικῆς σκηνῆς, Ath. 14.615a; Plut. *Demetr.* 25.9). Once again the use of this quote is dependent on its context. Athenaeus, recognising Phylarchus as the source, includes it as part of a wider discussion on humour and its uses. Demetrius is first made to compare Lysimachus' court to a comic stage (κωμική σκηνή), since his courtiers only had names of two syllables, resembling characters from comedy (Ath. 14.614f), to which Lysimachus responds with his denigration of Lamia's unmerited status. The theatrical imagery is therefore in keeping with Demetrius' initial insult. In Plutarch, the context is more political. Although he describes Demetrius' humiliation of Lysimachus, denying him the title of king, the quote is given as an example of Lysimachus' hatred of Demetrius (*Demetr.* 25.8-9).<sup>209</sup> It is not included as part of a general use of theatrical imagery to draw on witty insults. The

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<sup>208</sup> See Thonemann (2005), 74 on the historical importance of the Great Dionysia in relation to Demetrius' festival at Athens.

<sup>209</sup> The insults which Demetrius levels at the other Diadochoi in Plutarch are stated in Athenaeus but on a separate occasion, without mention of the comic and tragic stage (Ath. 6.261b).

similarities of this saying strongly imply the existence of an early tradition that associated parts of Demetrius' life with the stage.

If the use of metaphors and imagery taken from the physical layout of the theatre predates Plutarch, his own integration of this imagery in his narrative depends on his interpretation of the sources available to him. He is no blind copier, but, as I will demonstrate in the following section, adapts his source material because it confirms his idea of kingship and theatre.<sup>210</sup> I contend that the way in which Plutarch conceptualises tragic acting as a performance is determined by the *rapprochement* which he has established between kingship and tragic acting. Scholarship has tended to focus on the influence which acting had on Plutarch's depiction of monarchy, without necessarily considering the reverse. Both institutions effectively determine the language that Plutarch uses to describe each milieu: the influence functions both ways.

When Plutarch specifies the type of role played by an actor, the character invoked is almost exclusively a royal figure.<sup>211</sup> In the *Dem.* 22.5, which I mentioned in the previous chapter, it is as kings and tyrants that actors cry or laugh in the theatre (αἱ ὑποκριταὶ τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν προσώπων), while the presentations of new tragedies in Athens are interrupted by the demands of a spoiled actor playing the role of a queen (βασιλίδος πρόσωπον, *Phoc.* 19.2). Of the few tragic roles performed on stage that are referred to, Plutarch names only kings, queens or tyrannical figures, and not gods or heroes. For example, the performance of Hecuba and Andromache in Euripides' *Trojan Women* moves a tyrant to tears (*Pel.* 29.10), and the famous Roman tragedian Aesopus gets carried away in his role as the mythical king Atreus (*Cic.* 5.5), while it is as King Pentheus and then as his mother Agave that the actor Jason, performing in Euripides' *Bacchae*, appears before the Armenian court holding the severed head of Crassus as his prop (*Crass.*

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<sup>210</sup> In this respect I follow Duff (2004) and Mossman (2015)'s reading of Plutarch's adaptation of his source material in the *Demetrius*: Plutarch adapted his source material, not as a simple compiler but according to his thesis. As Duff (2004), 284 n. 46 points out, the existing theatrical imagery of the *Antony* cannot be owed to Duris and yet fits as a parallel for similar imagery in the *Demetrius*.

<sup>211</sup> There are two exceptions: *Dem.* 22.5 with the tyrant, a figure close to the king, and *Lys.* 23.4 with the messenger and the servant.

33.2).<sup>212</sup> As a counter-example, Lucian mentions roles such as Hercules (Luc. *Nigr.* 11.5; *Pisc.* 31.13-15).

Not only does Plutarch allude quasi-systematically to royal characters – as opposed to other types of tragic roles – but he also includes these references outside his discussions of monarchy. Many of these examples are inserted in Plutarch’s Athenian or Roman narratives, far from the Diadochoi or the Roman king or emperor. The mention of actors as kings and tyrants at *Dem.* 22.5 occurs in a classical Athenian democratic context, as the orator Aeschines objects to his colleague Demosthenes’ participation in festive celebrations, despite the death of his daughter some days prior. Aesopus’ performance as Atreus is mentioned in a discussion of Cicero’s oratorical education, in the last decades of the Republic (*Cic.* 5.5), while the behaviour of the actor playing the queen is contrasted with the virtue of the Athenian orator and general Phocion’s wife (*Phoc.* 19.3-4). Yet Plutarch returns again and again to the figure of the king and the queen in his evocation of tragic roles regardless of the political context in which these are mentioned. But it is not only the *persona* of the tragic actor which is permeable with kingship: it also his appearance.

The permeability between kingship and theatrical performance is found in Plutarch’s treatment of the diadem as a theatrical costume. This is clear in Plutarch’s use of *σχῆμα* to refer to this insignia of power. Although not exclusively, the word belongs to precise theatrical terminology used in a wider range of literary sources from Plato (*Rep.* 373b) and Aristotle (*Rh.* 1386a32) to the satirical dialogues of Lucian (*Pisc.* 31.8) and refers to the appearance and body language of an actor. It is this term which Plutarch, in the passage already cited at *Quaes. Conv.* 711c, employs to designate the physical part, along with the voice, which an actor must tailor to his performance on stage. The designation of the diadem as *σχῆμα* both theatricalises this insignia by associating it with the outward appearance of the actor and heralds the change of costume undertaken by the tragic actors. Plutarch’s reference to the actor’s change of costume (*σχευή*) to become his character on stage naturally parallels the Diadochoi’s change of appearance to mark their new identities as kings.

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<sup>212</sup> For a discussion of *Cic.* 5.5 see Ch. 4, I, 163. See Braund (1993), 474 and Zadorojniy (1997), 180-181 on the tragic quality of Crassus’ death.

Most scholars who comment on this passage have noted the theatrical element of not simply the Diadochoi, but especially of Demetrius' relationship to clothing.<sup>213</sup> Plutarch famously compares him to an actor when, in order to escape Pyrrhus' forces unnoticed, he changes out of his kingly apparel into the dress of a private citizen (*Demetr.* 44.9). Yet the use of the diadem and its equation with an actor's costume is more than a portrayal of Demetrius' attitude towards kingship. Important as it is, I argue that it also reflects Plutarch's parallel between tragic acting and the office of kingship in general, beyond Demetrius.

Plutarch uses the insignia of royal power more than once to refer to the identity of a dramatic *persona* on the stage. For instance, he observes that in the performance of tragedies some famous actors take on the secondary role of messenger or servant rather than that of the character who bears the diadem and sceptre (τὸν δὲ διάδημα καὶ σκῆπτρον φορεῖν, *Lys.* 23.4). Both the diadem and the sceptre are historically attested insignia of royal power, of which Plutarch was conscious.<sup>214</sup> At *Lys.* 23.4, however, these objects are used to evoke the *persona* of the king, where they

<sup>213</sup> De Lacy (1952) 170; Stadter (2010), 209 = (2014), 300; Tatum (1996), 142; Duff (1999a), 117 on the importance of clothing as part of Demetrius' theatrical character. Mossman (2015) notes the theatrical quality of Demetrius' regalia but goes beyond it, arguing that Plutarch constructs the ekphrasis of Demetrius' clothing to parallel his character. Clothing and its link to the theatrical world is a common theme between the *Demetrius* and the *Antony*: cf. Pelling (1988), 21-2 on theatre and tragedy as a running theme throughout the pair.

<sup>214</sup> Cf. *Praecepta*, 816f for a similar use of the diadem and sceptre in a theatrical context to denote the role of the king. Both terms are most frequently used in conjunction with royalty. The sceptre is either mentioned as an attribute of the supreme god of a pantheon (Zeus at *Quaes. Gr.* 301f; Osiris at *De Iside*, 335a; 371e), a royal symbol inherited from representations of the divine (*Ad Princ.* 780f) or the attribute of a king (Odysseus at *De Soll.* 970f; kings in general at *Praecepta.* 801d). The diadem is generally not used of Alexander but of the kings who succeeded him, as well as their descendants. In the *Alexander* it is only worn by a man who appears to Alexander in a dream, just before his death (*Alex.* 73.7-9); it is never worn by Alexander. Plutarch, however, mentions Alexander's diadem twice in *De Alex.* (331a, 340b). For the Diadochoi, with whom it is directly associated at *Ant.* 54.8, and their successors: Philip III (*De Alex.* 336e); Demetrius (*Demetr.* 18.1-3, 53.4); Antigonos III (*Cleom.* 16.7); Perseus (*Aem.* 23.2, 33.6); Ptolemy IV (*Amat.* 753d); Ptolemy VI (*TG.* 1.7); Cleopatra (*Ant.* 85.7); Seleucus II (*De Grat.* 508d); a Seleucus (*An Seni.* 790b); Attalus II (*De Frat.* 489f). It is found in the legacy of the Macedonian kingdoms, worn by Mithridates VI' Macedonian wife Monime (*Luc.* 18.3-5) and offered to Tiberius Gracchus by a Pergamene ambassador (*TG.* 14.5.). The term is also used of Eastern kings and queens: Semiramis of Syria (*Amatorius*, 758e), Sardanapalus of Assyria (*De Alex.* 326f), Xerxes I of Persia (*De Frat.* 488d); Tigranes II of Armenia (*Luc.* 28.6-7, 36.6, *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 3.2, *De Alex.* 332a); Orodes II of Parthia (*Crass.* 21.8). The diadem is only mentioned in a Roman context as a symbol of tyranny. The rumour of Tiberius' desire for a diadem is used to accuse him of illegal ambitions (*TG.* 19.3); Caesar's friends, either Antony (*Caes.* 61.5-8; *Ant.* 12.3) or flatterers (*Brut.* 9.8), who wish to confer too many honours upon him, try to offer him a diadem. Plutarch also uses the diadem as a symbol of power (*An Seni.* 789e; *De Tranq.* 465a).

become props to create the dramatic character on the stage. This blurring of royal insignia and theatrical paraphernalia is also used, for instance, in Plutarch's narrative of Aesopus' impression of king Atreus on the Roman stage, where he uses a sceptre to smite a poor attendant (*Cic.* 5.5). The parallel between the Diadochoi's employment of royal insignia with that of tragic actors with their costumes is not simply a question of imitation but also harks back to the parallels which Plutarch sees between the office of king and the profession of tragic actors. The comparison between the Diadochoi and the tragic actor is, therefore, not only determined by Plutarch's denigration of these generals as simply imitators of the office of king, but is deeply rooted in his conception of tragic performance, which he reads as a dramatisation of kingship. If the Diadochoi are tragic actors it is because tragic actors, in Plutarch's corpus, are men who pretend to be kings.

In essence, Plutarch's equation of the Diadochoi with tragic actors is multi-layered and damning. He draws on Platonic idea of *mimesis* to depict the Diadochoi as imitators of the worst aspects of kingship. But the philosophical ramification is not enough to explain fully this simile. The performative aspect of tragic acting also plays an important role. Tragic actors are by default actors of kingship. This acting simile therefore works on two levels, a philosophical understanding of *mimesis* and a conceptualisation of tragic acting as the performance of kingship. Plutarch's analysis of the Diadochoi's behaviour through both a philosophical and a performative lens is repeated later in the *Life*. Plutarch reuses the imagery of *Demetr.* 18.5 to describe the Macedonians' processing of royal power. Describing the mounting tension between Demetrius and the Epirote king Pyrrhus, as they plunder their respective territory and end up wounding one another in combat, Plutarch argues that Pyrrhus was detrimental to Demetrius' cause because he gained great renown and admiration amongst the Macedonians (*Demetr.* 41.4).

καὶ πολλοῖς ἐπήει λέγειν τῶν Μακεδόνων, ὡς ἐν μόνῳ τούτῳ τῶν βασιλέων εἶδωλον ἐνορῶτο τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τόλμης, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι, καὶ μάλιστα Δημήτριος, ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς τὸ βάρος ὑποκρίνοιτο καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ ἀνδρός.

And many of the Macedonians came to say that in only [Pyrrhus] of the kings could the image of Alexander's daring be observed, and that the others, and Demetrius most of all, acted upon a stage the arrogance and haughtiness of the man.

(*Demetr.* 41.5)

The Macedonians use Alexander as a multi-faceted model against which to measure their leaders. They contrast Alexander's daring in battle, present in Pyrrhus, with his βάρος and ὄγκος, which marked the dead king's less attractive royal display of power, present in the other kings. As soldiers it is not surprising to find them preferring Pyrrhus for his Alexander-like daring in battle. It is the commander who fights with his men that the Macedonian soldiers value, not the display of royal pomp. Here Plutarch uses a theatrical metaphor to illustrate the superficiality of the Diadochoi and Demetrius' understanding of kingship. Once again they are condemned as imitators of the worst aspects of kingship. Yet, the language through which the Macedonians express their appreciation of Pyrrhus and their denigration of Demetrius betrays a particularly negative understanding of both these leaders. While the latter is indeed an imitator of bad qualities, the other is not depicted as the truth, but is also described through mimetic terminology.

Just as Plutarch used Platonic imagery to portray the Diadochoi as imitators of royal power (*Demetr.* 18.5), so do the Macedonians to depict Pyrrhus' emulation of Alexander. He is not the dead king, but a shadow (εἶδωλον) of his daring. This term is instrumental in Plato's discourse on mimetic art in Book 10 of the *Republic*, where he presents a system for distinguishing the truth from the arts. He argues, using the example of a couch, that truth (ἀλήθεια) is a divine creation, which is reproduced in the material world by a craftsman who builds it (*Rep.* 596c). The object is, therefore, not the divine truth, but a reproduction. In turn, a painter creates an image, εἶδωλον, of the craftsman's work. The εἶδωλον is thus twice removed from the original truth, as it is a likeness of a materialisation of truth (*Rep.* 598b).<sup>215</sup>

The poetical artist, a category which includes the tragic writer and actor, is defined in similar terms. Plato first names him as an imitator of images (μιμητής εἰδώλων, *Rep.* 600e) and then equates him with the painter by defining him (μιμητής) as the

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<sup>215</sup> Said (1987) on εἶδωλον in Plato as a ghost-like creation of the outward appearance rather than essence of what it imitates. Vernant (1990), 231 on εἶδωλον in Archaic thought as the copy of the essence rather than the appearance. See Ch. 4, III, 193 n. 453.

creator of an image (ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητής, *Rep.* 601b). Plato then banishes simultaneously the painter and the theatrical artist on the grounds that their creations are inferior to reality (*Rep.* 605a). By referring to Pyrrhus as an εἶδωλον, the Macedonians find him wanting: he is not truly Alexander, but an imitation of a reality which no longer exists.

While the behaviour of both Pyrrhus and Demetrius is decoded using the imagery of *mimesis*, the Macedonians reserve one final nuance between the two. Pyrrhus may be a phantom of the truth, but the Diadochoi, especially Demetrius, are acting (ὑποκρίνεσθαι). This distinction is crucial because it demarcates one as the imitation and the others as the creators of imitation. The Macedonians are conscious that the identification of Pyrrhus as a shadow of Alexander's daring is greatly dependent on their own observations: it is they who *see in* (ἐνορᾶν) him a mimetic reproduction of a truth. The agency of the viewer is almost more responsible than the man performing the action in turning him into an imitation. On the other hand, the Diadochoi and Demetrius are not depicted *as* actors but are in fact acting. By substituting the simile with a metaphor the Macedonians give these men full agency for their actions. They, as the complete creators of the *mimesis*, are morally responsible for the falsification of the truth.

Just as at *Demetr.* 18.5 Plutarch is drawing on both Platonic and performative ideas of *mimesis*: Pyrrhus is described through Platonic ideas of mimetic art, while the Diadochoi, as the ultimate imitators are described not through Plato's language, but through images taken from the world of theatrical productions. The importance of performance, in the depiction of the Diadochoi, is reinforced by the localisation of ὑποκρίνεσθαι in the theatre's performative space, the stage (ἐπὶ σκηνῆς). When Plutarch recounts this incident in the *Pyrrhus*, where the Macedonians compare the protagonist with the Diadochoi to Alexander's greatness, he preserves the Platonic language but omits the theatrical metaphor (*Pyrrh.* 8.2). The soldiers believe (οἶεσθαι) they observe in Pyrrhus a shadow and imitation (ἐν τούτῳ σκιάς τινας ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ μιμήματα) of Alexander's actions and force in battle, recalling the terms used by Plato to refer to the representation of truth, as opposed to reality.<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> The use of *σκιά* designates the reproduction of the truth on the walls of Plato's famous cave at *Rep.* 515a, which the inner-dwellers mistake for reality, *Rep.* 515c; on *μίμημα* as three times removed from the truth cf. *Rep.* 599d.

The Diadochoi, on the other hand, are not described as actors, but as imitators of Alexander's appearance, through his clothing and body language (έν πορφύραις καὶ δορυφόροις καὶ κλίσει τραχήλου καὶ τῷ μείζον διαλέγεσθαι). They are no longer acting. As in the case with Pyrrhus, they are perceived to be images of Alexander but simply imitate different aspects, less valued by the soldiers.

The lack of metaphor pertaining to theatrical production is explained by the importance which both acting and the stage hold in the *Demetrius* as opposed to the *Pyrrhus*. Note for instance that at *Pyrrh.* 8.2 Demetrius is not even named but conflated along with his father, Seleucus, Ptolemy and Lysander as “the other kings” (*Pyrrh.* 8.2). While the stage and acting are not important to Pyrrhus, they are crucial elements of Demetrius and the Diadochoi's presentation as kings. Pyrrhus, despite modern scholarship's desire to associate him with early Hellenistic kings, is not treated with quite the same imagery as his Macedonian contemporaries.<sup>217</sup> He may later display certain despotic traits, which can be read through a theatrical lens (cf. elephant), but he is never an actor. Pyrrhus stands apart from the other Macedonians of his period.<sup>218</sup> This image, exclusive to the Diadochoi, of kings as actor-like figures upon the stage goes beyond the *Demetrius*. Philip III Arrhidaeus was half-brother to Alexander the Great and immediately succeeds him on the throne of Macedonia after his death. Plutarch also compares him to a theatrical professional, which serves to explain the type of king he was.

Ἀριδαῖον δὲ τίς ἂν ἐποίησε μέγαν; ὄν οὐδὲν νηπίου διαφέροντα μόνον δὲ σπαργανωθέντα πορφύρα Μελέαγρος εἰς τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου θρόνον ἔθηκεν, εὖ γε ποιῶν, ἴν' ὀφθῆ παρ' ἡμέρας ὀλίγας πῶς ἀρετῆ βασιλεύουσιν ἄνθρωποι καὶ πῶς τύχη. ἀγωνιστῆ γὰρ ἡγεμονίας **ὑποκριτὴν** ἐπεισῆγαγε, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς **ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δορυφόρημα** κωφὸν διεξήλθε τῆς οἰκουμένης.

<sup>217</sup> See Brown (1995) on the inclusion of Pyrrhus in the study of the Diadochoi's coinage or Adams (2007a) in the creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms.

<sup>218</sup> Mossman (1992), 104 has demonstrated how Plutarch drew on epic rather than tragic imagery in the *Pyrrhus*, while he preferred tragic rather than epic imagery in the *Demetrius*, as she argues that the *Pyrrhus* was composed after the *Alexander* and relies on an analogue use of epic imagery. Although Pyrrhus is never explicitly defined through tragic imagery, Braund (1997) argues that the two citations of Euripides' *Phoenician Women* at *Pyrrh.* 9.5-6 and *Pyrrh.* 14.2 are echoed thematically in other parts of the *Life* to highlight familial tensions. Although Pyrrhus is never compared to an actor, he knows a period of moral decline: Buszard (2005), 483 analyses Pyrrhus' meeting with the Roman Fabricius as reflecting Plutarch's emphasis on the latter's virtue at the expense of the former's less impressive behaviour; see Mossman (2005), 508.



Who could have made Arrhidaeus great? He whom, no different from an infant, other than that he was swathed with purple, Meleager put on upon the throne of Alexander, doing well at any rate, so that it could be seen, in just a few days, how men rule through virtue and through fortune. For he brought an actor in place of a competitor for hegemony, much like a mute extra upon the stage passing through the inhabited world.

(*De Alex.* 337d)

Just as in the *Demetrius*, Plutarch's association of a king with an actor reflects the ruler's unworthiness. This rests on Arrhidaeus' inability to carry out effectively the office of king. His association with an infant refers to his supposed mental impairment, which Plutarch believed to have been caused by a physical disability (*Alex.* 77.7; cf. *Diod.* 18.2.2). The purple dye (πορφύρα), reminiscent of Demetrius' outrageous regal outfit (*Demetr.* 41.6), draws attention to a superficial understanding of royalty based on appearance. Arrhidaeus is thus an actor because he only looks like a king rather than because he deserves to be king through his abilities. The theatrical metaphor, however, goes further than a denunciation of his inability to rule. It also helps define the power structure through which he was established on the throne. The "contest of absolute power" (ἀγωνιστής ἡγεμονίας) refers to the struggle between Meleager and Perdikkas, two of Alexander's generals, who prompted their favourites to Alexander's vacant throne (cf. *Diod.* 18.2.1-4). Arrhidaeus did not succeed directly as Alexander's half-brother but acceded through the workings of Meleager.

Similarly to the discourse of the *Demetrius*, where military success and political machinations are responsible for making kings, as opposed to justice and virtue, here Plutarch opposes monarchs like Arrhidaeus who become rulers through fortune (τύχη) rather than through virtue (ἀρετή). He may look the part but his mental abilities and his accession to the throne do not recommend him as a *good* king. This is reinforced by his comparison to the dramatic extra (ἐπὶ σκηνῆς δορυφόρημα), which, as I will discuss in relation to Demetrius' entry in the theatre (*Demetr.* 41.5), did not speak during the action. By reducing his theatrical role to a human prop used by others, Plutarch insists on Arrhidaeus' inactive part in politics. Once again the theatrical metaphor and simile allow Plutarch to pass moral judgement on political situations and actions. The similarities in Plutarch's treatment of the Diadochoi and Arrhidaeus demonstrate that Plutarch's conceptualisation of

Alexander's successors as actor-like figures upon a metaphorical stage, pretending to be kings, goes beyond the *Demetrius* and affects his recreation of the entire period.

Theatrical metaphors and similes allow Plutarch to explain a moment in history, the creation of new Macedonian kingdoms. These stylistic devices focus on kings as tragic actors upon the stage and allow Plutarch to explore the nature of this kingship, where superficial qualities are valued over virtue. Part of the reason why Plutarch chose to represent them through such a precise aspect of theatrical performance is due to the permeability which Plutarch saw between tragic acting and kingship. Yet Plutarch's assessment of the Diadochoi is not the only instance where theatrical imagery finds itself at the heart of political discourse. Although stressing different consequences to histrionic politics, Demetrius Poliorcetes' entrance upon the stage in the theatre of Dionysus at Athens marks another step in Plutarch's depiction of early Macedonian kingship.

## **2. Demetrius on the Stage**

Demetrius Poliorcetes' entrance into the Theatre of Dionysus at Athens in 295 B.C. is unquestionably the most explicit example, in the Plutarchan corpus, of politics and theatre moulded together. This instance must be read within the wider context of Demetrius' ever evolving relationship with Athens. Antigonos and Demetrius are initially celebrated as liberators, once they have taken the city from Demetrius of Phalerum (*Demetr.* 8), but the prince falls from grace by exasperating the Athenians with his transgressions (cf. his desecration of the Parthenon by establishing it as his quarters and misbehaving in the sacred precinct, *Demetr.* 25). Their relationship worsens when Demetrius asks for their support in war but is refused (*Demetr.* 30). As Demetrius comes to reclaim Athens, he is forced to enter into a long siege, which Plutarch paints in particularly gruesome terms. He conjures the extreme conditions in which Athens finds itself through an image of a father and a son, having lost all hope, fighting over a dead mouse fallen from the beam of a roof (*Demetr.* 34.2). The

Athenians eventually relent, and expecting the worst (οὐδὲν μὲν ἀπ' ἐκείνου χρηστὸν προσδοκᾶν), open the city gates (*Demetr.* 34.1).

οὕτως οὖν τῆς πόλεως ἐχούσης, εἰσελθὼν ὁ Δημήτριος καὶ κελεύσας εἰς τὸ θέατρον ἀθροισθῆναι πάντας, ὅπλοις μὲν συνέφραξε τὴν σκηνὴν καὶ δορυφόροις τὸ λογεῖον περιέλαβεν, αὐτὸς δὲ καταβάς ὡσπερ οἱ τραγωδοὶ διὰ τῶν ἄνω παρόδων, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐκπεπληγμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου πέρας ἐποίησατο τοῦ δέους αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ τόνου φωνῆς καὶ ῥημάτων πικρίας φεισάμενος, ἐλαφρῶς δὲ καὶ φιλικῶς μεμψάμενος αὐτοῖς διηλλάσσετο, καὶ δέκα μυριάδας σίτου μεδίμνων ἐπέδωκε, καὶ κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς αἰ μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν. συνιδὼν δὲ Δρομοκλείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπὸ χαρᾶς τὸν δῆμον ἔν τε φωναῖς ὄντα παντοδαπαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐπαίνους τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀμλλώμενον ὑπερβαλέσθαι, γνώμην ἔγραψε Δημητρίῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸν Πειραιᾶ παραδοθῆναι καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν.

With the city in this state, Demetrius, having entered into the theatre and ordered all to be assembled there, fenced the stage with hoplites and encircled the platform with bodyguards, while he himself entered through the upper doors like the tragedians. The Athenians were exceedingly fearful, but he made the start of his speech the end of their fear. For he avoided strain of voice and harshness of words, but reconciled himself to the Athenians as he chided them with lightness and friendliness. And besides he gave them a hundred thousand bushels of grain and appointed leaders who were most pleasing to the *demos*. Dromocleides the orator, seeing that the people, in their joy, were shouting all sorts of proposals and were striving to outbid the praises of the demagogues upon the *bēma*, proposed a motion that the Piraeus and Munychia be delivered to Demetrius the King.

(*Demetr.* 34.4-7)

I am not disputing the veracity of Demetrius Poliorcetes' entry into the Theatre of Dionysus. It is, of course, plausible that Demetrius addressed the Athenians in their theatre, considering the growing use of the Theatre of Dionysus as a locus for assemblies.<sup>219</sup> Certain scholars have considered the historical truth of this passage. Chaniotis incorporates it in a wider argument to illustrate the mounting importance of staging in royal appearances during the Hellenistic period.<sup>220</sup> Chaniotis argues that Hellenistic society underwent a gradual theatricalisation, where theatrical

<sup>219</sup> See Ch. 5, III, 213-4.

<sup>220</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 238. Briant (1973), 307-9 argues that the historical Antigonos stage-managed ("mise-en-scène") his public appearances, partly by studying Plutarch's description of Aristodemus hailing Antigonos as king after Demetrius' victory at Salamis (*Demetr.* 17.5-6). Kyle (2007), 232-49 takes a similar view concerning sports made spectacles aimed at asserting royal Macedonian and Hellenistic power.

performances were incorporated in the civic behaviour and mindset of the post-Classical period.<sup>221</sup> While others have argued for the dramatic nature of Hellenistic art and literature, Chaniotis focuses his study on politics as spectacle.<sup>222</sup> Chaniotis' initial research was published in a 1997 article, 'Theatricality beyond the theatre: staging public life in the Hellenistic world'. Key to his argument is the rise of "the statesman as actor" and "his public appearance as stage performance".<sup>223</sup> In order to support his claim, Chaniotis quotes Plutarch's version of Demetrius' descent into the theatre, arguing that it reflects a historical truth.<sup>224</sup> This, Chaniotis asserts on the grounds that Plutarch was drawing heavily on Hellenistic sources such as Duris.<sup>225</sup> While Chaniotis does not develop this point further in his 1997 article, he has since offered a wider analysis of Hellenistic sources which corroborate his thesis.

Chaniotis has demonstrated the importance of spectacle in the Hellenistic construction of political narrative. He underlines how Plutarch's use of the theatre reflects a wider trend in Hellenistic historiography found in the words of Polybius, Poseidonius and Diodorus. He argues that Plutarch's more theatrical scenes are a legacy of the Hellenistic tendency to assimilate historical moments with drama.<sup>226</sup> More specifically, Chaniotis explains how Demetrius' entrance in the theatre reflects Hellenistic historiography's understanding of the theatre's importance as a political space. Thus Polybius' rendition of Philip V's confrontation with riotous troops in the theatre in 217 BC (*Polyb.* 5.25.4-7) highlights the Hellenistic depiction of political action as an illusion created through behaviour analogous to dramatic performances: the politician becomes a performance whose spectacle occasions a strong emotional reaction in his audience.<sup>227</sup> But this theatricalisation of historical moments is not simply a product of the historian's narratological choices. At the heart of Chaniotis' work lies the idea that this association of politics and drama in Hellenistic historiography is a reflection of wider trends in Hellenistic public and civic life.

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<sup>221</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 221. For a concise overview of the development of drama from the Classical to Imperial Rome see Csapo (2010), 170, who argues that the public theatre was gradually privatised.

<sup>222</sup> Wilson (1996) also argues for the blurring of lines between politics and theatre.

<sup>223</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 224.

<sup>224</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 224. Cf also Chaniotis (2009), 111-27.

<sup>225</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 244. Cf. also Wiles (1997), 36.

<sup>226</sup> Chaniotis (2013a), 57.

<sup>227</sup> Chaniotis (2013a), 69.

Chaniotis' analysis of Hellenistic epigraphical sources demonstrates how the language of emotional display and the dramatic nature of narrative were at the heart of Hellenistic public discourse.<sup>228</sup> For example, a decree from Eretria dating roughly from the first century BC demonstrates a certain Theopompus' promotion of his civic virtue through the language of emotion and self-display (*IG XII 9.236*).<sup>229</sup> Chaniotis also analyses this theatricalisation of the public sphere within the dynamics between monarchs and peoples: the religious honours and deification bestowed upon the Hellenistic king by a *polis* were articulated according to a constructed role which the *polis* chose to perform.<sup>230</sup> Whether at the heart of a citizen's presentation to his fellow citizens, or a *polis*' interaction with a king, Chaniotis underpins the importance which emotionality, based on constructed dramatic narratives, and display, occasioned by performance of identifiable roles, played in Hellenistic civic life.<sup>231</sup> The presence of a theatre made political in Plutarch is a reflection of his Hellenistic sources, themselves echoing the concerns of their historical period.<sup>232</sup>

Chaniotis' arguments have been corroborated by a number of other studies. Peter Thonemann explains the historical relevance of Demetrius' entrance into theatre by arguing that the Macedonian king has sound political motivations in conferring with the Athenians in such a manner.<sup>233</sup> Thonemann analyses this scene in conjunction with other contemporary sources to argue that Demetrius was

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<sup>228</sup> Chaniotis (2013b), 758-9. Cf. also Chaniotis (2013a), 75 and (2013c), 43, where Chaniotis also draws a parallel between the exploitation of emotion and dramatic narrative in Hellenistic historiography and in epigraphical evidence. Chaniotis (2009) provides, in modern Greek, a wide-spread analysis of the influence which the theatre held on Hellenistic public life: from the theatre as *locus* for public life and the parallels between the actor's performance and the politician's behaviour to the public appearance of the Hellenistic king as well as the experience of religious rituals. See Chaniotis (2013d) for a study, in English, of the theatricalisation of religious experiences in the Hellenistic period.

<sup>229</sup> Chaniotis (2013b), 758.

<sup>230</sup> Chaniotis (2003), 440. Chaniotis' research goes beyond the interaction between *polis* and Hellenistic ruler. Chaniotis (2015), 99 concludes that the behaviour displayed by the conquered Greeks towards Roman rule, during the Hellenistic period, was articulated according to similar theatrical dynamics: the Greeks performed according to a pre-scripted role in order to please their Roman audience. See Chaniotis (2007), 52 on the theatre as an importance *locus* in enabling political interactions between Greek cities and Roman emperors.

<sup>231</sup> Chaniotis (1997), 226-7 also argues that, as part of the theatricality of Hellenistic politics, delivery (*ὑπόκρισις*) was awarded pride of place, a point also explored at Chaniotis (2009), 64-102. Considering how important Demosthenes' obsession with artificial delivery was in the Peripatetic and Hellenistic criticism of his style of oratory (see Ch. 3, II, 142-5), Chaniotis' statement needs some reconsideration. While the focus on delivery may have increased, its reception was not always positive.

<sup>232</sup> Chaniotis (2013a), 56-7.

<sup>233</sup> Thonemann (2005).

synchronising his newly formed cult with that of Dionysus.<sup>234</sup> This was achieved by reforming the calendar (as suggested by epigraphical evidence) and replacing the statue of Dionysus which was brought into the theatre during the Great Dionysia with his own personal entry into the same sacred precinct.<sup>235</sup> The “tragic” elements of Demetrius’ self-presentation at Athens are determined by the means through which he sought to establish his royal image at Athens, that is by superimposing his festival, the Demetria, with that of Dionysus.<sup>236</sup> Eoghan Moloney’s recent article on Macedonian royalty’s relationship to theatre puts Thonemann’s interpretation into a wider historical context. Moloney argues that early Macedonian kings, such as Archelaus and Philip II, influenced the development of Greek drama by utilising it to establish and maintain their royal houses. Moloney demonstrates how Euripides composed a tragedy for Archelaus which established his line as descended from Hercules (TrGF F 228), emphasising tragedy as the medium through which Archelaus chose to showcase his royal lineage.<sup>237</sup> Moloney further argues that Philip II favoured dramatic actors, both as part of the entertainment for his festivities and as ambassadors between Macedon and neighbouring territories (Diod 3.83).<sup>238</sup> If Moloney’s conclusion is right and if these performances, first ordered by Archelaus and then Philip II, were designed to reinforce the hierarchy of the royal family, then Demetrius’ use of the theatre at Athens follows a royal Macedonian tradition of employing the theatrical space for political purposes.<sup>239</sup> In the light of Chaniotis’, Thonemann’s and Moloney’s studies, Plutarch’s description of Demetrius reflects a real and historical blurring of politics and theatre. And yet, while the importance of the theatre as a political locus may be owed to his sources, Plutarch use of this scene is specific to his aims as a biographer and a political thinker.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Thonemann (2005), 79.

<sup>235</sup> Thonemann (2005), 72-3 and 79-80.

<sup>236</sup> Thonemann (2005), 85.

<sup>237</sup> Moloney (2014), 237-40.

<sup>238</sup> Moloney (2014), 244.

<sup>239</sup> Moloney (2014), 247-8.

<sup>240</sup> Diodorus Siculus’ account of Demetrius’ wars is positively un-theatrical when compared to Plutarch’s version. Diodorus may emphasise Demetrius’ striking physique, with his beauty and his regal armour (ὀπλά βασιλικά), but the description is succinct and the effect which his appearance induces on the multitude (κατάπληξις) has no theatrical connotations (Diod. 19.81.4). Overall Demetrius’ relationship to theatre in Diodorus is very limited, with a mention of his men occupying the region of the theatre (ὁ περὶ τὸ θέατρον τόπος) when they take hold of Rhodes (Diod. 20.98.8). Demetrius may be associated with magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπώς), but Diodorus never uses terms

Historical truth, however, is less my concern here. Rather I wish to explore the way in which Plutarch chose to represent this moment of Macedonian and Athenian history, and what implications this narrative holds for his depiction of royal politics. The language Plutarch uses, the actions and the reactions he describes betray his understanding of early Hellenistic kingship and its success. This is a retelling through a very specific lens. I argue that in this passage Plutarch enmeshes the structure of the theatre with Demetrius' political action to highlight the emotional influence held by the king over the *dēmos*. The theatre thus becomes the *locus* for Demetrius' political goals to be achieved: the theatre with its space for performance makes the politics happen.

Plutarch is undeniably stylising Demetrius as a tragic actor by using the layout of the theatre. This layout is not simply named to transform Demetrius into an actor, but it serves to highlight which aspects of acting are important to his performance. In other words, Demetrius' identity as an actor is only relevant as far as the reader understands what aspects of the acting profession he is drawing upon. At *Demetr.* 18.5 Plutarch insisted upon the change of manner and appearance, while here the focus is put on speech. The stage (σκηνή) is given prime importance and is accompanied by the naming of the speaking platform (λογεῖον). The λογεῖον was the specific part of the theatre upon which the actor recited his role and as such is strongly associated with verbal performance.<sup>241</sup> With one exception (cf. *Thes.* 16.3), Plutarch never draws attention to the λογεῖον when referring to the theatrical stage. By adding this area to his narrative he focuses on the spoken part (rather than the

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such as tragic or theatrical to qualify his public appearances and dress. Even Athenaeus, whose text is closest to Plutarch's, does not include any theatrical imagery in his treatment of Demetrius other than the exchange between Demetrius and Lysimachus (Ath. 14.615a) and the mention of his likeness carried by the Athenians into the theatre (Ath. 12.536a). There existed another tradition which did not instinctively associate Demetrius in Athens with the stage. Athenaeus seems to be particularly interested in Lamia cf. Demetrius' love of Lamia and their daughter Phila (Ath. 13.577c); the dinner Lamia gave to entertain him (Ath. 3.101f; 4.128b); the Athenians' excessive honours to Demetrius, including honours to Lamia (Ath. 6.253a); a salacious poem recounting Demetrius and Lamia's exchanges over perfume (Ath.13.577). Other mentions include Demetrius' siege engines (Ath. 10.414f) and his protection of Euagoras the hunchback at his court (Ath. 6.244f).

<sup>241</sup> The epigraphical evidence attests to the building of this structure, as an individual part of the theatre, between the σκηνή and the προσκήνιον: *IG XI 2 161*; *TAM II 408*. The λογεῖον was not unique to the theatre and could simply designate an area of a building designed for public speaking: cf. *ID 442.232* and *ID 314.167* where there is no direct evidence of its inclusion in a theatrical complex. See also Plut. *Prae.* 823b where it is associated with the βήμα, the orator's platform.

costume, props or body language) of the actor's performance which Demetrius is about to emulate. In this way, Plutarch unequivocally compares Demetrius to the "tragedians" (οἱ τραγωδοί) and reinforces the simile with the mention of the upper entrance ways through which actors arrive on the stage (διὰ τῶν ἄνω παρόδων).<sup>242</sup> The upper doors of a theatre could only lead to the stage, where the actors played out the drama, as opposed to the ground level πάροδοι which lead to the orchestra, where the chorus performed (cf. Vit. 5.7.2).<sup>243</sup> The use of the theatrical setting to describe the area in which Demetrius operates naturally demarcates him as an actor, but more specifically as an actor upon the stage about to recite his speech. It is the manner in which he declaims, and the consequences of this speech, which mark the success of such a histrionic entry.

Before entering into the matter of Demetrius' speech to the Athenians, I want to draw attention to the mention of the spear-carriers (δορυφόροι) who surround the λογέιον. The presence of the hoplites in the theatre reinforces Demetrius' image as the conquering monarch who has successfully besieged a city. The mention of the spear-carriers in relation to a Macedonian monarch is unsurprising considering their role as royal bodyguards, from King Croesus (*Sol.* 27.3) to Alexander the tyrant of Pherae (*Pel.* 26.4) and other Macedonian monarchs such as Antigonus (*Eum.* 10.8). But the institution of the δορύφορος was also a symbol of despotism and Plutarch often uses it in opposition to lawful measures.<sup>244</sup> For instance, Sulpicius calls his bodyguards the "counter-senate", an anecdote which is followed by a narrative of his attack upon the consuls as they held an assembly (*Mar.* 35.2), while Pompey's enemies accuse him of despotic tendencies and use his bodyguards as an example for his anti-republican actions (*Pomp.* 67.3). In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that, while Alexander's bodyguards are sometimes referred to as σωματοφύλαξ (cf. *Alex.* 39.7, 51.6), this term is never used for the Diadochoi, who only have spear-

<sup>242</sup> The term τραγωδός encapsulates both the artist involved in the production of tragedies, whether an actor, chorus or poet, and the actual play. Plutarch usually foregoes any specification but lets context determine the meaning. Thus the τραγωδός involved in the preparation of new plays in the *Phocion* is clearly an actor because he is shown rehearsing in the role of a queen (βασιλίδος πρόσωπον, *Phoc.* 19.2), while the τραγωδοί (in the dative of means) through which Themistocles wins as chorus-leader refer to dramatic productions rather than a collective of artists (*Them.* 5.5). See Papadi (2008), 120 on Plutarch's use of πάροδος for political entries (cf. *Alc.* 10.1; *Pomp.* 22.6).

<sup>243</sup> Townsend (1986), 422.

<sup>244</sup> See Chaniotis (2005), 64 for an analysis of spear-carriers as symbols of tyranny in historiography.



carriers to protect them. In Plutarch's eyes Alexander's legitimacy as king is unquestionably stronger than that of his successors.

If the δορῦφορος is a symbol of the more despotic side of monarchy, especially Macedonian monarchy, it is also the term used in theatrical terminology to designate the mute extra on stage (LSJ s.v. II.4). These figures were part of the imagery associated in tragedy with despotic figures. For instance, Aegisthus, King Agamemnon's half-brother, whose liaison with the latter's estranged wife Clytemnestra leads him to murder the king and unlawfully take his throne, is repeatedly associated with these figures. Aeschylus' Aegisthus is expected to arrive on stage with spearmen accompanying him (Aesch. *Lib.* 769), while Euripides' usurper is depicted as protecting himself against Orestes, Agamemnon's son and his future killer, with a bodyguard (Eur. *El.* 616). When Plutarch lists all the elements needed for a theatrical production, the spear-carrier (δορῦφορος) is mentioned along with dancing masters, stage machinery, masks and costumes of purple robes (*De glor. Ath.* 348f). Not only was Plutarch aware of the theatrical dimension of the word but he also uses it accordingly in a political simile to undermine bad dinner hosts, who, like a mute *persona* upon the stage (δορυφόρημα ὡς ἐπὶ σκηνῆς), prefer to invite guests to increase their prestige rather than share in their company (*Quaes. Conv.* 709c). The emphasis here is put on looking the part of the good host, rather than caring about the presence of a dinner guest by engaging with him. In the light of these examples, the mention of the spear-carriers carries simultaneously their despotic and theatrical meaning. The silent presence of mute body-guards, as some sort of extras on stage, parallels Demetrius' identity as both actor and unworthy king.

Key to Demetrius' performance is his speech. Plutarch does not include its content because to some extent, it is irrelevant. Rather he puts the focus on the manner of its delivery and the emotions which Demetrius manages to inspire in his audience. Plutarch makes a clear connection between Demetrius' speech (λόγος) and the alleviation of the Athenians' intense fear. This fear is dissipated from the start of the speech, implying that Demetrius' initial manipulation of the Athenians' emotions does not rely on reasoned argumentation, but rather on the techniques employed by

actors when wishing to arouse emotion in their audiences. The conciliatory nature of the speech is not simply achieved by using inoffensive words but is matched by the softness of his tone (φωνή), recalling the importance of voice change associated with the actor's profession at *Demetr.* 18.5. The theatrical nature of Demetrius' speech is reinforced by Plutarch's use of ποιείσθαι to designate the king's provocation of his audience's emotion.

The verb ποιείσθαι is strongly linked to the theatrical art and Plutarch uses it, for instance, to describe the emotional characteristics of dramatic *personae*, such as Philoctetes or Jocasta, who are constructed (ποιείσθαι) to wither away or die upon the stage (*Quomodo adul.* 18c). Demetrius' speech, while being political and with political consequences on the make-up of Athenian society, is described using the language of poetical creation. The emotional impact is so strong that the Athenians go from total panic (ἐκπλήσσεσθαι) to a joy (ὑπὸ χαρᾶς) that overwhelms their political judgement.<sup>245</sup> This change of emotion is extreme, especially when considering the context of the action. The Athenians' fear was founded: Demetrius has led them to the brink of starvation and has greeted them with a double array of armed forces. Their delight at Demetrius' promises, however, and their lavishing upon him proposals and praises, seem indecent considering the pain he has inflicted upon them. Yet this extreme reversal of emotion is key to the success of theatrical performances. Manipulation of feeling was at the core of ancient discourses on the theatrical experience.<sup>246</sup> Plutarch repeatedly points to the dangerous emotional impact which theatre has on the viewer when reality cannot achieve the same effect. A tyrant, unmoved by the plight of the men he has destroyed, is reduced to tears by a performance of the *Trojan Women* (*Pel.* 29.9). Plutarch also points out our delight in seeing *personae* suffer when we cannot endure to witness real pain (*Quomodo adul.* 18c).

The relationship between emotional manipulation and acting is clear when comparing Plutarch's treatment of other politicians' speeches in the theatre.

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<sup>245</sup> Also noted by Chaniotis (2013a), 69.

<sup>246</sup> Both Plato and Aristotle emphasise the appeal which mimetic art holds over the audience's emotions. Plato, in the *Republic*, denounces the strong emotional reaction of an audience to a character's suffering, as dangerous (*Rep.* 605c), adding that in actual life the same men prefer to regard their own calamity with calmness and reason (*Rep.* 605d). Theatre thus encourages an emotional reaction without the guide of reason. Aristotle's angle is different, as he welcomes pity and fear as appropriate reactions to the witnessing of dramatic tragedies (*Poet.* 1449b27).

Demetrius is not the first political figure to perform a speech in the theatre, weighing his words before his audience. The Athenian general and orator Phocion, for instance, is depicted, some thirty years prior, preparing his declamation behind the stage (ὑπὸ σκηνῆν), re-considering the length of his speech (*Phoc.* 5.3). But Demetrius is less of an orator and more of a theatrical figure. The language which Plutarch uses to describe the effect of his speech is steeped more in poetical than in oratorical imagery. Where the Athenian statesman prepares to recite his speech (λέγειν), Demetrius' discourse is shown to create (ποιεῖσθαι) a change of emotion. Phocion, unlike Demetrius, knows how to keep the theatre at bay and retain his identity as an orator. An even better comparison can be made between Demetrius and Aratus, who gives a speech in the theatre at Sicyon under similar circumstances.

Aratus has just taken the city and stations his men in the theatre, placing them on each side of the side entrances (πάροδοι, *Arat.* 23.2). He then appears coming from the stage into the middle (ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς εἰς μέσον), positioning himself in the orchestra, just as Demetrius occupied the stage. Yet, Aratus is never compared to a dramatic professional nor is his speech described through poetical terminology. This can be explained by the un-theatrical delivery and impact of his speech on the Corinthians. The speech is important and changes the course of Corinthian history but Plutarch's treatment of it relies on rhetorical rather than theatrical language. In order to persuade the Corinthians to join the Achaean League, Aratus uses argumentation (διεξέρχεσθαι λόγον), in a speech fitting to the circumstances (τῇ πράξει πρόπειν). While Plutarch insists on the emotions of Aratus' audience as they rejoice to see him, grateful that his capture of the city has liberated them from Macedonian occupation, he makes absolutely no mention of the emotional impact which Aratus' speech may have had on its audience. Demetrius, on the other hand, exploits his theatrical setting to the fullest.

Demetrius' entrance into the theatre, his occupation of the stage, his recourse to form rather than content, his manipulation of his audience's emotion, expressed through language pertaining to poetry, all contribute to his designation as a tragic actor declaiming his monologue before his audience. This angle, however, needs to be tilted slightly. It is *because* Demetrius is successful at being an actor that he can manipulate his audience's emotions so effectively. Demetrius is less "like" an actor

and more a politician who successfully achieves his goals through acting. With Demetrius' entrance into the theatre of Dionysus, Plutarch pushes the histrionic metaphor to its extreme by depicting Demetrius as following the normative behaviour of the tragic actor arriving and performing upon the stage. While certain elements of Plutarch's description echo his earlier depiction of the Diadochoi, as actors upon the stage who undergo certain physical and behavioural transformations, the focus is on the effect which such histrionic behaviour has, not on the performer, but on the audience. The theatrical elements of Demetrius' behaviour allow his speech to be so absolutely effective in shaping the reaction of the audience. If the *Demetrius* is the advent of Macedonian histrionic kingship, Plutarch uses equally theatrical imagery in the *Aemilius* to depict its end.

## **II. Perseus and his Court: Performing a Tragedy for Rome**

Perseus of Macedon was not only the last of the Antigonids, but is also mentioned as the last of Demetrius Poliorcetes' descendants and the subject of the penultimate conclusion of his ancestor's *Life* (*Demetr.* 53.9). While Perseus was not awarded his own biography, Plutarch incorporates him into the *Aemilius Paullus* as his subject's main antagonist. Rita Scuderi has demonstrated how Perseus' shortcomings are designed to be read in direct contrast to Aemilius' virtues.<sup>247</sup> I am less focused on their character and more concerned by the way in which Plutarch uses theatrical imagery to describe the Macedonians. I concentrate my study on Plutarch's description of Aemilius' triumph, celebrated in Rome for his victory over Perseus at Pydna in 167 B.C. I contend that Perseus and his court are specifically depicted through a theatrical lens as a means for Plutarch to comment on the king's failings and the suffering which such failings inflict on his subjects. The theatrical nature of Aemilius' triumph rests on the relationship between the Romans as spectators and the Macedonians as performers. This dynamic, however, is unique to the Macedonians and never extends to Aemilius, who, although also on display, is never described as a performer affecting a theatre-like audience.

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<sup>247</sup> Scuderi (2004-5), 63.

Crucial to the identity of the Macedonians as performers is Plutarch's idea of the Romans as theatre-audience. Plutarch, from the very beginning, sets up Aemilius' triumph and Perseus' defeat as if it were a theatrical spectacle. The way in which the news of the outcome at Pydna reaches Rome sets the tone. A report of Aemilius' victory is first announced at the entrance of the theatre (εἰς τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ θεάτρου) as the people are watching equestrian games (ἵππικοὶ ἀγῶνες, *Aem.* 24.4) and occasions a joyful response (χαρά) with applause and shouts (μετὰ κρότου καὶ βοῆς, *Aem.* 24.5). By applauding with joy the Romans exhibit the behaviour which Plutarch believed to be typical of audiences at chariot races (*Sull.* 18.4). In general, Plutarch considers clapping and shouting as a response which belongs to the theatrical space (ὡσπερ ἐκ θεάτρου (...) μετὰ κρότου καὶ βοῆς τῶν παρόντων), not the political realm (*An Seni.* 785b). In the *Aemilius*, the news usurps and replaces the spectacle. Plutarch immediately adds the propagation of the report in the city (κατέχειν τὴν πόλιν), casting the theatre as the starting point for Rome's response. The news of the events at Pydna is received in Rome in the theatre, as if it were a spectacle. This theatricalisation of Perseus' defeat is continued in the preparations for Aemilius' triumph.

ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἔν τε τοῖς ἵππικοῖς θεάτροις, ἃ κίρκους καλοῦσι, περὶ τε τὴν ἀγορὰν ἰκρία πηξάμενοι, καὶ τὰλλα τῆς πόλεως μέρη καταλαμβάντες, ὡς ἕκαστα παρεῖχε τῆς πομπῆς ἔποψιν, ἐθεῶντο, καθαραῖς ἐσθήσι κεκοσμημένοι.

The people erected benches for spectators both in the equine theatres, which are called circuses, and around the forum, while they seized the other parts of the city, as each part supplied a view of the triumphal procession, and, adorned in white garments, watched the spectacle.<sup>248</sup>

(*Aem.* 32.2)

This passage sets the scene for Plutarch's subsequent description of Aemilius' triumph. The mention of the equine spectacles in the theatre recalls the announcement of the victory, which also took place in the theatre during equestrian games at *Aem.* 24.4. The transformation of a political and military event into a theatrical one, however, is taken even further as the city itself is transformed into a

<sup>248</sup> LSJ s.v. ἰκρία, II.3, cf. also Aristoph. *Th.*395 and Ath. 4.167f, for the translation of ἰκρία as benches in a theatre.

space designated for performance. Once again the theatre is the starting point. The ἕδρα were benches specifically used for spectators, as Aristophanes' metonymical use of these seats to designate the theatre demonstrates (*Th.* 395); this word is, to my knowledge, not used anywhere else in Plutarch. While their installation seems only too appropriate in the theatre, their erection in the forum converts a predominantly political space into a theatrical one. In fact, the people transform the whole city into an observation point. The spectacular nature of the Romans' enterprise is reinforced by Plutarch's use of θεᾶσθαι, the verb specifically reserved for the viewing of performances (cf. previous chapter). While *Aem.* 24.4 and *Aem.* 32.2 demonstrate the people's willingness to treat Perseus' defeat and Aemilius' triumph as a spectacle, responding to the news as one would to a spectacle, and transforming the whole city into a gigantic theatre from which to witness the victory procession, the Romans are not the performers but remain solely the audience. Plutarch reserves the role of the performer who triggers a response in the audience not to Aemilius, but to the Macedonians.

At the core of my discussion on the Macedonians rests the distinction between “the tragic” and “the theatrical”. Although the tragic is a fluid term, the interpretation of which changed and evolved even during antiquity, it can be differentiated from the theatrical. However one chooses to define the tragic, it does not necessarily presuppose a staged ensemble that requires an interaction between spectator and performer. There are, in fact, instances in which elements pertaining to the tragic registers available to Plutarch are transposed into his narratives without any sense of bombastic artificiality. Christopher Pelling has demonstrated how the notion of the tragic in Plutarch can transcend its theatrical aspect to denote the vulnerability of the human condition, the inevitable suffering of existence and the limited agency of man.<sup>249</sup> “Theatricality” itself, Pelling points out, can also contribute to Plutarch's depiction of human failing.<sup>250</sup> I am less concerned with Plutarch's use of theatre to depict and explore human frailty but rather with its use to examine the power play

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<sup>249</sup> Pelling (2016), 122-3.

<sup>250</sup> Pelling (2016), 126-9 for a discussion of “theatricality” and human failing in the *Demetrius-Antony*. See also Introduction, 8.

between political bodies, and here between the Roman *plebs*, the Macedonian prisoners-of-war and the victor.

I contend that Plutarch represented the interaction between Macedonians and Romans as one of performance and spectatorship. Considering Plutarch's wider depiction of Macedonian royalty this is hardly surprising. But the performative aspect of the Macedonians is not simply a reflection of their political make-up; rather it is their perceived theatrical nature which Plutarch uses for his moral purposes. I argue that the theatricalisation of the Macedonians on display allows Plutarch to contrast the Macedonians and Aemilius as *exempla*. While Perseus' entourage is described through a theatrical lens, offering to the spectator images of suffering, Aemilius does not invite the same process of viewing in the audience. This distinction reveals Plutarch's conceptualisation of the moral differences between his protagonist and his enemies.

εἶτα μικροῦ διαλείμματος ὄντος ἤδη τὰ τέκνα τοῦ βασιλέως ἤγετο **δοῦλα**, καὶ σὺν αὐτοῖς τροφέων καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν **δεδακρυμένων** ὄχλος, αὐτῶν τε τὰς χεῖρας ὀρεγόντων **εἰς τοὺς θεατάς**, καὶ τὰ παιδιά δεῖσθαι καὶ λιτανεύειν διδασκόντων. ἦν δ' ἄρρενα μὲν δύο, θήλυ δ' ἓν, οὐ πάνυ συμφρονούντα τῶν κακῶν τὸ μέγεθος διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἦ καὶ μᾶλλον **ἐλεεινὰ** πρὸς τὴν **μεταβολὴν** τῆς ἀναισθησίας ἦν, ὥστε μικροῦ τὸν Περσέα βαδίζειν παρορώμενον· οὕτως **ὑπ' οἴκτου** τοῖς νηπίοις προσεῖχον **τὰς ὄψεις** οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, καὶ **δάκρυα** πολλοῖς ἐκβάλλειν συνέβη, πάσι δὲ μεμειγμένην **ἀλγηδὸν καὶ χάριτι τὴν θέαν** εἶναι, μέχρι οὗ τὰ παιδιά παρήλθεν.

Then, at a small interval, the children of Perseus were now led as slaves and with them a mass of foster-parents, tutors and teachers who, in a state of having wept, were reaching their arms to the spectators and teaching the children to beg and entreat. There were two boys and a girl, who, on account of their age, were not very aware of the magnitude of the evils. The future change of their ignorance provoked even more pitying, so that Perseus was barely noticed as he walked on. Thus the Romans turned their eyes towards the children through pity and it came to pass that many shed tears and for all those present the spectacle was mixed with pain and joy, which did not end until the children had passed by.

(Aem. 33.6-9)

There are two different groups in this scene: the Macedonians as performers and the Romans as spectators. I contend that while the former are described through imagery

which belongs to the narrative and performance of tragedy, the latter is depicted through the lens of theoretical approaches to spectatorship. Plutarch's depiction of Perseus' children parallels certain aspects of the narratological conventions of ancient tragedy. As enslaved royalty (δοῦλα) they recall the fate of Trojan (Eastern) royal figures of the tragic plot, from the princess Cassandra (Aesch. *Ag.* 1326) to Hector's mother, Hecuba (Eur. *Tro.* 140) and his wife, Andromache (Eur. *Andr.* 12). But Perseus' children are not simply reminiscent of tragic princes and princesses, but also parallel quite closely the conventions of representing children in ancient Greek tragedy. Gregory Sifakis' work on children in tragedy highlights the recurrent symbol of children as figures of innocence who remain unaware of their parent's misfortune.<sup>251</sup> In fact, tragic characters explicitly draw the audience's attention to the children's unawareness, often in contrast with the suffering of their parents, which they must share. For instance, Ajax envies his children their obliviousness to the evils of their parent (οὐδὲν τῶνδ' ἐπαισθάνεσθαι κακῶν, Soph. *Aj.* 552), while the Nurse puts the children's ignorance of their mother Medea's pain (μητρὸς οὐδὲν ἐννοεῖσθαι κακῶν) down to their tender age (νέα φροντῖς, *Med.* 47-8). Like Ajax's children, Perseus' sons and daughter are unaware of the evils which have befallen their father. Similarly, Medea's sons remain unconscious of their plight on account of their youth.

While Perseus' children recall certain aspects of ancient tragedy, the multitude of carers (τροφεῖς), teachers (διδάσκαλοι) and tutors (παιδαγωγοί), who accompany them also play with tragic expectations of the scene. Their tears (δακρύεσθαι) and outstretched arms to the Romans (τὰς χεῖρας ὀρέγειν) are gestures designed to invoke pity in the audience. John Oakley has explored the correlation between figures of suffering and the raising of hands and arms to invoke pity.<sup>252</sup> Using vase paintings representing Ajax moments before his death, or Penelope's suitors as they are showered with Odysseus' arrows, he argues that this behaviour exhibited in extreme moments of vulnerability betrays a desperate prayer for relief.<sup>253</sup> Plutarch through his narrative transforms the suffering of the attendants into a performance. Plutarch refers to the intended target of their performance as

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<sup>251</sup> Sifakis (1979), 69.

<sup>252</sup> Oakley (2005), 208.

<sup>253</sup> Oakley (2005), 211.



spectators (εἰς τοὺς θεατάς). The qualification of the audience as θεαταί transforms the observer into a theatrical audience. By comparison, when the Roman patrician Manlius is condemned for threatening the order of the Republic, he is brought to trial before the Romans (*Cam.* 36.5). Manlius behaves exactly as the Macedonian followers do, extending his arms (τὰς χειρας ὀρέγων) and crying before them (δακρύων, *Cam.* 36.6). In this passage, however, Plutarch does not refer to the Romans as spectators, but as observers (οἱ ὀρῶντες).<sup>254</sup> This difference is crucial. The Macedonian followers may be conducting themselves according to codified norms of behaviour expressing a particular emotional state, but, by referring to their viewers as spectators, Plutarch takes this expression of suffering into the realm of spectacle.

This theatricalisation of the attendants' conduct into a performance is reinforced by their attitude towards the children. They teach (διδάσκειν) Perseus' sons and daughter to beg and entreat (δεῖσθαι καὶ λιτανεύειν), recalling the designation of some of these servants as teachers (διδάσκαλοι). The teacher, διδάσκαλος, often accompanies children in Plutarch's corpus but considering what these servants are asking of their pupils it is plausible to view this teaching in a theatrical light. The διδάσκαλος was also the overseer of dramatic productions, from the instructor of the chorus (*An Seni*, 787e; *Arist.* 1.6) to the producer of plays (*Epicurus*, 1096a). By using this term Plutarch associates these servants with theatrical professionals who direct their performers, here the children, to play a certain role, that is, the conquered sufferer. This contrasts with the children's unawareness but it also creates a divide between them and their servants. While the children's plight may recall tragic themes, these nurses and teachers are acutely aware of their audience and the effects that they wish to produce, transposing their suffering into the realm of tragic display.

The ultimate theatrical element of this scene, however, rests on the response of the audience, who react following behaviour described in theoretical approaches to spectatorship. The Romans response to the presence of Perseus' children recalls the Aristotelian model of the audience's experience of tragedy in the *Poetics*.<sup>255</sup> At

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<sup>254</sup> See Pelling (2005b), 287 for a discussion of the use of pity at *Cam.* 36.6.

<sup>255</sup> Zadorojnyi (1997), 173, Duff (1999a), 44-3 and Duff (2004), 285-6 also argue that Plutarch had an Aristotelian understanding of the tragic hero. Sandbach (1982), 209 demonstrates that few of the

the heart of Aristotle's definition of tragic action lies the concept of the change (μεταβάλλειν) of fortune from good to bad (ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, Arist. *Poet.* 1453a15). This change occasions pity (ἔλεος) in the viewer if it is undeserved (περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, Arist. *Poet.* 1453a5).<sup>256</sup> It is precisely the princes and princess's future change (πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν) of consciousness, from unawareness to the realisation of their underserved plight and their inevitable future suffering as they do not yet, which elicits pity (ἐλεεινά) in the Romans. The audience's crying (δάκρυα ἐκβάλλειν) at the spectacle (θέα) is also reminiscent of Plato's attribution of weeping as one of the influences which mimetic art exerts on the audience (δακρῶσαι, Pl. *Rep.* 606a; cf. κλαίειν specifically about tragedy, *Phileb* 48a). Yet Plutarch offers a twist in this theatricalisation of Aemilius' triumph. The Romans, he says, experienced both pain (ἀλγηδών) and joy (χάρις) at the spectacle before them. Plutarch has repeatedly used the term χάρις as the standard reaction to the news of Aemilius' victory at Pydna, from the army (*Aem.* 22.2) to the people (*Aem.* 24.5). The joy felt by the Romans, in this instance, emanates from the enslavement of their enemies as a sign of their imperial success. The pain on the other hand must be attributed to an Aristotelian understanding of the effects of pity. In his *Rhetoric* Aristotle identifies pity as a type of pain (λύπη) which is experienced when confronted with the suffering of an underserved misfortune (*Rh.* 1385b13). As such, it seems fitting that the Romans also respond with pain (ἀλγηδών) to the pity (ἐλεεινά/ὕπ' οἴκτου) excited in them by the plight of Perseus' naive children. Note how it is the aspect of the procession which most recalls tragedy, the

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quotations in which Plutarch references Aristotle can be said to derive directly from the Aristotelian corpus, although, (1982), 223 he recognises Plutarch's knowledge of specific works. Becchi (2014) demonstrates how influential the Peripatetic tradition was in shaping Plutarch's approach to Aristotle. Some scholars have argued for Plutarch's active and direct use of Aristotle: Bos (1999) on Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul; Capriglione (1999) demonstrates how Plutarch quotes Aristotle's *Poetics* almost *verbatim* but in a different context: where Aristotle discusses tyranny, Plutarch interprets the consequences of homosexual acts; Schettino (1999) on Plutarch's use of the *Athenian* and *Lacedaemonian Constitutions*. Others have sought to point out the similarities between Plutarch and Aristotle's concepts of certain ideas: Cervantes Mauri (1999) on *eleutheria*, Rodríguez Alfageme (1999) more generally, noting that both echo one another on topics which Plato ignored. Cf. also Teodorsson (1999) on Plutarch's use of the Peripatetics and Aristotle in his scientific enquiry. A demonstration of Plutarch's reading of Aristotle is beyond the enquiry of this thesis, and it is not possible to name accurately all the source(s) through which Aristotle may have influenced Plutarch. This does not, however, negate the commonalities between the philosopher and the biographer, and I have identified similarities between Plutarch's conception of theatre and emotions and its Aristotelian equivalent.

<sup>256</sup> See note above.

unconsciousness of the children, rather than the theatrical display of grief, on the part of the attendants, which triggers their pity. Yet Plutarch's Romans are not so grotesque as to treat this moment as an actual tragic performance.

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses λύπη for “pain”, while Plutarch employs ἀλγηδών. This, I contend, is deliberate since it allows Plutarch to allude to both definitions of pity in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle associates the experience of pity felt when viewing tragedy, not as a pain, but as a pleasure (ἡδονή, *Poet.* 1453b13). This difference can be explained by man's attitude towards reality and representation. When pity is triggered by actual events, it is experienced as a pain, but when it is excited by representation, that is mimetic art and it contributes to the pleasure of viewing (cf. *Poet.* 1448b10; 1453b13).<sup>257</sup> Plutarch echoes these ideas in his *How to Study Poetry*, where he points to the diverging emotional reaction between disgust felt at the witnessing of actual suffering and joy caused when the same suffering is displayed in tragic heroes (*Quomodo adul.* 18c). By referring to pain as ἀλγηδών, rather than λύπη, Plutarch reminds his reader that while Aemilius' triumph may resemble a spectacle, the suffering presented is very real. The Romans have not completely mistaken reality for imitation, and therefore can derive no pleasure from the suffering since it is all too real. Whether paralleling tragic themes or displaying theatrical behaviour, the Macedonian princes and princess, along with their attendants, are described in terms of a theatrical performance before their Roman spectators. This dynamic between captured and conquered is repeated in the description of Perseus' appearance.

Αὐτὸς δὲ τῶν τέκνων ὁ Περσεὺς καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ θεραπείας κατόπιν ἐπορεύετο, **φαιὸν** μὲν ἱμάτιον **ἀμπεχόμενος** καὶ κρηπίδας ἔχων ἐπιχωρίους, ὑπὸ δὲ μεγέθους τῶν κακῶν πάντα θαμβοῦντι καὶ παραπεπληγμένῳ μάλιστα τὸν λογισμὸν ἑοικῶς. καὶ τούτῳ δ' **εἶπετο χορὸς** φίλων καὶ συνήθων, βεβαρημένων τὰ **πρόσωπα** πένθει, καὶ τῷ πρὸς Περσέα βλέπειν αἰεὶ καὶ δακρῦειν ἔννοιαν **παριστάντων** τοῖς **θεωμένοις**, ὅτι τὴν ἐκείνου τύχην ὀλοφύρονται, τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοῦς ἐλάχιστα φροντίζοντες.

After his children and their retinue, Perseus himself walked dressed in a dark garment and the boots of his people, but from the magnitude of his

<sup>257</sup> ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητὴν. Belfiore (1985), 34 argues that Aristotle consistently saw pity as a type of pain but that it contributed to the pleasure of *mimesis* when represented in drama.

evils he seemed as one dumbfounded and mad. And a chorus of friends and intimates followed him, their faces weighed down by grief, and by always looking towards Perseus and crying, they inspired the spectators to realise that they lamented his fortune without much consideration for their own.

(*Aem.* 34.1-2)

Plutarch uses a choregic metaphor to designate the friends and intimates of Perseus, by referring to them collectively as a chorus (χορός). Pelling reads this as “tragic” but I contend that rather than highlighting certain themes present in tragedy, Plutarch is here alluding to the theatrical aspect of dramatic productions, that is their performance.<sup>258</sup> The χορός is a theatrical term that designates the group of singers and dancers who accompanied and responded to the individual actors in ancient drama. Plutarch associated the chorus with the theatre and spectacles (cf. *Ant.* 56.8; *Luc.* 39.5) choregic competitions (cf. *Lyc.* 21.1, *Nic.* 9.7; *Alex.* 29.1) and chorus-leaders training their choruses (cf. *Arist.* 53.4; *Dio.* 17.5). This idea of theatrical performance is reinforced by the mention of their faces as πρόσωπα. The term πρόσωπον refers to either human physiognomy, and describes the countenance and face of a person, or it is employed to designate the theatrical mask of the dramatic *persona*.<sup>259</sup> Although Plutarch did use πρόσωπον to refer to someone’s face without any theatrical connotation (cf. *Mar.* 26.8), the use of χορός to designate Perseus’ attendants allows for an ambiguous reading of πρόσωπον as both face *and* mask. Not only did dramatic choruses wear masks, but they also wore the same type of mask, which contributed to their unified sense of identity as a group.<sup>260</sup> Plutarch offers an image of Perseus’ attendants fixed in one sorrowful expression, like a dramatic chorus unified, before the viewer, by the same facial features.

While the mention of the χορός, coupled with πρόσωπον, points to the performative aspect of tragedy, the chorus’ lamenting does indeed refer to themes present in tragedy beyond its representation. Plutarch parallels these followers’ behaviour with lamentation in ancient tragedy.<sup>261</sup> For example, the Argive mothers lament their fate, weeping (δακρύειν) in their grief (πένθος) as they mourn their unburied sons (*Eur. Supp.* 973), as do Perseus’ followers who lament

<sup>258</sup> Pelling (2005b), 299.

<sup>259</sup> For πρόσωπον as dramatic persona, cf. *Phoc.* 19.2

<sup>260</sup> Vervain (2012), 163.

<sup>261</sup> See Pelling (2005b), 299 on the identification of the followers’ behaviour as lamentation.

(ὀλοφύρεσθαι), expressing their grief (πένθος) through tears (δακρύνειν).<sup>262</sup> While the lamentation displayed by Perseus' retinue is not a manifestation of mourning, its association with human suffering echoes tragedy's own flexible use of lamentation beyond the norms of funeral rituals.<sup>263</sup> Thus Perseus' chorus parallels the royal slave who, coming out of the royal palace, is seen crying (δακρύνειν) out of grief (πένθος) for the fate of her royal mistress who is not yet dead (*Alc.* 138). In fact, their lamentation evokes the figures of slaves who generally share the suffering of their masters in tragedy (cf. for example, Eur. *Hipp.* 325; *Med.* 47-49).<sup>264</sup> Yet the theatrical aspect of this lamentation is only completed by the effect which it occasions on the Romans. The conduct of Perseus' followers induces in the Romans an experience that is described using terminology reserved for poetical creation.

The behaviour of the attendants causes the same effect which poetical creation induces in the audience. The attendants' body language enlightens the Romans by *representing* (παριστάναι) the origins of their suffering. Naturally παριστάναι does not predominantly possess the meaning which I am here imparting to it, but considering the performative nature of this passage and Plutarch's wider use of the term in a poetical context I believe it can be read through a theatrical lens. Plutarch did conceive of the poet's influence as one which could bring to light certain emotional truths. In his *On Moral Virtue*, he argues that a poet (ποιητής) portrayed (παριστάναι) the connection between reason and the irrational in human feeling through his writing (*De Virt. Mor.* 442d). In the context of Aemilius' triumph, the poet is replaced by a chorus, and the poetical language by a display of lamentation, the performance of which illustrates, just as poetry might, the details of human suffering. The theatrical aspect of this realisation is reinforced by the reiteration of the Romans as spectators (οἱ θεώμενοι). Just as Perseus' children inspired pity in the Romans, these friends and intimates induce an emotional awareness in their audience.

Neither at *Aem.* 33 nor at *Aem.* 34 does Perseus induce an emotional reaction in the audience. Rather than stand as a catalyst for an understanding of suffering, he

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<sup>262</sup> Cf. the chorus of Argive maidens (κατολοφύρεσθα, Eur. *Orest.* 341, or the chorus of Greek slave women at *IT.* 644). Alexiou (1974), 102-8 and Dué (2006), 33-6 discuss the lamentation of captive woman although Sutter (2008) argues that similar lamentation also belongs to the male realm.

<sup>263</sup> See Swift (2010), 321 on the distortion of rituals in tragedy and in particular those of lamentation.

<sup>264</sup> See Serghidou (2010), 171 on the suffering of the master shared by the slave.

is ignored by the crowd. This can also be explained by an Aristotelian understanding of tragedy which shapes Plutarch's depiction of the Macedonians in Aemilius' triumph. Aristotle argues that while tragedy is a narrative of a change of fortune from good to bad, this change must not be induced by the hero's vicious nature (διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν), for a man of base (πονηρός) qualities cannot inspire pity in the audience (*Poet.* 1453a1-9). Pelling has pointed to Plutarch's Aristotelian understanding of pity as an emotion aroused by the witnessing of a deserving man suffering a harsh fate.<sup>265</sup> It is precisely because Perseus is not worthy that he is unable to inspire pity in his present audience. Immediately after the description of the conduct of Perseus' friends and intimates, Plutarch explains that Perseus' presence at the triumph resulted from his own cowardice (ἀνανδρία), as he cannot commit suicide to avoid the degradation of public humiliation.<sup>266</sup> This cowardice, Plutarch adds, stems from a weakness inspired in a vain hope which only leads to Perseus being objectified as a spoil amongst his treasures on display (μέρος τῶν αὐτοῦ λαφύρων, *Aem.* 34.4). While Perseus could inspire some pity in Aemilius when he was defeated, his suffering at being presented in the triumph is solely of his own making. In Aristotelian terms, Perseus is not worthy to be pitied by an audience who would have seen suicide, in this situation, as a form of courage.

The theatrical language allows Plutarch to explore the depth of suffering which a king's failures inflict on his children and his courtiers. Plutarch intertwines the tragic themes with the performative to describe the suffering of the Macedonians. Although Plutarch does not explicitly use such language to describe Perseus, this omission betrays the influence which theoretical approaches to the theatrical experience had on Plutarch's evaluation of the Macedonian king's character. This depiction of the Macedonians as tragic performers, rather than tragic figures, concludes Plutarch's depiction of this line of Macedonian royals, starting with Demetrius, as a form of tragic actors. The Macedonians in Aemilius' triumph are a form of spectacle which induces an emotional reaction in the audience akin to

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<sup>265</sup> Pelling (2005b), 287 draws on different passages but the conclusion applies to my argument. Jouan (2002), 191-2 also notes the parallels between Plutarch's general understanding of pity as aroused by the contemplation of suffering and Aristotle's definition of tragic emotion, but notes that Plutarch never mentions *catharsis*.

<sup>266</sup> This is the choice Cleopatra will make, and which will earn her "Yes, indeed, well done for one descendent of so many kings" (*Ant.* 85.8).

a theatrical experience. This, however, contrasts heavily with Plutarch's treatment of Aemilius' appearance and its influence on the Romans present.

(...) εἶτ' αὐτὸς ἐπέβαλλεν, ἄρματι κεκοσμημένῳ διαπρεπῶς ἐπιβεβηκῶς, ἀνήρ καὶ δίχα τοσαύτης ἐξουσίας **ἀξιοθέατος**, ἀλουργίδα χρυσόπαστον ἀμπεχόμενος καὶ δάφνης κλώνα τῇ δεξιᾷ προτείνων. ἔδαφνηφόρει δὲ καὶ σύμπας ὁ στρατός, τῷ μὲν ἄρματι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ κατὰ λόχους καὶ τάξεις ἐπόμενος, **ᾄδων** δὲ τὰ μὲν ᾠδὰς τινὰς πατρίους ἀναμειγμένας γέλωτι, **τὰ δὲ παιάνας ἐπινικίους** καὶ τῶν διαπεπραγμένων ἐπαίνους εἰς τὸν Αἰμίλιον, **περίβλεπτον ὄντα καὶ ζηλωτὸν ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπίφθονον.**

Next [Aemilius] followed, mounted on a magnificently adorned chariot, a man well worth seeing without such pomp, dressed in purple threaded with gold and holding out with his right hand a spray of laurel. The army all at once crowned with bay leaves, followed the chariot of their general by companies and divisions, singing some customary songs mixed with laughter, as well as battle-songs of victory and panegyrics to the achievements of Aemilius, who was admired and deemed worthy of emulation by all, and envied by no one of good quality.

(Aem. 34.6-7)

Plutarch creates linguistic parallels between Aemilius and Perseus only to accentuate the contrast between the two men. He introduces both through their clothing, using exactly the same verb (ἀμπεχόμενος), but while Perseus is dispossessed of the wealth he has been accustomed to, wearing a dark dress and Macedonian boots (φαιὸν ἱμάτιον, κρηπίδες ἐπιχώριοι), Aemilius shines with expensive purple dye and golden threads (ἀλουργίς χρυσόπαστος). Plutarch has both followed (ἔπεσθαι) by their respective groups of faithful followers, but where Perseus' intimates weep, Aemilius' soldiers celebrate. This lexical parallelism is not simply used to contrast the good fortune of the one at the expense of the other. It allows Plutarch to define Aemilius' worth in comparison with Perseus' lack of merits. Perseus is defined solely through his appearance, as his physique, from his clothes to his bewildered and dumbfounded expression, define him as a man overcome by evils he could not face. Aemilius, on the other hand, transcends his physical appearance.

It could easily be argued that Aemilius has given in to Macedonian taste for luxury after having accumulated so much of their wealth. Aemilius' lavishly

decorated chariot smacks of the excessive wealth which Plutarch has associated throughout the *Life* with Macedonian royalty. Perseus is shown to possess extensive resources (*Aem.* 12), with obscene amounts of gold and silver (*Aem.* 28), which are then paraded as spoils of war in Aemilius' triumph (cf. *Aem.* 33). Aemilius' purple dress with gold embroidery (άλουργίς χρυσόπαστος) recalls the royal outfit of Perseus' ancestor, Demetrius Poliorcetes, with its golden-threaded purple cloth (χρυσόπαστοι άλουργίδες, *Demetr.* 41.6). In fact, Aemilius and Demetrius are the only subjects of Plutarch's biographical corpus who wear purple cloth of embroidered gold, the other examples of purple (πορφύρα) and gold (χρυσός) together are reserved for women (*Tim.* 15.11; *Ques. Conv.* 693b) or lavish displays (a mosaic at *Nic.* 28.6; Cleopatra's barge at *Ant.* 26.1, Dionysus' funeral decorations at *Pel.* 34.1). Yet unlike his treatment of Demetrius' clothing as tragic (*Demetr.* 41.6), Plutarch does not invoke theatrical language in his description of Aemilius. On the contrary, he robs this pompous display of its power by remarking that such a man as Aemilius was worthy of spectacle (ἀξιοθέατος) beyond his appearance. While Aemilius is not showing the modesty which, say, Agesilaus kept in all circumstances, the effects of his appearance are neutralised by the man's ethical nature. This is shown by the way in which the Romans react to Aemilius' presence.

The way in which Plutarch describes Aemilius' effect on the crowd is completely devoid of any theatrical language. By expressing the Romans' admiration through περίβλεπτος Plutarch is creating a contrast between their different modes of viewing according to the subject before their eyes. Unlike their viewership of the Macedonians, where Plutarch uses θεάσθαι which immediately conjures up images of theatrical spectatorship, Plutarch is using a compound of βλέπειν to suggest the gaze and the reaction of the Romans, a verb which, although linked to the visible world, holds no theatrical connotations whatsoever. Not only is περίβλεπτος un-theatrical in nature, but it is also used in the *Lives*, specifically to denote the admiration of perceived virtue. The Spartans feel it for Agesilaus when he resists any foreign influence in favour of keeping the simple Spartan ways (*Ages.* 19.4) and it is virtue (ἀρετή) which is admired by the Spartans in their royal figures (*Lyc.* 3.4), just as Marcellus' son is admired for his temperance (σωφρονεῖν) and good education (πεπαιδεύσθαι, *Marc.* 2.5). Aemilius therefore does not produce an



emotional reaction akin to a theatrical experience, but rather inspires the recognition of his virtues. This is further emphasised by Plutarch's statement that no man of good character (οἱ ἀγαθοί) would feel envy (ἐπίφθονος) towards their general. Once again Plutarch is using language of ethics to describe the Romans' reaction to Aemilius' presence. He creates a division between those who respond to Aemilius by positively recognising his ethical worth and those who react to his presence with vice.

Considering the importance which Plutarch gave to the Romans' transformation of the triumph into a theatrical display, this capacity to step away from the spectacular into the ethical reveals Aemilius' character. Aemilius' propensity for virtue is further highlighted by the behaviour of the soldiers who accompany him. While their behaviour could be perceived as performative, Plutarch does not associate it with the theatrical world. They are indeed shown as singing (ἀείδειν) odes which are mixed with laughter (γέλως), a term which, as I have stated in the previous chapter, can be associated with dramatic performances. Yet the performative quality of this singing is reduced first by the acceptability of the laughter as a customary practise and second by the nature of the songs as odes of victory, which links them to their triumphal context rather than a theatrical one. Not only do the Romans fail to respond to this singing as a theatrical audience, but they are at no point shown to react to the soldiers at all. These men support Aemilius' glory, but do not encourage, as Perseus' attendants did, a direct emotional response.

Aemilius stands in perfect opposition to the Macedonians: while they can only induce an experience close to that of viewing a tragedy, he inspires an ethical understanding. Considering Plutarch's wider purpose in the *Parallel Lives*, and especially in his programmatic statement of the *Aemilius*, this difference is crucial. He explicitly correlates his desire to improve his person through the study of the virtuous men of the past (*Aem.* 1.1-5). Timothy Duff has demonstrated well how Plutarch's programmatic statements are particularly relevant to the specific biographies which they introduce.<sup>267</sup> The *Aemilius*, he notes, is a narrative of a man

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<sup>267</sup> Duff (1999a), 18 for an analysis of Plutarch's programmatic statements in the *Lives*, where for instance he identifies his work as biography, rather than history, a point which is relevant to his narrative of the *Alexander-Caesar* but which changes in his introduction of the *Theseus-Romulus*, where he identifies his work as history in opposition to myth.

who possessed many virtues which Plutarch, through his writing, presents to the reader.<sup>268</sup> Plutarch's description of the audience's reaction during Aemilius' triumph goes beyond the narrative of a spectacle in Rome. By using the language of theatre to describe the Macedonians and that of virtue to describe Aemilius, Plutarch is setting up two opposed models. Aemilius' worth is defined by his lack of theatrical behaviour, that is any conduct which recalls tragedy (or comedy) and which depends on spectatorship, especially in comparison with the Macedonians. But Plutarch's moralistic picture goes beyond the character of his subjects. This dichotomy between theatrical productions and displays of virtue as two different but parallel genres, allows the observer to understand different aspects of human nature. While theatre induces a deep emotional understanding of suffering, Plutarch's biographies may offer ethical improvement to the reader.

Plutarch is no longer depicting the creation of a new type of kingship but rather its end. Imagery taken from the production of drama allows Plutarch to demonstrate the consequences of bad kingship, by theatricalising tragic elements to depict the Macedonians as performers of suffering who induce an emotional understanding in the Romans as audience. While the Romans are prone to approach the triumph as a spectacle, the identity of performer is unique to the Macedonians. Aemilius does not seek to present himself as a performer nor does he encourage the Romans to respond as an audience. The last Macedonian royals are inherently theatrical, and while they cannot teach virtue, they can transmit the suffering of their ultimate loss of power.

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<sup>268</sup> Duff (1999a), 33.

### Chapter 3: Acting and delivery in Demosthenes' relationship to oratory

This chapter explores the ambiguities which Plutarch saw between oratory and acting in the *Demosthenes*. The association of public speaking with the theatrical world was an integral part of ancient rhetorical discourse from the Classical period onwards.<sup>269</sup> Plato, in his *Gorgias*, undermines both the spoken texts of tragedies and rhetorical performances by associating them with one another. Tragic poetry is written for the pleasure and gratification of the spectators (*Gorg.* 502b) and when it is stripped of its musical aspect, it becomes a form of public speaking (Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ποιητικὴ, *Gorg.* 502c). If tragic poetry can be likened to speeches delivered in the assembly, so can oratory be perceived as a form of tragic poetry: most orators, according to Plato, speak only to please and gratify their assemblies, not to act for the good of their city and citizens (*Gorg.* 502e). In Plato, rhetoric is dangerously close to drama. The historical Gorgias positively recognised poetry's persuasive force as a rhetorical tool (*Enc. Hel.* 9) and seems to have allowed for the inclusion of dramatic styles in his rhetorical performances (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1404a25, 1419b3-9 for Gorgias' use of comic tricks, Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 348c).<sup>270</sup> There is no trace in Gorgias of the denunciation of oratory's superficiality which, when compared to drama, is accused of favouring style over substance.<sup>271</sup> Aristotle's list of different components of speech (περὶ τὸν λόγον, *Rh.* 1403b16) includes delivery (περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, 1403b22) as one of its most important aspects. He argues that it first appeared through tragedy, as poets initially acted in their own plays, and concludes that rhetoric and poetry share a common concern for delivery (*Rh.* 1403b22-5). This discourse transcended the Greek world into the Roman one, as Cicero, for instance, also blended public speaking with theatre. Describing the qualities which the ideal orator should possess, he names the voice of a tragedian and the deportment of an actor (*Cic. De Or.* 1.128). Later, however, he argues for the superiority of oratory over acting: the former persuades by

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<sup>269</sup> Historically, the genres of drama and rhetoric did influence one another as early as the fifth century: cf. Scodel (1997), 489-501.

<sup>270</sup> Bons (2007), 43.

<sup>271</sup> Cf. Consigny (2001), 189-90

touching upon the truth, while the latter only imitates it (*De Or.* 3.214).<sup>272</sup> By addressing and assessing the relationship between oratory and acting in the *Demosthenes*, Plutarch was following an already existing and diverse tradition. The *Demosthenes* allows Plutarch to explore both the influence of acting upon oratory and its limits as an oratorical tool as the relationship between acting and oratory frame the *Life*, from Demosthenes' early involvement in political action to his last moments before committing suicide. It is these two significant moments that I explore in this chapter.

### **I. The Orator and the Actor**

Plutarch's *Demosthenes* is a well-established tale of success, a scrawny boy who rises from obscurity to become one of the most influential orators of his time. Demosthenes' enthusiasm for politics at the start of his career (*Dem.* 5) is tempered by his lack of rhetorical clarity and effectiveness: "his weak voice", "short breath", and "garbled pronunciation" are prominent enough to disturb the meaning of his speech (*Dem.* 6.4).<sup>273</sup> It is especially this weakness of voice that exposes him to the ridicule and scorn of his audience (*Dem.* 6.3-4). Yet, the start of his metamorphosis into a successful orator has little to do with the political sphere.<sup>274</sup> His rhetorical epiphany occurs through the agency of an actor. I argue that Plutarch, through his narratological choices, asks the reader to compare the political sphere with the acting world and to situate his character within these two frameworks. Plutarch recounts in immediate succession two separate occasions on which Demosthenes is counselled for his rhetorical shortcomings. Both anecdotes follow the same narrative: Demosthenes, after being laughed at (*καταγελάσθαι*) or rejected (*ἐκπίπτειν*), leaves the political sphere to roam (*ῥέμβεσθαι*) or retreat (*ἀπεῖναι*), only to be accosted by a well-meaning figure who counsils him in his own fashion, the politician Eunomus of Thria in the first instance and in the second the actor Satyrus (*Dem.* 6-7).

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<sup>272</sup> Fanham (2004), 145 on Cicero's attitude towards dramatic poetry and poets in the *De Oratore*. See Ch. 4, III, 182.

<sup>273</sup> ἦν δέ τις ὡς ἔοικε καὶ φωνῆς ἀσθένεια καὶ γλώττης ἀσάφεια καὶ πνεύματος κολοβότης, ἐπιπαράττουσα τὸν νοῦν τῶν λεγομένων τῷ διασπᾶσθαι τὰς περιόδους.

<sup>274</sup> Demosthenes' initial drive to enter politics is given a two-fold explanation: his envy of the orator Callistratus' fame and success (*Dem.* 5.4) and his love of competition and power (*Dem.* 6.1).

The identity of Eunomus of Thria is not clear and his occupation remains uncertain, but Plutarch presents him as a politically-minded man.<sup>275</sup> While Eunomus chastises the young Demosthenes for his moral shortcomings (*Dem.* 6.5), he barely addresses his elocutive faults, despite Plutarch's careful list of them just before this encounter. Craig Cooper argues that Eunomus' criticism centers on Demosthenes' vocal shortcomings, pointing out that in light of this previous listing of Demosthenes' speech impediments at *Dem.* 6.4, Eunomus' urging Demosthenes to strengthen his body is an attempt to remedy the young man's poor vocal delivery, but this interpretation falls short of the real significance of Eunomus' warning.<sup>276</sup> Although beneficial, an athletic build is not a prerequisite in Plutarch for an effective voice, as shown by Cato Minor who only after giving an enthralling speech resorts to exercise in order to fortify his body (*Cat. Mi.* 5.6), while Cicero simultaneously improves his endurance and his voice, achieving the former through gymnastics and the later through modulation (*Cic.* 4.4). Eunomus is concerned with Demosthenes' physical weakness only as far as it betrays the vice of "luxuriousness" (τρυφή, *Dem.* 6.5) and not as a direct means to improve his voice. Contrary to Cooper's argument, Eunomus is not interested in improving Demosthenes' delivery. His rebukes are purely centred on ethical matters as he only concentrates on the moral, and not performative, guidelines to political success.

By concentrating on Demosthenes' moral failings Eunomus isolates certain aspects of a politician's responsibility, which Plutarch considered fundamental to the character of a good statesman. Eunomus contrasts Demosthenes with Pericles, and while he allows him to match this template of Greek politics in speech (ὁ λόγος ἔχων ὁμοιότατος τῷ Περικλέους), he rebukes him for greater failings. The compliment is nothing in comparison with Demosthenes' lack of courage and firmness in speaking to the people.<sup>277</sup> This comment is far from trivial when

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<sup>275</sup> Lintott (2013), 52 on Eunomus' identity. Traill (1994) distinguishes Plutarch's Eunomus from a general defeated by Gorgopa in in 388/387 (Xe. *HG* 1.8-9), who may be the same man who participated in an embassy to Sicily (*Lys.* 19.19). Cooper (2008), 74 picks up on Eunomus' uncertain, but political, identity and contrasts the character's behaviour in the *Demosthenes* and in *Political Precepts*.

<sup>276</sup> Cooper (2008), 74.

<sup>277</sup> προδίδωσιν ὑπ' ἀτολμίας καὶ μαλακίας ἑαυτόν, οὔτε τοὺς ὄχλους ὑφιστάμενος εὐθαρσῶς, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἐξαρτυρόμενος, ἀλλὰ τρυφῇ περιορῶν μαραινόμενος.

considering Plutarch's attitude towards the *demos*, especially in Athens after the Persian wars. Timothy Duff is right in pointing out that, in Plutarch's view, Themistocles transformed Athens, through his reforms, into a radical democracy and, by giving it too much freedom, left his political successors to contend with its whims.<sup>278</sup> In the Athenian *Lives* which follow Themistocles' time, Plutarch consistently judges it imperative to stand firm against the desires of the *demos* when it threatens the safety of the state (cf. *Per.* 7.8; *Phoc.* 2.6-7; *Dem.* 14.3-4). By displaying cowardice and softness at an early age, Demosthenes is in danger of giving the *demos* too much freedom.

Pericles is held throughout the *Life* as a template of political excellence. His depiction in his own *Life* is more ambiguous. He is represented as a man who fulfilled the *demos*' expectations to push his rivals out of office (*Per.* 7.4) and to further his political security (*Per.* 9.2). Despite this display of demagoguery, Pericles is somewhat saved from total criticism by his ability to control the people rather than be controlled by them (*Per.* 15.1).<sup>279</sup> Yet, the inconsistency of character from one *Life* to another is not atypical in Plutarch's writing, and Eunomus' Pericles should not be compared with Plutarch's fuller and more complex picture in his *Pericles*. In the *Demosthenes* Pericles is regularly used as a simple ideal against which Plutarch's subject is measured, as elsewhere he censures Demosthenes' lack of military courage and moral consistency, arguing that he would have equalled the statesman of old, such as Pericles, had he displayed these qualities (*Dem.* 13.6).<sup>280</sup> By unfavourably comparing Demosthenes to Pericles, Eunomus proves to be more interested in

<sup>278</sup> Duff (2010), 58 on the consequences of an "emboldened" Athens. Pelling (2011), 128 analyses the relationship between *demos* and leader in the *Alcibiades* and *Pericles* and brings out the prominence of the Athenian *demos* as a political power after the Persian wars.

<sup>279</sup> The consensus in Plutarchan scholarship on this aspect of Plutarch's Pericles is firm: this demagogic aspect of his political career was a phase, rather than an expression of his deeper character. Plutarch explicitly notes that Pericles acted thus in opposition to his nature which was in no way "popular" (*Per.* 7). Breebaart (1971), 260 notes, as one of the defining features of the biography, the complex picture which Plutarch offers of Pericles' character. Breebaart (1971), 263-4 recognises the demagogic flavour of Pericles' early politics but argues that not only did Pericles later revert to his own nature proposing a more aristocratic program, but that Plutarch believed Pericles to be pushed into such a course of action in part because of the contemporary political climate. Pelling (2011), 129 remarks that, rather than an accurate reflection of Pericles' character, this catering to the whims of the people is restricted to *Per.* 7-14 with some echoes in later life; also noted by Farrarese (1974), 9, Stadter (1987), 258-60 and Duff (1999a), 9.

<sup>280</sup> Lintott (2013), 52 is right to suggest that Pericles' status of oratorical model must be due to his military achievement and his portrayal in Thucydides. This comparative use of Pericles also stands true of the *Phocion* as the main character, seconded by Plutarch, sets Pericles as the ideal template of the man who united a military and a political career (*Phoc.* 7.5).

providing principled guidance to Demosthenes rather than honing his rhetorical technique. Even the setting of the scene, the Piraeus, lends itself to the great scope of grand politics. The port transcends Demosthenes' individuality and becomes synonymous with Athens' military and naval history, from Themistocles' equipment of the Piraeus to attach the city to the sea after his success at Salamis (*Them.* 19.3) to Sulla's siege of the port in his efforts to take Athens (*Sul.* 12.1).

Although the premise for their meeting closely resembles his encounter with Eunomus, Demosthenes' conversation with Satyrus favours the aspect of oratory omitted by his older councillor. Where Eunomus exuded stateliness, Satyrus' sphere is much more domestic.<sup>281</sup> He is introduced as an actor and friend with no further indication of his status, and rather than meeting in a historic landmark of Athenian topography, they talk in the familiar setting of Demosthenes' house (*Dem.* 7. 1-5): the atmosphere is much more intimate. Although Satyrus agrees with Demosthenes on his rhetorical shortcomings, he does not rebuke him but seeks to improve his oratorical skills through example.

“ἀληθῆ λέγεις ὦ Δημόσθενες” φάναι τὸν Σάτυρον, “ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τὸ αἴτιον ἰάσομαι ταχέως, ἂν μοι τῶν Εὐριπίδου τινὰ ῥήσεων ἢ Σοφοκλέους ἐθελήσης εἰπεῖν ἀπὸ στόματος.” εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ Δημοσθένους, μεταλαμβάνοντα τὸν Σάτυρον οὕτω πλάσαι καὶ διεξελθεῖν ἐν ἧθει πρόποντι καὶ διαθέσει τὴν αὐτὴν ῥήσιν, ὥστ' εὐθύς ὄλως ἐτέραν τῷ Δημοσθένει φανῆναι. πεισθέντα δ' ὅσον ἐκ τῆς ὑποκρίσεως τῷ λόγῳ κόσμου καὶ χάριτος πρόσεστι, μικρὸν ἠγγῆσασθαι καὶ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν ἄσκησιν ἀμελοῦντι τῆς προφορᾶς καὶ διαθέσεως τῶν λεγομένων.

“You speak truthfully Demosthenes” asserted Satyrus “but I will swiftly cure the cause, if you want to recite from memory for me one of Euripides' or Sophocles' dramatic speeches”. Once Demosthenes had spoken, Satyrus, taking the same speech, moulded it and, with appropriate character and arrangement, went through it in detail, so that directly an entirely different speech appeared to Demosthenes. He was persuaded how much a speech, by means of performance, had ornament and grace and he

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<sup>281</sup> If this Satyrus is based on a historical actor, he could be one of at least three different people. He could be the comic Satyrus of Olynthos (*Dem.* 19. 193-5; *Aeschin.* 2. 156), and Lintott (2013), 52 conjectures that he may have visited Athens during Demosthenes' youth. Lintott also identifies a comic Satyrus who won a victory at the Lenaia c. 375 BC. and a tragic Satyrus of Marathon (*Luc. J. Tr.* 41; *Nec.* 14). Other traditions would have the actor Andronicus teach Demosthenes how to speak properly (*Plut.*, *Vit. Dec.* 845a-b and *Quintil.* 11.3.7).

considered exercise to be small and worth nothing for one who neglects pronunciation and composition of words.

(*Dem.* 7.3-5)

Rather than asking Demosthenes to recite one of his own speeches, and to work with the texts that he will be employing in the political sphere, Satyrus turns to the register he knows best, that of the theatre. The texts of Euripides and Sophocles do not exclusively belong to the acting world, and there is later evidence of their use in political training since tragic passages were included in exercises to improve the style of aspiring orators.<sup>282</sup> Here, Plutarch views these tragic texts as exercises and not as practical speeches to be used in politics. The departure from the political sphere is further emphasised by the use of ῥήσις to refer to the passage by either Euripides or Sophocles. Although not exclusively reserved for theatrical writing, ῥήσις can refer to a speech in a play: for example, Plato's denunciation of amateurs bothering Sophocles or Euripides with recitals of their own creations in Plato's *Phaedrus* (Pl. *Phdr.* 268c), or Demosthenes's quotations of Aeschines' lines from various plays, including Euripides' *Hecuba* (Dem. 18. 267) or even old Strepsiades' remark in Aristophanes' *Clouds* when he mentions a recital of a passage from Euripides (Ar. *Cl.* 1371).<sup>283</sup> It is with explicit allusion to Aristophanes that Plutarch employs this word to signify a passage from a comedy which a sophist imposes on his fellow dinner guests (*Quest. Conv.* 712d). In the corpus of Plutarch's work, ῥήσις is rare and, if it is not always used in reference to plays, it is systematically employed in conjunction with non-political writing, especially fiction. For instance, Plutarch expresses his contempt for the texts of the Delphi tour-guides by referring

<sup>282</sup> Although Roman and writing in the first century A.D., Quintilian singles out both Sophocles and Euripides as wonderful examples of powerful Greek styles from which a pupil can learn (Quint. 10.1.67-68). He even distinguishes between the two tragedians, selecting Euripides' eloquence as ideal to practice for pleading in courts (Quint. 10.1.67), while preferring Sophocles' language for political speeches (Quint. 10.1.68). Considering the importance of legal discourse in Greek tragedy, Quintilian's remarks are not surprising cf. to cite only a few studies, Halliwell (1997) for a general study of political discourse in tragedy; Lloyd (1992) for a specific study of agonistic debates in Euripides; Harris (2004) and Fletcher (2008) for the importance of legal language in Sophocles' *Antigone*. Cf. also Harris, Leão and Rhodes (2012) for the links between legal procedures and ancient tragedy and comedy.

<sup>283</sup> ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἦσ' Εὐριπίδου ῥήσιν τιν', ὡς ἐκίνει / ἀδελφὸς ὠλεξίκακε τὴν ὁμομητοῖαν ἀδελφὴν (Ar. *Cl.* 1371-2); τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλεῖ αὐτὸ προσελθὼν καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ τις λέγοι ὡς ἐπίσταται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάνυ σμικροῦς (Pl. *Phdr.* 268c); παρ' ἃς παρανάγνωθι καὶ σύ μοι τὰς ῥήσεις ἃς ἐλυμαίνου, "ἦκω νεκρῶν κευθμῶνα καὶ σκότου πύλας" (Dem. 18. 267).



to their recital as a ῥήσις, which despite having been prepared (συντεταγμένως), fails to inspire the tourists (*De Pyth.* 395B; 396C).<sup>284</sup>

The *Demosthenes* is the only work in which Plutarch uses ῥήσις with respect to an orator and even in this more political biography, it is reserved for the texts which the protagonist uses for his training (cf. also *Dem.* 11.1 where it is used of the speeches practiced with pebbles in his mouth). It is never employed for the speeches that he and other politicians write for or deliver in the assembly. In these instances, Plutarch prefers λόγος, the customary word he reserves for political discourse.<sup>285</sup> Even with respect to *Dem.* 7, once Demosthenes has transferred Satyrus' techniques from this theoretical realm to the actual political sphere, Plutarch replaces ῥήσις with λόγος (*Dem.* 7.5). By referring to the speeches proposed by Satyrus as ῥήσις, Plutarch ensures that the context of Demosthenes' awakening to delivery is theatrical rather than political. Yet, Plutarch does not situate Satyrus' actions solely in a theatrical context but plays, throughout the passage, with the ambiguities between oratory and acting. This is especially shown in Statyrus' treatment of the recited text.

Despite the theatrical nature of the passage, the language used by Plutarch to describe Satyrus' initial approach, with “appropriate character” (ἥθος πρέπειν) and “composition” (διάθεσις), is rooted in a lexical field which belongs to rhetorical treatises. The technical meaning of ἥθος, when specifically reserved for rhetorical discourse, refers to the process of characterisation by an author.<sup>286</sup> Aristotle, for instance, considers style of speech to act as an indicator of a man's character (*Arist. Rh.* 1395b13), which is duly echoed by Demetrius of Phalerum who explores the different emotional effects which style can have on a reader or listener, as it reveals certain aspects of the speaker's character (*Demetr. Eloc.* 1. 28.).<sup>287</sup> This exposure of character through style is not confined to rhetorical treatises and extends to fictional writing. “Longinus”, for instance, argues that the decline of Homer's style is reflected by the comic nature of the characters presented in his narrative of Odysseus' returned home (*Longin.* 9.15). But ἥθος also has a significant role to play

<sup>284</sup> See Halliwell (1997), 125 on the tragic origins of ῥήσις in Greek thought.

<sup>285</sup> Cf. *Dem.* 3.2; *Dem.* 5.1-6; *Dem.* 6.3-5; *Dem.* 8.6; *Dem.* 9.1 to cite only a few examples.

<sup>286</sup> Vickers (1989), 19 on ἥθος in rhetorical treatises as character study.

<sup>287</sup> Grube (1961), 33; Chiron (1993), xxv on Aristotle's legacy in Demetrius of Phalerum's *On style*.

in theoretical discourse on tragedy and its use in Aristotle's *Poetics* is central to his categorization of tragedy into different types. Thus, tragedies are to be divided between the simpler plots, which rely on emotion, and the more complex ones, which rely on the revelation of character (Arist. *Poet.* 1455b32-1456a3).<sup>288</sup> Aristotle recalls Sophocles and Euripides' description of the nature of their characters, when the former is said to have declared that he portrayed men "as they ought to be" and the latter "as they are" (Arist. *Poet.* 1460b11). Just as in English, ἦθος carries the double meaning of the nature of an individual and the creation of an author. By reading ἦθος with διάθεσις, I argue that both meanings are preserved by Plutarch to suggest the ambiguity of Satyrus' recital.

Plutarch uses the term διάθεσις twice within this passage (*Dem.* 7.4 and *Dem.* 7.5) and yet, while the most common translation in both cases is "delivery", I argue that these terms cannot be translated as such. Of the two instances recorded by LSJ as inferences where an oratorical use of διάθεσις means 'delivery', this Plutarchan passage (*Dem.* 7) is the first (LSJ s.v. I.2.b.).<sup>289</sup> As Gunderson points out, this translation of διάθεσις is unusual since it is more often connected with the notion of "disposition" or "arrangement" (Gunderson adds "word order") rather than performance.<sup>290</sup> I cannot quite agree with Gunderson who justifies his lexical acceptance of 'delivery' by arguing that the unpleasantness of Demosthenes' delivery stems from his disruption of the original structure of the tragic verses, later put to right by Satyrus' reading.<sup>291</sup> Plutarch is clear to state that the actor reads out the *identical* passage, which Demosthenes had performed for him, and it seems peculiar of Demosthenes to change the word composition of his quoted passage when the purpose of the exercise rests on a change of performance, not of text.

The question remains as to which translation should be used for διάθεσις to explain why Plutarch chose to employ such a word to describe Satyrus' actions and

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<sup>288</sup> Gill (1984), 150-151 on the distinction between ἦθος and πάθος and the role it plays in Aristotelian categorisation of both tragedy and epic. Halliwell (1998), 151-152 for an in-depth discussion of the dramatic use of ἦθος in Aristotle and the importance of explicit moral discourse for the plot of a drama.

<sup>289</sup> Noted by Gunderson (2000), 243.

<sup>290</sup> Gunderson (2000), 242. Other meanings of διάθεσις in Plutarch: of the disposition of a man (*Dem.* 3, *Num.* 19; 20, *Nic.* 1); with reference to architecture (*Per.* 13); of works of art (*Arat.* 32, *Demetr.* 22); of writing (*Quomodo adul.* 17b) with reference to money and debt (*Comp. Alc. Cor.* 3.1; *De Genio*, 583e).

<sup>291</sup> Gunderson (2000), 243.

what role it plays in defining Demosthenes' initiation in oratorical performance. Within the Plutarchan corpus, *διάθεσις* can have a performative meaning but, I argue, it should not be divorced from its wider sense of "composition". For example, when Coriolanus defends himself before the people, his rising emotion is betrayed by a change in the tone of his voice and in the *composition* of his face (*διάθεσις* *πρόσωπον*, *Cor.* 18.3). While 'delivery' cannot directly be used in this instance, the "arrangement" of his features contributes to the manner in which Coriolanus externalises his speech. Another more obvious example of *διάθεσις* as "delivery" exists but within a theatrical context rather than an oratorical one. In an attempt to join the conversation at dinner, a sophist shows off by describing a new form of entertainment, which seems to have originated in Rome (Plut. *Quaes. Conv.* 711b). It consists of having servants perform the more dramatic dialogues of the Platonic corpus. I am not concerned here with the appropriateness of such an entertainment (that forms the topic of conversation which ensues), but rather with the language used to describe the preparation and techniques that the slaves resort to in order to perform Plato's dialogues.

πρόσεστι δ' **ὑπόκρισις** πρέπουσα τῷ ἡθεὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων προσώπων καὶ φωνῆς πλάσμα καὶ σχῆμα καὶ **διαθέσεις** ἐπόμεναι τοῖς **λεγόμενοις**.

They give a performance that is consistent with the character of the established dramatic parts with an affected tone, appearance and *arrangement*, all designed to follow the speeches.

(*Quaes. Conv.* 711b)

The context is theatrical: the sophist considers the Platonic dialogues as the liveliest of dramatic pieces (*τούτων τῶν δραματικῶν οἱ ἐλαφροί*) and the servants recite these works for the entertainment of a refined audience (*Quaes. Conv.* 711b). It is safe to assume that the slaves are not recomposing Plato's dialogues and while it is not clear exactly what *διαθέσεις* is referring to, it takes on a performative meaning as it is part of the manner in which the slaves are giving these speeches. In both *Cor.* 18.3 and *Quaes. Conv.* 711b, *διαθέσεις* contributes to the delivery of a speech, and therefore carries a performative meaning, without necessarily having to be translated as such. To return to *Dem.* 7, the additional problem of translating *διάθεσις* as

“delivery” is the use of ὑπόκρισις in this passage. Owing to its tantalisingly theatrical meaning ὑπόκρισις can also, in an oratorical context, carry the sense of “delivery” (LSJ s.v. II.2.). Yet, Demosthenes practices his ὑπόκρισις, and not his διάθεσις, before his mirror (*Dem.* 7.6). I consider that the difference between διάθεσις and ὑπόκρισις rests on the former’s more specific relationship to λόγος and the latter’s more general connection to performance. Both the uses of διάθεσις in *Dem.* 7 are related to speeches, first with ῥήσις and then with λέγειν.<sup>292</sup> Its relationship to λόγος is also clear in Plutarch’s *Table Talk* where he uses almost the same wording to refer to the composition of Plato’s speeches (διάθεσις ἐπόμεναι τοῖς λεγομένοις *Quaes. Conv.* 711b / διαθέσεως τῶν λεγομένω, *Dem.* 7.5). In other words, the term διάθεσις refers to that part of delivery (ὑπόκρισις) which touches on speech but does not mean delivery as a whole.

It is because Satyrus understands how to communicate the intention of a tragedian, with regards to character and composition of the work, that he can effectively deliver the speech (*Dem.* 7.4). This revelation, in turn, allows Demosthenes to understand the importance of the manner, that is the diction and the style, in which a speech is to be delivered (*Dem.* 7.5). There remains, however, the thorny question of this scene’s theatrical quality. By applying ἦθος and διάθεσις, whose meanings transcend both the rhetorical and acting world, to a context that is neither purely oratorical nor purely theatrical, Plutarch is underlining the similarities between the two spheres. The ambiguous relationship between fiction and reality is fully felt, as Satyrus’ transformation of Demosthenes’ speech, while aimed at communicating the truth of the original text, is merely the acted representation of fictional writing. Demosthenes seems to approach his recital with an oratorical mind, applying key rhetorical concepts to his training, yet his “appropriateness of character” and his “composition” are being applied to a tragic text and, therefore, to fiction, and not to oratory. This removal from reality which Satyrus’ reading occasions is emphasised by his “moulding” (πλάττειν) of Demosthenes’ text.

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<sup>292</sup> ἐκ τούτου κατάγειον μὲν οἰκοδομησαὶ μελετητήριον, ὃ δὴ διεσώζετο καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, ἐνταῦθα δὲ πάντως μὲν ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κατιόντα πλάττειν τὴν ὑπόκρισιν καὶ διαπονεῖν τὴν φωνήν.

The use of πλάττειν in conjunction with literary fiction, and in particular theatre, casts the actor's actions into the sphere of the artificial.<sup>293</sup> Gunderson argues that, here, Plutarch demonstrates the educational benefits that falsehood offers to an aspiring orator, but this ignores both Plutarch's moral preferences and his general treatment of πλάττειν in relation with literary creation.<sup>294</sup> Plutarch's use of πλάττειν is linked to notions of artificial language, which he judges morally as separate from what is true. For instance, stories that are re-invented, changed or added to form a lie are fashioned (*Pel.* 10.5, *Adulator*, 57b). He also extends the use of πλάττειν to literary creations, censuring the writers who embellish actual events by remoulding them, with dramatic narratives, into tragic climaxes (*Alex.* 75.5).<sup>295</sup> While πλάττειν becomes synonymous with fabrication and fiction, this artificiality is not just criticised in fictional writing, but is also excluded from sound political language. The speech of a politician must be sincere, that is of "un-moulded character" (ἦθος ἀπλαστος) which confirms the "genuine purpose" (φρόνημα ἀληθινός, *Praecepta*, 802F) of the orator: Plutarch suggests the truthfulness of the politician's word, not through an affirmative but by negating what it ought not to be (ἀπλαστος). If Demosthenes improves, and indeed he must if he is to be successful, Plutarch reminds the reader of the importance of artificiality in his education. While Satyrus' exercise may seem to support the rhetorical training of a future orator, he ultimately does not seek to teach Demosthenes virtue, but uses theatrical techniques to demonstrate the effectiveness of delivery (ὑπόκρισις).

To conclude, Plutarch creates strong parallels between Demosthenes' encounter with Eunomus and with Satyrus, but the outcome of each meeting is strikingly different. Eunomus' speech is followed by a similar failure in the assemblies to that which had preceded his meeting with Demosthenes. Satyrus' reading is, however, followed by an enthusiastic discovery of the importance of performance. Plutarch creates this division between the moral concerns of a

<sup>293</sup> "Moulding" can have a positive meaning in Plutarch. Reason moulds the soul and helps to educate the learner properly (*Quomodo adul.* 28.e and *An Virtus* 439f). Moulding is only acceptable, however, when the forces at work are morally good and therefore can only have an ethical influence. See Duff (2008), 2 on the positive influence of πλάττειν.

<sup>294</sup> Gunderson (2000), 124.

<sup>295</sup> κάκει πῶν ὅλην τὴν <νύκτα καὶ τὴν> ἐποιούσαν ἡμέραν, ἤρξατο πυρέττειν, οὔτε σκύφον Ἡρακλέους ἐκπιῶν οὔτ' ἄφνω διαλγῆς γενόμενος τὸ μετὰφρονον ὡσπερ λόγῃ πεπληγῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά τινες φροντο δεῖν γράφειν, ὡσπερ δράματος μεγάλου τραγικὸν ἐξόδιον καὶ περιπαθὲς πλάσαντες.

politician's life and the improvement of his performative skills in order to situate his protagonist between a worthy persuader and a more superficial one. By showing Demosthenes to be more sensitive to Satyrus' teachings than Eunomus' message, Plutarch introduces the reader to the type of politician Demosthenes will be in later life. Demosthenes' concern for delivery over ethics is confirmed some chapters later, when disregarding all of Pericles' other qualities, he chooses to strive after and mimic (ζηλοῦν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι) the form and shape (πλάσμα καὶ σχηματισμός, note the same theme of artificiality and superficiality) of the Athenian general's speeches, considering these to be the true source of his greatness (*Dem.* 9.2).<sup>296</sup> The theatre not only affects one of the most seminal moments of Demosthenes' youth, but it also echoes throughout his life, defining his understanding of public life and affecting his political action.

If Demosthenes is awakened to the possibilities which a skilful performance can offer him, it remains to be seen how this theatrical dimension of oratory affects his political practice. Since delivery in oratory covered both the tone of voice and the development of appropriate body language, it is not hard to presuppose that Plutarch showed his Demosthenes practising and using the persuasive power of both voice and of body. True, Demosthenes proves to indulge in histrionic oratory, but the bulk of his efforts seem to be concentrated on the development and use of his voice, rather than on his gestures. Plutarch mentions physical training but it is not aimed at the improvement of his bodily grace: Demosthenes wishes to improve the strength of his voice and breath. The only reference to any practice of movement is his rehearsals before the mirror (*Dem.* 11.1). Even the anecdote which Plutarch supplies to confirm Demosthenes' belief in the power of voice *and* performance (ὁ τόνος καὶ ἡ ὑπόκρισις τῶν λεγόντων) shows his preference for voice rather than for gesture. According to hearsay, a man approached Demosthenes for legal help and after putting his case to him, was gratified with his support only once the anger, which he had felt at the injustice he was suffering, surfaced in the tone of his voice (*Dem.* 11.2), and not through gestures.<sup>297</sup>

<sup>296</sup> Demosthenes' imitation of Pericles' less worthy, moral superficial traits recalls Demetrius' emulation of Alexander's appearance rather than fighting spirit. See Ch. 2, I, 86.

<sup>297</sup> "νή Δία," φάναι, "νῦν ἀκούω φωνὴν ἀδικουμένου καὶ πεπονθότος."

It is important to note that Plutarch often describes the voice (φωνή) of his orators. This is due first to its function as a mirror for the character of his subjects and second to the importance of voice as a tool of persuasion. Plutarchan scholars have already explored the interconnection between ἦθος and λόγος and I will only venture to add φωνή to the equation.<sup>298</sup> Thus Pericles' composed countenance is reflected in a suitably calm voice (*Per.* 5.1), Cato Major's sternness of spirit finds its full expression in his harsh battle cries (*Cat. Ma.* 1.8), Cato Minor's inflexibility is equally present in his voice and in his countenance (*Cat. Min.* 1.3) and Cicero's passion as an orator translates itself into high-pitched tones (*Cic.* 3.7).<sup>299</sup> But the orator's voice is not just a marker of his character, it is also an important tool of persuasion and has a direct effect on the audience. Pericles' gentle voice warrants the "amazement" of all those who listen to him (*Per.* 5.1; *Praec.* 800c) while Demosthenes' weak voice impedes his meaning and thus his public importance (*Dem.* 6.4), and Cicero's forcing of his voice concerns the audience rather than amazes them (*Cic.* 3.7). The ideal voice must possess sweetness (*Per.* 7.1) rather than harshness and strength (*Cic.* 3.7) rather than weakness (*Dem.* 6.4). Yet, this dependence on voice, and its modulation, is not exclusive to the orator. The actor relies with equal strength on its power of communication (*Demetr.* 18.5).<sup>300</sup> Voice is therefore a tool used by both orators and actors. It is Demosthenes' approach to his voice and its training which becomes problematic. By comparison, Phocion, whose voice is unpleasant (*Phoc.* 5.2), neither seeks to amend it nor lets it distract from his ability to persuade.<sup>301</sup>

Demosthenes is only once tempted to fool his audience through staging and gestures, which proves to be rather ineffective. Bribe into silence, Demosthenes nevertheless chooses to attend the assembly meeting the following day but feigns a

<sup>298</sup> Pelling (2000b), 332 has shown how rhetoric tends to stem from the nature of the character rather than his education but (2002), 339 notes that Demosthenes and Cicero are exceptions as examples of the profound impact which education can have on speech. Rhetorical training still constitutes an important part of the future politician's education, a point stressed in several of Plutarch's political treatises (cf. *Praecepta*, 802f-803b). See Duff (2008) and Swain (1990b) for general studies of education in Plutarch.

<sup>299</sup> If the voice does not illustrate the character of the speaker, it is a vehicle for emotion: for instance, Cicero's fear impedes his speech at *Cic.* 35.5 and Cleopatra's trembling voice betrays her suffering at *Ant.* 83.1.

<sup>300</sup> See Ch. 2, I.1, 77 n. 194.

<sup>301</sup> See Ch. 5, I, 196-7.

loss of voice (*Dem.* 25.5). To convince his fellow citizens of his muteness he resorts to costume, wearing woollen bands wrapped around his neck as an accessory to simulate a sore throat, and to gestures, affecting his voiceless state with a motion of the head.<sup>302</sup> This piece of political theatrics recalls the ploys used by actors to persuade the audience of their fake identities through costumes and gestures but this deception is unsuccessful, as it does not fool the cleverest of his critics (*Dem.* 25.6). The loss of voice is very significant. By resorting to costumes and gestures, he abandons his most powerful tool and is swiftly punished for tipping into theatrics: his little act fails miserably to convince the crowd.

Demosthenes' lack of body language during his oratorical performances is striking when compared to the swishing togas and raised arms of the Roman *Lives* (a point which I will develop in the following chapter). Why, then, is Demosthenes' more dramatic nature expressed through his voice rather than through his body? The anecdotes recounting Demosthenes' improvement of delivery are taken from Peripatetic sources. Demetrius of Phalerum, Plutarch's principle reference concerning the orator's training, is his source for the style of Demetrius' spoken word (*Dem.* 9.3), for the different types of training he underwent to improve his voice (*Dem.* 11.1), for the negative reaction to his overly prepared speeches (*Dem.* 11.3), and for Demosthenes' frenzied performance (*Dem.* 9.4). Plutarch's reading of the Peripatetics not only coloured his appraisal of Demosthenes but also determined his recreation of Demosthenes' rhetorical interests.<sup>303</sup> Plutarch reflects this Peripatetic emphasis on delivery as voice and λόγος.

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<sup>302</sup> καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν εὖ καὶ καλῶς ἐρίοις καὶ ταινίαις κατὰ τοῦ τραχήλου καθελιζόμενος εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν προήλθε: καὶ κελευόντων ἀνίστασθαι καὶ λέγειν, διένευεν ὡς ἀποκεκομμένης αὐτῷ τῆς φωνῆς.

<sup>303</sup> Theophrastus, also a Peripatetic and quoted as a source in the *Demosthenes* (*Dem.* 10.1, 14.4 and 17.4), devoted an entire treatise to delivery (Diogenes Laertius 5.48), which although not necessarily original seems to have been very influential: cf. Fortenbaugh (2003), 254. Since the text is non-extant it is hard to determine what place body language held in his conception of rhetorical performance. While Athanasius explains that Theophrastus valued tone of voice (τόνος τῆς φωνῆς) as central to delivery (Athanasius, *Prefatory Remarks to Hermogenes' On Issues*), Cicero quotes Theophrastus as taking gestures into consideration but Theophrastus seems to have concentrated on the expression of the eyes rather than on other parts of the body (Cic. *De Orat.* 3.221). Theophrastus' influence on the *Demosthenes*, however, seems limited, especially in comparison with that of Demetrius of Phalerum. Plutarch does not actually name Theophrastus' views on delivery directly as a source for Demosthenes' own rhetorical performance but rather Demosthenes' moral failings as an orator (*Dem.* 10.1) or as reporting various political happenings in Athens at the time (*Dem.* 14.4; 17.4). Interestingly,



But Plutarch's emphasis on voice rather than gestures in the *Demosthenes*, is not simply a reflection of his Peripatetic sources, but also stems from classical (Athenian) attention to delivery, which favoured voice over body language. Nancy Worman has shown how Aeschines and Demosthenes' reciprocal insults concentrate mainly on delivery in their attempts to undermine each other's character. This delivery, Worman argues, is expressed through the excessive reliance on misuse of the orator's voice.<sup>304</sup> Gestures do not feature in the orators' arsenal of insults. Demosthenes' construction of Aeschines' debauched character, for instance, relies on his opponent's booming voice, which suits overly tragic language rather than the seriousness of political debate (Dem. 18.127).<sup>305</sup> Although many of Demosthenes' insults aim at discrediting Aeschines' acting, he does not shame him for excessive gesturing or exaggerated body language. Aeschines, on the other hand, describes Demosthenes' voice as high-pitched (Aeschin. 2.157) and grating (Aeschin. 2.3-35) to expose his opponents' cravenness (Aeschin. 2.113; 2.3-35).<sup>306</sup> Even Aristotle, whose rhetorical treatises are rather laconic concerning delivery, recognises the importance of a powerful voice and λόγος, but remains silent as to the employment of gestures (Arist. *Rh.* 1403b4; 1414a6). The earlier Greek evidence for delivery seems to concentrate more on voice and speech than on body language.

To conclude this first section: I have argued that Plutarch highlights the ambiguities between oratory and acting in his treatment of Satyrus' reading and Demosthenes' subsequent response, by drawing on terms which apply to both rhetorical theory and theatrical performances. Demosthenes blurs the already ambiguous lines between oratory and acting. Although an orator, Demosthenes' sensitivity to histrionic politics is shown through his attitude towards delivery, which he prizes over moral rectitude. Yet, and this is specific to Demosthenes, his delivery is centred on tone of voice and

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Hermippus accused Theophrastus of resorting to grand gestures when delivering (Athenaeus 1.21.b). This anecdote, whether true or not, shows that accusations of using excessive gestures were employed to undermine a speaker. See Boulogne (2005), 289 for a list of Plutarch's uses of Theophrastus in the *Lives*.

<sup>304</sup> Worman (2004), 4. Cf. also Easterling (1999), 159.

<sup>305</sup> ὡςπερ ἐν τραγωδίᾳ βοῶντα “ὦ γῆ καὶ ἦλιε καὶ ἀρετῆ”. There are other examples of this: Dem 18.13; 313. Worman (2004), 8 on Demosthenes' ridiculing Aeschines through his booming voice. Yunis (2001), 115 also picks the particular relationship between bombastic voice and Aeschines' theatrical past.

<sup>306</sup> Worman (2004), 15.

λόγος, not on gestures. The artificiality of Demosthenes' performance constitutes an essential part of Plutarch's idea of his rhetorical style, and this performance is achieved through theatrical means. Demosthenes proves, however, to have histrionic limits. This is clearly shown in his last moments, before his suicide. In this last vivid scene, Plutarch brings all the aspects of Demosthenes' attitude towards delivery and political speech together to conclude the *Life* in a scene in which he contrasts oratory and acting one last time.

## **II. The Triumph of Oratory over Theatre**

Before discussing this last scene, it is important to establish its context and to understand the crucial importance which competition holds in the *Demosthenes*. Plutarch's Demosthenes is lured into political life by his attraction to the ἀγών. Although the notion of contest (ἀγών) is ubiquitous in Plutarch's work, it is most often reserved for either military struggles between opposing forces or competitions held for religious occasions.<sup>307</sup> It is less commonly used for politics. Plutarch did sometimes conceive of political power play as an ἀγών, where the term is generalized to designate any type of political struggle and yet the scope is truly diverse: Lycurgus' reforms for the *Gerousia* (*Lyc.* 26.1), Pericles' confrontation with Thucydides to escape exile (*Per.* 14.3), Aeschines and Demosthenes' rhetorical tug of war (*Dem.* 15.6), the general competition between patricians and plebeians (*Cam.* 7.4-5), the Catiline conspiracy (*Cat. Mi.* 22.1), a struggle for office (*Ca. Mi.* 41.3), are all referred to as *agōnes*. While Plutarch recognizes the contests which politicians must face, he distinguishes between this inevitable aspect of political life and men's attraction to it. In his *Precepts on Statecraft*, conceived as a guideline to the ideal statesman, Plutarch hails politics as a sure contest (*Praecepta*, 820d). He also warns,

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<sup>307</sup> For ἀγών as either athletic or dramatic competition: *Lyg* 19; *Pel.* 29; *Demetr.* 19; *Per.* 13.11, *Aem.* 24.4; as warfare *Them* 8; *Arist* 10, *Mar* 20, *Luc* 15, *Pomp* 13. The sheer volume of both uses is such that a study of either exceeds the scope of this thesis but *Them.* 11.3 provides a beautifully succinct example of athletic competitions functioning as a simile for warfare. This reflects a general cultural perception of performative events in ancient Greece, from the military and sporting games (cf. Vanhove (1992)), to the musical and dancing choruses of the Hellenic festivals and public occasions (cf. Meuli (1968)), and even to funerary practices where the idea of contest was central (cf. Daqing (2010); Fisher and Van Wees (2011)). This competitiveness, which has been interpreted as a compass to define male virtue and status, has also been applied to rhetorical contests, where orators competed with each other in the political sphere (cf. Fredal (2006)).

however, the aspiring politician of the dangers which this agonistic trait presents. A man should not enter public life with a design for contests of superiority (πρὸς ἄμλλαν) – that is reserved for actors upon the stage (ὡσπερ ὑποκριτὰς εἰς θέατρον) – but should be driven by what is honourable (καλός, *Praec.* 799a).<sup>308</sup> Within this moralistic frame, Demosthenes displays a questionable attitude towards politics.

Demosthenes' practice of oratory was born out of necessity. He impeaches his guardians for squandering his inheritance (*Dem.* 6). Plutarch concludes that, while he was unable to win back his property, the confidence and experience he gained from successfully prosecuting his guardians, combined with the taste (γεύεσθαι) for the ambition (φιλοτιμία) and power (δύναμις) associated with contests (περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας), spurred him into public life.<sup>309</sup> Plutarch goes on to further illustrate Demosthenes' relationship to contest through a simile. Just as this Laomedon of Orchomenos, who trained as a runner to improve his physical health, eventually became a long distance champion, so Demosthenes, who entered public life to right his personal wrongs, became one of the Athens' most prominent political figures (*Dem.* 6.2).<sup>310</sup> This comparison works on two levels. Finally, Laomedon and Demosthenes share a utilitarian start to their career, entering into their professional milieu to rectify private matters, *and* they both elect to operate in an agonistic milieu. The example of Laomedon illuminates the nature of the milieu in which Demosthenes wishes to succeed. It is the competitive side of athletics (καθάπερ στεφανίται ἀγῶνες) which serves as a comparison to the equally agonistic nature of

<sup>308</sup> Plutarch perceived certain limits to the benefits of political struggle, as exemplified by his treatment of Agesilaus and Lysander's rivalry. In conclusion to the mounting conflict between the young Spartan king Agesilaus and his general Lysander, Plutarch remarks that ambition and competition in politics bring harm to society if they are not checked (*Ages.* 8). Bearzot (2005), 32 explores the ambiguities of *philotimia* in Plutarch, and especially in the context of the rivalry between the Spartan king and his general. Frazier (1996), 106 also notes Plutarch's reproachful attitude towards competition in the *Agesilaus*. Frazier (1996), 101-104 on the Fifth Century Athenian *Lives* constructed around the rivalry between different generals and politicians, as pairs Aristides/Themistocles and Pericles/Cimon stand in competition with one another respectively.

<sup>309</sup> τόλμαν δὲ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν καὶ συνήθειαν ἱκανὴν λαβών, καὶ γευσάμενος τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας φιλοτιμίας καὶ δυνάμεως, ἐνεχείρησεν εἰς μέσον παριέναι καὶ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν.

<sup>310</sup> καὶ καθάπερ Λαιομέδοντα τὸν Ὀρχομένιον λέγουσι καχεξίαν τινὰ σπληνὸς ἀμυνόμενον δρόμοις μακροῖς χρῆσθαι τῶν ἰατρῶν κελυσάντων, εἶθ' οὕτως διαπονήσαντα τὴν ἔξιν ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖς στεφανίταις ἀγῶσι καὶ τῶν ἄκρων γενέσθαι δολιχοδρόμων, οὕτως τῷ Δημοσθένει συνέβη τὸ πρῶτον ἐπανορθώσεως ἕνεκα τῶν ἰδίων ἀποδύντι πρὸς τὸ λέγειν, ἐκ δὲ τούτου κτησαμένῳ δεινότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἤδη καθάπερ στεφανίταις ἀγῶσι προτεύειν τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἀγωνιζομένων πολιτῶν.

political participation (οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἀγωνίζεσθαι πολῖται). Plutarch constructs Demosthenes' early psychological pull towards oratory in such a way as to emphasise not only the competitive nature of Demosthenes' professional milieu but also his attraction to it.

Yet the place which competition holds in the *Demosthenes* is unique to that biography. This becomes clear when comparing its use in other *Lives* of prominent orators. The *Pericles*, for instance, displays Plutarch's typical use of agonistic imagery reserved for military encounters (*Per.* 10.2; 16.1) and athletic and musical performances at festivals (*Per.* 1.6; 13.11; 36.5). There is one political use of ἀγών but its place is not significant in the narrative. Plutarch's treatment of Pericles' rivalry with Thucydides (*Per.* 14.3), who fought to have their opponent ostracised, is treated as a mere moment in Pericles' career, swiftly dealt with and stowed between the description of more important events, that is the embellishment of the Acropolis (*Per.* 13) and Pericles' more tyrannical phase (*Per.* 15).<sup>311</sup> Even Plutarch's treatment of Phocion, Demosthenes' near contemporary and rival, is remarkably free of agonistic politics. In the *Phocion*, Plutarch often sets the two politicians up against each other: he compares their style of oratory (*Phoc.* 5.5), he contrasts their career choices (*Phoc.* 7.5), he sets them up as political opponents in their opposing attitude towards the Macedonians (*Phoc.* 9.8), and even lets Demosthenes win the day at Phocion's expense (*Phoc.* 16.3).<sup>312</sup> Yet, he never chooses the lexical field of contests to describe their relationship. The only direct acknowledgement of a rhetorical struggle is Demosthenes' witticism denouncing Phocion as the "cleaver" of his speeches (κοπίς, *Phoc.* 5.9).<sup>313</sup> When agonistic imagery is used, it is to describe warfare (*Phoc.* 6.5-6; 14.8), festivals and games (*Phoc.* 20.1; 31.3) and Phocion's fame and fortune (*Phoc.* 1.4; *Phoc.* 3.4).

The culmination of Demosthenes' agonistic behaviour occurs in a dream the night before his suicide. In this dream he sees himself competing on the tragic stage with another man. I argue that the agonistic setting of the theatre enhances the histrionic behaviour of the orator. Before entering into the matter of the dream it is

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<sup>311</sup> Stadter (1989), 183 on the relative insignificance of Pericles' rivalry with Thucydides.

<sup>312</sup> Cooper (2000), 227 for a discussion of Plutarch's understanding of their different styles of oratory; cf. also Tritle (1988), 23 with a focus on Phocion's style.

<sup>313</sup> Also reported at *Dem.* 10.4.

important to note that Plutarch is not the first to have associated the ἀγών with theatre in regards to oratory and there is a strong precedence in Greek classical thought for the relationship between rhetorical competition and the theatrical world. In Thucydides' rendition of the Mytilenean debate, for instance, Cleon questions the appropriateness of oratory, exposing the relationship between political contests and spectacle, where λόγος is used to entertain rather than inform the *demos* (Thuc. 3.38).<sup>314</sup> This relationship between oratory and performance is also present in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. He identifies a histrionic quality to speeches composed for oratorical debate.<sup>315</sup> Here Aristotle is specifically referring to speeches designed for oratorical contests in the Assembly and Law courts (*Rh.* 1413b1-2), as opposed to written speeches. He argues that speeches designed to be spoken, while losing all appeal when read, are more powerful when performed: the speaker must rely on delivery to convey the power of such a speech (*Arist. Rh.* 1413b3).<sup>316</sup> Plutarch plays with similar themes in the *Demosthenes* as the protagonist concerns himself primarily with delivery to enhance speeches designed for oral contests.

The narrative build-up to the dream is as follows: Demosthenes flees Athens as Antipater and the Macedonians march on the city, his unrelenting anti-Macedonian views having allowed his rival, Demades, to condemn him to death (*Dem.* 28.1-2). He takes refuge in the temple of Poseidon on Calauria as he is pursued by an ex-tragic actor, Archias, now turned executioner for the Macedonians (*Dem.* 28.3). Just before he meets Archias face to face, an encounter that will lead to his suicide, Demosthenes has a vision in his sleep. Through the form of a dream, Plutarch explores how his character responds to a theatrical *agōn*, unveiling the parallels between theatre and oratory but ultimately preserving the distinction between the actor and the orator.

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<sup>314</sup> αἴτιοι δ' ὑμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι. See Halliwell (1997), 122 on Cleon' anti-rhetorical understanding of the relationship between oratorical ἀγών and theatre; Hesk (2000), 248-255 for an analysis of Cleon's anti-rhetorical arguments in Thucydides and Cooper (2000), 231 on the relationship between ἀγών and theatre in rhetorical theory.

<sup>315</sup> Graff (2001), 33 notes that Aristotle's analysis of forensic oratory is in fact rather limited and his valuing of the written word over oratory is fully felt at *Rh.* 1413b3. Aristotle generally ignored the fourth century oratorical corpus and in particular Demosthenes' orations: cf. Trevett (1996), 376.

<sup>316</sup> αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἀρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά: διὸ καὶ ἀφηρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη.

ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐτύγγανεν ὄψιν ἑωρακῶς κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἐκείνης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀλλόκοτον. ἐδόκει γὰρ ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι τῷ Ἀρχία τραγωδίαν ὑποκρινόμενος, εὐημερῶν δὲ καὶ κατέχων τὸ θέατρον ἐνδεία παρασκευῆς καὶ χορηγίας κρατεῖσθαι. διὸ τοῦ Ἀρχίου πολλὰ φιλόανθρωπα διαλεχθέντος, ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡσπερ ἐτύγγανε καθήμενος, “ὦ Ἀρχία” εἶπεν “οὐθ’ ὑποκρινόμενός με πώποτ’ ἐπεισας, οὔτε νῦν πείσεις ἐπαγγελλόμενος.” ἄρξαμένου δ’ ἀπειλεῖν μετ’ ὀργῆς τοῦ Ἀρχίου “νῦν” ἔφη “λέγεις τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Μακεδονικοῦ τρίποδος, ἄρτι δ’ ὑπεκρίνου. μακρὸν οὖν ἐπίσχες, ὅπως ἐπιστείλω τι τοῖς οἴκοι.”

Demosthenes happened to have seen a disturbing vision in his sleep during that night. He imagined that he was competing with Archias by playing a part in a tragedy and while he was successful and mastered the theatre, he was overcome because of a want of preparation and expense. Therefore, while Archias was lecturing on many benevolent matters, Demosthenes looked up towards him just as he was seated. “Oh Archias” he said “you have never yet persuaded me with your acting, nor will you persuade me with your promises.” And when Archias began to threaten him in anger, he affirmed “Now you speak this out of the Macedonian tripod, just then you were acting. Wait a while that I might send something to those at home”.

(Dem 29.2-3)

The scene stands apart within the *Life* for its dramatic and programmatic impact. It is visually powerful and leads to Demosthenes’ final words and actions. Yet, if it serves any purpose in foreshadowing Demosthenes’ imminent demise, it can hardly be accused of spoiling the plot. Demosthenes was so famous that very few readers would have been unaware of his suicide.<sup>317</sup> Nevertheless, while the prophetic function of this dream is limited, it plays a strong psychological and symbolic role. In this respect, the function of Demosthenes’ vision is in keeping with Brenk’s 1975 innovative study of dreams in Plutarch’s *Lives*. Brenk notes that the prophetic function of oracular dreams tends to be downplayed in comparison with their

<sup>317</sup> Demosthenes was already a rhetoric institution prior to Plutarch. Demosthenes was omnipresent in Greek rhetorical treatises from the Peripatetics to Dionysus of Halicarnassus and Hermogenes: cf. Wooten (1989). In Latin texts he appears in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (4.8-11) and in Cicero’s works, especially *De Oratore* which is littered with references to Demosthenes, either as a model orator (*De Orat.* 7) or for the importance which he ascribed to delivery (*De Orat.* 17) and to voice (*De Orat.* 18). See Bishop (2015) for a study of Cicero’s use of Demosthenes. Demosthenes also features heavily in Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*, who recounts similar anecdotes to Cicero and Plutarch: for example, Demosthenes’ insistence on the importance of delivery (11.3.6), or the exercises he performed to improve his performances (11.3.54). The similarities between Cicero, Quintilian and Plutarch suggest a commonality of sources: cf. Wooten (1997) on the reception of Demosthenes in both Cicero and Quintilian. Pernot (2006), 73 emphasises the difference in Quintilian’s and Plutarch’s conclusions as to Demosthenes’ moral worth.

psychological and symbolic roles.<sup>318</sup> They act as strong emotive forces, which explain the drive for a character's actions. For example, Antigonus Monophthalmus dreams of Mithridates stealing a golden crop he had witnessed grow (*Demetr.* 4.2). While the dream prophesies Mithridates' rise to power and the danger he will present to the Antigonids, it mostly serves as a psychological catalyst for Antigonus and his son, once the general wakes up. It prompts Antigonus to condemn Mithridates to death and it forces Demetrius to choose his loyalties between a father and a friend (*Demetr.* 4.3-4). They are moments of "individualism", to use Brenk's term, where Plutarch exposes his subject's character, and reveals its inner workings to the reader.<sup>319</sup> It showcases Antigonus' rapid mistrust and Demetrius' moral choice, between his loyalty to his father and his kindness to a friend.<sup>320</sup> While dreams act as stylistic devices, facilitating the biographer's characterisation of his dreamer, they also serve a symbolic role. For instance, Antigonus' dream sees him coming upon a golden field, the content of which is reaped by Mithridates who then leaves for the Black Sea, symbolising Mithridates' future success in founding the line of Pontic kings (*Demetr.* 4.5). Although this dream does play a determining factor in Demosthenes' attitude towards Archias once he awakes, I am less concerned with its psychological influence on the character. Rather, I propose to explore the way in which Plutarch chose to explain certain aspects of politics through a theatrical dream. I argue it serves to crystallise his idea of Demosthenes' oratory and by extension to comment on the action of the politician within democracy.

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<sup>318</sup> Brenk (1975), 339 here compares Plutarch to Herodotus, arguing that while Plutarch uses dreams as prophecies, Herodotus would more sincerely have believed in the divine origin of oracular dreams; Plutarch's attitude seems to have been more literary and less religious. Brenk (1977) revisited the theme of Plutarch's use of dreams without major changes to his categorisation. Pelling (1997), 199 on the prophetic function of dreams in Plutarch. Pelling (2010), 322 revisits Brenk's interpretation of prophetic dreams in Plutarch, arguing that while these dreams are straightforward in their depiction of the outcome, their complexities lie in the image which they offer of the dreamer and his character. Durán Mañas (2010) offers an extensive lexical study of dreams in Plutarch but limits herself to Plutarch's subjects that belong to the Hellenistic Period.

<sup>319</sup> Brenk (1975), 338 on the psychological function of dreams as motivating factors; Brenk (1975), 348 on their literary function as characterisation of the hero. Pelling (1997), 199 also argues that Plutarch's dreams serve to expose the hero's psyche.

<sup>320</sup> Pelling (2010), 319 on condemning Antigonus for his haste.

I propose to read Plutarch's use of theatrical imagery in this dream as a means to explore and measure Demosthenes' identity as an orator. The distinction between the theatrical and the political is deliberately blurred. Demosthenes and Archias' professional identities shift between actor and politician: Demosthenes is an orator with theatrical sensibilities and Archias is a tragic actor turned Macedonian spokesman. If Demosthenes and Archias are not in competition as politicians, they are within the context of a tragic production, and I argue that the theatrical elements of this dream are not simply the different components of the staging of a tragedy but recall specific aspects of Demosthenes' political character. The type of actor Demosthenes proves to be is determined by the politician he has been throughout his life. In other words, the drama represented in the dream, and Demosthenes' performance, is not determined by Plutarch's faithful recreation of the procedures involved in performing ancient tragedies, but rather he highlights the procedures which recall the defining elements of Demosthenes' political character. The influence which Demosthenes' political nature has on the theatrical aspect of this dream has mostly been overlooked in scholarship.

Judith Mossman offers an extensive study of the theatrical ambiguity of this passage in her exploration of the gap between Demosthenes' rhetoric and his acts in the *Life*.<sup>321</sup> Her analysis is part of a wider discussion of the power of oratory and its limits in the *Demosthenes*, as both a political and a moral force.<sup>322</sup> Mossman interprets the dream as the final example of the orator's potential to deliver an effective speech but whose popularity, as he enthralled his audience, does not reflect the success of his performance since his oration ultimately fails in its intention. This, Mossman argues, recalls his great political speeches which were followed by military losses (cf. his speech for and his conduct during the battle of Chaeronea at *Dem.* 20.1-2).<sup>323</sup> While Mossman rightly identifies the nature of the dream as referring back to his career, rather than simply prophesying his death, she does not explore the theatrical nature of the dream as referring to specific aspects of Demosthenes' political past. Her observation on theatre focuses on the tragic quality of the scene, which, she concludes, facilitates Demosthenes' attainment of

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<sup>321</sup> Mossman (1999), 78.

<sup>322</sup> Mossman (1999), 87.

<sup>323</sup> Mossman (1999), 97.



wisdom.<sup>324</sup> While I do not dispute this reading, I argue that the inclusion of theatrical details in the dream are not simply a description of a tragic production but allows Plutarch to discuss certain political and oratorical themes relevant to his Demosthenes beyond the dichotomy between rhetoric and action.

The initial echo between Demosthenes' dream-self and his political-self is the qualification of the scene through its agonistic tone: Demosthenes and Archias face one another as "rival contenders" (ἀνταγωνίζεσθαι). It recalls the ancient conception of theatrical productions, of which Plutarch was conscious. Throughout the *Lives*, Plutarch conceptualises tragedies and comedies as competitive occasions, and theatres are often the location of many different types of competitive performances.<sup>325</sup> This contention also picks up on the importance of the ἀγών in Demosthenes' own relationship to political power. By drawing the reader's attention to the agonistic nature of the scene, Plutarch is merging one of the defining aspects of Demosthenes' approach to politics with a specific characteristic of theatrical productions. Similarly, the category in which Demosthenes and Archias are vying for first place is determined by the type of politician Demosthenes has proven himself to be. There existed different categories in which theatre professionals could compete. Tragic performances were divided into different groups, as poets and actors competed in separate categories.<sup>326</sup> Plutarch was aware of this diversity, and he refers to more than one type of category, from playwrights (*Cim.* 8.8) to choruses

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<sup>324</sup> Mossman (1999), 98.

<sup>325</sup> Performances given in the theatre in general, not just drama: musical instruments (*Pomp.* 52.5; *Phil.* 11.2), choruses (*Ant.* 56.8; *Ages.* 29.2; *Ant.* 56.8), dance (*Alex.* 67.8).

<sup>326</sup> Theatrical competitions were a long established tradition of Athens' Great Dionysia and an important aspect of dramatic productions in Greece generally: cf. Csapo (2010), 107-8. While playwrights, *choregoi* and even chorus members were carefully recorded on victory lists and commemorated by monuments, the name of actors only emerged in the fourth century. See for instance Goette (2007) for an overview of the different choragic monuments erected during Athens' democracy. Parke (1977), 132-3 identifies a shifting interest in actors rather than in new playwrights during the 4<sup>th</sup> century. Walton (1980), 133 dates the introduction of prizes for actors to the middle of the 5<sup>th</sup> century and (1980), 171 argues for 80 years after Thespis wins the first prize for tragic actors. By the late 5<sup>th</sup> century the lead tragic actor (fourth century for the comic actor) also competed for honours cf. Martin (2002), 44. The exact dating of this change is uncertain, but Csapo (2010), 106 cites an inscription from 386 BC as the first surviving evidence of an association of actors, acting in their own name and distinguishing themselves from other theatrical categories (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2318.201-3). Plutarch was aware of this change (cf. Thespis as regarded as an ancient performer rather than as a modern actor *Sol.* 29.6). A certain hierarchy was still maintained, since the principal tragic actor was the only one to receive a prize, on behalf of the whole cast, but by Demosthenes' time poets and actors competed in recognised, separate categories (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 2325, ll. 259; 266). See Csapo (2010), 83-116 for a thorough and well-supported analysis of the rise of the actor.

(*Nic.* 3.2-4) and actors (*Alex.* 29; *Cat. Mi.* 46.8 and even in his own time *Praec.* 813f). By choosing the category of “tragic acting” (τραγωδίαν ὑποκρινόμενος), Plutarch recalls the importance of acting on Demosthenes’ development as an orator since it was not through rhetorical training, but through the teaching of an actor, that Demosthenes’ delivery blossomed. It also stresses the importance which delivery has played in Demosthenes’ oratorical development. He is not competing as a writer, which might have warranted his distinction as a poet, he is competing as a performer.<sup>327</sup> By insisting on the agonistic nature of Demosthenes and Archias’ meeting, and by setting their competition within the precinct of acting, Plutarch merges Demosthenes’ attraction to politics with a specific characteristic of theatrical performances.

If the mention of the ἀγών and the category in which Demosthenes was competing recall his oratorical past, so does his behaviour as an actor. The scene focuses entirely on Demosthenes. It is, after all, his dream. Archias is completely effaced from the action, which acquits Plutarch from having to explain Demosthenes’ failure through Archias’ success. Instead Plutarch balances what Demosthenes is capable of achieving, through active participles (εὐήμερων δὲ καὶ κατέχων), against what he cannot accomplish, through a passive infinitive (κρατεῖσθαι). Demosthenes’ success (εὐήμερων) is expressed as a total control (κατέχων) of the theatre. The verb κατέχειν suggests something forceful, if not aggressive, and Plutarch often uses it to describe military ownership of territory or property (cf. for instance the use of the verb to denote control over land at *Arist.* 5.1 or sea at *Caes.* 1.8). Generally, it expresses forces of subjugation, as for example Cato’s control over his slave boys (*Cat. Ma.* 21.8), or a fire’s consumption of a young man’s body (*Alex.* 35.8).<sup>328</sup> Demosthenes’ possession of the theatre, as it

<sup>327</sup> Plutarch distinguishes between poets of tragedies (cf. *Quae. Conv.* 732f; *Adv. Col.* 1127a) and actors of (cf. *Alc.* 32.2; *Lys.* 23.4; *Crass.* 33.3; *Ages.* 21.4; *Alex.* 10.2) or acting in (cf. *Pel.* 29.9; *Dem.* 28.3) tragedies.

<sup>328</sup> The term is also used to express the influence which a god has over the mortal mind, a sort of inescapable divine possession. Thus *Erōs* (ἔρως) takes hold of a woman Alcibiades seduces (note the god is doing the possession, not the man, *Alc.* 23.7) and the Muses control the power which wine has over the symposiast (*Quae. Conv.*, 717a). Within a context of wine drinking, Plutarch also uses κατέχειν to express the power of bacchic-like revelries, where dancing (ὄρχησις), music (ψαλμός) and general drunkenness (μέθη) control the men who indulge in these experiences (*Dio.* 7.7). In these examples, revelry exercises powers over men. In this dream Demosthenes is in control of a building. I do not suggest that Demosthenes’ control of the theatre at *Dem.* 29.2 should be read as a bacchic scene, but I wish to emphasize the strength of κατέχειν which suggests total domination.

were, is a striking image of a man who controls his audience's experience of his performance.<sup>329</sup> The force with which Demosthenes holds the spectators is further emphasized by the metonymic use of the theatrical space to refer to the spectators: it is not merely individuals that Demosthenes possesses, but an entire building, imposing and weighty. Once again it is Demosthenes' traits as a politician which determine the action since, a few chapters prior to this dream, Plutarch has used *κατέχειν* to express Demosthenes' captivation of the *βῆμα*'s attention (*Dem.* 23.2). What Demosthenes has proven himself capable of doing in this political life, he now dreams of doing in the theatre. Yet, this is not enough to secure this success.

Once again Plutarch uses imagery of subjugation to describe what is happening to Demosthenes: he is overcome (*κρατεῖσθαι*), a verb which Plutarch consistently uses to refer to military and political domination (cf. *Cor.* 8.6). The reason given for this loss is a lack (*ἔνδεια*) of preparation (*παρασκευή*) and expense (*χορηγία*). Just as Demosthenes' political character determined the agonistic nature of the dream, as well as the category in which he competed, so does it justify the mention of *παρασκευή* and *χορηγία*. The political significance of this simple sentence has been ignored if not misunderstood by modern scholarship. Previous translations have tended to keep both *παρασκευή* and *χορηγία* within a theatrical context. Thus Perrin translates them as “stage decorations” and “costumes”, Mossman as “props” and “costume”, while Lintott chooses “costumes” and “stage directions”.<sup>330</sup> The theatrical imagery is preserved in non-English translations. Robert Flacelière and Émile Chambry chose “*décor*” and “*mise en scène*”, while Chiara Pecorella Longo writes “*allestimento*” and “*messa in scena*”, both reading the scene through a purely dramatic lens.<sup>331</sup> Robin Waterfield is more cautious in his translation and offers “resources” and “financial backing”, and therefore distances his translation from an overly-theatrical interpretation, but misses, as I will argue, the intertextual echo of these words with the rest of the *Life*.<sup>332</sup> Demosthenes' lack of both *παρασκευή* and *χορηγία* are crucial to a many-layered interpretation of this dream, and it is this

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<sup>329</sup> A similar image is used at *Marc.* 20.8, where such a scene of horror takes place that the theatre is filled with silence and shivers. To my knowledge there is no other use of *κατέχειν* and *θέατρον* in Plutarch's corpus.

<sup>330</sup> Perrin (1919), 73; Mossman (1999), 97; Lintott (2013), 43.

<sup>331</sup> Flacelière and Chambry (1976), 46; Pecorella Longo (1995), 281.

<sup>332</sup> Waterfield and Erskine (2016), 103.

complex picture which I now propose to explore, first as a literal reading of a dream about theatre, and then as an intra-*Life* commentary on Demosthenes' achievements as an orator.

The reading which most modern scholarship offers requires a literal understanding of the scene as Demosthenes dreaming of performing a tragedy. Perrin, Mossman and Lintott's decision to keep the meaning within a dramatic context is understandable as both words can be related to theatrical productions. Mossman explains her choice as reflecting of a historically attested practice, involving the sponsoring of a theatrical production by a *choregos*.<sup>333</sup> Dramatic performances demanded huge amounts of preparation and expense. Athenian festivals, and in particular the staging of plays at the Great Dionysia, required a number of sponsors, the *choregoi*, to finance and supervise these theatrical productions (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 56.3).<sup>334</sup> The office of *choregos* demanded of the holder to make possible the long process which saw the transformation of various groups of individuals and professionals into a coherent successful dramatic production.<sup>335</sup> The *choregos* had to find a suitable location for the play to be rehearsed (*Antiph.* 6.11), select a good group of chorus members (*Xen. Hiero.* 9.4), cover the expense of costumes and props – Demosthenes mentions ordering the creation of gold crowns (*Dem.* 21.16) – as well as pay the salary of the various professionals attached to the production – Demosthenes names both a trainer for the chorus (*διδάσκαλος*, *Dem.* 21.17) and flute-players (*αὐλητῆς*, *Dem.* 21.156).<sup>336</sup> This *choregos*, however, chose neither the main actor nor the poet, as these were nominated by the Archon.<sup>337</sup>

Plutarch was certainly aware of the theatrical potential of the term. It is clear that Plutarch knew the significance of *χορηγία* as referring to the expense paid by the *choregos* (*LSJ* s.v. I.1.). Caesar, for example, sponsored a number of public spectacles, including theatrical ones (*Caes.* 5.9), and Nicias, in his quest for public favour, counters Cleon's buffoon-act by subsidizing theatrical and sporting events

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<sup>333</sup> Mossman (1999), 97.

<sup>334</sup> Wilson (2000), 53 on the importance of wealthy Athenian sponsors in dramatic representation.

<sup>335</sup> Wilson (2000), 61 for a detailed description of the different requirements.

<sup>336</sup> MacDowell (1990), 240 on the *didaskalos*' supervision of the chorus' progress. Lysias speaks of thirty minae for the production of a tragic chorus (*Lys.* 21.1), which, although not too hefty, was still a substantial amount.

<sup>337</sup> Wilson (2000), 61.

(*Nic.* 3.2-4). Plutarch's most extensive use of *χορηγία*, while not necessarily applied to a purely theatrical context, is always associated with the expenses of a spectacle or performance.<sup>338</sup> Themistocles' love of sacrifices and of splendid receptions requires a generous budget and is designed to impress his guests (ἀφθόνου δεισθαι χορηγίας, *Them.* 5.1).<sup>339</sup> As another example of this, the Syracusans' funeral preparations for Timoleon (οἱ Συρακουσίοι εἰς τὸ παρασκευάσαι (...) περὶ τὴν ταφήν) are the object of superb expense (λαμπρῶς χορηγίας τυγχάνειν, *Tim.* 39.2). The ceremony is hyper-emotional, tainted with Dionysian imagery of a chorus-like crowd, all dressed identically and crowned with garlands, and of hysterical mourners (*Tim.* 39). None of the examples above suggest that Plutarch used *χορηγία* to refer to a specific aspect of expenses laid down by a sponsor, and while the translations of the term as "stage decorations", "costume" and "stage directions" keep the meaning of the word within a theatrical context, they only cover part of its original significance.

Perrin and Lintott both chose to translate *παρασκευή* as "costume", most certainly by extrapolating this meaning from the original stem, *σκευή*, the attire of the actor (LSJ s.v. *σκευή*). Yet, in the Plutarchan corpus, *παρασκευή* is not used for the actor's garb; that is reserved for *σκευή* (cf. *Demetr.* 18.5; *De glor. Ath.* 348e-f).<sup>340</sup> The most overwhelming use of this word is, in fact, to be found in a military context, where Plutarch employs it to refer to the preparations of war.<sup>341</sup>

<sup>338</sup> There are two other uses of *χορηγία* in the *Lives*: it can either refer to a royal treasury or funds (*Alc.* 35.5; *Cleom.* 26.6; *Demetr.* 47.4, *Aem.* 28.7), or, very occasionally, be used in a military context (*Mar.* 15.1; *Flam.* 2.4). The use of *χορηγία* to refer to a royal treasury, and especially Macedonian (Demetrius and Perseus) funds is unsurprising, especially in light of Chapter 2. By using *χορηγία* Plutarch is no doubt playing on the performative aspect of military activity. There is much to be said about performance and the army in the *Lives* but exceeds the scope of my work.

<sup>339</sup> This anecdote is, most consciously I would argue, followed by a narrative of his theatrical victories as sponsor of tragedies (*Them.* 5.5).

<sup>340</sup> When *σκευή* is used outside of a theatrical context, it refers to the clothes people put on to deceive through their appearance. Thus *Cor.* 22.4; *Caes.* 10.1, the same story is repeated at *Cic.* 28.2. While the clothing is not strictly speaking worn by a professional actor, the wearer performs a lie in order to deceive through his appearance. The word is also used to refer to intricate armour: *Luc.* 28.3; *Tim.* 27.5; *Phil.* 6.8; *Aem.* 18.6.

<sup>341</sup> The *Lives* are strewn with examples of army equipment and preparation for battle: cf. *Pomp.* 20.2; *Cam.* 2.7, *Per.* 35.3; *Tim.* 13.6; *Cat. Ma.* 26.3; *Pyrrh.* 10.6, just as a few examples. The *Fabius* offers both a militaristic and theatrical reading of the word. An impetuous member of Rome's military elite rails against Fabius for his apparent reluctance to fight Hannibal. Minacius mocks him by comparing Fabius' building of military camps on hilltops to the preparation of beautiful theatres for those who would watch the spectacle of Italy's plunder and scorching (ὁ δὲ (...) ἐχλεύαζε μὲν τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων στρατοπεδείας, ὡς καλὰ θέατρα τοῦ δικτάτορος αἰεὶ παρασκευαζομένου θεωρήσουσι πορθουμένην καὶ φλεγόμενην τὴν Ἰταλίαν *Fab.* 5.6). Because the camps are perched on great

Although the word has no theatrical meaning by itself, it can be used in a dramatic context. The most obviously theatrical use of παρασκευή occurs in *On the Glory of the Athenians*, where Plutarch describes the Athenian theatre as an institution which by nature encourages the preparation of excessive expense (παρασκευάζεσθαι χορηγία πολυτελής) destined for stage production (*De glor. Ath.* 348f). He goes on to detail what exactly this expensive preparation entails, from costumes to purple clothes, stage machinery, extras and dancing instructors.<sup>342</sup> It is clear, however, from the context that the preparation of a stage production did not involve one specific aspect of the production but covered a wider range of artefacts and activities (cf. *Quaes. Conv.* 710f for another example of a generalised use of choregic preparation). While the preparation required in creating a stage production did involve “costumes” and “props”, it does not, however, have such a specific meaning. To follow Perrin, Mossman and Lintott’s translation, then, Demosthenes dreams that he as the actor performed to his very best, but his efforts were not matched by the *choregos*, who did not deliver his part of the production. I argue that, although their translations are validated by the language which Plutarch uses, this reading is too specific.

My discussion of παρασκευή and χορηγία aims to show that both terms do not necessarily carry a theatrical meaning, but are crucial in defining and condemning Demosthenes as an orator. I will discuss παρασκευή first. Preparation is the key to Demosthenes’ oratorical *persona*. This is established throughout the narrative but particularly stressed in the aftermath of Demosthenes’ encounter with Satyrus. He undertakes a number of exercises, from confinement in a cave (*Dem.* 7.6) to reworking speeches in various ways (*Dem.* 8.2). This aspect of Plutarch’s biography has been the subject of much scholarly research.<sup>343</sup> Craig Cooper has questioned the

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heights and out of reach, the soldiers can only watch their state burn, rather than fight their enemy. In this passage, παρασκευή becomes the link between the encampment being set up and its symbolic role as a theatre, that is as a location to sit down and view a (only too real) drama, rather than refer to a particular theatrical practice.

<sup>342</sup> σκευών δὲ καὶ προσώπων καὶ ξυστίδων ἀλουργῶν καὶ μηχανῶν ἀπὸ σκηνῆς καὶ χοροποιῶν καὶ δορυφόρων δυσπραγμάτευτος λαὸς καὶ χορηγία πολυτελής παρασκευαζέσθω.

<sup>343</sup> It inspired Alfred P. Dorjahn to write a series of articles, aimed at disproving Plutarch by using passages from Demosthenes’ own speeches that could display signs of improvisation: Dorjahn (1947); (1950); (1952); (1955) and (1957).

sources and the implications of such a representation.<sup>344</sup> He argues that Plutarch is drawing on the Peripatetic representation of Demosthenes, that specifically condemned his over-reliance on preparation.<sup>345</sup> These philosophers moulded Demosthenes' character in accordance with their valuing of natural talent at the expense of hard earned ability.<sup>346</sup> The dichotomy between natural improvisation and artificial preparedness is most obvious in Plutarch's contrasting of Demosthenes and Demades.

καὶ μέντοι δημοτικὸν ἀπέφαινον ἄνδρα τὸν λέγειν μελετῶντα  
θεραπείας γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ[το] δήμου <τὴν> παρασκευὴν, τὸ δ' ὅπως  
ἔξουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀφροντιστεῖν ὀλιγαρχικοῦ καὶ βία  
μᾶλλον ἢ πειθοῖ προσέχοντος. τῆς δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἀτολμίας αὐτοῦ καὶ  
τοῦτο ποιοῦνται σημεῖον, ὅτι Δημάδης μὲν ἐκείνῳ θορυβηθέντι  
πολλάκις ἀναστὰς ἐκ προχείρου συνείπεν, ἐκείνος δ' οὐδέποτε  
Δημάδη.

He used to declare, however, that a democratic man was one who practises the art of speaking: for preparation is service for the *demos* but heedlessness, of how the multitude consider a speech, belongs to an oligarchic man, one who gravitates towards violence rather than persuasion. They produce this particular example of his cowardice in a crisis: that when Demosthenes was being shouted down, Demades often stood up and spoke spontaneously for him, but Demosthenes never reciprocated.

*Dem. 8.6-7*

Πλὴν τὸν γε Δημάδην πάντες ὠμολόγουν τῇ φύσει χρώμενον  
ἀνίκητον εἶναι καὶ παραφέρειν αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα τὰς τοῦ  
Δημοσθένους σκέψεις καὶ παρασκευάς.

Besides, all agreed that Demades was unconquered as he relied on his own nature, and as his extemporising surpassed the scrutiny and preparation of Demosthenes.

*Dem. 10.1*

Both passages highlight two oppositional approaches to politics, that of natural ability and that of intensive study. While Demosthenes needed to be prepared, Demades preferred to improvise. Plutarch's evaluation goes beyond rhetorical merit, and questions the moral character of the politician who prefers one to the other. At *Dem. 8.6-7*, he takes the reader into the psychological makeup of his protagonist only

<sup>344</sup> Cooper (2000), revisited at Cooper (2009).

<sup>345</sup> Cooper (2000), 225 and Cooper (2004), 154.

<sup>346</sup> Cooper (2000), 226.

to conclude by contradicting his character. Demosthenes' rationale is laid bare as he vindicates his penchant for study by claiming it as a democratic practice.<sup>347</sup> Yet Plutarch steps away from his character and contradicts his justifications by proving that Demosthenes is not a defender of the *demos*, but a coward. His dependence on heavy study for his oratorical success stops him from defending his colleagues against the onslaught of a rowdy crowd. The term *thorubos* recalls the rhetorical depiction of the assembly goers in Attic speeches, which tended to represent the *demos* as an unruly mob, impeding the orator's exercise of *παρρησία*, frank speech, one of Athens' fundamental democratic ideals.<sup>348</sup> Demosthenes' refusal to extemporise, rather than express a deep respect for the *demos*, actually reveals the orators' inability to overcome his anxiety with regards to his audience. Both at *Dem.* 8.7 and *Dem.* 10.1, Demades is named as the example of an orator who displays great ability to react on the spot, which is always opposed to Demosthenes' zeal for preparation. It is Demades' spontaneity (*ἐκ προχείρου*) and his nature (*φύσις*) which Plutarch opposes to Demosthenes' practice (*μελετᾶν*), study (*σκέψεις*) and preparation (*παρασκευή*, *Dem.* 8.7; *Dem.* 10.1). Here Theophrastus is quoted as having valued Demades over Demosthenes for precisely these reasons (*Dem.* 10.1).<sup>349</sup>

Even without considering the Peripatetic flavour of Plutarch's *Demosthenes*, there exists, in Greek rhetorical practice and theory, a precedent for disregarding preparedness. The concept played a role in rhetorical persuasion and was part of the arsenal of character-traits used by the fourth century Athenian orators to create a

<sup>347</sup> Demosthenes does not appear to have ever made such a claim and there is no evidence from his speeches to confirm this story. But the opposition between the democratic man and one of oligarchic persuasion is in keeping with some of the language he uses in his speeches: for example, his discredit of Meidias as a rich citizen who reserves political rights for himself that he does not wish to share with the wider Athenian (poorer) *demos* (*Dem.* 21.198-201), cf. Lintott (2013), 53. This antithesis between (persuasive, law-enforcing) democracy and (violent) oligarchy also recalls fourth century discourses in Athenian oratory (cf. *Dem.* 22.32, 51-2; 24.75-6).

<sup>348</sup> Tacon (2001), 183 and Schwartzberg (2010), 464 on the negative depiction in ancient sources of the *demos* as *thorubos*, interrupting the speaker.

<sup>349</sup> The influence of the Peripatetics on Plutarch's *Demosthenes* is also apparent when comparing Demades' depiction in this *Life* and in the *Phocion*. He is represented as a demagogue, whose sycophantic attitude towards the Macedonians is a foil for Phocion's more selfless collaboration, motivated by the good of the realm (*Phoc.* 1). Demades is as incompetent a leader as Phocion is capable. In the *Demosthenes*, however, he becomes a model of oratorical genius in comparison with the protagonist's artificial attempts at rectifying his natural defects.



*persona* for either their opponent or for themselves.<sup>350</sup> To accuse an opponent of being prepared was to accuse him of artificiality and cunning, rather than truth (cf. Dem. 18.282), while a speaker claiming unpreparedness would solicit the sympathy of the judges (cf. ἀπαράσκευος, Dem. 40.30). The audience seems to have been sensitive to this prepared ἦθος, as observed by Alcidamas, who noted the distrust and resentment of the audience when confronted with an obviously pre-written and over-prepared speech (Alcidamas, *On Sophists*, 12).<sup>351</sup> Alcidamas advocated extemporisation as the ideal of public speaking and correlated a lack of improvisation with inaction and disgrace, as an orator's silence could inspire only contempt (Alcid. *Soph.* 9).<sup>352</sup> Whether Peripatetic or not, Plutarch is clearly casting his Demosthenes in this tradition of the prepared, cowardly orator, but the question remains, what was its relationship to theatrical performances?

Cooper has argued that this Peripatetic opposition between prepared and improvised was an opposition between the artificial and the natural.<sup>353</sup> Thus Demetrius of Phalerum considered Demosthenes' oratory as "intricate and actor-like" (ποικίλος αὐτός ὑποκριτής), rather than "simple and noble" betraying the speaker's inclination for what is "soft and mean" (μαλακώτερος καί ταπεινότερος cf. Philodemus, *Rhet*, 1.15/ Demetrius of Phalerum fr. 162 Wehrli).<sup>354</sup> This echoes Plutarch's own quotation of Demetrius, who considered Demosthenes' over-reliance on delivery, practised with obsessive care, to be vulgar (Plut. *Dem.* 11.3). As Cooper notes, the Peripatetic attitude towards intricate speech is moral: it displays the speaker's sole interest in persuading the audience, rather than concentrating on the

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<sup>350</sup> Cf. Halliwell (1997), 124; Christ (1998), 38; Schloemann (2002), 140.

<sup>351</sup> Halliwell (1997), 124 on the Athenian audience's concern for minutely prepared speeches. Schloemann (2002), 140 for the association between pre-written speeches and over-preparation in ancient thought. Johnson (2013), 666 argues that the concern shown by early imperial writers, whether Greeks or Romans, for over-prepared and pre-written speeches, reflect the contemporary elite's conflicting attitude towards the importance of the written text. Whitmarsh (2005), 25 notes the importance of oratorical performance at the same period, where improvisation was praised above all in the arsenal of the skilled sophist. Considering the ambiguous attitude towards over-preparedness and the value placed on improvisation at the height of the Roman Empire, Plutarch's insistence on Demosthenes' over-preparedness could be driven as much by the ideals of his own period as by the sources available to him.

<sup>352</sup> Edwards (2007), 48 points out that these ideas were not first expressed by Alcidamas, but seem to reflect the values advocated by his teacher, non other than Gorgias himself.

<sup>353</sup> Cooper (2000), 323.

<sup>354</sup> Wehrli (1968), 35. Cooper (2009), 320 argues that Demetrius of Phalerum's hostile view was born out of a political struggle with Demochares, Demosthenes' nephew, who accused Demetrius of collaborating with the Macedonians.

content.<sup>355</sup> It is this very criticism which is expressed at *Dem.* 11.3, where Demosthenes' preparation is vulgar because it concerns itself with influencing the audience, rather than speaking the truth. There is a general tendency in rhetorical theory to associate elaborate speeches, and over-preparation with the artificial, designed to manipulate the audience, as is implied in the passage from Demetrius of Phalerum I quoted.<sup>356</sup> Yet there is nothing explicit in Plutarch's description of Demosthenes' preparation, as it stands in the *Life*, that links it directly with theatrical productions.<sup>357</sup> Rather this preparation is theatre-like because it encourages artificiality at the expense of the unaffected and the true. Παρασκευή, then, embodies in Plutarch's narrative of Demosthenes' life the artificial side to rhetoric, which concerns itself with the audience's reception, rather than true action. That Demosthenes, whose affiliation with histrionic speech Plutarch established early in his narrative, should prepare is not surprising. The question remains, though, that if παρασκευή is the mark of Demosthenes' rhetorical behaviour, why does he lack the practice in his dream? Before addressing this point I wish to discuss Demosthenes' relationship to χορηγία, as my answer includes both terms simultaneously.

Whether used in a theatrical context or not, χορηγία has negative associations of over-spending. For instance, when comparing Pericles' and Nicias' public prominence, Plutarch is clear to divide them between the good and the bad statesman. Pericles' sober reliance on his natural eloquence to curb the crowd is contrasted with Nicias' inability to control the *demos* through speech. Instead he relies on his sole asset, his standing through wealth (προέχων οὐσία), which he uses to sponsor public theatre (*Nic.* 3.1). By contrast, although Plato did participate in choregic activities by training boys to dance, Plutarch is certain to tell the reader

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<sup>355</sup> Cooper (2000), 323 on the moral evaluation of intricate speech and delivery in Peripatetic thought.

<sup>356</sup> Halliwell (1997), 124.

<sup>357</sup> Gunderson (2000) includes Demosthenes' preparation in his study of the orator as actor but he neglects certain aspects of Plutarch's *Life* and, I believe, remains unconvincing. Gunderson (2000), 121 reads Plutarch's description of Demosthenes' drive to study, and his subsequent alienation in his cave, as a shift away from the public into the private sphere. The orator no longer performs for others but for himself. While this is a reasonable assessment, what follows is rather less demonstrable. In Gunderson's point of view this over-study becomes a meta-theatrical moment, where Demosthenes' cave is transformed into a theatre (the *locus*) for his spectacles, where he is simultaneously the spectator (looking into his mirror) and the actor (performing before the mirror). While Gunderson (2000), 122 supplies wonderful variants of θεᾶσθαι to describe the scene, Plutarch never uses such language.

that his philosophical hero did not provide the money himself but was supplied by Dion, his wealthier benefactor (*Arist.* 1.4). Plutarch considers excessive money, and the desire for it, as unworthy.

Plutarch's Demosthenes cannot resist money and is easily influenced by it. He renounced prosecuting Meidias in return for the hefty sum of three thousand drachmae (*Dem.* 12.4-6), despite having already prepared the speech (*Dem.* 12.3) and being convinced of his capability of winning the case (*Dem.* 12.6). Demosthenes is not solely motivated by the *drachmae*: he partly accepts it through fear of Meidias' power and wealth in comparison with his own political insignificance at the time of the trial (*Dem.* 12.3-5). The bribe is here associated with Demosthenes' more cowardly nature. The same character trait is displayed at *Dem.* 14.2, where Plutarch, quoting Demetrius of Phalerum, denounces Demosthenes' cowardice, who, despite having vociferously declaimed against Philip, refused to fight the Macedonians in exchange for Persian gold. Demosthenes also chose to emblazon his shield with golden letters "for the good fortune" (*Dem.* 20.2), echoing part of a formula found on Athenian inscriptions expressing hope for the future (cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 43.7).<sup>358</sup> Plutarch never associates gold on shields with positive notions of military actions. On the contrary, only characters who display vanity or theatrical behaviour are bold enough to gild their shield with gold, with Alcibiades as prime example (*Alc.* 16.1). It is the people who tend most towards theatrical behaviour that choose golden shields: the Syracusians, whose theatrical nature led them to bury Timoleon with great pomp, cast their shields with gold and purple (*Tim.* 31.1), and the young Macedonian soldiers shimmering brightly in the daylight from their gilded armour (*Aem.* 18.8). As for Demosthenes, the allusion to the inscription links his military role, through his shield, with wider Athenian enterprises and aims to cast him as an Athenian concerned for his state. However, the context of this anecdote is that of military cowardice. Demosthenes has just run away from the battlefield, throwing away his weapons to ease his flight (*Dem.* 20. 2).

The most despicable example of Demosthenes' weakness for wealth is his change of attitude towards the corrupt Harpalus, who has come to seek refuge in Athens. Demosthenes is initially the only orator who does not covet Harpalus'

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<sup>358</sup> Lintott (2013), 67.

money but sees the danger he poses for the city and counsels the Athenians to expel him (*Dem.* 25.3). But Demosthenes is bribed into not prosecuting Harpalus. The latter understands Demosthenes' psychology, recognising his desire for gold (ὁ Ἄρπαλος ἐρωτικῶς πρὸς χρυσίον ἀνδρὸς ὄψει, *Dem.* 25.5), and wins him over by selling him a heavy Persian cup to silence him in the assembly (*Dem.* 24.3-4). Through these three examples, I hope to have shown that Demosthenes' potential to do good – successfully impeach an opponent through his speech, rather than his network, Demosthenes' desire to build Athens' future, his drive to expel men dangerous to his city – is often perverted by his love of money. Its irresistible draw corrupts his chances of being a better orator and a better citizen.

Why, then, is it politically significant that Demosthenes should lack both *παρασκευή* and *χορηγία*? Demosthenes' relationship to both terms is synonymous with his weaker temperament as an orator. Demosthenes' need to prepare his speeches betrays his cowardly character and casts him into the realm of public speakers who value the superficial form over content in politics, while his love of money, which often reveals (the shield) or encourages (the faked loss of voice) theatrical display, prevents him from choosing the right political path. Succinctly, *παρασκευή* and *χορηγία* tend to refer to Demosthenes' more artificial, performative character, and systematically hinder his potential to act in the noblest of oratorical fashions. That he should lack both in his dream is significant. This dream exposes a sad paradox, as it is only when Demosthenes reveals himself to be the perfect orator, holding his audience through his words without allowing weakness of character, that he loses. This is normal. He is not on the political stage, but the theatrical one, and on this stage, dominated by Archias, and through him the Macedonians, the perfect orator has no place. Demosthenes' dream is the symbol of his departure from theatre, his acceptance of sober oratory, and through his failing, the end of Athenian public discourse.

Demosthenes' departure from histrionic behaviour is exemplified by his interaction with Archias once he wakes up. Plutarch creates a contrast between Archias, the actor who embodies falsehood, and Demosthenes, the orator who speaks the truth. I argue that the characterisation of both rivals during this altercation bears close

resemblance to the historical Demosthenes' depiction of his own character and that of his opponents, especially Aeschines, in his own speeches.<sup>359</sup> Plutarch is not inspired by anti-Demosthenes views, which have prevailed as the source for his oratorical *persona*, but by a much more positive and virtuous depiction inspired by the man himself. The division between honest speech and falsehood permeates the historical Demosthenes' understanding of *παρρησία*. Demosthenes held this oratorical concept as the prerogative of the Athenian *βῆμα*, at the heart of the city's Democratic institutions (Dem. 7.1). The practice of *παρρησία* was the marker of a righteous man (Dem. 18.177; 58.60), and Demosthenes makes it a key feature of his own character (Dem. 8.24). It was a powerful force that reveals the truth (Dem. 60.26) and combats deceit (Dem. 10.76). It is this very concept that Plutarch's Demosthenes uses to unveil Archias' falsehood. He immediately denounces Archias' attempts to sooth him with kind promises, when both know that Archias has come to kill him. Frank speech, however, did not come without its dangers, and the historical Demosthenes often warned against the possible violence of its reception (Dem. 3.8; 6.31-32; 8.32; 10.54): it took courage to speak up before a contrary audience as *παρρησία* was likely to be responded to with anger (*ὀργή* Dem. 9.3).<sup>360</sup> It is this very emotion (*μετ' ὀργῆς*, Plut. *Dem.* 29.3) with which Archias greets Demosthenes' honest words.<sup>361</sup> The Demosthenes who stands before Archias after his dream is not the man of the Peripatetics, but the orator himself.

The opposition of frank speech with falsehood is not the only parallel between this scene and Demosthenes' orations. Plutarch's Demosthenes denounces Archias with the same arguments used by the actual Demosthenes, in *On the Crown*, to condemn his own theatrical opponent, Aeschines. In order to undermine his opponent, Demosthenes reminded his audience of Aeschines' less savoury past, and especially his previous life as a failed actor. Demosthenes' criticism could not simply rest on Aeschines' career in entertainment – performing was not in itself a dishonourable profession – but undermined his opponent by discrediting his quality

<sup>359</sup> There is a certain reluctance in modern scholarship to study Plutarch's use of Demosthenes' own speeches to compose his biography. Lintott (2013), 16 points to an example of Plutarch quoting from Demosthenes' *On the Crown verbatim* at Dem. 17.3.

<sup>360</sup> ἄξιὸν δ' ὧν ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἂν τι τῶν ἀληθῶν μετὰ παρρησίας λέγω, μηδεμίαν μοι διὰ τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῶν ὀργὴν γενέσθαι. See Ch. 5, III, 218 n. 505.

<sup>361</sup> Interestingly *μετὰ παρρησίας λέγειν* occurs in Demosthenes' orations: cf. for instance 8.24; 9.3; 10.54.

as an actor (Dem. 18.262).<sup>362</sup> If Demosthenes' depiction of Aeschines is to be believed, the latter was indeed an abysmal actor. His performance as the slayer of the eponymous king in Sophocles' *Oenomaus* was remarkably unskilled (κακῶς ἐπιτρέβειν, Dem. 18.180), and his reception was so negative that Demosthenes described the audience's reaction as a scene from a violent battle (Dem. 18.262). These criticisms are similar to those which Plutarch's Demosthenes more laconically levels at Archias. He was always a bad actor, as Demosthenes argues that his performance had been consistently unconvincing (Plut. *Dem.* 29.3).

But the parallel between Archias and Aeschines goes further. Both the actual Demosthenes, and Plutarch's version, parallel their opponent's political careers with their acting professions. Archias could no more persuade Demosthenes as an ambassador than as an actor (οὔθ' ὑποκρινόμενος (...) πώποτ' πείθειν, οὔτε νῦν πείθειν ἐπαγγελλόμενος), while Aeschines' political career was as worthless as his petty roles (πονηρὸν ὄντα καὶ πολίτην καὶ τριταγωνιστήν, Dem. 18. 267).<sup>363</sup> But the most striking commonality between this Plutarchan passage and *On the Crown* is the description of the Macedonian supporters' attitude towards Demosthenes. Both Archias, as the oracle of Macedonia heralding its decisions, and Aeschines, having previously defended an embassy to Philip, are supporters of the Macedonian crown. Where Archias first approached Demosthenes with promises (ἐπαγγελλόμενος) and then threats (ἀπειλεῖν, *Dem.* 29.3), the Macedonian supporters, including Aeschines, tried the actual Demosthenes during the Amphicytonic Council with threats (ἀπειλεῖν) and then promises (ἐπαγγελλόμενος, Dem. 18.322).<sup>364</sup>

This balance between Demosthenes and the figure of the actor-made-politician has an antecedent in the *Life*. When Philip II of Macedon dies, Demosthenes celebrates along with the Athenians. This allows Aeschines to censure his opponent on the grounds that such festal behaviour is improper in the light of the recent death of Demosthenes' daughter, the latter having refused to show signs of grief in public

<sup>362</sup> Harris (1995), 29-30 on Demosthenes insulting Aeschines as a *bad* actor, rather than an actor.

<sup>363</sup> An additional parallel between the two erstwhile actors could be read in the mention of the tragic role of Creon. Plutarch's Demosthenes, a few lines later, compares Archias with Creon (*Dem.* 29.6) while the actual Demosthenes reminded the audience of Aeschines' career as Creon (Dem. 18.180). Yet if it is an allusion it is a bit harder to fit: Plutarch's Demosthenes refers to Creon's refusal to let Antigone bury her brother Polyneices as he anticipates the fate of his body, while the historical Demosthenes mentions Creon as one of several roles which Aeschines performed badly during his acting career (ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς) and does not make mention of Creon's imposition.

<sup>364</sup> Lintott (2013), 78.

(*Dem.* 22.3).<sup>365</sup> While Plutarch condemns Demosthenes for celebrating such a man's murder (*Dem.* 22.4), he defends him against Aeschines' attitude towards grief. He achieves this by contrasting the good politician with actors. The good politician refuses to mingle personal crises with public matters, and thus displays manly virtue by putting the interests of the state first. Actors, on the other hand, do not display emotion according to their own volition but according to the action of a plot (*Dem.* 22.4).<sup>366</sup> The comparison seems slightly forced, except that Plutarch is defending Demosthenes against an opponent who was notorious for having been an actor. While the actors are a metaphor for those who feel compelled to act according to what others expect of them, without reference to their own wishes or feelings, the imagery works well as the type of behaviour which an ex-tragic actor would endorse. By refusing to display his grief in public, Demosthenes did not succumb to the pressure of expectation but acted in the interest of Athens, while Aeschines, as the "actor-type", could only perform a pre-designed role.

To return to Demosthenes' last rhetorical battle, I am not arguing that Archias be read as a symbolic Aeschines, conjured up in the last moments of the narrative to taunt Demosthenes, but rather that Plutarch draws on Demosthenic imagery to cast his hero as a brave orator. Plutarch's Demosthenes follows the actual orator's idea of truth and righteousness while his opponent echoes the falsehood of the real Demosthenes' artificial and theatrical rival. This is a man who, in the face of death, chooses without any paraphernalia to speak for the truth. The truth does not save Demosthenes, but it guarantees his courage in the face of death and defeat.<sup>367</sup> Despite his pursuit of truth, however, Demosthenes has one last deception to play. He will not persuade Archias to let him die in peace through λόγος. To overcome

<sup>365</sup> Aeschines did level this criticism at Demosthenes (*Aeschin.* 3.77), reproaching him for wearing garlands and white clothing to perform sacrifices a week after his child's death. Aeschines uses this to undermine Demosthenes' character, arguing that if a man was so heartless in his private affairs he could not be trusted with public matters (*Aeschin.* 3.78). Plutarch quotes Aeschines almost *verbatim* at the mention of Demosthenes' dead daughter: "ἐβδόμη δ' ἡμέραν τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτῷ τετελευτηκίας" (*Aeschin.* 3.77) and "ἐβδόμη ἡμέραν τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦ τεθνηκίας" (*Plut. Dem.* 22.3) and picks up on the same details of Demosthenes' appearance, although expresses them differently "στεφανωσάμενος καὶ λευκὴν ἐσθῆτα λαβὼν" (*Aeschin.* 3.77) and "ὁ Δημοσθένης ἔχων λαμπρὸν ἰμάτιον ἐστεφανωμένος" (*Plut. Dem.* 22.3).

<sup>366</sup> τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς τῶν βασιλικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν προσώπων, οὓς ὀρώμεν οὔτε κλαίοντες οὔτε γελῶντες ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ὡς αὐτοὶ θέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπαιτεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. See Ch. 1.1.1. 18 n. 58.

<sup>367</sup> In the *synkrisis*, Demosthenes' suicide is praised at the expense of Cicero's pitiful last moments (*Syn. Dem. Cic.* 5).

his opponent, he must beat him at his game. He fools Archias into believing he will follow him but asks for one last moment. Pretending to write back home, Demosthenes chews on his pen to release the poisonous substance inside. The scene is an act aimed at veiling his true intentions from Archias. In this respect, Mossman is right in pointing out that Demosthenes plays one final tragic part, and that this time his props do not fail him.<sup>368</sup> It works, but with great soberness, very different from the golden letters, the props of rope, the stylised delivery. Demosthenes' deception is acceptable not only because it is not artificially forced, but also because it takes place outside the political scene. Here is a man fooling another to guarantee a personal honourable end, not as part of a setup to persuade the *demos* of untrue sentiments. Demosthenes has removed his theatrical behaviour from the political sphere.

To conclude, I argue that the narrative of the dream, the unfolding of the action and the imagery that Plutarch uses are initially determined by the type of politician Demosthenes has shown himself to be. Yet, on the theatrical stage, he proves himself to be a proper orator, who does not rely on the paraphernalia of artificially constructed delivery and over-expense. It is only once he confronts an actual actor that Demosthenes rejects the contrived elements of his histrionic behaviour. Plutarch here draws on two different traditions: the Peripatetic philosophy which generally censured Demosthenes for his histrionic behaviour and the orator Demosthenes who portrayed himself as the champion of truth against artificiality and falsehood. Plutarch's Demosthenes may have been theatrical, but in his last moments he proves that oratory is superior to theatre. Plutarch's moral message remains the same: that theatrical behaviour in politics is not for the righteous, but for the lesser politician; and Demosthenes, despite his faults, proves himself a better man.

Demosthenes' initial encounter with histrionic politics is significant. Plutarch explains how an actor shaped the orator's understanding of successful oratory as delivery at the expense of moral content. Demosthenes' emphasis on delivery centres on the tone of his voice and the power of *λόγος* rather than gestures. Demosthenes' affinity with the theatre finds its conclusion in a dream at the close of

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<sup>368</sup> Mossman (1999), 97.



the narrative. He brings together all the theatrical elements of Demosthenes' political character, only to confront his protagonist with a real actor in an actual dramatic setting. In this context, although he is forced to commit suicide, Demosthenes ultimately proves to be a politician rather than an actor in a struggle which symbolises the moral triumph of oratory over theatre.

## Chapter 4: Reading oratory as performance in Cicero's political conduct

This chapter explores Plutarch's deployment of theatrical imagery in the *Cicero* to explore the subject's oratorical and political behaviour in the context of late Republican Rome. I argue that Plutarch exploits the performative aspect of comedy and tragedy to depict and evaluate Cicero's behaviour as an orator. This *Life's* relationship to theatre has produced a substantial number of studies in recent years, more than for its Greek counterpart, the *Demosthenes*. The majority of this scholarship which touches on the theatrical aspect of the *Life* has almost exclusively focused on Plutarch's exploitation of tragic themes. Laurel Fulkerson uses the adverb "tragically" to define Octavian's manipulation of Cicero and adds that Cicero's demise is "tragicomic", but only explains this qualification by pointing out the changeability of Cicero's fortune.<sup>369</sup> Marta Várzeas's study is more specific, as she chooses an intertextual approach to the *Demosthenes* and the *Cicero*. Her main argument rests on Plutarch's exploitation of *philanthropia's* tragic potential as a means to highlight the better and worse attitudes which men in power display towards their political and social inferiors. The tragic quality of *philanthropia*, Várzeas argues, stems in great part from Plutarch's association of this concept with allusions to Sophocles' *Antigone* present in the pair.<sup>370</sup> While her approach demonstrates Plutarch's quasi-philosophical use of Sophocles' tragedy, allowing the reader to draw moral conclusions by revealing the truth about human nature, Várzeas does not touch upon Plutarch's exploitation of performance and staging to explore politics.

The most in-depth analysis of drama in the *Cicero* is John Moles' commentary, which reveals the scholar's great literary sensitivity. It is Cicero's death, from its causes to its conclusion, constructed by Plutarch to dramatise his narrative, that Moles sees as a tragedy.<sup>371</sup> Moles contends that in order to lend a tragic quality to Cicero's death, Plutarch exploits two tragic themes: Cicero's inability to control external events which lead to his suffering, and his own

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<sup>369</sup> Fulkerson (2012), 67.

<sup>370</sup> Várzeas (2009), 333.

<sup>371</sup> This is echoed by Edwards (1991), 149.

contribution, through error, to his downfall. Thus Cicero's failures are partly determined by his ill-advised choices in moments of crisis, while his suffering, at the hands of a fate he cannot escape, inspires the reader with compassion.<sup>372</sup> As examples of both, Moles cites Cicero's excessive ambition as the cause of his political short-sightedness, preventing him from making the more beneficial choice (*Cic.* 46.1), while his death is precipitated by the triumvirate's inability to curb their own desire at the expense of human decency (*Cic.* 46.6).<sup>373</sup>

While Moles consistently supports his tragic reading with a very close reading of the text, he does not identify the theatrical quality of Cicero's suffering. Moles does not argue that as far as Cicero's demise is concerned, Cicero's identity becomes that of a performer, whose actions are viewed by the audience as a theatrical spectacle. Moles' definition of tragedy follows the Aristotelian theory of the tragic. Halliwell has rightly shown that the understanding of "the tragic" as the exploitation of human suffering, caused by exterior and uncontrollable forces as well as failures of one's character, is not a universal definition of "the tragic" but a very Aristotelian reading of it.<sup>374</sup> He has demonstrated that Plato, for instance, defined what constitutes tragedy as a genre in different terms, viewing it as a very pessimistic interpretation of humanity's lack of control over its fate and the individual's own responsibility in shaping his or her moral character.<sup>375</sup> My aim is not to give a definitive definition of "the tragic", nor do I believe that the exploitation of suffering, inevitable demise and emotional solicitation are exclusive to tragedy; epic, historiography and indeed biography also rely on these themes.<sup>376</sup>

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<sup>372</sup> Moles (1988), 190.

<sup>373</sup> Moles (1988), 197-198 for a discussion of both passages.

<sup>374</sup> Halliwell (2002), 117 argues while Plato rejects the fatalistic dimension of tragedy (the idea that one cannot control one's destiny) he accepts the human responsibility for good and evil.

<sup>375</sup> Halliwell (2002), 99-100 who also points out Aristophanes' own distinctive definition. Silk (1996) on a modern analysis of tragedy and "the tragic" as a genre mostly through Athenian Classical tragedies. Most (2000), 26-27 on the evolution of the idea of "the tragic" in Antiquity after Aristotle.

<sup>376</sup> Mossman (1988), 85 makes a similar remark in her study of epic and tragic themes in the *Alexander*. Walbank (1960), 222 has argued that the similarities between historical narratives and tragedies derive from their common ancestor, the epic genre, rather than an influence of tragedy on historiography. See Rutherford (1982) for a study of elements considered "tragic" in Homer's *Iliad*. Halliwell (2002), 110 has also demonstrated how Plato reads Homer as "tragic" in the *Republic*, suggesting a quasi-philosophical rather than literary definition of the term. Marincola (2003), 288 has pointed out how modern scholarship's focus on pity and fear as tragic emotions present in (Hellenistic) historiography stems from an over-use of an Aristotelian model of the tragic. His overall argument rests on the exploitation of emotions (including suffering) in historical writings as originating from the rhetorical tradition rather than from a desire to construct a historical narrative through tragic elements.

Nor do I reject the presence of tragic elements in Plutarch's narrative.<sup>377</sup> In fact, as I will show, Plutarch echoes, at different moments, both Platonic and Aristotelian readings of tragedy. Rather I propose to complement the understanding of the *Cicero*'s tragic tone with Plutarch's exploitation of the theatrical world to describe political action.

This chapter seeks to complement the study of the tragic in the *Cicero* by adding that of the theatrical. While I consider that certain tragic themes are crucial to the *Life*, I demonstrate that a distinction between the two terms allows us to form a more holistic picture of Plutarch's use of theatre. Both terms can be read in parallel to one another in order to fully understand Plutarch's moral and political picture. By studying the theatrical elements which shape Cicero's demise I move away from the understanding of theatre as a device to highlight "fatal flaws" or to explore various aspects of his unsavoury habits towards one which allowed Plutarch to comment on political action. While the tragic may help understand Cicero's character, the theatrical defines his nature as a politician. I will first address the initial mention of theatrical productions in the *Life* as part of Cicero's educational training to demonstrate that the inclusion of actors as teachers is more than a parallel between Cicero and his Greek counterpart. I will then contrast the two models presented by Plutarch in the *Cicero* of political success through emotional manipulation, the one relying solely on speech, the other on performance, props and gestures. Finally, I will explore Plutarch's construction of Cicero's demise not simply as a scene of intense suffering but as one which rests on Cicero as an actor and his audience as spectators, to highlight the themes which Plutarch has developed throughout the *Life* of proper and improper oratory.

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Marincola (2003), 299 concedes that while historians could have exploited certain elements taken from tragedy in their narratives, genres remained "quite fluid" in antiquity. Pelling (2016), 115-6 notes that the definitions given to "the tragic" in modern scholarship are not only based on Aristotle but also transcend tragedy.

<sup>377</sup> I fully recognise that Plutarch drew on "tragic images and analogies" (Pelling (2016), 116) to shape his narrative. In fact, much has been gleaned from the distinction of the tragic from other genres in Plutarch; cf. for instance Plutarch's exploitation of the differences between tragic and epic as genres in his *Lives*: Mossman (1988) in the *Alexander*; Mossman (1992) in the *Pyrrhus*; Zadorojnyi (1997) in the *Crassus*; Papadi (2008), in the *Pompey*; Mossman (2014) in the *Themistocles*.

## I. Humour and Suffering as Performance

The first mention of the theatrical world in the *Cicero* is Plutarch's inclusion of the comic actor Roscius and the tragic actor Aesopus as influential teachers of the young Cicero. The inclusion of Roscius and Aesopus is often explained as Plutarch's desire to parallel Cicero's educational path with Demosthenes' theatrical-like training (*Dem.* 7.1), as both benefited from an instruction inspired by the acting profession.<sup>378</sup> Following an explicit comparison with his Greek counterpart, Plutarch states that Cicero remedied his weak delivery by turning his attention to the comic actor Roscius and the tragic actor Aesopus (*Cic.* 5.4).<sup>379</sup> Since the theatrical world entered their lives under very similar circumstances, it would be legitimate to assume that Cicero's integration of theatrics in his politics should parallel that of Demosthenes. Yet, not only is Plutarch's treatment of this educational moment different in the *Cicero*, but the type of histrionic politician which his protagonist proves to be does not follow the Demosthenic model set up in the first half of the pair.

Plutarch's treatment of this moment is brief and detached. The mention of Roscius and Aesopus does not introduce a psychological narrative of discovery, and seems to serve more as a parallel between Demosthenes and Cicero. Even more striking is the difference between the effect which Demosthenes' encounter with Satyrus occasions and that which ensues from Cicero's study of Aesopus and Roscius. While Satyrus' encounter with Demosthenes was essential to his performative development as a speaker, Plutarch makes very little use of performance through voice in the *Cicero*. Plutarch remains vague as to Cicero's impediments, only informing the reader that he suffered no less than Demosthenes' own problematic experience with delivery (νοσήσας (...) πρὸς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν).

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<sup>378</sup> Dupont (2000), 17; Lintott (2013), 140. See Pelling (2002), 339 on the similarities between Demosthenes and Cicero's relationship to *paideia*, especially in shaping their rhetorical style.

<sup>379</sup> λέγεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἦτον νοσήσας τοῦ Δημοσθένους περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, τοῦτο μὲν Ῥωσίου τῷ κωμῳδῷ, τοῦτο δ' Αἰσώπῳ τῷ τραγῳδῷ προσέχειν ἐπιμελῶς. See Henry (1919) for a biographical overview of both Roscius and Aesopus, with good references to primary (literary) evidence. See Laidlaw (1960) for a discussion of Aesopus and Roscius' careers in Cicero's writings and Dupont (1985), 103 for an analysis of the historical Roscius' career. See Dupont (2000), 15-19 for an analysis of Cicero's association with Roscius in later sources.

With the *Demosthenes* in mind, the allusion to an ailment associated with delivery suggests that Cicero suffered from locutive difficulties. Cicero's voice needed some attention to be rendered agreeable (*Cic.* 3.7), but no direct correlation is made between his study of these actors' delivery and the improvement of his voice. In fact, Plutarch does not go into any detail as to the influence Roscius and Aesopus had on his performance and remains silent on the methods which Cicero followed to resolve his weakness.

The conspicuous absence of delivery in Plutarch's description of Cicero's education, especially with references to Roscius and Aesopus, is surprising considering the wealth of sources which described both men's professional acting.<sup>380</sup> The historical Cicero often used Roscius and Aesopus as examples to discuss the importance of tone of voice in delivery (cf. *De Orat.* 1.258; 3.102). Aesopus even features heavily in the *Pro Sestio*, where Cicero interwove the tragedian's delivery with political repercussions, crediting his use of voice and features with great emotional impact upon the audience (*Cic. Pro Ses.* 58).<sup>381</sup> Early imperial sources continued to associate these men with performances. Quintilian, writing some decades before Plutarch, uses their respective deliveries to compare them and through them to compare the different genres of acting necessary to comedy and tragedy. Thus Roscius, as a comedian, spoke quickly while Aesopus, as a tragedian, spoke more gravely (*Quint. Inst.* 11.3.111). The Roman rhetorician Fronto, who chronologically immediately succeeded Plutarch, describes Aesopus' preparation of a new role by carefully choosing his gestures and tone of voice according to his mask (*Corresp.* 17). Delivery, whether gestures or tone of voice, was therefore fundamental in the depiction and understanding of both actors, yet Plutarch ignores this. It could be argued that Plutarch did not master enough Latin to comprehend fully the historical Cicero's depiction of Roscius and Aesopus.<sup>382</sup> Rather, I contend

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<sup>380</sup> Plutarch seems to make no use of Cicero's *For Quintus Roscius the Actor*, where he defended Roscius against the prosecution of a certain Fannius Chaerea.

<sup>381</sup> See Sutton (1985), 60 for the relationship between Aesopus' delivery, the emotional reaction of the audience, and the political consequences of his performance. See also Laidlaw (1960), 56 for a more generalised but equally adamant exploration of the relationship between Aesopus' delivery and political impact in the *Pro Sestio*.

<sup>382</sup> Plutarch admits at *Dem.* 2.2, by way of introduction to the *Cicero*, that he came to Latin later in life. This statement has been the starting point of most scholarship on Plutarch's knowledge of Latin. Scholars have tended to recognise Plutarch's knowledge of Latin but remain cautious as to his ability to read the language beyond those required to collect sources; see Jones (1971), 81-7, who emphasises

that while delivery was central to Demosthenes' political development, it is not for Cicero. Yet acting plays an important role in Plutarch's discussion of oratory in the *Cicero*, and both Roscius the Comedian and Aesopus the Tragedian are not mentioned idly. Both comedy and tragedy shape Plutarch's discussion of Cicero's oratorical behaviour. The place of tragedy is, however, far more developed and complex in the *Life* and therefore shall be treated in greater length.

Plutarch follows his mention of Roscius and Aesopus with two separate anecdotes, the first treating tragedy (*Cic.* 5.5) and the second, comedy (*Cic.* 5.6). In this regard, Plutarch is thematically following the specific profession of each actor, since Aesopus is explicitly introduced as a tragedian and Roscius as a comedian. Yet while the second anecdote fits with the narrative of acting's influence on Cicero's education, the first does not touch on either the character of the *Life* or on *paideia*. To follow Plutarch's thematic structure, I start with the second anecdote and the role of comedy in the *Life*.

οὐ μικρὰ δὴ πρὸς τὸ πείθειν ὑπῆρχεν ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκρίνεσθαι ῥοπή τῷ Κικέρωνι, καὶ τοὺς γε τῷ μέγα βοᾶν χρωμένους ῥήτορας ἐπισκώπτων (...) ἢ δὲ **περὶ τὰ σκώμματα καὶ τὴν παιδιὰν ταύτην** εὐτραπέλια δικανικὸν μὲν ἐδόκει καὶ γλαφυρὸν εἶναι, χρώμενος δ' αὐτῇ κατακόρως, πολλοὺς ἐλύπει καὶ κακοηθείας ἐλάμβανε δόξαν.

Acting had no small weight on Cicero in influencing his ability to persuade, and he jested about the orators who employed loud shouts (...) This wit, displayed by his jokes and childish games, were considered to be appropriate to the law-courts and polished but by using it immoderately he distressed many and received a reputation for malignity.

(*Cic.* 5.6)

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἐχθροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἀντιδίκους **σκώμμασι** χρῆσθαι πικροτέροις δοκεῖ ῥητορικὸν εἶναι· τὸ δ'οἷς ἔτυχε προσκρούειν **ἔνεκα τοῦ γελοίου** πολὺ συνήγε μῖσος αὐτῷ.

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Plutarch's use of intermediaries, such as other sources and bilingual friends, to gain a more in-depth knowledge of Latin material. See also Strobach (1997) and De Rosalia (1991). See Setaioli (2007) for a study of Plutarch's attitude to Latin as a language. While it is clear that he used Latin sources for his *Lives*, the debate continues as to Plutarch's actual mastery of a second language. Lintott (2013), 16 takes Plutarch's own admission at face value and dismisses his Latin as rather limited. Stadter (2014), 138-9, whose research focuses on Plutarch's use of a diverse set of sources in the *Lucullus*, including Livy, Cicero and Horace, considers his level of Latin to have been good enough for an intellectual engagement with Latin texts, rather than simply limited to the collecting of information.

It is thought that it is the province of the orator to assail with biting humour one's enemies and opponents. But this impulse to strike against anyone for the sake of provoking laughter brought him much hatred.

(Cic. 27.1)

Κικέρων δὲ πολλαχοῦ τῷ σκωπτικῷ πρὸς τὸ βωμολόχον ἐκφερόμενος, καὶ πράγματα σπουδῆς ἄξια γέλῳτι καὶ παιδιᾷ κατειρωνευόμενος ἐν ταῖς δίκαις εἰς τὸ χρειώδες ἠφείδει τοῦ πρέποντος.

Cicero was carried away in many places through jest towards buffoonery, and, treating matters worthy of serious attention with irony, as he used laughter and jesting in legal cases to suit his own needs, he neglected propriety.

(Comp. Dem. Cic. 1.4)

The theme of humour in Cicero's oratorical action is repeated throughout the *Life* and even appears in the *synkrisis*. Scholars have noted this recurring theme in the *Cicero* and argued that it was included to reflect Cicero's more cruel side, as he inflicts needless pain on his opponents.<sup>383</sup> This reading implies that the insertion of Cicero's excessive humour is purely meant to illustrate a character flaw in Plutarch's wider depiction of his subject's *ēthos*. I add that Plutarch's condemnation of Cicero's use of wit not only touches on his subject's personal but also on his political character. Plutarch recognises that humour constitutes an integral part of the orator's arsenal, especially in the law-courts, defining it as a means to undermine political enemies or opponents (πρὸς ἐχθρούς ἢ πρὸς ἀντιδίκους, Cic. 27.1).<sup>384</sup> In this regard, Plutarch values humour more as a stylistic device for a political end, to be divorced from its performative aspect.<sup>385</sup> When it is used as cognitive experience that requires a performance on the part of the speaker for the mere amusement of the audience it is no longer acceptable. Although Cicero directs this humour to his rivals

<sup>383</sup> Moles (1988), 155; Lintott (2013), 140. Xenophon (2002), 606-7 treats humour and invective in the *Cicero* as a parallel for the *Demosthenes*: while Demosthenes was the butt of comedy, Cicero uses comic tropes to undermine his opponents.

<sup>384</sup> Cicero devoted a whole section on humour in his own discourse on rhetoric in *De Oratore*, including the benefits or harm which humour may bring to the orator, and the extent to which a speaker should rely on wit (*De Orat.* 2.229-2.235). See Rabbie (2007) for a study of wit in Cicero's rhetorical treatises. Harries (2007) on the importance which the comic stage held in Cicero's early forensic oratory. Plutarch did concede a rhetoric role to laughter and jest. See Cosenza (2000), 119 on Plutarch's views on wit in his *Precepts of Statecraft*.

<sup>385</sup> Cf. Monaco (2013) for the uses of humour as a political tool in the *Demetrius*; her conclusion (2013), 126-7 is similar to mine, that humour is only acceptable if it is aimed at preserving the State.



(cf. especially *Cic.* 27, where Plutarch provides an extensive list of anecdotes on this theme), the nature and use of his humour is unacceptable for an orator. This division between oratory's acceptable use of wit and Cicero's less savoury employment of humour rests, I argue, on Plutarch's distinction between the superior aspects of the comedic genre as a politically-minded art, and its inferior reliance on pleasure and performance.<sup>386</sup>

Plutarch introduces the first mention of Cicero's comic penchant through the lens of performance, as he follows the assertion that acting (ἐκ τοῦ ὑποκρίνεσθαι) influenced Cicero's oratory as seen in his use of wit. Translators and commentators have read ὑποκρίνεσθαι as "delivery", extrapolating the meaning of the verb from its noun ὑπόκρισις, which carries both the meaning of 'rhetorical delivery' and of "acting".<sup>387</sup> Yet the verb ὑποκρίνεσθαι never holds a rhetorical meaning, at least in Plutarch, who consistently uses it to refer to "playing a part", with two exceptions, at *Caes.* 43.4 where it keeps its original meaning of "making a reply" and at *Dem.* 11.3 where Plutarch is, as I have argued, playing on the ambiguities between oratory and acting.<sup>388</sup> The performative aspect of Cicero's humour is reinforced by the terms Plutarch uses to describe this wit, as σκῶμμα (*Cic.* 5.6; *Cic.* 27.1), παιδία (*Cic.* 5.6; *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.4), βωμολόχον (*Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.4), γέλως (*Comp. Dem. Cic.* 1.4) and γέλοιος (*Cic.* 27.1) are strongly reminiscent of the terms Plutarch uses to describe the aspects of comic drama which he condemns.

He censures Old Comedy partly on the grounds that it resorts too freely to jests and buffoonery (πρὸς τὰ σκῶμματα καὶ βωμολοχίας, *Quaes. Conv.* 712a). This point he develops elsewhere, as he dismisses the comedian's reliance on amusement and buffoonery (τὸ γελοῖον [...] καὶ βωμολόχον) as detracting from the more serious themes also present in comedy (*Adulator*, 68c).<sup>389</sup> While the comics

<sup>386</sup> See Ch.1, I.2, 35-6.

<sup>387</sup> Perrin (1919), 95 and Ozanam (2001), 1574 for ὑποκρίνεσθαι as delivery. Lintott (2013), 89 translates it correctly as acting. Dupont (2000), 19 points out that Plutarch's understanding of Cicero's education is Hellenised since the Greek term ὑποκρίνεσθαι was inherited from the stage whereas the Roman equivalent, *actio*, came from law courts.

<sup>388</sup> For ὑποκρίνεσθαι as "playing a theatrical part", referring to acting either directly or to metaphors and comparisons: *Cat. Mi.* 46.7, *Sol.* 29.6; *Dem.* 29.2-6; *Pelop.* 29.9; *Demetr.* 41.5, *Quaes. Conv.* 673b-d; *De Defect.* 431c; *Non Posse.* 1102b; *Adulator* 53f; *De Iside.* 379a.

<sup>389</sup> A similar sentiment is reiterated in the *Table-Talks*, as one of the guests accuses Old Comedy of being too overloaded with jokes and buffoonish acts (πρὸς τὰ σκῶμματα καὶ βωμολοχίας, *Quaes. Conv.* 711f). Cf. my discussion of Antony's jesting at *Ant.* 29.4 and comic narrative in Ch. 1, I.2.

can produce strong political points (πολλά αὐστηρά καὶ πολιτικά), it is precisely the pleasurable and performative aspect of comedy which renders (ποιεῖν) this frank speaking (παρρησία) ineffective (*Adulator*, 68c).<sup>390</sup> Plutarch thus opposes comedy's better qualities expressed through political language (πολιτικά, παρρησία) with its more superficial aspects conveyed through theatrical language (γελοῖον, βωμολόχον). This unacceptability of Cicero's humour is further highlighted by the incentive that drives him as he acted for the sake of provoking mirth (ἔνεκα τοῦ γελοίου, *Cic.* 27.1), which is precisely how Plutarch defines the comedian, as an actor whose aim is to create laughter and thereby bring pleasure to the spectator (*Stoicos*, 1065e).<sup>391</sup>

While Cicero's employment of humour is partly motivated by political sentiments, his inability to divorce wit from its more theatrical aspects, pleasure and performance, casts his rhetorical behaviour as comedian-like. In other words, what Cicero retains of comedy is the performative quality rather than simply its essence, the humour. Plutarch ultimately criticises Cicero because his political behaviour is theatrical. Although much more complex, Cicero's relationship to tragedy is similar. In order to explore how Plutarch divorced the themes which tragedy highlights about the human condition from the genre's performance in the theatre, I contrast two separate but complementary anecdotes: Aesopus' rendition of Atreus and the triumvirate's sacrifice of Cicero.

In his description of Cicero's educational development (*Cic.*5), Plutarch remains silent as to Cicero's relationship with tragedy. Instead, he takes the focus of the narrative away from his education strictly speaking, and gives pride of place to Aesopus alone (*Cic.* 5.5). This anecdote is inserted between Cicero's initial study of Roscius and Aesopus (*Cic.* 5.4) and Plutarch's demonstration that acting, and in particular comedy, influenced his oratory (*Cic.* 5.6). The story reported at *Cic.* 5.5 can be justified as an illustration of Aesopus' character, as it immediately follows

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<sup>390</sup> τοῖς κωμικοῖς πολλά πρὸς τὸ θέατρον αὐστηρά καὶ πολιτικά πεποίητο συμμεμιγμένον δὲ τὸ γελοῖον αὐτοῖς καὶ βωμολόχον, ὥσπερ σιτίοις ὑπότριμμα μοχθηρόν, ἐξίτηλον ἐποίει τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ ἄχρηστον.

<sup>391</sup> ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ μὲν φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα τὴν κωμῶδιαν κοσμεῖ καὶ συνεργεῖ πρὸς τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς, ἐφιεμένης τοῦ γελοίου ἢ κεχαρισμένου τοῖς θεαταῖς.

his mention at *Cic.* 5.4, but I contend that it also serves an important role in introducing key themes to the narrative of Cicero's life.

τὸν δ' Αἴσωπον τοῦτον ἱστοροῦσιν ὑποκρινόμενον ἐν θεάτρῳ τὸν περὶ τῆς τιμωρίας τοῦ Θυέστου βουλευόμενον Ἀτρέα, τῶν ὑπηρετῶν τινος ἄφνω παραδραμόντος, ἔξω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λογισμῶν διὰ τὸ πάθος ὄντα τῷ σκήπτρῳ πατάξαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν.

The story goes that this Aesopus, as he was acting in the theatre the role of Atreus deliberating on his vengeance over Thyestes, and when one of the attendants suddenly ran by, since he was out of his reason through passion, struck and killed him with his royal staff.

(*Cic.* 5.5)

The action of Atreus' gruesome revenge on his brother Thyestes, by feeding him the flesh of his own sons under the guise of a reconciliatory banquet, had been the object of both Greek and Roman tragedies.<sup>392</sup> This episode is not Plutarch's own perspective on the myth, but rather his understanding of Plato's denunciation of mimetic art in his *Republic*. Plato's Socrates assures his companions that by imitating a *dramatis persona's* emotions and actions, the actor is in danger of absorbing, as it were, the character and nature of this *persona* into his body, voice and thought (*Pl. Rep.* 395d).<sup>393</sup> Elsewhere, in an effort to describe the working process of certain historians, Plutarch associates them with actors (ὡσπερ δραμάτων ὑποκριταί) who, portraying the deeds of generals and kings, merge (ὑποδύεσθαι) with their characters (*De glor. Ath.* 345e). This is precisely what happens to Aesopus. Atreus, as a violent, angry, vengeful *persona* presents an important threat to the soul of the actor. The plays that survive all testify to the extreme violence with which poets chose to represent Atreus' emotions and actions and the association of Atreus with vengeance (τιμωρία) would have been sufficient for the reader to understand the degree of emotion with which Aesopus must act the

<sup>392</sup> Sophocles wrote two versions of the myth, one in his *Atreus* and another in his *Thyestes in Sicyon*, while Euripides wrote both a *Thyestes* and a *Phlistenes* which follows Thyestes' quest for revenge. Hellenistic tragedians tackled the myth, which only survive by name: cf. Tarrant (1985), 40. Roman versions predating Seneca include Ennius' *Thyestes* and Accius' *Atreus* (mentioned by Cicero, cf. this chapter, 163 n. 384) for the Republican period and Varius' *Thyestes* and Mamercus Aemilius Scaurus' *Atreus* for the first half of the Julio-Claudian area. These versions are mostly fragmentary: cf. Tarrant (1985), 40. Seneca the Younger's *Thyestes* is probably the most famous version of the myth which survives antiquity.

<sup>393</sup> ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρῳ διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθῃ τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν;

scene. It is Atreus the angry *persona*, and not Aesopus the actor, who strikes the poor attendant. The importance of emotion, which Aesopus has mimetically felt, is explicitly credited by Plutarch as the means through which Aesopus loses his sense of self.<sup>394</sup> It is this extreme passion (πάθος), conveyed by the character, that pushed reason out of Aesopus' mind.

At first glance, this anecdote seems imbued with tragic imagery: a tragic actor performing a fictional tragedy commits a real tragic act onstage. I argue that this episode, however, is less a commentary on the nature of tragedy and more to do with theatrical performances. Aesopus' story relies much more on visual performance than on tragic feeling. This is especially clear when comparing this passage to a later one, which also depicts a loss of reason through passion but which ultimately proves to be much more tragic. Caesar, Antony and Lepidus initially maintain the harmony of their triumvirate by each relinquishing a close member of their circle to please the other: Lepidus abandons his brother, Antony his uncle and Caesar a loyal Cicero (*Cic.* 46.5).<sup>395</sup> Plutarch withholds his judgement until the end of the chapter, where he expresses his disgust at the actions of the triumvirate by using imagery that recalls his treatment of Aesopus' murder.

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<sup>394</sup> Edwards (1991), 118 notes that this anecdote about Aesopus is not reported elsewhere. There are two contradictory passages in the historical Cicero's own writings that recall this story. In his early work *On the Orator*, Cicero explores the orator's relationship to emotion. M. Antonius paints a vivid scene of witnessing an actor possessed by the emotion of his character, his eyes sparkling with ardour behind his mask, quoting several emotional lines from *Teucer*, a tragedy by Pacuvius (*De Orat.* 2.193). The speaker goes on to argue that if the actor is possessed by the feelings which are supposed to animate his *persona*, the poet, here Pacuvius, must have experienced the same when creating his *persona*. M. Antonius names Democritus and Plato as the authorities on the poet's possession by passion when writing emotional scenes (*De Orat.* 2.194). While Plutarch's anecdote is more dramatic, resulting in a violent death, the basic principle is the same: Cicero, through his speaker, introduces the Platonic denunciation of poetical corruption (whether of the actor or of the poet) through *mimesis*. Plutarch could have, arguably, been aware of Cicero's own writings on *mimesis* and emotion, but re-transposed the story to fit Aesopus. The historical Cicero, however, later reviewed this Platonic judgement in his *Tusculan Disputations*, using very similar imagery and language. The speaker argues that the orator as well as the actor and the poet do not feel the emotion of the *persona* they act or the speech they write (*Tusc.* 4.55). The actor, the tragedy and the poet which serve as examples, are none other than Aesopus playing Atreus in Accius' eponymous play. Graver (2002), 168 explains this shift by explaining that Cicero was first influenced by Peripatetics and then by Stoics. If Plutarch were drawing on Cicero's own writings, this allusion would be very complex, using a philosophical outlook from an earlier text with the example from a later work, which contradicts his earlier views. I do not believe, therefore, that Plutarch is drawing on Cicero directly.

<sup>395</sup> Plutarch has just described Cicero's initial kindness towards Caesar, recognising him as the guarantor of Rome's future peace (*Cic.* 44) and Caesar's exploitation of Cicero (*Cic.* 45); this betrayal is to be fully felt as an extremely selfish act on Caesar's part.

οὕτως ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ λύσσης τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν, μάλλον δ' ἀπέδειξαν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου θηρίον ἐστὶν ἀγριώτερον ἐξουσίαν πάθει προσλαβόντος.

In such a way they departed from the reasoning of men through anger and rage, and demonstrated that no beast is more savage than the man who adds power to passion.

(Cic. 46.6)

Plutarch employs nearly the same vocabulary to describe the actor and the politicians' state of mind. Just as Aesopus was “out of” his rational state (ἔξω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ λογισμῶν), so are those who order Cicero's execution (ἐκπίπτειν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν). Passion (πάθος) is in both cases held as responsible for the violence of the men's actions, in Aesopus' case expressed through the lethal beating and in the triumvirate's example portrayed by their savage behaviour.<sup>396</sup> Vengeance also plays an important role in both passages, as Aesopus was influenced by Atreus' revenge against his brother and Caesar by Antony's hatred for Cicero (Cic. 46.3). Antony even justifies the mutilation of Cicero's corpse, and in particular the cutting off of his hands, as retribution for the writing of the *Philippics* (Cic. 48.6). Yet, despite these linguistic ties, there exists a crucial difference between Plutarch's treatment of Aesopus' outburst and the decision which Caesar and his colleagues reach which marks the former as theatrical and the latter as specifically tragic.

The fundamental difference between Aesopus' tragic act and that of the triumvirate's recalls Aristotelian ideas of good and bad tragic drama.<sup>397</sup> Aristotle distinguishes between plays that rely on different senses to inspire emotion in their audience (1453b3-9).<sup>398</sup> Plays that are truly tragic are defined by their creation of

<sup>396</sup> Although Várzeas (2009), 339 discusses this passage in her exploration of the dynamics between tragedy, especially Sophocles' *Antigone*, and *philanthropia*, she does not equate it with tragedy or with Aesopus' theatrical outburst. Várzeas sees, however, the triumvirate's actions as the opposite of *philanthropia*.

<sup>397</sup> See Ch. 2, II, 105 n. 255.

<sup>398</sup> τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενον ἐστίν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερόν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδία κοινωνοῦσιν. In both Cicero's cited works the treatment of emotion is philosophical. Although passages from tragedies are quoted, the action remains unimportant, and the whole focus rests on different emotions. The citations serve as illustrations of various emotions, with fury and grief at *De Orat.* 2.193 and anger at *Tusc.* 4.55. Even the effect of passion on the poet is described through his inflamed spirit (*animus*), recalling philosophical discourses on the soul. While emotion is important in Plutarch's description, his version is much more focused on tragedy itself as it concerns action.

pity and fear through the sense of hearing (ἀκούειν, 1453b5) and therefore through speech, while plays that rely on sight (ὄψις) and therefore on staging, are not only monstrous (τερατώδης) but have no commonality with actual tragedy (οὐδὲν τραγωδία κοινώνειν, 1453b9).<sup>399</sup> It is precisely this distinction between *logos* on the one hand, and performance on the other, that distinguishes, in Aristotelian terms, the truly tragic nature of the triumvirate's deliberation from the simply monstrous aspect of Aesopus' behaviour.

Although the triumvirate's dynamic is described as one of strife (ἔρις), the action does not involve any physical violence, but only occurs through speech. Antony's disagreement with the proposed terms, Lepidus' support of Antony, Caesar's initial resistance of and then concession to his colleagues (*Cic.* 46.2-5), could all be acted out on a stage without resorting to anything but dialogue. Plutarch, on the other hand, insists on the performative quality of the Aesopus anecdote. The importance of performance in this scene is suggested by the almost pleonastic mention of acting (ὑποκρίνεσθαι) as located in the theatre. Plutarch very rarely specifies the *locus* for acting, unless it is to stress the importance of staged performance.<sup>400</sup> The importance of performance in the scene is highlighted by the total absence of spoken words, as Aesopus is mostly defined through physical action and gesture. Plutarch's stress on physical performance rather than *logos* is further emphasised by the actor's use of the staff (σκήπτρον). This of course points to Atreus' status as king, since the σκήπτρον was an *insignium* of royal power.<sup>401</sup> But its mention crucially serves to remind the reader of the means through which Aesopus is persuading the audience of his stolen identity. The actor relies on props and theatrical paraphernalia that become his *persona* and it is through such devices that he ultimately emulates his violent nature. While Caesar's

<sup>399</sup> τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενον ἔστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερόν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγωδία κοινωνοῦσιν.

<sup>400</sup> Of the sixteen mentions of "acting" in the *Lives*, only four are explicitly located in the theatre (*Pel.* 29.9; *Cat. Min.* 46.7; *Dem.* 29.2, including this passage from the Cicero), and of the fourteen mentions of 'actor' (ὑποκριτής) only one is precisely performed in the theatre (*Dem.* 22.5). As a point of comparison, Plutarch's inclusion of the theatre at *Dem.* 29.2 is also determined by its relevance to the narrative. Plutarch has already introduced the scene as a theatrical performance that is as the *agon* between two tragic actors and does not need to mention the theatre as the *locus* of the action. The mere mention of the theatre allows Plutarch to visually create the dynamics between Demosthenes onstage and the effect of his performance on the audience in its seats.

<sup>401</sup> Mentioned in Homeric epic (cf. *Hom. Il.* 2.186; 18.557) through to tragedy (*Aesc. Eum.* 626).

decision to abandon Cicero is painful and should inspire true emotion, Aesopus' murder, through its exclusive reliance on performance and theatrical paraphernalia, can only inspire disgust and cannot truly be called tragic.

Aesopus' perversion of tragedy is not simply achieved through an exclusive reliance on gesture and props; but by the performance of a murder on stage. Aesopus effectively acts out what can never be shown on the theatrical stage. Oliver Taplin has carefully discussed the distinction between action which is reported in tragedy (battles, suicides, murders) and the verbal response to it by the actors onstage, defining the first important only as far as it allows the second to take place. The lead up and the reaction to violence constitute the action of ancient Greek tragedy, not the violence itself.<sup>402</sup> Aesopus was following the norms of tragic action by resolving (βουλεύειν) to kill but turned away from the tragic genre by killing. By stressing the performative nature of Aesopus' murder and his perversion of tragedy's norms, Plutarch makes the Aesopus episode much less about tragedy and much more about performance. By creating such strong lexical similarities between the triumvirates' decision to execute Cicero and Aesopus' murder, Plutarch brings these two passages carefully together for comparison. While one appears tragic, it relies on the influence of a fictional *persona* artificially embodied through props, the other, without recourse to staging, is more focused on suffering. It is precisely because the triumvirate are not acting, but are honestly motivated by real emotion, that their actions are so genuinely horrifying. Reality, Plutarch suggests, can be worse than fiction.

Plutarch's introduction of comedy and tragedy in the *Cicero* follow similar patterns. Although Cicero uses comedy in a political context and Aesopus performs a tragedy in a theatrical one, Plutarch explores in both cases the better and worse aspects of the two genres. What makes both instances unacceptable is the exploitation of the theatrical aspect of both genres. Cicero is not able to divorce humour from its theatrical aspect in his political enterprises, while Aesopus' seemingly tragic act is in fact the result of a theatrical experience. Whether comedy or tragedy, the

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<sup>402</sup> Taplin (1983), 2. Sommerstein (2010), 37 also notes the due absence of striking another person on the tragic stage, as opposed to performed beating in comedy.

performance of these genres endangers the performer. By resembling the jester, the politician becomes ridiculous, and by becoming his *persona* the actor destroys his soul. While Cicero's relationship to comedy is only touched upon in an anecdotal way, tragedy plays a significant role in the *Life's* exploration of political action. It is the danger of including the theatrical in the tragic to respond to a political crisis which, for me, constitutes a major political theme of the *Life*. As I have suggested, Plutarch defines the tragic as an exploration of the human condition achieved through *logos*, while the theatrical solicits the audience's reaction through visual impact. It is this Plutarchan distinction between oratory as *logos* and theatrical politics as spectacle that I wish to explore in my second section. I argue that Plutarch presents in the *Cicero* two distinct models of political action based on emotional manipulation. In order to show this I will contrast Cicero's finest oratorical moment with Antony's dangerous exploitation of political spectacle.

## **II. Cicero contra Antony: Competing Models of Emotional Politics**

In this section, I intend to explore the two different models of emotional appeal in politics as presented in the *Cicero*. I have chosen to contrast Cicero's successful manipulation of Caesar's emotion with Antony's arousal of the plebs' anger at Caesar's death. While my conclusion casts Antony as the histrionic politician, and Cicero as the proper orator, it is important to remember that Cicero has already displayed a *penchant* for theatrics, especially as far as comedy is concerned. Rather than a Demetrius, who uses theatrical performances consistently, Cicero is the Roman Demosthenes, who wavers between theatrical and non-theatrical oratory. In this section, I lay down the template of proper and improper exploitation of the audience's emotion in politics as presented in the *Cicero*.

Although the *Life* provides many examples of Cicero's rhetorical skills, his manipulation of Caesar's emotions after the battle of Pharsalus is one of the most striking. Although Caesar had exiled Quintus Ligarius for his Pompeian sympathies, Cicero successfully revokes his sentence by defending him in an



astonishingly successful speech.<sup>403</sup> Plutarch sets the scene with Caesar's complete denigration of Ligarius' worth. Firmly believing that the orator cannot alter his opinion, Caesar treats Cicero's speech almost as a piece of rhetorical entertainment (*Cic.* 39.6). This premise is important because the tension of the passage rests wholly on Cicero's ability to change Caesar's mind. The success of this speech does not rely on any physical performance on the orator's part, but exclusively depends on Cicero's rhetorical style.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἀρξάμενος λέγειν ὁ Κικέρων ὑπερφυῶς ἐκίνει, καὶ προὔβαινε αὐτῷ πάθει τε ποικίλος καὶ χάριτι θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, πολλὰς μὲν ἰέναι χροᾶς ἐπὶ τοῦ προσώπου τὸν Καίσαρα, πάσας δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τρεπόμενον τροπὰς κατάδηλον εἶναι, τέλος δὲ τῶν κατὰ Φάρσαλλον ἀψαμένου τοῦ ῥήτορος ἀγώνων, ἐκπαθῆ γενόμενον τιναχθῆναι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῆς χειρὸς ἐκβαλεῖν ἔνια τῶν γραμματείων. τὸν δ' οὖν ἄνθρωπον ἀπέλυσε τῆς αἰτίας βεβιασμένος.

But when he began to speak, Cicero moved them above measure, and as his speech unfolded it was both intricate with emotion and admirable in its grace, so that Caesar released many colours upon his face and it was entirely visible that he was affected in all the aspects of his soul. At last when the orator touched upon the contest at Pharsalus, it is said that Caesar was furiously overcome with shaking of his body and threw out of his hands some of his papers. Therefore he released the man from blame because he was overpowered.

(*Cic.* 39.7)

This passage shows Cicero at his very best, manipulating Caesar into changing his seemingly unwavering mind. Cicero's success is suggested by the concluding βεβιάσθαι, which usually refers to physical constraint but here illustrates the total power of the orator over Caesar. This is in keeping with the rest of the *Cicero*, in which Plutarch often uses the lexical field of victorious warfare to describe the effects of Cicero's oratory (cf. for instance how Cicero's audience is mastered by his

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<sup>403</sup> This moment is based on one of Cicero's actual extant speeches, the *Pro Ligario*, which highlights the political tensions faced by the Roman elite at the end of the civil war. Plutarch's inclusion of the *Ligario* is not chronologically accurate. Plutarch includes it between Pompey's demise at the battle of Pharsalus (*Cic.* 38) and Caesar's return to Rome as absolute ruler (*Cic.* 40), while the actual trial would have taken place in Rome, once Caesar had returned and established himself as master. This slight change in the time line allows Plutarch to emphasise Cicero's rhetorical virtuosity and its hold over the victorious dictator. Ryan (1999) on the historical context surrounding the trial. The actual trial hinged on Ligarius' return from exile, into which he was forced for having supported Pompey and for having subsequently collaborated with the Numidian king against Rome. Edwards (1991), 143 points out the discrepancy between the level of emotion which Plutarch imparts to the speech and the reality of Cicero's actual text, which seems unlikely to have produced such an effect.

speech *Cic.* 12.6).<sup>404</sup> There is nothing theatrical about Cicero's delivery nor are any physical ploys mentioned. He is never shown using his voice, body language, gestures or props to enhance the impact of his speech. Rather than credit Cicero's performance as the driving force of the scene, Plutarch highlights the importance of his rhetorical style. It is the emotional intricacy (πάθει τε ποιμίλος) and its wonderful grace (χάριτι θαυμαστός) that cause the stirring in his audience. In fact, *logos* becomes the means through which Plutarch defines Cicero's actions: he begins by speaking (λέγειν) and his behaviour is later implied by the description of the nature of his speech (λόγος), while his final mention is through his identity as an orator (ὀήτωρ). By contrast, Caesar's reaction to the speech is purely expressed by body language expressing emotional distress.

Caesar's πρόσωπον is the seat of many changes of colour. In Plutarch, the rising of colour in a man's face is synonymous with emotions exposed. For instance, believing that his plot to bring down Galba has been uncovered, Otho's terror is expressed by the sudden scarlet colour of his complexion (*Galb.* 24.3). Similarly, Antiochus goes from furious blush to extreme pallor when he sees Stratonice, the object of his desires (*Demetr.* 38.3). Plutarch considers this reaction as the exterior marker of the prince's inner workings (he uses ψυχή, *Demetr.* 38.3-4). The release of colour upon one's face reveals, in Plutarch, the emotional anxiety experienced by the character. This also applied to Caesar as he listened to Cicero's speech. Although listed in succession rather than directly linked together, the many colours upon Caesar's face and the turmoil of his soul form the two ends of the same emotional experience: the skin on Caesar's face is the external expression of his inner agitation. The ultimate expression of Caesar's emotional struggle, however, is illustrated by the quivering (τινάσσειν) of his body.<sup>405</sup> Plutarch reserves this term to describe movement caused by extremely violent forces, such as the shaking caused by earthquakes (*Cim.* 16.4) or the thrashing of cows burning alive (*Fab.* 6.8). This extreme body language shows how deeply Caesar is moved and therefore proves Cicero's shrewd understanding of his audience's psychology. He has struck at his

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<sup>404</sup> τῷ λόγῳ κρατηθέντας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

<sup>405</sup> LSJ s.v. τινάσσειν.

very core.<sup>406</sup> Yet this emphasis on Caesar's gestures and lack of words is also designed to contrast with Cicero's sole reliance on speech. By contrasting Caesar's body language and Cicero's *logos*, Plutarch puts the performative quality of the scene entirely on the audience and not on the speaker. I interpret this distinction as Plutarch's understanding of emotionality in oratory. While the "true" orator can invoke emotions in his audience, he does not experience them. That is reserved for the listener, and he alone. By making this distinction, between the speaker who summons emotion on one hand, and the audience who experiences it on the other, Plutarch is describing Cicero as the ideal orator.

Cicero's use of emotion follows the theoretical guidelines of rhetorical manipulation of the audience. For Aristotle, emotional appeal is one of three means through which an orator can persuade his audience, going as far as listing and defining several emotions necessary for the orator's arsenal (1356a). This is also the case of the historical Cicero's own discourse on emotions. In his *On the Orator*, his character Antonius argues that the orator should, in legal cases, guide the judges on the desired path by influencing their feelings (*De Orat.* 2.186-7). In both Aristotle and Cicero's writings, however, emotional appeal is not a target in itself but the means to perform political righteousness. Cicero uses Caesar's emotions, not to establish his superiority over his audience or promote his own welfare but to safeguard the livelihood of a man who has been the victim of civil war. In this respect, Cicero's prowess before Caesar echoes other passages of the *Life* in which Plutarch praises Cicero for his moral rigour. When his eloquence is commended it is for favouring a just and direct manner of speech (τὸ δίκαιον ἀήτητον) which is aimed at promoting what is good (καλός) rather than what would flatter (κολακεύειν, *Cic.* 13.1). Cicero's manipulation of his audience's emotions, however intense, follows the commendable patterns prescribed by rhetorical theories on the ethical use of feelings.

At the opposite end of Cicero's successful and appropriate emotional manipulation of Caesar is Antony's counterproductive and dangerous arousal of the Roman

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<sup>406</sup> See Pelling (2002), 241 on the importance of knowing one's audience for rhetorical success in Plutarch.

people at the despot's death. This scene described the immediate aftermath of Caesar's murder, as Cicero and Antony respond differently to this new political crisis. While Cicero wishes to reward Cassius and Brutus for disposing of the man who had transformed the Republic into a monarchy (*Cic.* 40.1) and installed a regime which Cicero could not endure (*Cic.* 42.1), Antony as consul cannot condone the murder of his dearest friend and colleague (*Cic.* 42.3).

Ἀντώνιος μὲν ὑπατεύων τὴν βουλήν συνήγαγε καὶ βραχέα διελέχθη περὶ ὁμονοίας, Κικέρων δὲ πολλὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν οἰκείως διελθὼν, ἔπεισε τὴν σύγκλητον Ἀθηναίους μιμησαμένην ἀμνηστίαν τῶν ἐπὶ Καίσαρι ψηφίσασθαι, νείμαι δὲ τοῖς περὶ Κάσσιον καὶ Βρούτον ἐπαρχίας. ἔσχε δὲ τούτων τέλος οὐδέν. ὁ γὰρ δῆμος αὐτὸς μὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ **πρὸς οἶκτον** ἐξαχθεῖς, ὡς **εἶδε** τὸν νεκρὸν ἐκκομιζόμενον δι' ἀγοράς, Ἀντωνίου δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐσθήτα δείξαντος αὐτοῖς αἵματος κατάπλεων καὶ κεκομμένην πάντη τοῖς ξίφεσιν, ἐκμανέντες **ὑπ' ὀργῆς** ἐν ἀγορᾷ ζήτησιν ἐποιοῦντο τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἔθεον ὡς ὑφάψοντες.

Antony as consul brought the council together and spoke briefly about concord, while Cicero, fittingly for the moment, spoke with much detail and persuaded the senators to mimic the Athenians and vote an amnesty concerning the attack on Caesar, and dispense provinces upon Cassius and Brutus. Nothing came of this finally. For the people being lead to feel pity, as they saw the body carried away through the Forum, and since Antony displayed to them the clothes stained with blood, and cut up everywhere by swords, they were driven mad from rage in the Forum, and they made a search for these men and ran to their homes, carrying fire to set them alight.

(*Cic.* 42.3-4)

Antony and Cicero's methods in the Senate are in direct opposition to each other. While Antony does not seem invested in this senatorial meeting, Cicero offers a pragmatic solution to the impending chaos. This is shown in their speeches, as Antony's brief intervention (βραχέα διαλέγειν) directly contrasts with Cicero's thoughtful response (διέρχεσθαι). The contents of their respective speeches are also in opposition, since Antony responds with the unhelpful mention of the abstract notion of *Concordia*, while Cicero offers a pragmatic solution with a detailed plan of action. Plutarch even explicitly credits Cicero's behaviour as appropriate for the occasion (πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν οἰκείως), marking his sensitivity to the political situation at hand at the expense of the consul's behaviour. If Cicero's ultimate

reward for excellent oratorical behaviour is displayed in his successful persuasion (πείθειν) of the Senate, his plans fail because of Antony's less savoury but very successful alternative to political debate. Once again, Plutarch contrasts Cicero's behaviour with that of Antony.

Plutarch identifies Antony's targeted audience as the Roman people, while Cicero was persuading the Senate. Antony is not addressing the political elite of Rome, but rather a group already showing signs of hyper-emotionality: Plutarch emphatically insists that the people themselves (αὐτὸς) are turned themselves (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ) towards emotionality, here pity. The combination of pity (πρὸς οἴκτον) as a response to sight (ἰδεῖν) suggests the Aristotelian definition of the bad theatrical experience, where the audience is moved to pity through the witnessing rather than hearing of suffering (*Poetics* 1453b1-9). The theatrical element of this scene is increased by Antony's treatment of Caesar's clothes which, through their bloodiness and lacerations, recall the violence of Caesar's murder. By exposing Caesar's torn garments, Antony is choosing visual impact (δεικνύναι) through objects and not *logos* to persuade his audience of the horror of Caesar's death. But the inappropriateness of Antony's actions rests less on the theatricalisation of Caesar's funeral and more on the consequences produced by the spectacle. The audience is pushed to extreme violence by a madness induced through passion (ἐκμαίνεσθαι ὑπ' ὀργῆς), which recalls Aesopus' aggressiveness caused by loss of reason through passion.

While Cicero followed the acceptable exploitation of the audience's emotion by using *logos* to achieve good, Antony's renunciation of speech and reliance on display and clothing not only contributes to transforming a political scene into a quasi-spectacle but also encourages mob-violence with terrible consequences for the peace of Rome. While Cicero can be theatrical, and I have discussed this with regards to his use of comedy, his most successful oratorical moments do not rely on staging and props. The orator's exploitation of emotion and manipulation of the audience, in effect, the persuasiveness of his performance, is achieved through *logos* alone. Cicero can very effectively use speech without resorting to theatrical ploys. In the final section, I wish to explore Plutarch's use of dramatic imagery to

narrate Cicero's last moments. I argue that while Plutarch highlights the tragic element of Cicero's death, he does not divorce it from a theatrical experience. This emphasis on the relationship between performer and viewer, between action and emotion, allows Plutarch to comment on Cicero's oratorical success and Antony's shocking politics.

### **III. Cicero's Demise**

The narrative of Cicero's death unfolds in quick succession: the triumvirate's decision to execute Cicero prompts him to flee across Italy and the sea to his villa at Gaeta (*Cic.* 47), where he is joined by assassins who execute him in his gardens before his household (*Cic.* 48).<sup>407</sup> The scene ends with the display of his head and hands on the Rostra (*Cic.* 49). I argue that in these three chapters, which are the last of the *Life*, Plutarch constructs Cicero's demise as a tragic drama, where the tragic and the theatrical are preserved together. The tragic nature of Cicero's suffering may add to his characterisation, but this has been argued in detail by Moles and does not concern my study.<sup>408</sup> Rather, I am interested in the ethical reasoning behind Plutarch's choice to theatricalise Cicero's death, and the political thought such a literary device reveals. My concern is with Cicero's character only in as far as it

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<sup>407</sup> The other extant sources of Cicero's death include Appian (*App. BC.* 4.4.19-20), Cassius Dio (*Dio.* 47.8.4; 47.11.2) in Greek and Valerius Maximus (1.4.6; 5.3.4) as well as a plethora of Latin authors, including Livy, mentioned by Seneca the Elder in his *Controversia* (7.2) and *Suasoriae* (6-7). The Cicero-death narrative has been the object of several studies. Roller (1997), 115 argues that the narratives preserved by Seneca the Elder in the *Suasoriae* betray the influence which declamation had on the retelling of Cicero's death. He adds that this death had become by the early Empire the object of rhetorical exercises in which politicians and orators would argue certain moral aspects of Cicero's demise. Wright (2001), 443 addresses the problem of *Quellenforschung* in the three most extensive narratives of Cicero's death, Livy, Appian and Plutarch (with some mention of Cassius Dio and Valerius Maximus). His interest in Plutarch is, however, to weigh his merits as a faithful historical source. Plutarch has often been cited as a viable source for Cicero's death as he explicitly named Tiro, Cicero's servant and writer of his first biography, as a source Plutarch consulted for Cicero's death (*Cic.* 49.4). Cf. Homeyer (1964), 68 who supports this claim but Moles (1988), 29 is less certain of Tiro's influence on Plutarch's narrative of Cicero's death. Wright (2001), 451 concludes, without much detail, by reducing Plutarch's version to a retelling based on rhetorical and dramatic needs. Yet in their own ways Roller and Wright point out the difficulties in trying to establish the *Hauptquellen* for Cicero's death, attempted by Homeyer (1964). It is impossible for me to establish with certainty which sources Plutarch used for Cicero's death, most of which are no longer extant. Rather than claiming that Plutarch is either faithfully copying others or completely inventing, I can argue convincingly only that he transformed his sources into his own narrative to underline the themes which he saw fit to explore.

<sup>408</sup> See the introduction of this chapter; Moles (1988), 200.

may be political. Plutarch's methods of dramatisation are consistent throughout *Cic.* 47-49, but because the details are different, I have chosen to discuss them separately. First, the narrative of Cicero's woeful flight ends with a quasi-mythological intervention of ravens nesting on the temple of Apollo nearby.<sup>409</sup>

τῶν δὲ κοράκων οἱ πολλοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς θυρίδος διεκάθηντο φθεγγόμενοι θορυβῶδες, εἷς δὲ καταβὰς ἐπὶ τὸ κλινίδιον ἐγκεκαλυμμένου τοῦ Κικέρωνος ἀπῆγε τῷ στόματι κατὰ μικρὸν **ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου τὸ ἱμάτιον. οἱ δ' οἰκέται ταῦθ' ὀρώντες** καὶ κακίσαντες αὐτούς, εἰ περιμένουσι τοῦ δεσπότητος φονευομένου **θεαταὶ γενέσθαι**, θηρία δ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖ καὶ προκίδεται **παρ' ἀξίαν πράττοντος.**

Many of the ravens were perched upon the window croaking noisily, but one sweeping down upon the bed, as Cicero was veiled, lifted little by little the cloth from his face with its beak. The household slaves observed this and reproached themselves for waiting to become the spectators of their master's murder, while a wild animal helped him and took care of him in his undeserved punishment.

(*Cic.* 47.9-10)

Studies that have advocated reading Cicero's demise as a tragedy have interpreted this as one of the *Life's* most tragic moments. It is indeed a scene of intense suffering, where the character's distress becomes a means to explore human fragility. Várzeas has established how bestial traits in human behaviour stand for the antithesis of *philanthropia* in the *Cicero*.<sup>410</sup> The qualification of the raven as a beast (θηρίον) recalls Plutarch statement in the preceding chapter of men's inhumanity in their lack of compassion (οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου θηρίον ἐστὶν ἀγριώτερον, *Cic.* 46.6).<sup>411</sup> Here the theme is expanded as the humanity of a beast, displayed by its capacity to feel for the sufferer, highlights the inhumanity of those present by their lack of kindness and triggers their compassion.<sup>412</sup> Cicero's veiling also increases the

<sup>409</sup> The first surviving mention of ravens at Gaeta in association with Cicero's death is in Valerius Maximus' account. The only other mention of the ravens in association with Cicero's death is Appian (*B.C.* 4.19). This version is very different from Plutarch's, as the raven destroys Cicero's sundial and pulls on the hem of his toga till a servant appears to announce the arrival of his executioners (1.4.6). Valerius Maximus included it in his compilation of omens (here one of death brought by auspices).

<sup>410</sup> Várzeas (2009), 339.

<sup>411</sup> A point anticipated by Moles (1988), 198.

<sup>412</sup> This is discussed in more detail by Moles (1988), 198-199, who highlights the dichotomy between the animalistic nature of cruelty and the human quality of kindness in the *Life*.

scene's sense of suffering.<sup>413</sup> Moles reads in this gesture the expression of Cicero's resignation to die, but I would argue that it marks Cicero's inability to withstand his suffering.<sup>414</sup> His veiling concludes the extensive narrative of his flight to his villa and acts as a final act to evade death. Here a comparison with Demosthenes is very apt. After taking his poison, Demosthenes veils himself to die in peace, but is harassed by bodyguards (*Dem.* 29.5). He then proceeds to unveil himself and face his enemy directly to utter his last triumphant words (*Dem.* 29.6). Cicero is not capable of unveiling himself, but a bird must do it for him, and he will only be able to stare his butchers (i.e. his fate) straight in the eyes when they (and it) are upon him (*Cic.* 48.5).

While the veiling is an ultimate sign of Cicero's psychological distress, the distress depicted in this scene is dependent on its theatrical quality. Plutarch does not actually exploit Cicero's internal turmoil, as he does not let the reader into the psyche of his character, but rather into that of his household. This shift in perspective allows Plutarch to transform Cicero's suffering into a theatrical performance. Plutarch achieves this by drawing on theoretical ideas of spectatorship. There is a clear parallel between the way in which Plutarch describes the slaves' response to Cicero's scene of suffering and Aristotle's description of tragedy.<sup>415</sup> Aristotle partly defined the experience of tragedy as the witnessing of suffering that awakens pity, for what is undeserved, and fear, for what we do not want to suffer (*Poetics* 1453a-b). This is exactly how Plutarch describes the slaves' emotional reaction to Cicero's suffering. Just as pity and fear are born out of the sight (ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως) of tragic action in Aristotle (*Poet.* 1453b1), so is the slave's emotional reaction occasioned by the witnessing (ὁρᾶν) of the crow's attempt to alleviate Cicero's suffering.<sup>416</sup> The evaluation of Cicero's plight as "undeserved

<sup>413</sup> See Cairns (2009) for veiling as a sign of shame in the context of grief and tears.

<sup>414</sup> Of all the extant narratives of Cicero's death, Appian's is the most similar in action to Plutarch's and yet does not exploit this veiling in the same way. In both versions, ravens enter Cicero's room to remove a cloth from his body, but the area which is covered is different. In Appian's narrative, Cicero is asleep, and the birds wake him up as his murders approach (*App. BC.* 4.4.19). They achieve this by making a noise (κλάζειν) and by stripping (ἀποσύρειν) the cloth (τὸ ἱμάτιον) away from his body (ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος). There is no suggestion in Appian that Cicero is veiled but rather that he is blanketed in his sleep.

<sup>415</sup> See Ch. 2, II, 105 n. 255.

<sup>416</sup> Ἔστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεινὸν γίνεσθαι. Of course emotions in tragedy should not be reduced to pity and fear: cf. Stanford (1983) explores a great number of different emotions in tragedies (shock, confusion, anger, hate, even *eros*), which are displayed by the *personae* or included



suffering” (παρ’ ἀξίαν πράπτοντος) further parallels Aristotle’s reading of the tragic experience, who defines pity (ἔλεος) is produced through the witnessing of undeserved misfortune (περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, *Poet.* 1453a5).<sup>417</sup> In the *synkrisis* Plutarch expects us to feel pity (οἰκτεῖπειν) when reading Cicero’s final moments (*Comp. Dem. Cic.* 5.1). This Aristotelian understanding of the viewer’s experience of tragedy is further highlighted by the identification of the slaves with the audience of a theatre. At *Cic.* 47.10, the slaves, through their passivity, are transformed (γίγνεσθαι) into the spectators (θεαταί) of a terrifying play. By using γίγνεσθαι, Plutarch differentiates between the slaves’ original identity as members of Cicero’s household who tend to him, and what the witnessing of suffering without taking part in the action can do to their role in the narrative. In other words, the seeing of Cicero’s underserved misfortune is not just an emotional experience, as the slaves’ natural practice of sight (ὄρᾶν) becomes one which is specific to theatre-goers (θεατής).<sup>418</sup>

Plutarch insists on the role of the slaves as theatre spectators but Cicero is given the role of the actor. He is the focus of their gaze and the catalyst for their emotions. Yet, Plutarch further emphasises the theatrical quality of Cicero’s position as performer by using the term πρόσωπον to refer to his countenance. The term πρόσωπον can mean “face” but in a theatrical context it also refers to the “mask” the actor wears to perform or the *dramatis persona* he embodies on stage (LSJ s.v. III.1. and 2.). I suggest that, throughout the scene of Cicero’s demise, Plutarch

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to produce an effect which the drama and language should create on the audience. See also Heath (1987), 15-7.

<sup>417</sup> The term is possibly suggested by the designation of the slaves as οἰκέται, the use of which is unique in the *Life* to chapters 47 and 48, the description of Cicero’s death. By contrast Appian refers to them as οἱ θεράποντες (*B.C.* 4.19). This Aristotelian reading of Cicero’s demise is, as far as the extant sources suggest, unique to Plutarch. Despite the similarities in action and characterisation between Plutarch and Appian’s version, the latter does not include any theatrical dimension to his narrative. There is an explicit recognition of the distressing nature of this episode since Appian refers to it as a ‘story of suffering’ (ἱστορία τοῦ πάθους), and yet this *pathos* is not exploited in a theatrical context (App. *B.C.* 4.19). Some men are moved enough to lie about Cicero’s whereabouts, and Appian lists pity (ἔλεος) as one of their motivations, but this sentiment is associated with good-will (εὐνοία) and is not caused by sight. Even the Ravens’ part is only treated as a divine omen, rather than the catalyst for a strong emotional reaction akin to a theatrical experience. Livy’s account is even further removed from Plutarch’s and makes absolutely no use of performance or spectacle. Livy presents Cicero as heroically resigned, one whose acceptance of death is almost inhumanly calm (Livy, *Per.* 120 = Sen. Eld. *Suas.* 6.17). There is no trace of emotionality on the part of Cicero in Livy’s account as preserved by Seneca, nor any importance given to viewership or emotional reaction.

<sup>418</sup> The implication is strong: we as readers cannot comfort or save Cicero, but we can only passively read on and feel for the character’s inevitable fate.

deliberately uses πρόσωπον to refer to his protagonist's face, rather than ὄψις (cf. for example *Per.* 31.4), in order to suggest the spectacle-like nature of his death. I do not deny that πρόσωπον refers to Cicero's actual face, but considering the context in which it is used, it also carries a theatrical meaning.<sup>419</sup> This is clear when comparing Plutarch's more general treatment of veiling as a sign of suffering in the *Lives*.

Within the context of veiling, Plutarch is not consistent with naming the covered body part, as he generally declines to specify which part is covered or uncovered (cf. *Phoc.* 34.1-5; *Caes.* 41.1; *Oth.* 9.2; *Cic.* 48.6). When he does mention body parts he can use either κεφαλή (cf. *Brut.* 17.6; *Num.* 7.2; *Cor.* 23.1) or more rarely πρόσωπον (*Pomp.* 79.4; *Ant.* 71.8). I argue that the distinction between a covered κεφαλή and a veiled πρόσωπον depends on Plutarch's perception of the theatrical potential of the man who veils himself. As an obvious parallel, Demosthenes also veils and unveils himself at the moment of his death, but it is his head (κεφαλή) which is initially covered (συγκαλύπτειν), and implied in the uncovering (ἐκκαλύπτειν, *Dem.* 29.5-6).<sup>420</sup> Plutarch does make use of Cicero's κεφαλή but only when referring to the severed members of Cicero's body (*Cic.* 48.6, 49.2). While κεφαλή denotes the material, flesh-and-blood part of the protagonist, Plutarch purposefully uses πρόσωπον to enhance the performative and emotional aspect of the scene. Besides its unveiling, it features twice more, at the moment of his beheading (*Cic.* 48.6) and at the exhibition of his remains in Rome (*Cic.* 49.2).

If Plutarch has set the scene of Cicero's demise by using not only the imagery of suffering but also that of theatrical production, where Cicero's anguish is translated as a spectacle to be reacted to emotionally, the theatrical imagery is further exploited at the orator's death. Here Plutarch continues the theme of gestures as catalysts for

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<sup>419</sup> The reference to πρόσωπον in the context of Cicero's death is exclusively Plutarchan. Appian and Cassius Dio only referred to Cicero's head as κεφαλή (App. *BC.* 4.4.19; Dio, 47.8.4; 47.11.2), never as πρόσωπον. Livy, with anatomical precision, describes Cicero's decapitation as the severing (*praecidere*) of his neck (*cervix*) and mentions his head (*caput*) when it is brought to Antony (Livy, *frg.* 127), but never makes use of Cicero's countenance.

<sup>420</sup> As another point of comparison, the case of Caesar's murder is particularly telling: Plutarch employs the same words to describe the action (ἐγκαλύπτειν) and means (ἰμάτιον) through which the veiling takes place in both passages (*Brut.* 17.6 and *Cic.* 47.9) but where Caesar covers his κεφαλή, it is Cicero's πρόσωπον which is unveiled.

emotion, but the performative aspect of the scene allows the author to comment on his subject's past histrionic career, especially Cicero's histrionic political behaviour. As a response to the raven's caring behaviour, Cicero's slaves drag him out of the house, and carry him around his grounds in a litter (*Cic.* 47.10). It is there that he finally meets his executioners (*Cic.* 48.1-3).

αὐτὸς δ' ὥσπερ εἰώθει τῇ ἀριστερᾷ χειρὶ τῶν γενείων ἀπτόμενος, ἀτενὲς <ἐν>εῶρα τοῖς σφαγεῦσιν, αὐχμοῦ καὶ κόμης ἀνάπλευς καὶ συντετηκῶς ὑπὸ φροντίδων τὸ πρόσωπον, ὥστε τοὺς πλείστους ἐγκαλύψασθαι τοῦ Ἑρηνίου σφάζοντος αὐτόν.

Cicero, holding his chin with his left hand as was his custom, gazed intensely at his butchers, completely dirtied and hair untrimmed, his face melted through anguish, so that the majority veiled themselves while Herennius decapitated him.

(*Cic.* 48.4)

Most of those who witness Cicero's last suffering react by veiling themselves (ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι). The exact act that occasions the veiling is ambiguous. The butchering of Cicero is expressed as a concluding genitive absolute, suggesting the finality of the action rather than the cause of the veiling. Rather, it is the state of Cicero's physical attitude and πρόσωπον that precedes the ὥστε: here the conjunction is expressing result. This act of veiling, I argue, is the expression of a deep emotional reaction. Douglas Cairns has demonstrated the cultural expression of veiling as a response to sorrow. While veiling usually expresses the griever's sense of shame (αἰδώς) at the display of grief, it can also simply signify the individual's vulnerability and suffering.<sup>421</sup> As words fail them, the sensitive witnesses of Cicero's anguished πρόσωπον veil themselves as he is beheaded as a silent sign of their distress.<sup>422</sup> The veiling ultimately denotes the capability of the many to feel compassion, an alternative meaning of αἰδώς (LSJ s.v. I.2.), which contrasts directly with the slaughter (σφάζειν) performed by Herennius as he cuts Cicero's throat. Cicero's πρόσωπον is not simply a catalyst for the viewer's emotion but is part of Plutarch's overall goal to fix his character into one staged pose before he

<sup>421</sup> Cairns (2009), 46.

<sup>422</sup> Cairns (2009), 46 also demonstrates that veiling, especially in tragedy, can be used as a silent marker of suffering without resorting to speech. For instance, Polyxena, in Euripides *Hecuba*, is led silent and veiled to her execution off stage.

dies. Moles' commentary picks up on this element and qualifies Cicero's demeanour as "frozen".<sup>423</sup> I would like to complement Moles' remark by explaining this "fixed" quality of Cicero's appearance. I suggest that Plutarch is describing Cicero in a static pose to suggest his failure as an orator. By appearing staged, rather than choosing movement and speech, Cicero surrenders the skills which have made him an excellent orator.

Cicero's main action here is his intense gaze as the other verbs pertaining to his character are included to describe his pose rather than suggest any movement. There is no evidence from the historical Cicero that he favoured this gesture, of holding his chin in his left hand, but extensive evidence suggest that hand gestures, including static poses, were an integral part of a Roman orator's delivery techniques.<sup>424</sup> Body language comprised a significant part of Latin rhetorical theories and both Cicero's rhetorical essays and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* consider gestures as an integral part of the orator's arsenal to persuade. For example, Cicero dismissed Marcus Calidius, arguing that the latter's refusal to use body language stunted the emotional impact of his speech, and therefore failed to persuade the audience (Cic. *Brut.* 278). In this humorous piece, the historical Cicero awards the slapping of hands and the stomping of feet pride of place in the orator's performance.<sup>425</sup> Quintilian, whose discussion of body language in oratory is exhaustive, reserved an entire section uniquely for hand gestures (Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.85-121). He describes with very precise detail the type of hand movement and poses an orator can perform for various occasions, such as the curling of the thumb and first three fingers to the mouth or breast to signify modesty (Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.97).<sup>426</sup>

Plutarch was certainly aware of the importance which gestures held in Roman oratory. This is extensively shown in the *Tiberius Gracchus* where hand gestures are treated as an integral part of oratorical display. Plutarch introduces the *Life* by contrasting Tiberius' composure and static pose to his brother's dynamic use of

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<sup>423</sup> Moles (1988), 200.

<sup>424</sup> See Aldrete (1999), 13 on static positions in Roman oratory.

<sup>425</sup> *Nulla perturbatio animi nulla corporis, frons non percussa non femur, pedis, quod minimum est, nulla suppositio.*

<sup>426</sup> This is the closest gesture, although it requires movement, to the one performed by Plutarch's Cicero.

space and clothing upon the βῆμα (*Ti. Gracch.* 2.2).<sup>427</sup> Despite Tiberius' supposed lack of body language, the *Life* is full of orators, including Tiberius himself, who exploit hand gestures in their public performances. For instance, several politicians resort to grasping the hands (ἄπτεσθαι χειρῶν) of a fellow orator in order to persuade him to desist from a course of action.<sup>428</sup> The consuls Manlius and Fulvius perform this precise gesture in order to entreat Tiberius to cease his political operation (*Ti. Gracch.* 11.2). A few moments later, it is Tiberius who uses the exact same gesture as he asks his rival Octavius to reconsider his decision (*Ti. Gracch.* 11.5). The importance of hand gesture in oratorical persuasion is not confined to the *Tiberius* but is present in other Roman *Lives*. Tullus accompanies his direct invitation for Coriolanus to stand up with a presentation of his right hand as an additional marker of his welcoming intentions (*Cor.* 23.9) while Caesar's future assassins kiss his breast and head in the Senate to emphasise their (simulated) plea for a man's return from exile (*Brut.* 17.3). Although the plea is a lie to get close to Caesar, the gesture is integral enough to political supplication for the victim not to realise initially the actual intentions of his assailants. Whether employed by consuls or orators, the gesture accompanies a verbal entreaty and is performed in order to increase the persuasiveness of the demand.

I have focused on hand gestures but the same comments can be made in reference to the Romans' use of togas in Plutarch. Cato the Elder "deceitfully" (ἐπίτηδες) uses his toga to hide the Libyan figs which once revealed would earn such admiration from the Senators (*Cat. Ma.* 27.1), while Clodius accompanies his verbal invective of Pompey at a public trial with the shaking of his toga (τὴν τήβεννον ἀνασεΐειν, *Pomp.* 48.7) and Murena uses his toga (τὴν τήβεννον προΐσχεσθαι) to mark his defence of Cato the Younger in the law courts (*Cat. Mi.* 28.3). By comparison, Plutarch's Greek politicians do not resort to gestures with clothing in law courts. Even Alcibiades, whose love of ostentatious clothing is the object of recurring discussion in his *Life* (*Alc.* 16; 39), is never shown to use

<sup>427</sup> ὥστε καὶ δημηγορεῖν τὸν μὲν ἐν μιᾷ χώρᾳ βεβηκότα κοσμίως, τὸν δὲ Ῥωμαίων πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος περιπάτῳ τε χρήσασθαι καὶ περισπάσαι τὴν τήβεννον ἐξ ὧμου λέγοντα.

<sup>428</sup> This hand gesture, the grasping of someone's hands, is exclusively Roman in Plutarch (cf. also *Marc.* 20.11; *Luc.* 35.5; *Cat. Mi.* 66.1; *Oth.* 15.2; 17.4). Hand gestures and kissing were performed by a supplicant and yet Plutarch only mentions these gestures performed for this purpose in the Roman half of the *Lives*. See Naiden (2006) 226-240 for supplication in Roman culture and politics.

clothing in law courts intentionally. The only example of his use of clothing in court turns out to be an act of unforeseen success, as the quail he had hidden in his cloak, but forgotten about, flies free and earns him applause (*Alc.* 10.2). Another point of contrast between Plutarch's Greek and Roman politicians is their response to the inability to speak, either because they cannot be heard or because no one wants to listen to them. While Romans will often resort to sign language (cf. *Ti. Gracch.* 18-19, *Pomp.* 25.6), the Greeks resign themselves through silence (cf. for instance *Phoc.* 27.9; 33.11; 34.9).<sup>429</sup>

Yet, both Cicero and Quintilian offer a warning as to the excessive reliance on gestures over speech.<sup>430</sup> For instance, when using humour, the orator must rely more on language than gesture lest he wish to resemble a theatrical jester (*ethologus*, *Cic. De orat.* 2.242).<sup>431</sup> Quintilian even directly contradicts Cicero's criticism of Calidius' lack of slapping and stomping, arguing that such gestures were theatrical (*scaenicum esse*) and therefore detrimental to the speech of the orator (*Quint. Inst.* 11.3.123).<sup>432</sup> The over-reliance on gesture, rather than language, is therefore a sign of a theatrical orator. In this sense, Cicero and Quintilian precede Plutarch's own distaste of body language over speech in oratory, repeatedly expressed throughout the *Lives*, but especially exemplified at Demosthenes' own death-scene, where the character is commended for choosing *logos* over the more physical aspect of public performances. Unlike Demosthenes, however, Cicero does not choose *logos* but renounces it.

Cicero is transfixed into a mask-like expression of sorrow and he will not regain his ability to speak. All his communication, from his hand gesture and his defiant gaze to the suffering etched on his face, is articulated through body language. By contrast, there exists a tradition in which Cicero is allowed a few final words. Livy's Cicero utters his final goodbye by reminding the reader of the services he, as the most excellent of politicians and orators, has performed for Rome (Livy,

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<sup>429</sup> Phocion's silent reaction to political opposition is an important theme of the *Life*, in which Plutarch explores the limitation of oratorical inaction. While silence can be detrimental, my basic argument remains. Greek oratory in Plutarch takes place through *logos* (or the lack of it) while Roman oratory tends towards gesture.

<sup>430</sup> See Graf (1991), 37 and Aldrete (1999), 69 on the fluidity of gestures between the political and theatrical realm in Latin discourses on delivery.

<sup>431</sup> See Laidlaw (1960), 62 and Connolly (2007), 200 on Cicero's awareness of the relationship between oratory and theatre.

<sup>432</sup> Cf. also *Inst.* 11.3.102 with specific reference to hand gestures as theatrical.

fr. 127 = Sen. *Suas.* 6.17).<sup>433</sup> Plutarch's Cicero is denied any speech, however brief. Not only does this contrast with Livy's version, but it also pales in comparison with Plutarch's version of Demosthenes' final moments. Similarly to Cicero, Demosthenes unveils himself and looks straight (διαβλέπειν) at his last enemy before condemning him with one final biting statement (*Dem.* 29.6): Cicero's Greek counterpart is made to stand up as the champion of oratory, embracing the power of *logos* one last time before his suicide.

I have demonstrated how Plutarch describes Cicero's demise through a theatrical lens. The experience of the viewers present at the scene, the physicality of Cicero's behaviour, the emphasis on pose rather than language, all cast Cicero in the role of a performer whose body language occasions a strong emotional response. Yet, this theatricalisation of Cicero's death is less due to Plutarch's desire to engage his reader in a dramatic retelling of a death which must have been as famous as that of Demosthenes. Rather, Plutarch is exploring the limitations of one aspect of Roman oratorical behaviour. Cicero's death-scene is strongly reminiscent of a previous passage in the *Life*, in which the character resorts to a public performance based on body language and appearance rather than on speech to secure his political advantage. Clodius impeaches Cicero for having executed Catiline and his followers without a trial (*Cic.* 30.5-6). To avoid prosecution, Cicero resorts to a supplication act (*Cic.* 30-31) rather than legally defending himself in the law-courts.<sup>434</sup> The

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<sup>433</sup> "Moriar," inquit, "in patria saepe servata."

<sup>434</sup> The historical Cicero discusses these events in his *Pro Sestio* and *Post Reditum ad Quirites*. There Cicero describes how the whole of Roman society supported him against the injustice and unconstitutionality of his exile, as he presents himself as the defender of Rome's true Republican values. Cicero's own account has been interpreted as a fine example of late Roman Republican showmanship. Hall (2014) reads this confrontation within the context of Ciceronian judicial theatre. Hall (2014), 41 understands Cicero's change of dress as part of a wider political practice during the Republic. He reads this practice of performing *in Sordius* as an integral part of the theatrics of a Roman trial. The change of appearance, taken out of its context of bereavement, becomes a visual support to the gestures and speech of supplication geared towards inducing pity in the viewer. The supplicant, therefore, gives a costumed performance aimed at emotional manipulation for political ends. For Hall, Cicero's change of dress is an exceptional example of this political occurrence. Kaster (2009), 310 also reads this episode as an example of political theatrics, but rather than analyse it as a political phenomenon he reads it as Cicero's literary creation. He demonstrates how Cicero uses certain dramatic themes to turn his exile and return to Rome into a "morality play": Kaster points out the use of dramatic stock characters such as the brigand, or *latro*, to portray Clodius and the exploitation of the tension between Cicero's dilemma between self-preservation and that of Roman society. Kaster (2009), 311 argues that those who support Cicero express themselves as a tragic chorus in support of their leading character. Kaster (2009), 310 n. 6 also points out Cicero's awareness of his reader's experience

practice which Cicero adopts is historically attested as a genuine Roman custom. It consisted in donning a maculate toga (the *sordes*) and letting the hair grow long, both of which were usually worn as a sign of mourning but used in a political context: they allowed the wearer to perform a public act of supplication against a motion he judged unfair.<sup>435</sup>

κινδυνεύων οὖν καὶ διωκόμενος, ἐσθήτά τε μετήλλαξε καὶ κόμης ἀνάπλευς περιῶν ἰκέτευε τὸν δῆμον.

So since [Cicero] was in danger and was prosecuted, he both changed his clothes and, going around with overgrown hair, he supplicated the people.  
(*Cic.* 30.6)

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῷ Κικέρωνι πρῶτον μὲν ὀλίγου δεῖν σύμπαν τὸ τῶν ἰπικῶν πλήθος **συμμετέβαλε τὴν ἐσθήτα**, καὶ δισμυρίων οὐκ ἐλάττους νέων **παρηκολούθουν κομῶντες καὶ συνικετεύοντες (...)** ὡς δ' ἦν οὐτ' οἶκτος οὔτε τις αἰδῶς πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλ' ἔδει τὸν Κικέρωνα φεύγειν ἢ βία καὶ σιδήρῳ διακριθῆναι πρὸς τὸν Κλώδιον, ἔδειτο Πομπηίου βοηθεῖν

But at first almost all the equestrians together changed their clothes with Cicero and no less than twenty thousand young men followed him, letting their hair grow long and supplicating with him (...) but since neither pity nor shame were created from this sight, Cicero needed either to flee or to come to a decisive conflict with Clodius with force and iron, and he begged Pompey for help.

(*Cic.* 31.1)

There are several contextual similarities between Cicero's supplication act and the last moment before his beheading. The former precedes his escape into exile and uses the appearance of mourning to indicate his disapproval; the latter concludes his

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and he consciously intends to dramatize the events surrounding his exile (*Cic. Fam.* 15. 12. 4-6). See Kaster (2009), 215 on the use of pity in this passage. Kaster (2009), 316 also points out Cicero's intense description of Aesop the tragedian's plea for Cicero before the Roman people, a performance which is judged by Cicero to have been better than what "[he] could have done [himself]" (*Cic. Sest.* 120). This increases the sense of emotion and the use of dramatic literary device all work to depict Cicero as the noble statesman, whose own plight is mirrored by that of the state, ready to risk his own interests (his life as a citizen) to save the Republic (Cicero's own personal "disaster" is a "wound to the commonwealth" *Cic. Sest.* 32); cf. Kaster (2009), 311. All translations of Cicero's *Pro Sestio* are taken from Kaster (2006). Dumont (1975) 424 on Cicero's rhetorical use of both comic and tragic tropes in his speeches.

<sup>435</sup> This Roman practice has been interpreted with a psychological lens. This physical debasement, through dirty clothes and the growing of long hair, created a certain bond between the supplicant and the person or people addressed by this performance: cf. Lintott (1999), 19; Edmondson (2008) 30-1; Blonski (2008), 50.



ultimate flight and heralds an actual period of mourning after his death. These similarities seem almost circumstantial, but Plutarch offers even stronger intra-textual links between these two passages, which suggest that his conception of both moments was similar. Plutarch processes Cicero's political action as a theatrical-like performance which is ethically unacceptable and proves to be unsuccessful.

In both instances Plutarch refers to Cicero's hair as overgrown, using exactly the same vocabulary, with the same morphology (κόμης ἀνάπλεως). The suggestion of length through ἀνάπλεως is almost unique to Cicero's hair.<sup>436</sup> When describing other instances in the *Cicero* of supplication acts through mourning clothes, Plutarch uses a different set of vocabulary. To describe the young equestrians' capillary growth, as they emulate Cicero's appearance and join in his supplication act, Plutarch uses κομᾶν (*Cic.* 31.1), the term he most frequently employs to designate hair left uncut.<sup>437</sup> Similarly the later description of the hair *in sordius* is referenced through τρέφειν (*Cic.* 35.5), not ἀνάπλεως. The importance of Cicero's neglected hair is even more striking in the light of Plutarch's usual reluctance at mentioning physical appearance when describing this Roman legal custom. He usually refers to a character's decision to supplicate by simply stating that they "changed clothes" (μεταβάλλειν ἐσθήτα, *Pomp.* 59.1; *Caes.* 30.6; *Ti. Gracch.* 10.9; 13.6; *Cam.* 36.4; and *De Sera.* 557e).<sup>438</sup> The use of identical vocabulary to describe Cicero's hair at his supplication scene and at this death, vocabulary which is only reserved only for him in the *Life*, creates a strong visual link between these two moments. But Cicero's neglected hair is not the only lexical echo between these two passages. Plutarch describes Cicero's act of supplication as a sight designed to produce either pity (οἶκτος) or shame (αἰδώς). While these emotions are in keeping with the general aim of this Roman custom, both οἶκτος

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<sup>436</sup> LSJ s.v. ἀνάπλεως.

<sup>437</sup> Cf. *Lys.* 1.2; *Nic.* 19.4-5; *Rom.* 16.5; *Crass.* 25.2; *Lyc.* 22.1; *Mar.* 41.6.

<sup>438</sup> Unsurprisingly the only other character whose wearing of the *sordus* is more visually rich than Cicero's is Antony, whose relationship to performance (at least with comic action) I explore in Ch. 1, I.2. Plutarch also refers to Antony's hair as ἀτημελής but provides additional detail by qualifying his garment as φαῖος, to denote the dirtying of the toga in mourning (*Ant.* 18.4). Antony is, however, the exception. The visual detail of Antony's mourning clothes, worn as a response to the hostility he encounters in his camp (note this is not in an oratorical setting and Lepidus will deny Antony the opportunity to speak) is crucial to the scene as Plutarch insists on the emotional reaction which Antony's pitiful sight (ὄψις) induces on his soldiers (*Ant.* 18.2-3). This, once again, underlines the importance which dressing-up holds for Plutarch's depiction of Antony's character. See Ch. 1, I.2, 32.

and αἰδώς foreshadow the emotions which the witnesses of Cicero's last suffering will feel. While Cicero fails to inspire these emotions in his political act, his genuine suffering at his death successfully creates pity and compassion (the alternative meaning of αἰδώς) in the witnessing of the scene: the raven's kindness invites the pity of the slaves, and through them the reader (confirmed by the *synkrisis*), while their veiling denotes their compassion at witnessing such a pathetic beheading. By creating parallels between Cicero's appearance as he pleads for reprieve and as he confronts death, Plutarch wants to connect these two moments of his life. The aim of the connection, however, is to contrast one moment with the other. While these similarities highlight the performative nature of both scenes and the importance of Cicero's appearance and gestures as an emotional catalyst, Plutarch offers an important contrast. While both scenes are theatre-like, one is close to ridiculous while the other is genuinely tragic.

Plutarch's disapproval of Cicero's use of the *sordus* is clear by his deferential treatment of Milo a few chapters later.<sup>439</sup> Milo finds himself in an analogue situation, as he has killed Clodius and faced exile, and yet refuses to supplicate. This refusal is an ethical rejection of the performative aspect which this supplication requires. It is not the asking for pity he cannot abide (ἀπαξιῶν) but the change of clothes and the growth of hair (*Cic.* 35.5). This earns him the ultimate Plutarchan compliment of courage (εὐθαρσῶς) and masculinity (ἀνδρείως, *Cic.* 35.5).<sup>440</sup> Cicero *did* execute Catiline without a trial, thereby violating the laws established by his constitution (although as council he possessed the *Senatus consultum ultimum*), but rather than accepting his fate soberly as Milo does, he resorts to a dishonourable use of public performance, based on visual impact. If Cicero's reliance on appearance for emotional impact is made unacceptable by Milo's behaviour, its artificiality is fully felt when comparing it to his death scene. Cicero's first change of appearance is as a

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<sup>439</sup> Lintott (2013), 184 here points out Plutarch's historical foreshortening as Milo's trial is narratologically very close to Cicero's in the *Life* but actually occurred four years later.

<sup>440</sup> This ethical distinction between Cicero's supplication and Milo's refusal to change his clothes is in keeping with Plutarch's general views of the use of clothing in politics. Plutarch generally condemns the use of clothing as a political tool unless it is a true reflection of reality. In his political treatise on the place of aged men in politics, Plutarch explicitly identifies the ideal politician by his refusal to increase his importance through clothing (μηδέποτε τὴν γλαμύδα περιτιθέναι, *An Seni.* 796e-f). This statement follows his analysis of the bad politician's behaviour, denouncing his treatment of assemblies as festival-like performances (πανηγυρίζων) rather than as the arena for serious debate (*An Seni.* 796e).

complete twisting of reality. His dishevelled hair is not the genuine expression of suffering which it will be once he faces his executioners. Similarly, the mourning clothes seem almost vulgar when used for a political situation, rather than to denote natural grief. His neglected appearance at his death, however, is not a falsehood, but a genuine expression of the suffering and injustice he has had to endure. If Cicero's dishevelled appearance is genuine at his death scene, it validates the tragic nature of Cicero's plight, but does not excuse his dramatic reliance on a performance which encourages a theatre-like reaction in the audience.

The visual and emotional connection between Cicero's supplication and his demise, reminds the reader that Cicero has relied on performance, rather than rhetoric, to secure his political advantage. In comparison with Cicero's rhetorical mastery, displayed for instance during his defence of Ligarius, his behaviour at his beheading is unworthy of his identity as a brilliant orator. In this moment Cicero chooses the theatrical side of oratory by preferring body language to *logos*. But this lack of spoken oratory betrays the psychological anxiety of the character. In the *Cicero*, Plutarch situated emotionality within a strict oratorical system which separates those that can inspire emotions and those that feel them. Cicero can manipulate Caesar's emotions precisely because he is himself in control of his λογισμός, expressed by his mastery of *logos*, while Caesar, just like Aesop and to some extent the Roman plebs, can only revert to action and gesture because they have been overwhelmed by emotion, which has deprived them of *logos*. In other words, passion can only dominate the audience, not the orator, and he can inspire emotion, but not experience it. By letting his emotions contradict his oratorical genius, Cicero proves his ambiguous nature at his end. Plutarch, however, offers a true nuance to Cicero's theatrical behaviour, as his death, although made into a spectacle, actually reflects the terrifying truth of human nature. It is in the aftermath of his beheading that Plutarch brings politics and drama, truth and representation together for his final judgement on Cicero's death.

τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκέλευσεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος θεῖναι, θέαμα Ῥωμαίοις φρικτὸν, οὐ τὸ Κικέρωνος ὄραν πρόσωπον οἰομένοις, ἀλλὰ τῆς Ἀντωνίου ψυχῆς εἰκόνα.

[Antony] ordered the head and hands to be placed above the Rostra upon the *bēma*, a spectacle to make the Romans shudder, as they did not think that they saw Cicero's *face* but the image of Antony's soul.

(*Cic.* 49.2)

The setting of this scene seems at first to be purely political. The historical significance of the Rostra, both as the seat of public debate in Republican Rome and as the historical location of Cicero's exposed body, is undeniable. Since the Rostra was such a political landmark of the Roman Forum it seemed almost unnecessary for Plutarch to mention the *bēma*, as this term does not designate a specific physical set-up but generally refers to any political space where an orator could speak.<sup>441</sup> This inclusion, however, is not accidental, as both the Rostra and the *bēma* play similar thematic roles in the *Cicero*. The Rostra (οἱ ἔμβολοι) is only mentioned once prior to this passage, when Cicero faces new opposition after the Catiline Conspiracy (*Cic.* 23.2). Cicero is then denied access to the Rostra, and by extension his freedom of speech. Yet Cicero twists the situation to his own advantage and succeeds, once upon the platform, in maintaining his political standing through an innovative speech (*Cic.* 23.3). The *bēma* offers even better examples of Cicero's skilful use of *logos* as he successfully manipulates his audience. Once again, Cicero is faced with a hostile crowd, both from the tribunes (κατηγορεῖν, *Cic.* 9.6) and the people (ἀγανακτεῖν, *Cic.* 9.5), but through a speech upon the *bēma* Cicero manages to occasion a marvellous change (θαυμαστή μεταβολή) in the people (*Cic.* 9.7). Plutarch is very careful to credit Cicero's speech (ταῦτα λεχθέντα) as the means of this change. Similarly, the *bēma* at *Cic.* 25.2 is the *locus* of Cicero's rhetorical success, expressed through εὐημερεῖν, which suggests an emphatic response from the audience. Combined together the Rostra and the *bēma* act as a reminder of the political significance of this space. Yet, rather than expand on the differences between the Rostra as the scene of Cicero's mutilation and its role as the *locus* for his earlier oratorical success, which is how the Latin sources treat this

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<sup>441</sup> The βῆμα obviously plays an important role in Plutarch's *Lives* as the *locus* of the political speaker's oratorical performance: for e.g. *Per.* 8.6; 11.1; *Them.* 19.6; *Pub.* 17.3; *Cor.* 10.1. Plutarch does play with the tensions between βῆμα and theatrical space elsewhere: *Pomp.* 13.2; *An Seni*, 785c.

landmark of Roman politics, Plutarch does not turn to the past.<sup>442</sup> He transforms the political sphere into a theatrical one, an image which is not created in any of the Latin sources.<sup>443</sup>

The transformation of this political setting into a stage upon which Cicero's last performance is to take place is achieved by the allusion to Cicero's displayed remains as a spectacle (θέαμα), a word which Plutarch grammatically places almost next to the *bēma*. The combination of θέαμα with its emotional potential (φρικτός) reinforces the spectacular nature of the political scene. Cairns has emphasised the emotional importance which φρίκη, the shudder, and its adjectival form φρικτός, carry: it is not simply representative of the physical manifestation of a subject's experience of emotion but it is also a means to emphasise the emotion itself which causes the shuddering.<sup>444</sup> Thus shuddering becomes a metonymy for the emotion(s) causing the physical symptom.<sup>445</sup> Cairns rightly points out, however, that shuddering does not exclusively refer to fear, but can imply anger, revulsion or even sorrow.<sup>446</sup> Whatever the precise sentiment felt by the Romans at *Cic.* 49.2, this shuddering is symptomatic of an intense emotional reaction.<sup>447</sup> The combination of

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<sup>442</sup> The Rostra becomes a way for the authors to explicitly recall Cicero's political past (Livy fr. 127 = *Suas.* 6.17; Cremutius Cordus, *Suas.* 6.19; Brutedius Niger, *Suas.* 6.21).

<sup>443</sup> The placement of the severed limbs upon the Rostra is not treated as a spectacle in the Latin sources. Livy only mentions the display through *ponere* and the act of seeing through *intueor*, neither of which have any theatrical meaning (*Suas.* 6.17). Cremutius and Brutedius are closer to Plutarch in suggesting that Cicero's mutilated remains were looked at (*conspectum esse*, *Suas.* 6.19; 6.21) without, however, fully exploiting the theatrical potential of the body parts on the political stage. The verb *conspicere* implies "looking at" but requires a cerebral sense of perception and understanding as opposed to *spectare* which signifies "to view as a spectator" and which stands as the direct Latin equivalent of θέασθαι. The Latin sources may imply display, but do not exploit the dramatic nature of Antony's morbid show.

<sup>444</sup> Cairns (2013), 88.

<sup>445</sup> Cairns (2013), 89 here employs two passages from Plutarch to illustrate his point, first the case of the Aetolians shuddering in fear at the sight of a young woman garbed as a goddess (*Arat.* 32.2), and Cassander's trembling in terror before the statue of Alexander at Delphi (*Alex.* 74.6).

<sup>446</sup> Cairns (2013), 94. Plutarch uses this term in scenes that are meant to inspire horror, rather than fear, in the viewer: cf. the manhandling of Coriolanus' person, *Cor.* 18.4; the execution of a vestal virgin, *Num.* 10.6.

<sup>447</sup> Latin sources make much of the Romans' (extremely emotional) reaction to Cicero's severed head and hands (Sen. Eld. *Suas.* 6.17-21). The Latin sources which describe the placement of Cicero's head and hand(s) on the Rostra dwell on the Romans' emotional reaction to this sight. Livy's Romans can barely look at the mutilated body, so heavy was their sorrow (Livy, fr. 127); Cremutius Cordus' men weep and wail at the sight of Cicero's mutilated body and Brutedius Niger's funeral for Cicero is accompanied by groans and tears because of Antony's display (*Suas.* 6.21). The lexical field employed by the Latin sources to describe the emotional reaction of the Romans is exclusively one of grief: Livy insists on the eyes filled with tears (fr. 127), Cremutius on tears, lamentations as well as public mourning (*Suas.* 6.19), and Brutedius on lamentations and weeping (*Suas.* 6.21). This grief is the beginning of the Romans' reminiscence of Cicero's oratorical and political greatness, as

θέαμα with an emotional reaction is reminiscent of Aristotle's and indeed Plutarch's idea of the spectator's experience at the performance of drama, a point which is reinforced by φοικτός. Cairns adds that when it is used in conjunction with a sudden sight, shuddering can become part of the experience of the spectator as he witnesses tragedy according to the Aristotelian model.<sup>448</sup> Shuddering (φοίπτειν) is precisely one of two responses which Aristotle notes as the emotions felt at the spectator's experience of tragedy (*Poet.* 1453b5). By transforming Cicero's head and hands into a spectacle which induces an emotional reaction which theoretically belongs to the audience, Plutarch theatricalises the political space of the Rostra. Yet, it is in the lines that follow Aristotle's description of shuddering as a response to the performance of tragedy that the philosopher denounces as monstrous drama which relies on the visual rather than on *logos* (*Poet.* 1453b9).

If Plutarch constructs Cicero's death as a spectacle to be responded to as one does a performance, this display distinguishes itself from theatre's fictitious drama for its capacity to highlight the truth. This truth, the brutality of which Antony is capable, is not directly named but suggested through a vocabulary that draws on an understanding of fiction, representation and reality inherited from Plato.<sup>449</sup> Cicero's *face* (πρόσωπον) becomes the *image* (εἰκών) of Antony's *soul* (ψυχή). What Plutarch means by ψυχή here is, I argue, the viciousness of Antony's character. My argument rests on Plutarch's use of the εἰκών of a ψυχή standing as a symbol to understand someone's *ethos*.

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Cremutius' Romans remember his "god-like eloquence" (*Suas.* 6.19) while Bruttidius' mourners remember the greatest details of Cicero's career (*Suas.* 6.21). Plutarch's Romans do not weep or lament nor is their emotional reaction the occasion to remember Cicero's greatness.

<sup>448</sup> Cairns (2013), 101.

<sup>449</sup> Most of the Latin sources vilify Antony by describing the grimness of the scene, such as Cicero's lips (*Sen. Suas.* 6.19) or white hair (*Suas.* 6.27), or his head is left lolling (*Suas.* 6.19), but Plutarch, although capable of describing some level of gore (cf. Cato the Younger's suicide *Cat. Mi.* 70), chooses another way to expose Antony. There is one Latin source, which tantalisingly resembles Plutarch's treatment of Cicero's head upon the Rostra. Cornelius Severus' poem, preserved by Seneca, refers to Cicero's ravaged head as an image (*imago*, *Sen. Suas.* 6.27). The use of *imago* to refer to Cicero's mutilated remains is temptingly similar to Plutarch's εἰκών, as both the Latin and Greek words carry the same reference to image, representation and imitation, artistic representation (statues, paintings) as well as ghostly apparitions. Cornelius' use of *imago* is very different from Plutarch's exploitation of Plutarch's εἰκών. While Plutarch includes his "image" in a Platonic system of truth and representation, Cornelius' use of *imago* is not metaphysical, but just the focus of the viewer's attention (translated as "sight" by both Winterbottom (1974), 589 and Hollis (2007), 346).

The only other mention of εἰκὼν ψυχῆς in the *Lives* occurs in the *Cato Minor* and sheds some light on Plutarch's approach to biographical writing. He justifies an insertion of a seemingly trivial episode of Cato's life on the grounds that it was necessary not to neglect the smallest marks of Cato's character (τὰ μικρὰ τῶν ἠθῶν σημεῖα), since he is tracing, as it were, the image of the soul (εἰκὼν ψυχῆς, *Cat. Mi.* 24.1).<sup>450</sup> In order to show Cato's response to the shame brought by the women of his family, Plutarch recounts an instance in the Senate between Cato and Caesar. The two men's intense debate is interrupted by the arrival of a letter for Caesar, which Cato immediately suspects to be part of a plot, only to be handed it and discover it is a salacious letter from his sister to Caesar. Cato promptly throws the letter back and resumes his speech (*Cat. Mi.* 24. 2-3). In passing, Fuhrmann connects *Cat. Mi.* 24.1 with Plutarch's use of the metaphor of "creating an image" to illustrate the role of the moralist, a use which the scholar equates with Plato's employment of creating wax statues to refer to philosophical dissertation (cf. *Rep.* 540c).<sup>451</sup> Although Fuhrmann rightly points to the similarities between *Cat. Mi.* 24.1 and Plato's *Republic*, he does not, I argue, identify the right Platonic passage. Besides these two instances in Plutarch, the only other use of the εἰκὼν of a ψυχή occurs in Plato's *Republic* 9, where he also uses these terms to refer to the illustration of a particular point about human morality.

The occurrence of the εἰκὼν of a ψυχή takes place as Plato's Socrates explores the nature of justice. In order to illustrate the essence of unjust and just accomplishments, he proposes to fashion (πράττειν) the image of a soul (εἰκὼν ψυχῆς, *Pl. Rep.* 588b), which a few lines further on Glaucon, Socrates' interlocutor, equates with a wax sculpture (*Rep.* 588d). This metaphor of the human soul externally looks like a man (*Rep.* 588e) but internally is divided into three parts: a multifaceted beast (*Rep.* 588c), a lion and a man (*Rep.* 588d). While the chimerical monster represents desire and the lion symbolises passion, the human part stands for reason (*Rep.* 590b-c). As injustice appeals to the monster and the lion, it is the anthropomorphical part of the soul that is touched by justice (*Rep.* 589b). If the

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<sup>450</sup> This is reminiscent of his proem at the start of the *Alexander*, in which he states that his concern is not the great action of political and military history, but the moments in which his subject's character is revealed (*Alex.* 1.2).

<sup>451</sup> (1964), 161 n. 6. Plutarch does not use the image of the wax statues at *Cat. Mi.* 24.1.

human, through good, can tame the lion and domesticate the beast, allowing for all parts of the soul to live in harmony, then justice can prevail (*Rep.* 589b).<sup>452</sup> But if the monster and the lion destroy the human part of the soul, through shameful actions, then injustice supersedes (*Rep.* 589c). While Plato's use of an *image* of a *soul* is conceptual, aimed at offering a model for the mechanism of the human soul, Plutarch preserves the idea of metaphorical illustrations of human nature while focusing solely on one individual.

To return to Cicero's head, by having εἰκὼν replace πρόσωπον, Plutarch is adding another layer to the distance between the viewer (the Romans) and reality (Antony's nature). In other words, Cicero's face stops being what it is – a severed head of a troublesome political opponent – to become something which is not truly present but which represents the truth. Antony is, essentially, not there to act and demonstrate his ψυχή but the εἰκὼν steps in as the intermediary to conjure up a reality from its absence. Considering Plutarch's equation of Cicero's exposed head with a spectacle, the biographer builds up a certain expectation of the theatrical: the multi-layered aspect of a truth suggested by several intermediaries recalls Plato's situation of tragedy *vis-à-vis* reality in Book 10 of the *Republic*. Plato argues that the tragic poet produces works that are an imitation of human vice and virtue, themselves imitations of divine creations (*Rep.* 598d-e) and are thus removed thrice from the truth (τριπτὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος, *Rep.* 599a). Transposed into Plutarch's work, the layering could look like this: the reality (Antony's ψυχή) as represented by an image (the εἰκὼν), itself suggested by Cicero's face (πρόσωπον). Can Cicero's πρόσωπον then be seen as the ultimate act of a tragedy being performed before the Romans? While Cicero has displayed a histrionic penchant during his life, and has foregone *logos* in death, his identity as a good orator is preserved through his revelation of the truth in death.

The ultimate difference between tragedy's relationship with reality and the scene witnessed by the Romans is their closeness to teaching about the truth. Plutarch conceptualises εἰκὼν, whether referring to a conceptual image (cf. *De Virt. Mor.* 446b; *Quaes. Conv.* 636f) or an artistic creation such as a statue (cf. *Brut.*

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<sup>452</sup> Annas (1981), 315 on justice as psychic harmony in Book 9 of the *Republic*. Ferrari (2007), 194 on the management of the soul by its rational part. Lorenz (2006), 148 on Plato's wider division of the soul in the *Republic*.



14.2; *Mulier.* 250f), as closely linked to the truth.<sup>453</sup> For instance, Alexander does not cover up his scars from the wounds received in glorious struggles (the capture of cities, the surrender of foreign kings, military victories), as they stand for the εἰκῶν of his virtues proven by action (*De Alex.* 331c), while the ideal king should be the εἰκῶν of God (θεοῦ) as the enforcer of law through which justice, the province of the divine, can be dispensed in society (*Ad Princ.* 780e). Both the scars and the king as εἰκόνες are not the *truth* but stand for another reality, Alexander's bravery and the Divine's propensity for justice respectively: they may be removed from reality and yet they still attempt to illustrate truth. In this sense Plutarch follows the Platonic differentiation between εἰκῶν and εἶδωλον, where the couch which the craftsman creates by taking the essence of the object thought by God is referred to as εἰκῶν but the creation of the poet, who knows not what he writes, is designated as εἶδωλον.<sup>454</sup> In Platonic terms, theatre can only fabricate phantoms (εἶδωλον, *Rep.* 599a; 599d), produced by men who have no knowledge of the human action which they imitate (*Rep.* 599b-c). While εἰκῶν represents a reality, εἶδωλον is only the figment of the poet's imagination. This difference is crucial: while tragedy can only offer phantoms, Cicero's face allows the Romans to understand the perverseness of Antony's nature.

Cicero's last moments are certainly tragic. The hero cannot escape his horrifying demise and his suffering is of such intensity that it awakens the empathy of others. Yet, to reduce Cicero's demise to simply the tragic downfall of a flawed character misses a crucial aspect of this end. Cicero's flight, death and afterlife are also theatrical. The dynamics between the spectator and the performer, the spectacle and its experience shape Plutarch's description of these last moments. Every scene requires Cicero to appear as a performer, the sight of which occasions a reaction described through theoretical discourses on theatre and representation. While the

<sup>453</sup> Saïd (1987), 311 (reiterated at Saïd (1993)) has demonstrated how Plato and later sources regarded εἶδωλον as referring to the copy of what can be visually experienced, while εἰκῶν referred to the emulation of an essence rather than the appearance. Saïd (1987), 324 thus argues that εἶδωλον is for Plato a ghost-like creation of the outward appearance of what it imitates, while εἰκῶν retains an intellectual relationship to the original truth whose nature it seeks to suggest. While Vernant (1990), 231 recognises these definitions of εἶδωλον and εἰκῶν as valid for Plato onwards, he demonstrates that εἶδωλον is not regarded as a superficial imitation in Archaic thought.

<sup>454</sup> Plato's Socrates goes on to argue that poets cannot contribute to the teaching of virtue and vice (*Rep.* 599d).

experience of the theatrical productions is essential to Plutarch's description of Cicero's demise, they are not simply included to highlight the tragic nature of his death or as a ploy to entertain his reader. My reading of this death requires a close analysis of the dynamics in the *Cicero*, of manipulation of emotion through speech and staging, where the orator must rise above the actor to reveal truth. The theatrical nature of Cicero's behaviour can be explained by Plutarch's understanding of acceptable oratory and politics. Cicero's most brilliant oratorical victories had been won without resorting to dramatic tricks. Yet here Cicero gives way to his youthful flirtation with the stage, which proves unsuccessful. Perhaps the staged quality of Cicero's severed head and hands was encouraged by the man who directed this gruesome spectacle, as Antony in his own *Life* will define his power through political spectacle.

## Chapter 5: Statesmen and Assemblies in the Theatre of Athens<sup>455</sup>

In this chapter I explore Plutarch's use of the theatre in the *Phocion* as an actual physical building and location. I argue that the theatre of Athens plays a central role in the *Life*. My discussion first centres on Phocion and his own relationship to the theatrical space, and then analyses the upholding or disrespect of civic values as displayed by politicians and *demos* in the theatre. My previous chapters treated statesmen who had an affinity with the theatrical world and displayed, in their own ways, a penchant for histrionic politics. In this light it would be natural to presuppose a similar disposition in Phocion. Phocion is not, however, theatrical in any aspect. Unlike Demosthenes and Cicero who were the products of a theatrical education, Phocion followed the teachings of philosophers. Not only is Phocion un-theatrical, but he is also introduced as a remarkable statesman who embodies the ideals of Athens in its hey-day. He is given the compliment of being compared to Pericles, Aristides and Solon, who served the state both as military leaders and orators (*Phoc.* 7.5).<sup>456</sup> Plutarch even names the goddess Athena and her attributes "warlike" and "political" (πολεμική και πολιτική) as Phocion's inspiration (*Phoc.* 7.6). More than an able statesman, he embodies the ideals of his city. But Phocion is also a statesman in a time of decline (κλίνεσθαι ἡ πατρίς, *Phoc.* 3.4), when demagogues such as the orator Demades could pass laws that stood against the honour and custom of the city (τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὸ ἦθος, *Phoc.* 1.1).<sup>457</sup> The *Phocion* is a depiction of the end of Classical Athens, paralleled by the fall from grace of this model leader. And at the heart of this decline lies the precinct of the theatre.

Plutarch uses the theatre in the *Phocion* as a *locus* to articulate the political character of both Phocion as a statesman and Athens as a democracy. By democracy, Plutarch meant the values which defined Athens' political character.

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<sup>455</sup> A version of this chapter, without section II and emphasising Plutarch's depiction of the *demos* and Phocion's relationship to the Athenians, will appear in Gray and Canevaro (2017), *The Hellenistic Reception of Athenian Democracy and Political Thought*, Oxford.

<sup>456</sup> See Ober (1989), 120 on the specialisation of Athenian politicians as either public speakers or military leaders.

<sup>457</sup> Plutarch here compares the city to a shipwreck: cf. Leão (2010), 187 on Plutarch's metaphor of the sinking *polis*.

Plutarch's picture of Athenian democracy which he favours in this *Life* puts leaders, in varying degrees of conviction and success, at the heart of the decision-making process, rather than the citizen body.<sup>458</sup> The theatre (τὸ θέατρον), that is the actual precinct in which plays were performed for the celebration of religious festivals, is mentioned four times. It is twice the *locus* for political assemblies (*Phoc.* 5.3 and *Phoc.* 34) – Phocion is at the centre on both occasions – and it is twice the scene for the preparation of dramatic performances (*Phoc.* 19. 2-3 and *Phoc.* 30.3), which become an opportunity for Plutarch to contrast Phocion's virtues with others associated with the stage. These four mentions are neatly constructed to go in pairs that contrast with one another. The first two mentions, an assembly (*Phoc.* 5.3) and a theatrical production (*Phoc.* 19.2-3), demonstrate Athens' healthy relationship to its civic values, while the theatrical production (*Phoc.* 30.3) and the assembly (*Phoc.* 34) that follow depict an unlawful disregard for Athenian democracy. I contend that this construction allows Plutarch to analyse Athenian political character through the participants' relationship to the theatre and demonstrate the decline of Athenian democracy.

### **I. The Theatre as *Locus* for the Statesman's Virtue**

The first mention of the theatre in the *Life* concludes Plutarch's description of Phocion's rhetorical style (ὁ λόγος) and the effect which it produces on his audience (*Phoc.* 5.3). While Phocion's speech is effective and serviceable, the brevity of his language (βραχυλογία) is severe and bitter (αὐστηρά καὶ ἀνήδυντος, *Phoc.* 5.2). Lawrence Tritle has rightly pointed out that the subject's character emerges from Plutarch's description of Phocion's *logos*.<sup>459</sup> Phocion is, indeed, more than once represented as severe (αὐστηρός, *Phoc.* 3.8; 8.3; 10.4-5). While language reveals Phocion's nature, I would like to push this further by f that it also reveals his political temperament. The anecdote that follows the description of

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<sup>458</sup> Duff (1999a), 133 rightly points out that the *Demosthenes* offers a slightly different point of view of approximately the same period in Athens.

<sup>459</sup> Tritle (1988), 11 = (1992), 4270; 4284-6. The emphasis on Phocion's rhetorical style is important considering Plutarch's emphasis on his career as both an orator *and* a general (*Phoc.* 7.5).

Phocion's effective but brief style displays Phocion's understanding of the statesman's role as he speaks before the Athenians in their theatre.

καὶ μέντοι καὶ αὐτόν ποτε τὸν Φωκίωνά φασι **πληρουμένου τοῦ θεάτρου περιπατεῖν ὑπὸ σκηνήν**, αὐτὸν ὄντα πρὸς ἑαυτῷ τὴν διάνοιαν· εἰπόντος δέ τινος τῶν φίλων “σκεπτομένῳ Φωκίων ἔοικας,” “ναὶ μὰ τὸν Δία” φάναι, “σκέπτομαι εἴ τι δύναμαι τοῦ λόγου περιελεῖν ὃν μέλλω λέγειν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.”

They say that once, as the theatre was being filled, Phocion himself was walking up and down behind the stage, his thoughts focused on himself. When one of his friends addressed him “Phocion, you seem like someone reflecting”, he said “Truly by God, I am considering if in any way I could shorten the speech I am about to recite before the Athenians”.

(Plut. *Phoc.* 5.3)

Before analysing this passage, I wish to underline the particular emphasis which Plutarch puts on the location of the scene as the theatre. The only other extant source for this particular snippet of Phocion's life appears in Pseudo-Plutarch, who, while retelling the incident almost *verbatim* changes the location of the scene. Although Plutarch names the theatre as the location (πληρουμένου τοῦ θεάτρου) and situates Phocion precisely within the precinct (ὑπὸ σκηνήν), Pseudo-Plutarch foregoes any mention of the theatrical space but introduces the scene as a nonspecific assembly (Ἐκκλησίας δὲ γενομένης, [Plut.], *Regum*, 187f).<sup>460</sup> It only refers to a generic assembly, pointing to the political nature of the meeting. The precision of the location loses its importance in the *Sayings of Kings and Commanders*, a collection of small quotations from famous statesmen, but in the *Life* Phocion's use of and situation in the theatrical space becomes instrumental to Plutarch's narrative of Athenian democracy at its end.

A statesman in a theatre about to speak to his audience: this ominously recalls other instances of politicians blending public speaking with performances. Here Phocion is situated ὑπὸ σκηνήν, *behind the stage*, a space which seems to have been reserved for the creation of artifices produced to enhance the dramatic nature

<sup>460</sup> Ἐκκλησίας δὲ γενομένης πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα ‘σκεπτομένῳ, ὃ Φωκίων, ἔοικας’, ‘ὀρθῶς’ ἔφη ‘τοπάξεις· σκέπτομαι γάρ, εἴ τι δύναμαι περιελεῖν ὃν μέλλω λέγειν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.’ The authenticity of this work has often been called into question. Babbitt (1931), 3 considers this a genuine piece of Plutarchan writing, while Russell (1973), 166 considers it a forgery, but one which drew heavily on Plutarch's work.

of the action upon the stage, but kept out of sight of the audience.<sup>461</sup> It thus stands as the opposite of ἐπὶ σκηνῆς (cf. *An Seni.* 791e), *upon the stage*. The Suda refers to ὑπὸ σκηνῆν as the space where instruments and tools were stored to create sound-effects, such as thunder, during a representation (Suda s.v. Βροντή). Plutarch's only use of ὑπὸ σκηνῆν in a theatrical context besides the *Phocion* is the *Aratus*, where Antigonos, in an attempt to claim Aratus' friendship during a dinner party, flatters Aratus as a good "judge of kings" by arguing that he had found Ptolemy wanting. In order to illustrate Aratus' supposed denigration of Ptolemy, Antigonos uses a theatrical metaphor. He declares that Aratus was first drawn to Egypt upon hearing (ἀκούων) of its wealth and exoticism, but as he reached Ptolemy's kingdom he discovered that the attractive display was a mere façade (*Arat.* 15.3). The breaking of the illusion is described as Aratus peering behind the stage (ὑπὸ σκηνῆν ὄραν), realising that all is tragedy (τραγωδία) and scene-painting (σκηνογραφία).<sup>462</sup> The ὑπὸ σκηνῆν transforms Ptolemy into a charlatan by casting him as a stage craftsman who creates his wealth through a mechanism which reveals itself as artificial once it is discovered. The metaphor is beautifully constructed, as the balance is set between the creation of the illusion through hearing and the unveiling through sight: it is only once we have seen the device behind the dramatic effects that we can no longer believe in its illusion. The term ὑπὸ σκηνῆν, when it is used in a theatrical context, whether real or metaphorical, is the space where illusion is created, hiding its true nature as an artifice to render the fiction more believable to an audience willing to be deceived.<sup>463</sup>

Considering Plutarch's use of ὑπὸ σκηνῆν as well as his more general employment of the theatre's structure in political occasions, it is natural to expect some histrionic behaviour on Phocion's part. Despite preparations "behind the stage", no element of his conduct suggests an exploitation of theatrics, that is a manipulation of emotions by using the theatrical space. There is no suggestion in this passage of any emotionality on the part of either the speaker or his audience.

<sup>461</sup> For ὑπὸ σκηνῆν as referring to a tent: *Mar.* 14.6; *Alex.* 32.1; *TG.* 4.5.

<sup>462</sup> It is perhaps not surprising, considering my argument in Chapter 2, that this metaphor is employed by a Diadoch (and *not* by Aratus) to describe the power dynamics of another Diadoch: Alexander's successors perceive and understand royal power through theatrical imagery.

<sup>463</sup> Julius Pollux, contemporary to Plutarch, also uses ὑπὸ σκηνῆν metaphorically to suggest the secrets that take place in the private sphere of the household (Poll. *Onom.* 4.128.3).

Phocion does not display any particular passion. On the contrary, he is shown in deep reflection. His contemplative nature is characterised by his double association with *σκέπτεσθαι*, a term that implies careful consideration (LSJ s.v. II.1.). In Plutarch it often denotes problem solving, from medical analysis of certain symptoms (*De Tuenda*, 129d), to pragmatic solutions of household issues (*Quaes. Conv.* 702a) and even within philosophical discourses (*Quaes. Conv.* 649a). This also lies at the heart of Phocion's attitude to governing, which, like the order set up by the Divine, he seeks to achieve through persuasion (*πειθῶ*) and reason (*λόγος*) as opposed to compulsion (*Phoc.* 2.9). Persuasion is ultimately Phocion's approach to political discourse (cf. *Phoc.* 16.1; 30.8; 31.3) although it is clear that he does not seek popular gratification but rather to offer good counsel (*Phoc.* 8.5). And yet he is popular in this scene. While Plutarch creates a dichotomy between the speaker's tranquil introspection behind the stage and the presumably noisy audience in the busy seating area, their number (*πληρουμένου τοῦ θεάτρου*) emphasises the popularity of the event. There is no suggestion of the extreme feeling and emotional swings which the Athenians who attended Demetrius' appearance in the same theatre were led to feel (*Demetr.* 34.3-4). The potentially emotive aspect of theatrical representations is defined by both the Athenians and Phocion as the audience is not looking for sensations and the performer is not engaging in emotional stimulation.

If the emotionality of drama is removed from the scene, so is its propensity for mimetic action. Phocion is not conducting himself contrary to his inclinations, as actors do upon the stage (cf. *Dem.* 22.5; *Demetr.* 18.5), nor is he subverting his identity as Antony did by pretending to be a comic slave (cf. *Ant.* 29.3) or even artificially enhancing his performance, as Demosthenes did by crafting his speeches and performance (cf. *Dem.* 7.5) and as Cicero did through clothing (cf. *Cic.* 30.6). On the contrary, Phocion's conduct is in keeping with his general character.<sup>464</sup> Plutarch describes Phocion as particularly devoid of emotion: the Athenians barely ever *witnessed* (*ὄρᾶν*) him either crying (*κλαίειν*) or laughing (*γελάειν*, *Phoc.* 4.3). These two emotions are natural, basic human reactions, but they are also two iconic

<sup>464</sup> Tritle (1988), 8 = (1992), 4266 points out that the description which Plutarch offers of Phocion's character at the start of the *Life* is consistent throughout.

expressions of dramatic action (cf. *Dem.* 22.5; *Pel.* 29.5). Phocion is not prone to displaying emotions in public, much less encouraging them in his audience. It is precisely Phocion that Plutarch thinks of when he declares that the Athenians sometimes sought sober and serious (νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων) leaders to oppose their wants and impulses (αἱ βουλήσεις αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄρμαί, *Phoc.* 8.3). If the lack of emotionality is a reflection of his natural character, then so is his desire to shorten his speech.

Phocion's intention to reduce the length of his speech is symptomatic of both his rhetorical habits and of his moral worth. Plutarch has, just a few sentences earlier, characterised his style by its brevity (βραχυλογία, *Phoc.* 5.3).<sup>465</sup> This is followed by a report from Zeno, who hails this type of laconic speech as the ideal style of the good philosopher (*Phoc.* 5.4). Phocion's desire to shorten his speech is, in the light of the statement that precedes the anecdote set in the theatre, a marker of his philosophical nature. The rapprochement between Phocion and the philosopher is thematically in keeping with Plutarch's summation of his early education as Phocion is supposed to have been a pupil of Plato, founder of the Academy, and later of Xenocrates, one of his successors (*Phoc.* 4.1).<sup>466</sup> As such, the use of περιπατεῖν to describe Phocion's back-and-forth behind the stage could recall his Academic connections, as Plato instigated the practice of "walking about" to encourage the stimulation of thought (cf. *Pl. Ep.* 348c), while Plutarch elsewhere refers to Xenocrates as a περιπατητικός (*Plut. Adv. Col.* 1115a). By contrast, where Demosthenes was educated by an actor, and took on acting qualities in his preparations, Phocion, who was educated by philosophers, is associated – through his desire to shorten his speech and his movements – more with the figure of the philosopher than with that of the orator.

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<sup>465</sup> Tritle (1988), 24 = (1992), 4285 argues that Plutarch's emphasis on Phocion's brevity, and its positive connotations in oratory, is inherited from Theophrastus and the Peripatetic tradition that followed rather than fourth century Athenian Oratory. Gehrke (1976), 195 also notes the importance of the Peripatetics as a source for Plutarch's *Phocion*.

<sup>466</sup> Gehrke (1976), 194 also notes that Plutarch stylised Phocion on the model of the philosopher in politics, an image that was inherited from the sources which he was using. Tritle (1988), 142 analyses Phocion's philosophical approach to politics as inherently Platonic. For the parallel between Phocion and Socrates see this chapter n. 491. Pelling (2002), 340 on the connection between rhetoric, education and character in Plutarch; Pelling's study does not touch on the *Phocion* but his analysis applies to my argument: rhetorical education, when provided, is strongly reflected in the political character of Plutarch's subject.



If much of the *Life* could be seen as an exploration of the advantages and limits of Phocion's philosophical approach to political life, in this scene his more philosophical approach marks him out as a thoughtful politician, concerned with rational argumentation.<sup>467</sup> Phocion's dedication to guiding his fellow citizens through effective language distinguishes him from the demagogues who pander to the Athenians' desires and their more irrational side. The contrast is an important one, as these demagogues litter the *Life*, from the start of the narrative (such as Demades who speaks only to please πρὸς χάριν, *Phoc.* 1.1, these same words repeated for demagogues in general at *Phoc.* 2.5) to its gruesome conclusion (see Hagonides managing simultaneously the desires of the Athenians, *Phoc.* 34.9, and that of the Macedonian representative Cleitus, *Phoc.* 35.2). Although Phocion initially seems to use the theatrical space to his advantage, his actual indifference to both his surroundings and to the dynamics which the theatre usually invites between speaker and audience marks him as a politician confident in the ability of his citizens' rational mind. In turn the audience's anticipation of his performance suggests their appreciation of a statesman known for his effective rather than pleasurable speeches.

## **II. Choregoi and Civic Values**

If Phocion as an orator disregards the performative aspect of the theatrical structure in favour of reason, the next mention of the theatre as the *locus* of civic action reinforces this disregard. The *Phocion* is particularly rich in genuine theatrical moments, which display the mechanisms at work in setting up a dramatic production. These moments are not used as similes to explain or criticise the behaviour of a politician or an assembly, but stand as descriptions of legitimate procedures necessary to the realisation of theatrical performances. Plutarch relates two instances of *choregoi*, or chorus leaders, performing their civic duty in Athens. I contend that both passages highlight Phocion's civic virtue against which the

<sup>467</sup> Pelling (2014) offers an insightful analysis of the role which philosophy plays in political action and rightly points out that Plutarch's mistrust of political actions if dictated by philosophical principles alone. Here Pelling (2014), 149 references Cato the Younger's inability to compromise due to his philosophical principles (cf. *Cat. Mi.* 30.9-10), the Roman counterpart to the *Phocion*, whose character is remarkably like his Athenian parallel (*Phoc.* 3.6).

misbehaviour of theatrical officials is measured. While the first passage (*Phoc.* 19.2-3) highlights Athens' respect for its values, the second passage (*Phoc.* 30.6-7) depicts a city in decline.

καί ποτε θεωμένων καινούς τραγωδοῦς Ἀθηναίων, ὁ μὲν τραγῳδὸς εἰσιέναι μέλλων βασιλίδος πρόσωπον, ἥτει κεκοσμημένας πολλὰς πολυτελῶς ὄπαδοὺς τὸν χορηγόν, καὶ μὴ παρέχοντος, ἠγανάκτει καὶ κατεῖχε τὸ θέατρον, οὐ βουλόμενος προελθεῖν. ὁ δὲ χορηγὸς **Μελάνθιος** ὠθῶν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἐβόα· “τὴν τοῦ Φωκίωνος οὐχ ὄρας γυναῖκα προϊούσαν ἀεὶ μετὰ μᾶς θεραπαινίδος; ἀλλ' ἀλαζονεύη καὶ διαφθείρεις τὴν γυναικωνίτιν.” ἔξακούστου δὲ τῆς φωνῆς γενομένης, ἐδέξατο κρότῳ πολλῷ καὶ θορύβῳ τὸ θέατρον.

Once, as the Athenians were witnessing new tragedies, the tragic actor, about to appear in the role of the queen, demanded from the *choregos* many valuably adorned attendants, and when [the *choregos*] did not allow it, [the actor] was incensed and held the theatre waiting, refusing to proceed. The *choregos* Melanthius, pushing him into the middle, cried “Do you not see the wife of Phocion always passing by with one maidservant? But you brag and spoil the *women's realm!*” When this discourse was heard, the theatre received it with much clapping and tumult.

(*Phoc.* 19.2-3)

This passage offers an entertaining glimpse of the dynamics between a producer and his lead actor. It is also a contrast between the actor, and by extension the professional world of the theatre, and the Athenian citizen, symbolised by the *choregos* and the audience. The individualistic demands of the actor perhaps reflect a caricature of the self-important actor, whose growing distinction as a specialised professional in the fourth century BC is received with a certain disregard by the author (and his source).<sup>468</sup> Plutarch tends to depict the actor as a professional who is driven by fame and gain (*Praecept.* 799a) and geared towards the pure evocation of emotion in the audience (*De Laude*, 545e) without achieving any *good*, that is anything which could be regarded as profitable for the city (*De glor. Ath.* 348c-d). Here the nature of the actor's self-importance is determined by his *persona*, “the queen”, as he demands extravagant sums of money from the sponsor – Plutarch insists on both the volume (πολλάς) and value (πολυτελῶς) of the equipment – presumably to increase the overall effect of his appearance once on stage. The

<sup>468</sup> See Csapo (2010), 94 on the emergence of the acting profession in the late fifth and early fourth century BC at Athens.

selfishness of the demand is accentuated by his reaction at the *choregos*' refusal: his concerns are not for the play, as he then refuses to perform, but for the splendour of his appearance. If this actor symbolises the selfishness of his profession, his *choregos* embodies Athenian civic values.

Peter Wilson's exhaustive analysis of the institution of the *choregia* has stressed the civic aspect of the position of the *choregos*. He was chosen (amongst others) by the eponymous Archon to sponsor and produce the tragic competitions of the Great Dionysia.<sup>469</sup> This demanded a high level of involvement with different bodies within the *polis* to ensure the smooth running of his tragedies, which would eventually contribute to the celebration of one of the defining civic festivals at Athens.<sup>470</sup> It presented the *choregos* with an opportunity to spend money for the public good while allowing him to compete in a democratically regulated *agōn*.<sup>471</sup> Plutarch understood the political importance of the *choregos* and included it in some of his narratives as part of the subject's career. In true Plutarchan form the inclusion elicits a moral examination. Thus, Themistocles' victory through the sponsorship of tragedies (*Them.* 5.5) and Nicias' success as a *choregos* (*Nic.* 3.2-4) reflect the less worthy aspects of their political drive.<sup>472</sup> Alternatively, Epaminondas' and Plato's training of their chorus members, while receiving the money from a richer donor, marks them as citizens contributing to their city's welfare through didacticism (*Arist.* 4-6). Plutarch not only understood the political aspect of the position of *choregos* but, just as any other civic position, read it through a moral lens to judge a man's political character. Here Plutarch has Melanthius, the *choregos* at *Phoc.* 19.2-3, stand for civic order.

Melanthius not only fulfils his role as producer, forcing the actor to perform his professional duty, but also upholds Athenian values by outing the actor's demands as immoral. He accuses the tragedian of ruining (διαφθείρειν) the woman's quarters (ἡ γυναικωνίτις). The phrasing is damning. The idea of ruin has

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<sup>469</sup> Wilson (2000), 51. See Wilson (2000), 71-89 for a summation of the tasks required from the *choregos*, which included recruiting the chorus members, training them and providing their equipment (cf. *Dem.* 21.16).

<sup>470</sup> Wilson (2000), 50-1.

<sup>471</sup> The agonistic and civic aspects of the office were intertwined. Wilson (2000), 165 stresses the importance of the agonistic aspect of choragic competition among rich citizens. Goette (2007), 148 underlines the civic aspect of choragic victory monuments which, although erected to celebrate the victor, also reminded the viewer of his membership of a wider social and political discourse.

<sup>472</sup> See Mossman (2014), 439; 442 on Themistocles' and Nicias' office as *choregoi*.

strong moral connotations in Plutarch, and especially in the *Phocion*. Cato the Younger's ineffective influence over his peers is explained through his virtue being too great (μέγεθος τῆς ἀρετῆς) for the dissolute and corrupt (διαφθείρειν) men with whom he lived (*Phoc.* 3.3), and Harpalus, fleeing Asia with stolen money from Alexander, is accused of ruining (διαφθείρειν) the city with his repeated attempts at bribing the Athenian orators (*Phoc.* 21.4), while those impious enough to wish for Phocion and his friend to commit suicide on a sacred day celebrating Zeus are condemned as corrupt (διεφθαρμομένοι, *Phoc.* 37.2). The tragedian is thus accused of the ultimate civic fault of ruining public morality. Plutarch's wording of the societal part affected by the tragedian's moral debasement is, however, peculiar.

The γυναικωνίτις designates the women's apartments in a household (cf. *Lys.* 1.9), and Plutarch fluctuates between a literal and figurative use of the term. David Roselli has used this passage to support the theory that women were allowed to attend theatrical performance, reading the γυναικωνίτις as the designated seating area for women, separate from that of the men.<sup>473</sup> Plutarch's use of γυναικωνίτις, however, need not refer to delimited physical space but rather a more metaphorical idea of the household. Examples such as Charon's interception of his son from the women's quarters (ἐκ τῆς γυναικωνίτιδος) to place him in Pelopidas' care (*Pel.* 9.10) and Themistocles' fleeing into the women's chambers (εἰς τὴν γυναικωνίτιν) at Sardis (*Them.* 31.2) suggest the reality of a physical space. Other instances, however, such as Cato the Younger's reference to the unruly women of his family (from sister to niece) through γυναικωνίτις and Philip's abuse of Aratus' son described as an outrage committed against his household (περὶ τὴν γυναικωνίτιν, *Arat.* 51.3) require a more metonymical understanding of the term as an abstract designation of the feminine, if not the domestic, sphere. Melanthius may not refer to the corruption of women present in the theatre, but more generally to domestic expectations of female public appearance. Whether direct or indirect, the dichotomy

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<sup>473</sup> Roselli (2011), 159 but 166-7 does not seem to reach a decisive conclusion as to the status of the women present in the theatre. The presence of women and others in the theatre remains unresolved. Most of the evidence is literary and comes from either tragedy and comedy or Plato and has produced contradictory conclusions. Podlecki (1990), 42 concludes that women *could* have been included in the audience, as they too would have benefited from the educational purposes of tragedy and comedy. Henderson (1991), 144 pushes for a positive view of the presence of woman, arguing that the evidence is not conclusive enough to demonstrate their absence, while Goldhill (1994), 35, using very similar evidence, argues that the sources are not "decisive" enough to claim without question that women were allowed to attend the Great Dionysia.

created by the *choregos* between himself and the tragedian remains the same. The performative element of the theatrical space and its capacity for immorality and excess, represented by the actor, is tempered by the rational and moral judgment of the theatre's civic part, represented by the *choregos*. The civic aspect of Melanthius' speech is reinforced by the reaction of the theatre.

The Athenians present in the audience are not there to listen to a political speech uttered by a statesman, but to witness new tragedies. And yet their reaction bridges the gap between spectatorship of a theatrical performance and audience of a political assembly. Clapping (κροτεῖν, κρότος) as a positive response is found both in the theatre and in certain assemblies. Applause is part of the expected reaction of the appreciative audience of spectacle whether tragedies (*Adulator*, 63a), or choregic performances, as demonstrated by the Athenians extensively clapping (κροτεῖν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον) in delight (ἡδεσθαι) at the sight of Nicias' attractive young slave dressed up as Dionysus in his master's choral bands (*Nic.* 3.4).<sup>474</sup> More generally the act of applauding in Plutarch is performed by popular crowds responding to public figures, whether in an assembly or not. For example, the Athenians clap (τοῦ δὲ δήμου κροτοῦντος) in delight (ὕφ' ἡδονῆς) in their assembly at Alcibiades' pledge of a financial contribution (*Alc.* 10.1), while the Romans (οἱ πολῖται) in raptures of joy (ὕπὸ χαρᾶς) applaud Pompey on his way back home from the Forum in appreciation of his office as *imperator* (*Pomp.* 22.6).<sup>475</sup>

If clapping is a porous behaviour that transcends the theatrical sphere into the political, the tumult, θόρυβος, is an iconic part of the (Athenian) democratic assembly. The term designates the lively interjections which the audience of an assembly uttered, as they reacted to, interrupted and sometimes silenced a speaker. The θόρυβος was both denounced as an anti-democratic practice and hailed as the integral part of the democratic decision making process. Aeschines regarded it as a practice that hindered the orator from performing his duty towards the *polis* as it

<sup>474</sup> Cf. also *Sull.* 18.3 for applause as an integral behaviour of the Roman authors during horse racing (ἐν ταῖς θεατρικαῖς ἵπποδρομίαις).

<sup>475</sup> Cf. also Marius expressing his joy (ὕφ' ἡδονῆς) at the reception of good news by clapping his hands (*Mar.* 44.4). Accompanying a politician back home amidst applause seems to be a particular feature of Republican civic life: cf. also *Cam.* 42.5; *Sert.* 20.5. In truth, most of the applause that occurs in the theatre is, in fact, directed at politicians (cf. *Alex.* 67.8; *Tim.* 38.7; *Phil.* 11.4; *Sert.* 4.5; *Pomp.* 68.5 = *Caes.* 42.1). Cf. Papadi (2008), 120 on Plutarch's exploitation of theatrical themes at *Pomp.* 22.6, depicting Pompey's entrance into the Forum as the appearance of a dramatic performer onto the stage.

deterred him from offering expert advice (Aesc. 3.2), while Demosthenes reproached the Athenians for not raising their voices when they disagreed with a proposal (Dem. 18.23).<sup>476</sup> The audience's response through *θήρουβος* tends to be restricted to political assemblies in Plutarch, and of the rare instances in which it is mentioned as occurring in the theatre, it is directed not at a play but at political events (cf. *Tim.* 34.6; *Flam.* 10.6).<sup>477</sup> The only instances in which a theatrical audience reacted to drama through *θήρουβος* occur in Athens, for example, when the Athenians disapprove of Euripides' lines (*Amat.* 756b; *Quomodo adul.* 33c).<sup>478</sup> While clapping is a normative response to dramatic performances, *θήρουβος* is not immediately associated with the theatre but rather with the assembly. By combining *κρότος* with *θήρουβος* Plutarch politicises the spectators' reaction, demonstrating the Athenians' understanding of the values upheld by the *choregos*. Their reaction reflects the ambiguity of the scene they are witnessing, between theatrical production and civic morality.

This scene, however, is not simply an opposition between the performative and the civic values of drama, but also between two forms of government. I contend that the comparison between a queen's retinue and the entourage of Phocion's wife, beyond standing for an opposition between pomp and simplicity, recalls a leitmotiv in the *Phocion*. Central to the *Life* is the theme of Phocion's frugality, imposed upon himself in his quest for the virtuous life, which contrasts with the excess of royalty, symbolised by the Macedonians. This is best exemplified by the passage that

<sup>476</sup> Much like ancient orators, scholars are divided in their interpretation of the *θήρουβος*. Balot (2004), 245; 257 agrees with Aeschines, arguing that the crowd's interruption limited the practical function of speeches and served to exacerbate the competitive drive between orators. Wallace (2004), 226 on the other hand, sees it as an expression of democratic free speech and the audience's power to regulate public speakers. This is echoed by Tacon (2001), 188, who reads the practice of *θήρουβος* in legal and forensic debates as an active means for the *demos* to participate in the decision-making process of Athenian democracy. Whether anti- or pro-democratic, the crowd's invectives are perceived as a form of pressure on the speaker: cf. Roisman (2004), 265; Schwartzberg (2010), 462.

<sup>477</sup> Rowdy and chaotic assemblies are generally a symbol of unstable regimes in Plutarch, and for a good study of the contrast between a composed and an agitated political gathering, cf. Buszard (2005) on the *Pyrrhus*. Buszard (2005), 488 reads the stability of Rome's early Republican institutions as expressed through its calm senate meeting (*Pyrrh.* 19.1-4) as opposed to the defective Tarentine demagogues and their rowdy assembly (*Pyrrh.* 13.4-11).

<sup>478</sup> Considering their propensity for *θήρουβος* within their political assemblies, and in the light of Plutarch's depiction of the Athenians' lesser qualities as spectacle-loving and theatre-obsessed in his *De glor. Ath.*, it is perhaps not surprising that the Athenians seem to be the only spectators to respond to their tragedies through *θήρουβος*. This, however, requires more research. See the Conclusion, 226.

precedes this scene in the theatre, which demonstrates the values at play on the occasion Alexander offers Phocion money and he refuses the gift. The context of these donations is political. Phocion has interceded on Alexander's behalf to smooth down the relationship between Macedonia and Athens (*Phoc.* 17.6-8).<sup>479</sup> Wishing to demonstrate his appreciation of Phocion's virtue (ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, *Phoc.* 18.2), Alexander sends a messenger to offer him a hefty sum of money. Phocion refuses, but the messenger, upon accompanying Phocion home and witnessing the simplicity in which he lives – his wife kneads the bread, Phocion draws the water and cleans his feet (presumably we are supposed to notice the absence of household slaves) – presses the gifts upon him. The exchange that follows reveals the gap between Alexander's superficial understanding of the benefits of virtue and Phocion's deeper appreciation of simplicity.<sup>480</sup> Through the messenger, Plutarch details the rationale behind royal euergetism, according to which good men (to the diadem) should be rewarded with material rather than moral advantages. It is precisely because Phocion is a friend of the king (φίλος ὦν τοῦ βασιλέως) that the messenger believes he should not suffer poverty (δαιτιᾶσθαι πονηρῶς, *Phoc.* 18.3). Phocion replies that he must refuse on moral grounds: he would naturally not use it, and if he did, he would set himself and the king (χρώμενος ἑμαυτὸν ἅμα κἀκείνον διαβαλεῖν) against the city (πρὸς τὴν πόλιν). Phocion's refusal to take the money is therefore determined not simply by his own pursuit of virtue, but also by concern for his and the king's standing in Athens.

In the light of this passage, the tragic actor's excessive demands for his regal *persona* recall the conspicuous consumption of wealth attained through royal Macedonian benefaction, while the *choregos'* defence of Phocion's wife finds its echo in Phocion's refusal to end his wife's daily toil by means of royal wealth. The association between Macedonian royalty and the theatrical world, especially that of the tragic actor, is even less surprising when considering Plutarch's insistence upon Alexander's love of dramatic festivals and the simile of the Diadochoi as tragic

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<sup>479</sup> Until his end, where he fails to convert Philip III, Polysperchon's puppet, to his cause (*Phoc.* 33.9-10), Phocion's persuasiveness functions much better on Macedonian kings and regents (cf. *Phoc.* 30.8; 31.3) than on Athenians, where he is often depicted as *trying* rather than succeeding to sway them (cf. *Phoc.* 9.10; 16.3).

<sup>480</sup> Duff (1999a), 135 focuses on Phocion's philosophical attitude towards need and sufficiency.

actors upon the stage.<sup>481</sup> This scene in the theatre becomes a symbol for the opposition between the growing Macedonian influence in Athens, and the Athenian resistance to its presence through its civic values. The audience is not given a direct voice, and only the *choregos*, a rich representative, is given the power of direct speech, and yet the Athenians are shown to believe in their core values, opposing Macedonian excess. In the first third of the *Life* the Athenians assert their civic ideals and force the theatrical space to bow before their values. The next mention of the theatre in the *Life*, however, demonstrates that the *choregos*, who should uphold civic values, has let the Macedonians in, and Phocion's fears concerning the threat of royal euergetism to the political unity of Athens are justified.

The contrast between Phocion's poverty and Macedonian royal wealth is re-iterated in the same context of choregic patronage but with a very different display of values. As the *Life* draws to its conclusion, and Macedonia's involvement in Athenian affairs increases, Plutarch contrasts Phocion and Demades' attitudes towards money. He recounts how Antipater, the first regent of Alexander's successor Philip III, viewed his Athenian allies, remarking that Phocion refused all gifts while Demades could never be satisfied (*Pho.* 30. 4). Once again Phocion's poverty is stressed through his refusal of Macedonian royal euergetism. By comparison, and crucially for my argument, Demades not only consumes Macedonian wealth but parades it through his office as *choregos*.

καὶ μέντοι Φωκίων μὲν ὡς ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείκνυτο τὴν πενίαν, [ἐν] ἧ  
 τσαυτάκις Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσας καὶ βασιλεῦσι φίλοις  
 χρησάμενος ἐγκατεγήρασε, Δημάδης δὲ τῷ πλούτῳ καὶ **παρανομῶν**  
 ἐκαλλωπίζετο. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος Ἀθήνησι τότε μὴ **χορεύειν** ξένον ἢ  
 χιλίας ἀποτίνειν τὸν **χορηγόν**, ἅπαντας εἰσαγαγὼν ξένους **τοὺς**  
**χορεύοντας** ἑκατὸν ὄντας, ἅμα καὶ τὴν ζημίαν ἀνὰ χιλίας ὑπὲρ  
 ἑκάστου <συν>εἰσήνεγκεν **εἰς τὸ θέατρον**. Δημέα δὲ τῷ υἱῷ νύμφην  
 ἀγόμενος, “ἐμοῦ μὲν” εἶπεν “ὦ παῖ τὴν σὴν μητέρα γαμοῦντος οὐδ’ ὁ  
 γείτων ἦσθετο· τοῖς δὲ σοῖς γάμοις καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δυνάσται  
**συγχορηγοῦσιν.**”

And truly Phocion displayed as a virtue the poverty in which he grew old, despite having been many times general of the Athenians and having enjoyed friendship with kings, while Demades, even to the extent of

<sup>481</sup> See Ch. 2, 67-8.



breaking the law, displayed his wealth. For there was then an Athenian law that forbade foreigners from participating in a chorus, unless the *choregos* paid a penalty of a thousand *drachma*. And Demades led in a chorus of a hundred members, all of whom were foreigners, and at the same time brought into the theatre the penalty of a thousand [*drachma*] for each member. And bringing a wife to his son, Demades said “As for me, my son, not even the neighbour noticed my wedding to your mother, but kings and potentates fund yours”.

(*Phoc.* 30.6-7)

Plutarch contrasts the two Athenian orators through their respect for and participation in civic life. While Phocion has contributed to the welfare of Athens with serious and lasting public engagement, Demades has disregarded the laws (*παράνομος*) of his city to pursue his selfish love of wealth. I have already touched upon the importance which civic authority rooted in the law holds in Plutarch’s conception of *good* political action. The only authority worth having is that which derives from the legal system, not from one man’s desires.<sup>482</sup> The depiction of Demades’ selfish disdain for the Athenian legal system is in keeping with Plutarch’s depiction of the orator throughout the *Life*.

Demades (*Δημάδης ὁ ῥήτωρ*) opens the *Life* as the negative foil for Phocion’s virtue (*Phoc.* 1.1), and is immediately denounced as the “wreckage of state” (*ναυάγιον τῆς πόλεως*, *Phoc.* 1.3) that will lead Athens towards its destruction. Throughout the *Life*, Plutarch always follows his motions and advice by opposing them to Phocion’s more informed counsel (*Phoc.* 16.5; *Phoc.* 20.6; *Phoc.* 22.5). A few chapters prior to the passage I have quoted above, Demades is shown to be the worst of the Athenians. His conduct has earned him seven fines for illegal measures (*παράνομοι*) and the ultimate punishment of being denied his civic rights (*γεγονὼς ἄτιμος*), a motion which prevents him from speaking in an assembly (*ἐξείργεσθαι τοῦ λέγειν*, *Phoc.* 26.3). Demades, however, takes advantage of Antipater’s march on the city and the subsequent fleeing of Demosthenes and Hypereides, to gain immunity and the Macedonians’ good opinion (*Phoc.* 26.3). This depiction of Demades’ political alienation is doubly crucial to his appearance as *choregos*. It highlights the benefits which Demades acquires from Athens’ negotiations with Antipater, as he regains his civic standing once the city surrenders

<sup>482</sup> This theme is very important to the *Phocion* as I will discuss in the last section of this Chapter.

its political freedom to Macedonian intervention.<sup>483</sup> This benefit is extreme as Demades, who has been denied civic rights (γεγονὼς ἄτιμος), is now shown to participate in an institution which was supposed to bring great dignity (τιμὴ) to the *choregos*.<sup>484</sup> Yet his behaviour as *choregos* confirms the portrait which Plutarch has offered of the orator.

Unlike Melanthius, the previous *choregos* of the *Life*, who upheld Athenian public decency, Demades rejects the city's legal practices by inviting non-Athenians into his production. The exclusion of foreigners from civic life was a keystone of Athenian democracy, whose decision-making process was reserved to citizens. Although choruses were not part of the political system in its strict sense, they entertained a very narrow relationship with civic identity.<sup>485</sup> Much like Athenian assemblies, Wilson insists on the "civic purity" of the chorus partly preserved by the exclusion of foreigners from its participation.<sup>486</sup> Demades is not simply risking a heavy penalty, but, more importantly, he is disregarding a defining feature of Athenian civic life. As Wilson points out, Demades' fine is not the proof of a strong democratic power capable of punishing transgressors, but demonstrates the orator's disregard if not enjoyment of legal violation.<sup>487</sup> The denigration of Athenian civic identity is further emphasised by the power that makes possible Demades' renewed illegal action.

Plutarch heavily implies that Demades owes his wealth to Macedonian benefaction. The royal origins of Demades' wealth as *choregos* are underlined by his acknowledgement of kings and potentates as sponsors (συγχρορηγεῖν) for his son's wedding, just as he sponsored his foreign chorus. The association of the *choregos* with kingship, and especially with the wealth of royalty, contrasts with Melanthius' own behaviour during his office as sponsor. Once again it is the theatre (εἰς τὸ θέατρον) which becomes the *locus* for the division between Athenian civic welfare and royal excess. While Melanthius stood as an opposing force to the

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<sup>483</sup> Mossé (1997), 13-4, on the difficult chronology of the *Phocion*. She notes, however, that Plutarch respects a chronological narrative from *Phoc.* 22 until the end of the *Life*.

<sup>484</sup> Wilson (2000), 120 on honour at the centre of the office of *choregos*.

<sup>485</sup> See Calame (1977), with a specific focus on young women in choruses and Swift (2010), 2-3 on choruses as integral to civic life, performed well beyond the realm of tragedies. They formed an important part of Greek civic education, attested by Plutarch in different contexts, from Sparta (cf. *Ages.* 21.3) to Athens (cf. *Arist.* 4-6).

<sup>486</sup> Wilson (2000), 150.

<sup>487</sup> Wilson (2000), 168.

conspicuous consumption of wealth, symbolised by the tragedian's conception of royalty, it is now the *choregos* who encourages an obscene display of riches made possible by Macedonian royal euergetism.

The choregic action at *Phoc.* 30.6-7 ominously echoes that of *Phoc.* 19.2-3. Both these passages illustrate Phocion's virtue in comparison with the misbehaviour of theatrical officials. Initially Phocion's wife, whose frugality reflects her husband's poverty, is upheld as the standard of virtue against the self-aggrandizing suggestions of a tragedian, but it is Phocion himself that stands as an example of simplicity in the face of Demades' mercenary exhibition. These passages, however, are not simply illustrations of Phocion's superiority. Although they depict two Athenian *choregoi* in action, the political context in which they execute their office reflects their moral intentions as citizens. Melanthius exercises his office during Athens' self-confident respect for its institutions, shown in the crowd's support of the *choregos*' defence of civic morality. There is just a hint of civic unease, symbolised by the tragedian, whose corruption occurs through his conception of his regal *persona*. This reflects Athens' relationship to Macedon: while Plutarch has mentioned Alexander in the preceding chapters (*Phoc.* 17-18), his presence has been minimised and regulated by Phocion's council. Demades, however, operates in a world where Athens has been deserted by its democratic figures, such as Demosthenes, and is now having to contend with the Macedonian presence. Athenian values are no longer upheld, nor is the tumultuous voice of Athenians heard in response to Demades' complete disregard for the *polis*' values. The denigration of Athenian institutions, as foreigners are invited into civic activities by demagogues, with the support of the Macedonians, will reach its paroxysm during Phocion's trial.

### **III. Condemned in the Theatre**

Plutarch presents Phocion's demise as caused both by the machinations of Polysperchon and the decline of peace within Athens itself. In order to dispose of Athens as he wishes, Polysperchon understands that he must remove Phocion from

his position of authority. Calculating that Phocion would be banished if the exiled and disenfranchised citizens returned, he reintroduces them into the city (*Phoc.* 32.2). They, in turn, disturb the peace and bring chaos to Athens (*Phoc.* 33.2). Meanwhile, Nicanor, the unpopular Macedonian general in charge of the garrison at Munychia, fearing for his safety amidst the popular unrest, seeks Phocion's support, which is granted (*Phoc.* 32.4). When Nicanor understands his peril he flees with designs to punish the city (*Phoc.* 32.5). Phocion is then rebuked by the city for letting a dangerous man flee, but he defends his purpose by professing his virtue in trusting a potentially innocent man (*Phoc.* 32.6). And yet, Plutarch holds the city to be right: Phocion's confidence in Nicanor was too strong and led him to preserve his virtue at the price of protecting the state (*Phoc.* 32.7). Amidst the civil chaos encouraged by Polysperchon, Hagnonides, an Athenian orator, denounces Phocion as a traitor (*Phoc.* 33.4). Phocion, in a moment of complete oversight, seeks out Polysperchon for justice (*Phoc.* 33.5). His appeal fails (*Phoc.* 33.7-9) and he and his friends are subsequently put on trial in the Theatre of Dionysus.

καὶ προσῆν τὸ σχῆμα τῆ κομίδῃ λυπηρόν, ἐφ' ἀμάξαις κομίζομένων αὐτῶν διὰ τοῦ Κεραιμικοῦ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτοὺς προσαγαγὼν ὁ Κλείτος συνείχεν, ἄχρι οὐ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπλήρωσαν οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ δούλον, οὐ ξένον, οὐκ ἄτιμον ἀποκρίναντες, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἀναπεπταμένον τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὸ θέατρον παρασχόντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ τ' ἐπιστολῇ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀνεγνώσθη, λέγοντος αὐτῷ μὲν ἐγνώσθαι προδότας γεγονέναι τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἐκείνοις δὲ διδόναι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐλευθέροις τε δὴ καὶ αὐτονόμοις οὖσι, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ὁ Κλείτος εἰσήγαγεν, οἱ μὲν βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ὀφθέντος τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐνεκαλύψαντο καὶ κάτω κύψαντες ἐδάκρυον, εἷς δ' ἀναστὰς ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὅτι, τηλικαύτην κρίσιν ἐγκεχειρικὸς τῷ δήμῳ τοῦ βασιλέως, καλῶς ἔχει τοὺς δούλους καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας. οὐκ ἀνασχομένων δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ἀνακραγόντων βάλλειν τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς καὶ μισοδήμους, ἄλλος μὲν οὐδεὶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν, αὐτὸς δὲ χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις ἔξακουσθεῖς, “πότερον” εἶπεν “ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως ἀποκτεῖναι βούλεσθ' ἡμᾶς;” ἀποκριναμένων δὲ τινῶν ὅτι δικαίως, “καὶ τοῦτ'” ἔφη “πῶς γνώσεσθε μὴ ἀκούσαντες;” ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἤκουον, ἐγγυτέρω προσελθὼν, “ἐγὼ μὲν” εἶπεν “ἀδικεῖν ὁμολογῶ, καὶ θανάτου τιμῶμαι τὰ πεπολιτευμέν' ἐμαυτῷ· τούτους δ' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ τί ἀποκτενεῖτε μηδὲν ἀδικούντας;” ἀποκριναμένων δὲ πολλῶν “ὅτι σοὶ φίλοι εἰσίν,” ὁ μὲν Φωκίων ἀποστὰς ἡσυχίαν ἤγεν, ὁ δ' Ἀγνωνίδης ψήφισμα γεγραμμένον ἔχων ἀνέγνω, καθ' ὃ τὸν δῆμον

ἔδει χειροτονεῖν περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν εἰ δοκοῦσιν ἀδικεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἀνδρας ἂν καταχειροτονηθῶσιν ἀποθνήσκειν.

The manner in which they were conveyed was distressing, as they were carried away by carriage through the Cerameicus to the theatre. There Cleitus brought them and held them until the archons filled up the assembly to the utmost, excluding neither slaves, nor foreigners, nor disenfranchised, but allowing the *bēma* and the theatre to be opened up to all men and women. After a letter from the king had been read, in which he said that he considered these men to be traitors and that he offered the right to judge, since they were free and autonomous, Cleitus brought forth those men. The most excellent amongst the citizens, on seeing Phocion, veiled their faces, bent down low and wept. One rose up and had the courage to say that since the king had entrusted the people with such a decision, it was proper for the slaves and foreigners to depart from the assembly. The multitude, unable to hold back, cried out for them to eject the oligarchs and the haters of democracy, and no one else attempted to speak on behalf of Phocion but he himself, and with difficulty and scarcely audible, he said “do you wish to condemn us to death with or without justice?” and when some answered that they should try him with justice, he spoke “and how will you form a judgement if you cannot hear me?” But they did not want to hear him more and drawing closer he said “ I confess, I have done wrong, and I condemn myself to death for my political actions. Men of Athens, however, these men are not guilty so why put them to death?” Many replied “because they are your friends”, upon which Phocion withdrew and was silent. But Hagnonides read a prepared edict according to which it was necessary for the people to vote by show of hand and if they thought those men had committed wrongdoing then to sentence them to death.

(*Phoc.* 34.3-9)

Following this account, scholars have assumed that Phocion was indeed put on trial in the theatre at Athens in 318 BC.<sup>488</sup> Besides Plutarch, the two extant sources available to us are Diodorus Siculus (Diod. 18.66.4-6) and Nepos (Nep. *Phoc.* 4), neither of whom mention the theatre as the *locus* for Phocion’s trial.<sup>489</sup> Nepos actually names the prison in which Phocion is kept as the place for his future trial

<sup>488</sup> Gehrke (1976), 119 and Bayliss (2011), 147 both accept the theatre as the location for Phocion’s trial. Mossé (1998), 81, who traces Phocion’s death using Plutarch’s account, does not, however, mention the theatre as the location of the assembly.

<sup>489</sup> Mossé (1998), 82 for a comparison between Plutarch’s and Diodorus’ account of the legal procedures leading to Phocion’s trial. Cf. Tritle (1988), 4-7 = (1992), 4261-6 on the sources of Nepos’ biography of Phocion. Both Tritle (1988), 6 = (1992), 4263 and Lamberton (2003), 9 note Nepos’ more hostile depiction of Phocion’s character. See Geiger (1988) for an analysis of Plutarch’s reliance on Nepos.

(Nep. *Phoc.* 3.4).<sup>490</sup> Diodorus foregoes any mention of location. This could be imputed to the increasing use of the theatre in the fourth century BC as a venue for assemblies in Athens, which although customarily held on the Pnyx, sometimes took place in the theatre of Dionysus (cf. ἐν Διονύσου ἐκκλησίαι, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 223 b5; ἐκκλησία ἐν Διονύσου, *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 780 4), a practice that continued during the Hellenistic period.<sup>491</sup> While the theatre might have appeared too self-evident or too unimportant to be mentioned by Diodorus, Plutarch twice insists on the theatre as the setting for the trial (πρὸς τὸ θέατρον and καὶ τὸ θέατρον, *Phoc.* 34.3). Although Plutarch chose to emphasise the dramatic location of Phocion's trial, the scene is not straightforwardly theatrical.

Compared to Demetrius Poliorcetes' entrance into the same theatre some thirty years later in 286 BC, Phocion's trial lacks the dramatic imagery and systematic use of specific parts of the theatrical space which define *Demetr.* 34.<sup>492</sup> Instead Plutarch resorts to legal and political terminology. Where Demetrius enters the stage through the upper doors of the stage (διὰ τῶν ἄνω παρόδων), following the usual protocol of tragic actors appearing before their audiences, Phocion's presentation before his judges follows the legal protocol of a trial. His appearance before them is expressed in legal terms (προσάγειν), a point reinforced by the insistence on the political nature of the trial as an assembly (ἐκκλησία) summoned by archons (οἱ ἄρχοντες).<sup>493</sup> Where Demetrius makes full use of the performative space of the theatre as the scene focuses on the stage (σκηνή), in the *Phocion* this performative aspect is transposed from the dramatic into the political space through the juxtaposition of the theatre with the βῆμα, the podium upon which political speakers performed during assemblies and trials. The σκηνή designates part of the structure of a theatre and therefore harks back to a physical reality, and the βῆμα often refers through metonymy to the act of performing speeches, rather than to a

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<sup>490</sup> *Hic ab Agnone accusatus, quod Piraeum Nicanori prodidisset, ex consilii sententia in custodiam coniectus Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret.*

<sup>491</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* also mentions the Theatre of Dionysus as a location for assemblies hosting the military performances of young men (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 42.4), although, as Rhodes (1993), 507 points out, the theatre may have been chosen for practical reasons as the theatre would have been more appropriate than the Pnyx to host such manoeuvres. See Hansen (1983), 3 on the use of the Theatre of Dionysus for assemblies in Hellenistic times.

<sup>492</sup> Jones (1966), 68, in his analysis of the chronology of Plutarch's works, places the *Phocion* and the *Demetrius* in the same group, if not written at the same time, at least published together.

<sup>493</sup> See Harrison (1971), 13 on the involvement of the Archons in the judicial process.

platform made physically manifest (cf. *Per.* 8.6; *Tim.* 22.6; *Nic.* 5.6).<sup>494</sup> The importance of the theatre, and its effect on the trial, cannot be imputed to the behaviour of an individual or a group conducting themselves as theatrical performers.<sup>495</sup> And yet the theatre is a fundamental feature of this scene.

In order to understand the importance of the theatre space it is crucial to underline the themes which Plutarch highlights through Phocion's trial. This moment explores the collapse of Athenian democratic *values* at the end of the fourth century BC. I italicise the term to draw attention to Plutarch's emphasis on the ideals, rather than the institutions, of Athenian democracy. Plutarch does not concentrate on the legal procedures which are illegally omitted or changed to allow for Phocion's condemnation, but rather focuses on the Athenian values which are violated at the ultimate cost.<sup>496</sup> This is achieved by dividing the crowd which attends Phocion's trial into two groups. To the "most excellent amongst the citizens" (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν), who stand for Athenian democratic ideals, Plutarch opposes the "many" (οἱ πολλοί) composed of slaves (δοῦλοι), foreigners (ξένοι), disenfranchised (ἄτιμοι) and even women (πάσαι), in other words all those legally excluded from politics in democratic Athens. This is unique to Plutarch. Diodorus insists upon the return of exiles who had supported Athens' independence and democracy against Phocion's collaboration with the Macedonians (Diod. 18.66.4-6) as Phocion's major opposition. The factions are divided between Phocion and his political opponents, not between the best of the citizens, and anyone who does not qualify. Nepos only speaks of the multitude (Nep. *Phoc.* 4.1), and, like Diodorus,

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<sup>494</sup> The βῆμα can refer to a physical place (*Pel.* 17.3), especially in the Roman context where it indicates the Rostra (cf. *Cam.* 7.4).

<sup>495</sup> In this sense my interpretation of Plutarch's trial contradicts Hall (2006), 351-392, whose thesis rests on a historical reading of ancient law courts as a type of drama, where the βῆμα becomes a σκηνή, the orator an actor attempting to persuade through prepared speech and gestures the assembly which stands for the spectators, where the narrative of a speaker acted like the messenger speech of tragedy and where clothing or the display of battle scars became "costumes" to enhance the performance. Plutarch only sees similarities between the two if the law courts have gone terribly wrong and no longer possess the institutional authority to dispense justice.

<sup>496</sup> Plutarch's description of Phocion's trial foregoes any mention of the usual court procedures: no precise charges are laid against Phocion, neither accuser nor accused speak to defend their position, and no witnesses are summoned to support either cause. Todd (1993), 128 on the usual procedures of an Athenian jurisdictional assembly. Harris (2013), 242 demonstrates that ballots were usually cast to decide the trial's outcome, although Harrison (1971), 58 points that that some cases seem to have been settled by show of hands. Bayliss (2011), 146 also notices the omission of specific charges levelled at Phocion, which he interprets as deliberate: by not mentioning Phocion's potential crime, Plutarch controls the reader's perception of his innocence.

insists on Phocion's opposition to the people (*aduersus populi*) as the incentive for the crowd's disapproval (Nep. *Phoc.* 4.1).<sup>497</sup>

Plutarch's account could, with some reason, be charged with drawing upon oligarchic traditions to discredit what had originally been a legitimate democratic assembly. Scholars have indeed pointed to both Plutarch's severe treatment of the crowd and the historical Phocion's affiliation with pro-oligarchic and anti-democratic movements of his time.<sup>498</sup> I would like to suggest that Plutarch is more "subtle".<sup>499</sup> The division does indeed seem oligarchic: the very best who are only composed of a few members oppose the very worst formed by the multitude. Plutarch echoes, however, Athenian democratic values upheld by the historical orators of the classical period, rather than oligarchic notions, to depict the behaviour and ideals of the βέλτιστοι. By opposition, he draws on Plato's depiction of "theatrocracy" in the *Laws* to depict the πολλοί.<sup>500</sup>

The βέλτιστοι are first marked by their sympathy for Phocion's plight, which Plutarch uses to distinguish them from the rest of the crowd. It is upon seeing (ὄρᾶν) Phocion enter into the theatre that their emotional response is triggered as they veil themselves (ἐγκαλύπτειν), bow low (κάτω κύπτειν), and shed tears (δακρῦειν). Since Plutarch explicitly parallels Phocion with Socrates (*Phoc.* 38. 2), it is tempting to see the βέλτιστοι's reaction as an allusion to Phaedo's grief, unable

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<sup>497</sup> Slaves are mentioned but as those who bury Phocion, not as part of the assembly (Nep. *Phoc.* 4.4).

<sup>498</sup> See Green (1990), 41 and O'Sullivan (1997), 134 on Phocion's presumed oligarchic affiliations. Green (1990), 43 challenges the presence of slaves, exiles, foreigners and women at Phocion's trial as inaccurate, arguing that this was the result of an "oligarchic canard" rather than historical fact. This claim is supported by Bayliss (2011), 148 n. 32. Bayliss (2011), 132 even questions Phocion's anti-democratic views. O'Sullivan (1997), 150-2 argues that Demetrius of Phalerum created a tradition of rewriting late fourth-century impiety trials by depicting the Athenians as hostile to intellectual and philosophical political figures, a tradition which is followed by Plutarch. Tritle (1988), 18-35 = (1992), 4277-95 and Bearzot (1993), 100-42 for a discussion of Plutarch's sources for the *Phocion* in general. Duff (1999a), 131 argues that Plutarch developed his interpretation of a tradition that viewed Phocion's anti-democratic policies as "moderate". By rightly pointing out the contradictions between the *Phocion* and the *Demosthenes*, set practically within the same time frame, Duff (1999a), 133 makes a good case for Plutarch's awareness of more anti-Phocion sources available to him.

<sup>499</sup> Pelling (1988), 207 on Plutarch's depiction of Antony's *daimon*. Duff (1999a), 36 also refers to Plutarch as a subtle writer.

<sup>500</sup> Pelling (2002), 209 on the opposition between *boule* and the *demos* as an important feature of Plutarch's understanding of Roman history and politics. Saïd (2002), 8-13 for a survey of the way in which Plutarch depicts the character of the Greek *demos*.



to contain his tears, before Socrates' suicide (Pl. *Phd.* 117c-d).<sup>501</sup> The significant linguistic similarities between these two passages strongly suggest Plutarch's deliberate parallel of Plato. It is the sight of the main figure's suffering (ὄρην in Plutarch / ἐσθίειν in Plato) which in both cases occasions the shedding of tears (δακρῦειν) and the veiling of the witnesses (ἐγκαλύπτειν). Yet where Socrates dismisses the crying of his friends as womanish behaviour (Pl. *Phd.* 117d), Plutarch does not condemn this emotional outburst since it allows the reader to perceive their worth compared with that of the mob.

Cairns has demonstrated how Phaedo's gesture of veiling reveals his sense of shame at his emotional outburst.<sup>502</sup> Shame is also instrumental to the βέλτιστοι's veiling, but rather than resulting from a sense of indecency at their own feelings, it marks their recognition of the shameful actions of the πολλοί. Athenian collective shame felt at unlawful conduct is a theme present throughout fourth-century oratory. Demosthenes, for instance, played with this idea in more than one speech, by invoking the shame (αἰσχύνη) which the Athenians should feel at the passing of unlawful measures (Dem. 20.28; 134) or by defending a decree on the grounds that it has brought no dishonour to the city (αἰσχύνη τῇ πόλει, Dem. 18.85).<sup>503</sup> By veiling themselves, the βέλτιστοι display their deep attachment to Athens and their

<sup>501</sup> ὡς δὲ εἶδομεν πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἑμαυτὸν οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἴου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην (Pl. *Phd.* 117c-d). Phocion's identity as a second Socrates has already been noted in modern scholarship. Tritle (1988), 30-1 sees it as inherited from the Peripatetic tradition of Phocion's death. Hershbell (1988), 380 mentions Phocion re-cast as Socrates in the eyes of the Greeks in his study of Socrates in Plutarch; Swain (1990a), 200 regards Phocion as a less complex model of the moral politician than Cato the Younger, generally able to sway the *demos* although failing in his final moment; Duff (1999a), 143-144 sees 'the Socratic paradigm' as a means to create parallels between Phocion and his Roman counterpart Cato the Younger and to highlight the moral tension between the good life but unjust death of both protagonists; Todd (2000), 32 questions the veracity of Phocion's death by hemlock as a possible invention by Plutarch to accentuate the similarities between Phocion and Socrates; Pelling (2005a), 115 reads Phocion's philosophical drive as a brave attempt but ultimately a misunderstanding of the Socratic way of life. Beck (2014b), 471-2, exploring "the Socratic paradigm" in Plutarch, sums up the different aspects in which Phocion resembles Socrates but focuses primarily on Cato the Younger. Several scholars have noted the importance of the *Phaedo*: Trapp (1999), 487-90 parallels with precise references Plato's account of Socrates' death with its corresponding moments in Plutarch's narrative of Phocion's demise. Do Céu Fialho (2010), 202 analyses this Socratic model throughout the *Phocion* as a whole, arguing for the importance of the *Phaedo* as Plutarch's point of reference for this model; she does not discuss *Phoc.* 34. 3, although she addresses the similarities between Phocion's calmness during his trial and that of Socrates during his.

<sup>502</sup> Cairns (2009), 48.

<sup>503</sup> Canevaro (2016), 201; 397 on Demosthenes' canny use of shame in the *Against Leptines* to denounce laws that contradict the *ethos* of the city.

anguish at her perversion by feeling shame at the behaviour of those who now take political action.

The conduct of the βέλτιστοι mark them as ideal citizens, upholding the values of Athenian democracy. Despite the ferocity of the assembly, one of these excellent citizens has the daring (τολμᾶν) to exercise frank speech.<sup>504</sup> The courage to speak with frankness (παρρησία) before an assembly is claimed by orators in their self-promoting construction of manly virtue.<sup>505</sup> Demosthenes, for instance, defined the “active citizen” as the brave speaker capable of frank speech (παρρησία), who prioritises the welfare of the city above the affection of the *demos* (Dem. 8.68-70).<sup>506</sup> Plutarch’s Phocion often practices παρρησία (cf. *Phoc.* 8.2; 8.3; 9.4), the unflinching use of which serves to highlight his rigorous moral attitudes towards his political office. Not only does this brave individual demonstrate one of the central virtues of the Classical Athenian orator, but his frank speech is also directed at denouncing and rectifying the illegitimacy of this judicial court. By demanding that the decision be confined to the people (δῆμος), rather than the slaves and foreigners present in the audience, he recalls the basic principle of Athenian democracy and acts as the conscience of the assembly. Plutarch’s βέλτιστοι and the daring citizen act and think according to the values set forth by the traditional Athenian democratic sources of the orators. This contrasts sharply with Plutarch’s depiction of the mob.

I contend that Plutarch is drawing on Platonic depiction of the Athenian crowd as described in the *Laws*, and in particular as a theatrical crowd obsessed by pleasure rather than lawlessness.<sup>507</sup> Plato levels this criticism through the mouth of the Athenian stranger who describes the deterioration and corruption of his city through an analysis of musical trends in Athens. He sets up a divide between “good” and “bad” music. The former concerns established genres of music, that are well defined and regulated (*Leg.* 700b7-c3) and which promote orderly control (τεταγμένως (...))

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<sup>504</sup> The entry of βέλτιστοι to the people is a feature of the *Life* as they have previously persuaded the people to entrust the city to Phocion (*Phoc.* 16.4).

<sup>505</sup> Balot (2004) and Balot (2007) on manly virtue and the courage to perform παρρησία.

<sup>506</sup> Balot (2004), 247 for a discussion of this passage and the attitude it reveals towards courage and παρρησία.

<sup>507</sup> Lamberton (2003), 11 interprets the theatrical quality of this narrative as stemming from the melodramatic and carnivalesque conduct of the unruly mob. I would like to push this further and suggest that the anarchic depiction of the *polloi* follows the tradition of Plato’s teatrocracy.

ἄρχεσθαι, *Leg.* 700d1). The latter refers to the rise of a new style that not only prized the imitation of instruments (αὐλωδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρωδίαις μιμούμενοι), but more importantly mixed (κεραννύντες) the established genres (πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες) and by doing so engendered lawlessness (Pl. *Leg.* 700d7-8).<sup>508</sup> While Plato's approach to music is philosophical and psychological, his criticism is, in fact, heavily politicised.<sup>509</sup>

The safeguard of “good music” is guaranteed by an authority (ὁ δὲ κύριος, *Leg.* 700c1) concerned with education (περὶ παιδείου, *Leg.* 700c5) who judges (δικάσαι, *Leg.* 700c2) the performance in silence (μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ τέλους, *Leg.* 700c6) and ensures its absolute control over the crowd (*Leg.* 700c6-7). By contrast, it is poets who promote “bad” music, as their concern is pleasure (ἡδονή), which allows lawlessness (παρανομία) in an audience (*Leg.* 700e2-5) free to express its judgment without knowledge of good and bad (καλός καὶ μή, *Leg.* 701a2). This, Plato names a theatocracy (θεατροκρατία), that is, the overrule of aristocracy in music (ἀντὶ ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν αὐτῇ) by the taste of theatre audiences (τὰ θέατρα), who by becoming noisy rather than silent (ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντα), showed their preference for ‘bad’ music (Pl. *Leg.* 701a1-3). The separation between aristocracy and theatre-goers is politicised further with the Athenian stranger's conclusion that this new genre of music has brought about a form of anarchy, as it incites a universal (ἢ πάντων (...) δόξα) disregard for law (παρανομία, *Leg.* 701a5-7) which encourages men to dismiss the opinion of those better than them (ἢ τοῦ βελτίονος δόξαν μὴ φοβείσθαι, *Leg.* 701a8-b1). Plato will echo this later in the *Laws*, once again through the mouth of the Athenian stranger, in a judicial context. He describes the “mean and dumb” courts of justice (δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα), which cannot judge in silence (μηδὲ σιγῶντα) but are full of tumult (ἀλλὰ θορύβου μεστά), which resemble more theatre-goers (καθάπερ θέατρα) than participants in a judicial court (*Leg.* 876b3). They become the judges who either loudly praise (ἐπαινεῖν) or censure (ψέγειν) each of the orators in turn (τῶν

<sup>508</sup> See Ch. 1, II.2, 54-5.

<sup>509</sup> See Folch (2013), 344 on theatocracy and the parallels which Plato perceives in the *Laws* between a city's musical practices and political constitution.

ῥητόρων ἐκάτερος, *Leg.* 876b4). The Athenian concludes that this judicial behaviour threatens the stability of the state (*Leg.* 876b6-7).<sup>510</sup>

Plutarch's description of Phocion's trial does not, of course, stem from a discourse on musical genres. And yet, Plutarch has already used a musical metaphor to describe the most efficient form of governing when faced with unstable times. Plutarch introduces the *Phocion* by arguing that the statesman should seek a balance between pleasing the crowd (διδόναι τὸ πρὸς χάριν), who in turn will show itself docile (πολλὰ πράως καὶ χρησίμως ὑπουργεῖν), and then demanding profitable power (τὸ συμφέρον ἐπιστάσια, *Phoc.* 2.8). Plutarch equates this blending between yielding to the people's demands and firm guidance with the musical mixture of all rhythms and harmonies (ἢ πάντων μὲν ῥυθμῶν, πασῶν δὲ ἁρμονιῶν μουσικωτάτη κράσις, *Phoc.* 2.9).<sup>511</sup> Plutarch is here disagreeing with Plato.<sup>512</sup> Although Plato's Athenian stranger mourns the loss of the days where the authorities would control the audience with absolute rigour – he mentions the use of the correctional rod – at *Phoc.* 2.8-9 Plutarch judges an authoritative form of governing as despotic (δεσποτικῶς). His view is to allow for a balance between the authoritative forms of government, symbolised by Plato's "good" music, and for the more popular, crowd-pleasing politics, represented by Plato's "bad" music. The balance between the two preserves the crowd from overruling its political body. In other words, Phocion should have yielded to the demands of the Athenians when dealing with Nicanor and in doing so would have protected himself and the State. It is by not allowing for a balance between authority and popular measures that a statesman allows Plato's theatrocracy to prevail.

There are remarkable similarities between Plato's theatrocracy and theatre-like courts and Plutarch's πολλοί. While Plato uses the theatre to illustrate the type of conduct his terrible assemblies display, Plutarch transforms the comparison into a reality. Plutarch's assembly at Phocion's court of justice are not *like* theatre-goers,

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<sup>510</sup> See Monoson (2000), 226-32 on Plato's ambiguous use of theatrical spectatorship in the *Laws*.

<sup>511</sup> Duff (1999a), 146 reads this as part of a wider theme in the *Phocion* where the subject is depicted repeatedly as a combination of 'hard' and 'soft' qualities with the exception of his preservation of Nicanor where his moderation is not upheld.

<sup>512</sup> Nikolaidis (1999), 412-3 has demonstrated how Plutarch was a careful Platonist and did not blindly adopt the ideas of Plato and his successors; Duff (2004), 276-8 argues that Plutarch's introduction of the *Demetrius-Antony* is constructed to demonstrate his disagreement with Plato's use of negative examples in moral writings.

but are quite literally sitting and standing in the theatre.<sup>513</sup> The comparison goes deeper. Plutarch plays with the relationship which Plato draws between the level of noise produced by an assembly and its inability to perform justice. Where Plato's mob utter cries (βοαί) and his court is filled with tumult (θορύβου μεστά), as members of Plutarch's assembly raises their voices in shouts (ἀνακραγεῖν), the force of which is fully felt as this noisy outburst stems from the mob's inability to contain itself (ἀνέχεσθαι). Just as in Plato a failure to listen in silence leads to unlawful measures (παρανομία) and the incapacity to judge silently disrupts the legal system, so does the tumultuous sound created by Plutarch's πολλοί. It is precisely because the assembly produces so much noise that Phocion can barely be heard (χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις ἔξακουέσθαι).<sup>514</sup> Plutarch is justified in labouring this point. Not only was the defender entitled to plead his case through oratory, but this also constituted a fundamental aspect of the Athenian democratic legal system.<sup>515</sup> By denying the defender a hearing, the mob impedes Phocion from practising a right that would guarantee him a just trial.

The parallel between Plato's theatrocracy and Plutarch's πολλοί extends to their similar attitude towards the opinion of their superiors. Plato's assembly no longer fears the opinion of those better (ἢ τοῦ βελτίονος δόξα) but impose their own uninformed judgment. Similarly, Plutarch's mob disregards the statement of the βέλτιστοι. They dismiss the opinion of the brave citizen who speaks up for democracy, and wilfully misunderstand the values which the man sets before them. They decry as oligarchic and anti-democratic the exclusive right of citizen political participation in Athens. This criticism, which had become standard in the fourth

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<sup>513</sup> The presence of women, slaves and foreigners at the assembly could refer to the actual theatre crowd which may have included members of the *polis* that were not considered male voting citizens, as opposed to assemblies that were strictly reserved for Athenian men. Since the evidence for the presence of women and slaves is not conclusive – foreigners were present in the audience of the Great Dionysia (cf. Goldhill (1997), 60) – it is perhaps safer to read their presence here as a means to emphasise the unlawfulness of the trial.

<sup>514</sup> Diodorus' mob is also incredibly noisy to the point of not letting the speakers defend themselves. Phocion attempts it twice and is impeded on both occasions (Diod. 18.66.5-6); yet there is no sense in Diodorus of the mob rejecting sound advice or their betters' judgement. Rather, it is the anger of a crowd completely discontented with the political action of the accused.

<sup>515</sup> Free speech in ancient democracy is covered by two ideals: ἰσηγορία, the equal chance for every citizen to speak at assemblies, and παρρησία, the opportunity to speak one's mind frankly: Saxonhouse (2005), 94 for a good summation of both terms. Balot (2004), 236 on the ideological importance of free speech for orators. Ober (1993), 482 for an alternative perspective on free speech as the principal tool through which the *demos* could participate in politics.

century when a motion was unpopular, reveals the mob's inability to understand properly the fundamental values of their city. This is echoed by their dismissal of Phocion's demand for justice, which they refuse to listen to out of sheer disinclination rather than out of principle or reason. Just like the assembly of Plato's theatrocracy, the πολλοί can no longer discriminate between good or bad.<sup>516</sup> This contrasts with both Diodorus' and Nepos' accounts. They insist upon the political dissatisfaction of the Athenians at Phocion's anti-democratic measures as the reason for his lack of hearing. These assemblies are politically angry, but Plutarch's mob is beyond reason.

Phocion's demise naturally parallels that of Athens as it signals the end of a certain Athens, one which valued honest speech, democratic participation and a reflective outlook.<sup>517</sup> Phocion's last appearance in the theatre is a far cry from his calm reflections behind the stage. He is no longer the orator who spoke with ease, confident to let his own style of rhetoric guide the Athenians, nor is he the sharp decision-maker which the narrative has portrayed him to be. He is an almost passive figure, targeted by a tumultuous assembly. Phocion's shift from orator to powerless defender does not stand on its own. Athenian civic values have also shifted dramatically. From the anticipation of Phocion's appearance in the theatre to their support of their *choregos* as he defended public morality, the Athenians have morphed into a force of such physical and intellectual violence that they have forgotten their values. The women mentioned in the theatre and the foreigners included in the chorus have transcended the theatrical space and infiltrated the political sphere. And yet the Athenians are not wholly responsible for the destruction of their values. While certain Macedonians facilitate Phocion's death, much of the corruption should be attributed to the Athenian demagogues who destroy the city with their counsel. It is Demades who first introduces foreigners into

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<sup>516</sup> Monoson (2000), 227 on Plato's theatrocracy as the citizens' inability to discriminate through intellectual discourse. The *demos*' inability to appreciate what is good and what is just is decried by 'the Old Oligarch' in his *Constitution of the Athenians*, as the people do not choose the good politicians believing that they will not be beneficial for them (Ath. Pol. 2.19); Balot (2006), 93 for his analysis of the Old Oligarch's views within the wider context of anti-democratic thought in the late fifth century.

<sup>517</sup> Leão (2010), 192 has also noted the correlation between Phocion's political demise and the degeneration of the *polis* and its ideals, and he contrasts Phocion's virtue with the general decadence of the assembly.

Athenian civic life and while Cleitus, a Macedonian representative, oversees Phocion's trial, it is the official magistrates (οἱ ἄρχοντες) who are responsible for allowing those barred from the assembly to enter the theatre and shout down the voice of democracy.

The recurrence of the theatre in the *Phocion* is remarkable when considering its relatively narrow use in the other *Lives* I have studied in this thesis. The *Agesilaus* is naturally the *Life* in which the theatrical space is exploited the least, with one mention at *Ages.* 29.2. This is unsurprising considering Agesilaus' distaste for dramatic productions. Perhaps more surprising is the infrequent mention of the theatre as a *locus* in the *Demetrius* in which it does not play a recurring role. Despite Demetrius' spectacular use of the theatre at Athens (*Demetr.* 34.4), Dionysus' sacred grounds are only explicitly mentioned once and not in relation to Demetrius but as the location for the death of his valiant subordinate Alcimus the Epeiroi (*Demetr.* 21.6). Rather than the θέατρον, it is the σκηνή which is important: Demetrius' identity as an actor requires an emphasis on the particular part of the theatre which relates to that specific profile. In the *Aemilius*, the theatre is the place in which the Romans hear of their victory over Perseus (*Aem.* 32.2) and later express their longing at Aemilius' absence from the political sphere after retiring (*Aem.* 39.3), but in both instances Aemilius is *not* in the theatre and keeps well away from it. Even when compared to Plutarch's more histrionic orators, the theatre holds relatively little importance. Demosthenes merely dreams of acting in the theatre (*Dem.* 29.2) and he is never physically shown to watch dramatic contests but, when compared to actors in the theatre, emerges morally the superior (*Dem.* 22.5), while the theatre in the *Cicero* is either associated with Aesopus' performance as Atreus (*Cic.* 5.5) or as a place of political disturbance with which Cicero is not associated (*Cic.* 13.2-4).

The theatre is most present in the *Antony*. While war with Octavian becomes inevitable, Antony and Cleopatra celebrate festivities on Samos (*Ant.* 56.8) and in Athens (*Ant.* 57.1) in the cities' respective theatres. This underlines Antony's and Cleopatra's inappropriate indulgences which lead to their inevitable failure in the war.<sup>518</sup> The festivities on Samos are contrasted with the suffering elicited by

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<sup>518</sup> Pelling (1988), 257-8.

Antony's conflict with Octavian around the Mediterranean (*Ant.* 56.8), while the celebrations in Athens are opposed to his divorce of Octavia and her expulsion from his Roman house (*Ant.* 57.4). The theatres confirm the repeated association, throughout the *Life*, of Antony's bad behaviour within the theatrical world and foreshadow Antony's inevitable demise.<sup>519</sup> While theatres are important to emphasise the frivolity of Antony's character, and to highlight his misplaced political allegiances, Plutarch is not blending the political dimension of the theatrical space to quite the degree he does when describing Demetrius' appearance in the theatre at Athens, or even when retelling Demosthenes' dream.

The theatre in the *Phocion* plays two interwoven roles. First, it acts as a *locus* for Plutarch to illustrate the evolving relationship between citizens and their institutions within Athenian politics. The deterioration of Athenian values is depicted in the narrative as the diminishing of the *demos*' civic convictions, illustrated by scenes in the theatre. Second, the worth of men is measured, not simply according to their respect for Athenian ideals, but also according to their relationship with the theatrical space. While Phocion, Melanthius the *choregos* and the very best of Athens reject the theatre and its excesses, the tragic actor, Demades, and the mob of Phocion's trial embrace histrionic action. The tragic actor and Demades, in their own way, support the superficiality of exuberant display enabled by the theatre, while the mob mistakes the theatre for the law courts, foregoing reason and behaving as the rowdy, participative spectators of Plato's teatrocracy.

This depiction of Athens is perhaps not surprising in the light of other works such as the *Themistocles* or the *Nicias*, in which the office of *choregos* is strongly associated with political leaders, and *On the Glory of the Athenians*, where Plutarch explores Athens' claims to fame. Within this theme, he examines Athens' affinity with tragedy and its performance (*De glor. Ath.* 348c). What benefit, he asks, did tragedies offer the city in comparison with the shrewdness of Themistocles which ensured the construction of its walls, the diligence of Pericles which produces the complex upon the Acropolis, the liberties given by Miltiades, and the supremacy

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<sup>519</sup> The theatre is last mentioned as Plutarch enounces the omens which predicted Antony's defeat at Actium, as the statue of Dionysus was ripped from the Athenian Acropolis and fell into the theatre (*Ant.* 60.4). To emphasis the theatrical connection, Plutarch aids the reader by reiterating the importance of Dionysus as one of Antony's avatars.



guaranteed by Cimon (*De glor. Ath.* 348c-d)? His answer is damning. Euripides, Sophocles or Aeschylus, for all their respective wisdom, eloquence and poetical magnificence, did not rid the city of its difficulties or lead it to success, but encouraged pleasure obtained through opulent displays of music, choruses and actors (very precisely described at *De glor. Ath.* 348d-349a).<sup>520</sup> In Plutarch's essay, theatre and the production of performances are important enough in Athens to warrant a comparison with the city's political and military practices. For example, he notes the difference in diet between the generals who offered simple, vegetarian dishes to their rowers, and the *choregoi* who gave their chorus members gourmet fish and meat (*De glor. Ath.* 349a). The depiction of the Athenians as theatre-loving is, therefore, not unique to the *Phocion*, but more work is needed to provide a coherent picture of this side of Athens throughout the whole of Plutarch's corpus.

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<sup>520</sup> Wilson (2000), 169 considers Plutarch's essay a sensitive analysis of the historical rise in prestige which the office of *choregos* attracted, and which led the losers to suffer abuse at the hands of the victor before the whole theatre.

## Conclusion

*La vie est un décor où il y a peu de praticables.*

Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, III.4.4

*Exit [Antigonus], pursued by a bear.*

William Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale*, III.3.1551

My two first choices of quotations may surprise, but combined together they encapsulate Plutarch's attitude towards histrionic political action. Hugo's "life is a theatre set in which there are but few entrances" is uttered by a young man, Grantaire, in a moment of drunken dejection. It expresses his consternation as to the limited possibilities offered to him by society. Although far from the misery of Grantaire's condition, Plutarch also understood the possibilities of life, especially political life, as a stage set, to be very limited. Plutarch finds odious politicians who transform the revered act of government into a performance aimed at entertaining or manipulating solely for their personal advancement and gratification without considering the welfare of the state. These are the actors and stage directors who discourage seriousness or truth in political action. Deceit, manipulation and lies are pardonable in politics if, and only if, they are carried out for the good of the realm. When life is a stage set, the moral possibilities are indeed limited and the consequences most often dire. Demades and Demetrius wreck the Athenians, the former by dragging civic values out of the theatre, the latter by inviting the theatre into politics. The Egyptians' inability to appreciate their public figures beyond the mere spectacular is a reflection of their leaders' self-centredness. Demosthenes, too late, preserves his moral compass by rejecting histrionic oratory and Cicero's attempts to act out his suffering do not save him from exile. By contrast, those politicians who choose to disengage themselves from the theatrical space preserve their ethical character. Phocion's refusal to engage with the structure of the theatre mirrors his political determination to preserve the welfare of the state and Agesilaus' distance from performance, in restricting the theatre to its purely spectacular function, preserves his person from mimetic art.

Although Plutarch's moral framework does not allow him to approve of theatrical politics, he understands the ambiguity and power of the theatre. His considering of the theatre as political is demonstrated by his equation of kings with

tragic actors, and the importance of civic values in the Athenian institution of the Great Dionysia. Even the Spartans, with their Platonic qualms, know how to use theatrical productions to assert their hegemony on their fellow Greeks. The blending of theatre into politics can also be dangerously effective. Demetrius' performance in the theatre wins over the adverse Athenians, Cleopatra and the Egyptians' construction of politics as spectacle alienate Antony from the Romans, and the Athenians' behaviour as a theatrical audience rather than as civic judges allow for their unlawful desires to prevail. Theatre is political, and politics when theatrical can be devastatingly successful.

The way in which a politician may be histrionic, however, is diverse. Shakespeare's humorous *mise en scène* contrasts with Hugo's pessimistic picture of life as a limited stage: if the moral scope is restricted, the action possesses boundless potential. Although (alas) Antigonus is never chased off the Plutarchan stage by a bear, no two kings, two people or two orators are histrionic in quite the same way. The nuances may sometimes appear subtle, but they reveal the angle from which Plutarch is exploring political dynamics. Cleopatra and Demetrius are both monarchs who rely on staging but not on the same aspects of stagecraft. Although Cleopatra encourages others to view public appearances as spectacles, she does not necessarily participate as an actor. This contrasts with Demetrius, whose political identity is encapsulated by the acting profession. This difference allows Plutarch to contemplate, on the one hand, the dynamics of Cleopatra's relationship to others, especially her people and foreign leaders and, on the other, Demetrius' focus on himself and his own performance. Similarly, both the Egyptians and the Athenians are associated with audiences, but with different stresses. The Egyptians view politics as a spectacle and the Athenians are a theatrical audience. This allows Plutarch to focus on the former group's gaze and reaction and therefore evaluation of political situations, and on the latter's behaviour in a political context, emphasising less the way in which they process politics and more their moral degradation as an assembly. If no two kings or no two peoples are histrionic in a similar manner, neither are two orators. Although both voice and costume were important to the actor, Demosthenes concentrates his performance on his voice and

Cicero on gestures and clothes. The moral position of the histrionic politician remains limited but the aspects through which a statesman can employ the theatrical are vast.

The analysis offered by this thesis is essential in order to appreciate the less studied aspects of Plutarch: his political and historical sensibility. Theatre, in this context, is only ever a starting point to explore, discuss and evaluate a political structure or moment. In turn, a political instance never stands in isolation. To understand Plutarch's conception of certain political acts is also to interpret his depiction of specific historical moments. It is not simply a type of monarchy which is questioned through Demetrius' histrionic conduct, but it is an entire historical period, that of Hellenistic kingship. The behaviour of the Athenians is more than a depiction of a perverted assembly: it illustrates Plutarch's notion of the end of Athenian democracy, the era covered most extensively in his biographies. My thesis allows for a better conception of Plutarch's political thought since, by looking at precise imagery, it broadens the understanding of his political metaphors and similes. It also unearths Plutarch's depiction of certain historical periods and moments. This contributes to our understanding of ancient historiography and helps the historian on his or her quest for truth.

This thesis has shown the breadth which characterises Plutarch's inclusion of histrionic politics. I have, by no means, covered all the ground. Athens' relationship to theatre and politics can be expanded to the other *Lives* (*Themistocles*, *Nicias*) and works of the *Moralia* (cf. *De glor. Ath. Praecepta*, 799d). The Roman *plebs* also deserves some attention as much of the dynamics between the people and the equestrians as well as the senators are played out in the theatre (cf. *Cic.*13.2-4; *Cato Ma.* 17.5) or described through the dynamics of performance (cf. *Pomp.* 48.7). Other peoples also display histrionic behaviour, from the Syracusians (cf. *Tim.* 31.1) and their leader Dionysius (cf. *Tim.* 14-15) to the Tarentians (cf. *Pyrrh.* 13.4-11) and yet do not rely on the same theatrical ploys. Beyond the straightforwardly political are the moments in which religious or military occasions are manipulated through means which recall theatrical displays for the advancement of one man or one group.

From Themistocles' manipulation of oracles, through "theatrical machinery" to persuade the reticent Athenians (cf. *Them.* 10.1.) to Sulla's humour before his troops (cf. *Sull.* 2.2; 13.3) and even the aggressive tactic used by the Pirates, which Pompey will defeat, to fool their victims by concealing their identity (cf. *Pomp.* 39). The scope is great.

Plutarch is not the only author who saw in certain political behaviours the shadow of the theatre. Dio Chrysostom's Alexandrians blur the lines between the assembly and the audience. In the context of the high Roman Empire, Shadi Bartsch has also identified the permeability between the audience as spectator and its tendency to become the performer.<sup>521</sup> Much of Bartsch's research focuses on the figure of the Emperor and his role as performer as well as his observation of his audience.<sup>522</sup> Politics as theatre may not be originally Plutarchan and if "the theatre is the only institution in the world which has been dying for four thousand years and has never succumbed", neither have histrionic politics.<sup>523</sup> But to reduce Plutarch to mere *Zeitgeist* would be misleading and would diminish the mastery of his own composition, and the delight which one derives from contemplating his theatrical men and women.

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<sup>521</sup> Bartsch (1994).

<sup>522</sup> See Bartsch (1994), 1-35 on Nero depicted both as a performer and as an observer of his audience in Imperial historiography.

<sup>523</sup> John Steinbeck, *Once There Was a War*, Essay 1.

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